Magnificent Delusions (31 page)

“It is preposterous to think that in an association with a great power like Russia the great power's interests will not prevail,” Bhutto said while commenting on Indian relations with the Soviet Union. But he did not see the paradox in his own suggestion of close defense bonds between Pakistan and the United States. If Soviet interests would prevail in that great power's ties with India, surely Pakistan could not expect that its interests would be paramount in an alliance with the United States.

Sulzberger described Bhutto's geopolitical view as foreseeing an “unending danger of Indian aggressive tendencies, fostered by Moscow.” Bhutto insisted that there was a need for China and the United States to work in concert in support of Pakistan. He said that he discovered sympathy for his idea of close Pakistani ties with China during his Beijing visit but that the Chinese were against the idea of formal pacts. Bhutto then expressed confidence that Nixon's “admirable statesmanship” would succeed in fostering a new US-Chinese relationship. This in turn would help realize his vision of a US-China concert to defend Pakistan.

Bhutto also spoke at length with Sulzberger about his desire to achieve profound social and political reform in Pakistan. He denounced Yahya as “a drunken, irresponsible, man” and compared him to “Ivan the terrible.” He promised to hold a national referendum on his reform program later that year and a second plebiscite on the new constitution he wanted the constituent assembly to draft. This document, he said, would put an end to any possibility that another “adventurer” could take power, because “after all we have had four dictatorships in 24 years.”
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Once Sulzberger published his interview, Pakistan assumed that Bhutto's wishes had America's blessings. Pakistan's tendency to see everything as part of some Byzantine intrigue was widespread. Pakistanis often saw reports in major US newspapers as trial balloons or orchestrated leaks managed by an American invisible hand. If the Americans had not liked Bhutto's proposal, they reasoned, it would not have received the coverage it did in the United States. Sober warned Washington: “We are now in a somewhat euphoric stage in US-Pak relations.” He voiced his conviction that “unwarranted expectations” were being built up in some quarters in Pakistan.
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As things turned out, the referendums Bhutto promised did not materialize. A few years later his forecast that a strong constitution would prevent another military coup also proved wrong. But after publicly stating his geopolitical views Bhutto moved energetically to try to create the US-China-Pakistan coalition to contain India. He projected India as “an enemy of Islam and Muslims” and, by extension, “an inveterate foe of Pakistan, determined to dismember it.”
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To Pakistanis, Bhutto presented himself as “a fearless and capable thwarter of India's designs,” and he described his domestic adversaries as appeasers or agents of India. Although Pakistan had just been defeated militarily, Bhutto said he would continue a policy of confrontation with India until the rights of Kashmir's people were secured and Indian Muslims' persecution ended. If Jinnah had mobilized Indian Muslims on the basis of fear of Hindu dominance, then Bhutto wanted to lead Pakistan in resisting India's domination.

But this hard-line stance against India, coupled with renewed demands for settling the Kashmir issue, rang alarm bells among the State Department's South Asia experts. Bhutto had made several suggestions to Americans in rapid succession, offering numerous facilities in return for US arms. The army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) communicated similar messages through the US military mission and the CIA station in Islamabad.

Pakistan's defense secretary, Ghiasuddin Ahmed, even identified locations along the Arabian seacoast for US naval bases. These included, from west to east, Jiwani, Gwadar, Sonmiani Bay, Karachi, and the area south and east of Karachi. He claimed that India had provided naval facilities to the Soviets at the port of Visakhapatnam and on Andaman Islands. He thought the United States might be interested in countering the expanded Soviet naval presence in that area.
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Pakistan officials speculated that the United States might be interested in developing a port such as at Gwadar, which could aid economic development of that region of Pakistan. In addition to new, US-developed ports, Pakistan intended to maintain and possibly enlarge the size of its prewar army. Sober, however, asked Bhutto whether doing so made sense, given the reduction in Pakistan's borders and its diminished financial capabilities.
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In March 1972 Rogers summarized the Pakistani plans and the American diplomats' concerns about those plans in a comprehensive memorandum for Nixon. Pakistan had offered the use of port and “tracking station” facilities for US forces along the Arabian Sea coast near Karachi, he reported. As in the case of the Badaber base near Peshawar, the Pakistani plan envisaged “access to facilities as needed,” although there was still an aversion to having large numbers of US personnel in Pakistan. The new Pakistani government also welcomed US collaboration in strategic military planning.

“Bhutto's objectives in all this seem fairly clear,” observed the secretary of state. “He has already taken steps to strengthen his security relationship with China. He now seeks to add a closer security association with us.” Bhutto considered the prospects of US military
support as fairly good because of US concerns over Soviet policy toward India and [America's] developing relations with China. What was not clear, Rogers said, was how these overtures to the United States related to “Bhutto's longer range intentions toward India.”

The Americans had learned from their experience during the 1950s and 1960s that references in Pakistani military plans to dangers from Soviet expansion were only bait for the Americans; Pakistan's real military concern remained India. The State Department's outlook was that the South Asian equation had changed significantly after the December 1971 war. “We could not and should not seek to build up Pakistan as any kind of strategic counter-weight to India,” Rogers cautioned.

According to him, America's basic policy objective in South Asia should be “to encourage movement toward a broad political settlement which would replace the sharp political-military confrontation that has plagued the Subcontinent for more than 20 years.” The United States, he recommended, should support Pakistan's “territorial integrity and economic growth,” but it should avoid Pakistan's military buildup because “it would encourage Pakistan again to postpone the difficult decisions it must make if it is to reach a basic accommodation with its stronger neighbor.”
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Rogers proposed, therefore, that the United States encourage India to be magnanimous toward Pakistan. But he was firm in saying that military supplies to Pakistan should not be resumed, as these might stimulate conflict in the subcontinent.

Nixon had given little thought to the subcontinent except in the context of the Cold War. From this view, Pakistan's willingness to line up with the United States and India's refusal to do the same made it easy for him to choose Pakistan over India. Now, however, he was being asked to decide on the basis of America's longer-term interests in South Asia. The consensus among US officials was that it was India, not Pakistan, that mattered more.

The US media also called for the need to regain India's confidence. The Indians, however, were “in no hurry to make up with a government in Washington whose unaccountable policies aroused anger and anguish even among America's best Indian friends.”
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So Nixon met with Kenneth Keating, US ambassador to India and told him to start mending fences with New Delhi. “India has a friend in the White House,” Nixon asked Keating to tell the Indians. “We are going to China for reasons of our own. We took action on India because our law requires it,” he added. “In reality we are India's best friend.”

As if to reassure himself that his recent policy had not permanently damaged US-India relations, Nixon observed that India needed relations with all major powers and would want close ties with Washington. “The United States is the only one that has no design on her,” he said. Nixon tried to justify his past decisions regarding India and Pakistan by saying, “Neither country should be a country. They are too poor, too bloodthirsty.”
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In addition, Nixon now had to tell Pakistanis that they should no longer rely on US arms. The occasion to do that presented itself when Pakistan's secretary general for foreign affairs, Aziz Ahmed, visited Washington in March. Before the meeting, Rogers called Kissinger to warn him that the Pakistani official was going to give the president “a hard sell on renewing supply of military equipment to Pakistan. “The secretary of state then alerted the national security adviser that encouragement of Pakistani expectations would be harmful. Kissinger said he doubted that Nixon, “who is very pro-Pakistan,” was “even thinking about it.”
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When Ahmed arrived in the Oval Office he played to Nixon's sympathy. Because of this, Kissinger could not sway the conversation in the direction Rogers had suggested. Ahmed had served as ambassador in Washington under Ayub and had been involved in negotiations during the heyday of Pakistan's military alliance with the United States. Thus, he knew Nixon's passions and prejudices. During the meeting Ahmed stressed that Bhutto had managed to create national unity and was about to bring martial law to an end. “Pakistan's main problems now are external,” Ahmed said, pointing particularly to the difficult relationship with India.

Ahmed then repeated an argument familiar to Americans: “Pakistan is militarily very weak,” he asserted somberly. “It was weak in December and is weaker now.” According to him, India knew of
Pakistan's weakness and for that reason continued to hold “90,000 men that Pakistan needs for maintaining internal security and order,” a reference to the prisoners of war. Ahmed told Nixon that he expected negotiations with India to be tough, as the Indians wanted to use their leverage to settle the Kashmir problem and demand Pakistan's recognition of Bangladesh.

The Pakistani diplomat went on to confide to his hosts that Bhutto intended to recognize Bangladesh; it was just a matter of time. “Bhutto had come to power with three cards to play,” he said, stating that the first of these was Mujib's release, which had already been given away. The other two cards in Bhutto's hand, according to Ahmed, were the recognition of Bangladesh and “the 28,000 Bengali soldiers in West Pakistan whom Mujib wants and the 20,000 civil servants whom he also wants.” Bhutto had already spoken to the Soviets about a deal involving recognition in return for an exchange of prisoners, but he had not heard back.

“India has moved three divisions to the West Pakistani border,” Ahmed told Nixon. This maneuver was designed either to exert pressure on Pakistan for the negotiations or “for a more serious attack.” He said that there had been some thought that the Indians would seize Pakistan-controlled parts of Kashmir and added that the Chinese did not think that such an attack would occur until after Nixon's impending visit to Moscow. Kissinger said gently that he was inclined to agree with the Chinese assessment. During this meeting both Nixon and Kissinger avoided telling Ahmed that US intelligence did not believe Pakistan's claims about Indian preparations for another attack on Pakistan.

Ahmed also complained that the Chinese capacity to give sophisticated weapons to Pakistan was very limited. France, he said, could provide some for cash, but Pakistan had no means to pay. Pakistan once again needed the United States to help equip its military. As in the past, Ahmed tried to play on potential superpower rivalry. He said he would not be surprised if the Soviet Union offered Pakistan a friendship treaty within a year. “The Soviet interest seems to be in showing that it is the USSR and not the U.S. or China who will provide security in the subcontinent,” he declared.

As an example of the role the Soviets were playing, Ahmed mentioned that, through Ceylon, Pakistan had sent messages to the Indian prime minister, Indira Gandhi, and the answers had come back through Moscow. This showed that “the Soviets intended to keep the peacemaking process very much within their grasp.” He noted that the Indians also were pushing for “greater control in South Asia. They had offered treaties of their own—similar to the one signed with Bangladesh—to Burma, Ceylon and Nepal.”

Nixon heard Ahmed out and avoided saying explicitly that the United States did not want to get back into the business of supplying weapons to Pakistan. Instead, Nixon said that the United States would provide all the help it could, but “most of our help would be in the economic field.” He cited difficulties with Congress and the US election in November as reasons why he could not move ahead with any military assistance. But, he said, his administration “would do all it could so that Pakistan's own resources could be free to work out its military arrangements with other friends.”
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This kept Pakistan's hopes of securing sophisticated weapons from the United States alive.

Bhutto continued to remind the Americans that Pakistan needed military materiel to deal with threats from the Soviet Union and India. Soon after Ahmed's Washington visit, he wrote a letter to Nixon claiming that the Indians were “threatening the preservation of the tenuous peace that has been achieved.” He insisted that India had moved five additional divisions to the West Pakistan border, and the Indian chief of staff had recently visited Moscow to replenish military equipment. “The Soviet Union and India have stepped up their subversive activities in both Balochistan and the North-West Frontier Province,” he contended.
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