Losing Vietnam (27 page)

The USSAG personnel on the ground at Tan Son Nhut believed the resumption of fixed-wing evacuation was not possible. Thus, the runway was closed and the airport was deemed unusable. Ambassador Martin visited the DAO compound to assess the damage and receive a briefing from Major General Smith, after which he belatedly decided against continuing the fixed-wing evacuation and turned control of the evacuation over to the military.

Martin's concern about the effect of the evacuation of U.S. and selected Vietnamese personnel on the rest of the population had resulted in an overly cautious use of available aircraft in the previous days and had caused an unreasonable delay in the decision to request military airlift. As a result, the movement of evacuees to planned primary landing zones was disrupted, forcing more people to the embassy, which had the least capable landing zone in the operations plan. The plan called for evacuating one hundred personnel from the embassy, not the eventual twenty-one hundred.

At 0951 on 29 April, CINCPAC directed execution of Option IV (helicopters), and for tactical air reference timing purposes L-hour (launch hour) was set at 1100 hours. Tactical aircraft were launched and with support aircraft were all on station by 0945 hours. Unfortunately, the marine ground support and helicopter forces, which were on separate navy vessels, did not commence the cross-decking operations required for their integration until L-hour was established. Thus, several hours of valuable daylight passed, necessitating a night operation. As a consequence, the first evacuation helicopter did not land at the DAO compound until 1406 hours, when the evacuation by helicopters commenced.
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The DAO compound, although in the same general location as the airport, was separate from where the fixed-wing evacuation was taking place. The situation at the airfield was becoming very tense,
with Vietnamese Air Force officers and civilians demanding evacuation and attempting to commandeer aircraft. Therefore, all Seventh Air Force, Air America, DAO, and marine guard personnel were taken from the flight-line area, many by Air America helicopters, to the DAO compound (see photos 3 and 4).

Photo 3. Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 28 April 1975. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, produced by 432nd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, U.S. Air Force.)

About 0815, VNAF commander General Tran Van Minh and other top air force officers had entered the compound and requested evacuation by American aircraft. This event signaled the complete loss of the Vietnamese Air Force command and control and magnified the continued deterioration of an already volatile situation. Major General Smith ordered them disarmed and segregated until their evacuation could be accomplished.
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In the early morning, two A-1s and an AC-119 had provided air cover for Tan Son Nhut. At 0605 hours SA-7 fire shot down the AC-119, and only one A-1 was left airborne. Almost all of the F-5s had left South Vietnam, and by 0920 at least twenty had landed at the U-Tapao Airbase in Thailand, with more in the air. There was little doubt that at the urging of Pentagon personnel the VNAF aircraft were flown to
Thailand to save them. The almost complete collapse of the air force was devastating. By the end of the day there were six C-130s, three C-119s, thirteen C-47s, twenty-seven F-5s, ten A-1s, six U-17s, three DC-3s, and more than two thousand refugees received at U-Tapao, as reported by the American embassy in Bangkok. The South Vietnamese Air Force has been severely criticized for its performance in those last days. Prior to that, its performance at Da Nang had left much to be desired. The air force of course had many moments of glory—but they weren't in the last days.

Photo 4. Tan Son Nhut Airfield, 30 April 1975. The Aftermath. (Source: Headquarters USSAG, Nakhon Phanom, Thailand, produced by 432nd Reconnaissance Technical Squadron, U.S. Air Force.)

A navy tank landing ship and a U.S. military sealift tug with a barge waited at the commercial wharf (Newport); by 1130 hours these were loaded and preparing to depart downriver. They were attempting to establish communications, should air cover be required during the voyage. An estimated six thousand evacuees were on board, including about one hundred American citizens. I was happy to see that the joint staff took to heart the idea of evacuating from Saigon by ship. True to Admiral Gayler's word, the U.S. Navy stood off Vung Tau for days, enabling forty thousand additional refugees to escape.

Lieutenant General Burns, acting as the designated subordinate commander and coordinating authority for CINCPAC in the conduct of FREQUENT WIND, exercised operational control of the air force units and of the ground support force and overland helicopters. CINCPAC Fleet retained operational control of supporting forces at all times for navy tactical air and when over water for the ground support force helicopters. COMUSSAG/7AF exercised command and control from the Seventh Air Force Tactical Air Command Center at NKP through the airborne mission commander in the airborne command and control aircraft, initially Col. J. S. Roosma Jr., and the marine ground support force commander on the scene, Brig. Gen. Richard E. Carey.

Upon landing at the DAO compound, Carey and his battalion of marines (865 men) took immediate charge of the security situation. The compound had seven designated landing zones, three of which were easily used during daylight hours. With darkness, helicopters could land on only the two with existing lighting, augmented by auto headlights and portable lighting equipment. The steady flow of choppers to the compound was thus maintained.

There were some difficult moments transporting evacuees. At about 1500 hours, the national police blocked nine busloads, escorted by Captain Wood, U.S. Marine Corps, from entering the compound. Wood negotiated with the police and secured safe passage for the buses when he allowed several of the senior police to join the convoy. Elsewhere in the city, Air America choppers picked up U.S. citizens from rooftops and deposited them at both the embassy and the DAO compound. The helicopter airlift assured a steady flow to the compound, and the evacuation went smoothly. The total number evacuated from the DAO was 395 Americans and more than 4,475 Vietnamese and third-country nationals.
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About 0030 hours, the last of the marine ground support forces was evacuated from the compound. The DAO personnel all deserve tremendous credit for the smooth evacuation.

The situation at the embassy was a horse of another color. The plan called for a minimal helicopter lift from the American embassy roof to evacuate those working in the main building. The majority of the personnel who rendezvoused at the American embassy were to be moved by bus to the DAO compound. The in-town pick-up locations were no longer usable, and bus movement had become tenuous, so a large
number of evacuees made their ways to the embassy grounds. To the consternation of those directing the airlift, the estimate of the number to be evacuated kept growing with time. It was obvious the rooftop landing zone, which could only accommodate a CH-46, was not sufficient. The marine security personnel took the initiative to clear the parking lot next to the main embassy building. The lot had a beautiful old tree that earlier even in this critical situation some at the embassy wanted to save. Notwithstanding, the parking lot was cleared so that CH-53s could land. About 1430, the first helicopters were inserted with two platoons of marines.

As the evacuation proceeded from the main embassy grounds, the very large number of personnel in the recreation areas adjacent to but separated from the main embassy by a high wall and gate became panicky and highly agitated. Additionally, the number seemed to keep growing, although a realistic head count had not been made. The lack of numbers for planning in the helicopter flow was a problem; however, once the people in the embassy grounds had been evacuated, those in the recreation area entered the grounds and the situation became more manageable.

At about 2400 hours there was a major lull in the helicopter flow. This caused all hell to break loose on the command net. CINCPAC asked, “Why no '53s in the Embassy at this time?”
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It appeared that out of concern for flight safety Admiral Whitmore (CTF 76) had made an independent decision to halt flight operations. All CH-53 helicopters were directed to return to base for aircraft servicing and crew rest. Needless to say, the flow was turned back on and by 0200 hours a CH-46 and a CH-53 were landing at the embassy about every ten minutes.

At 0121 hours, Blue Chip (USSAG/7AF command and control) received a message from CINCPAC, which I roughly copied: “Pass message to Ambassador Martin from Admiral Gayler. I have been directed to send following message to you by the president: On basis of a reported total of 726 evacuees CINCPAC is authorized to send 19 helicopters and no more. The president expects Ambassador Martin to be on the last helicopter. For your info: the Sec Def wishes that the last lift to depart NLT 0345 hours (2045Z) and we will do our best to meet that request. Warm regards. End Message. FYI request that Martin acknowledge this presidential message.”

At 0400 the airbase command center reported that a code 2 (Ambassador Martin) was on board Lady Ace-09. With that, only the 130-man ground support forces and a few Americans had to be lifted off to conclude the evacuation. The final extraction was the most dangerous. At 0433, a Lady Ace (CH-46) was forced into an immediate takeoff. Apparently the enemy was using riot-control gas (CS) on the embassy. At 0439 the Specter C-130 gunship saw much fire (mostly small arms) around the embassy. It was cleared to provide suppressive fire. At 0451 there was an antiaircraft threat at the presidential palace only six blocks southwest of the embassy. Earlier, there was a SA-7 warning published three miles west of the embassy in a cemetery. At 0517 the airbase command center reported that Swift-33 had become disoriented and had withdrawn because of riot gas but was coming in again.

With daylight, A-7s replaced the AC-130 gunship and provided overhead cover. At 0646 hours Swift-22 lifted the last of the ground support forces out of the embassy.
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One of the A-7s covering the helicopters had its engine quit and was lost at sea. Fortunately, the pilot ejected and was recovered. Thus ended FREQUENT WIND.
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The head count showed that 2,098 personnel (978 U.S. and 1,120 Vietnamese) were evacuated from the embassy.
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In all, 8,048 personnel (including 995 ground support forces) made their way to safety on the naval ships offshore, in the largest helicopter evacuation in history. Under Lieutenant General Burns's outstanding leadership, all of the Americans and thousands of foreign nationals both at Phnom Penh and Saigon were successfully evacuated, with the loss of only the two Saigon embassy guards.

Obviously all concerned with the evacuation deserve plaudits—the DAO and embassy staffs; the air force, navy, and marine pilots; the ground support forces; the navy ships and crews; and the battle staff at USSAG. The helicopter pilots flying into small landing zones at night and braving the antiaircraft fire, however, deserve special recognition. The incoming artillery and rockets at Tan Son Nhut created the only casualties, but there was constant small-arms and automatic weapons fire aimed at the evacuation aircraft. At the tactical control center, we plotted all firing incidents other than small-arms and automatic weapons fire, of which there were many. The envelope of enemy firing kept getting smaller and smaller as they moved in on the evacuation routes.
If a halt to helicopter flights had not been called when it was, we could have lost some helicopters soon. At least seventy-six FREQUENT WIND antiaircraft incidents were reported, of which thirty-six were SA-7 firings.
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During the previous three months the enemy had effectively shot down fourteen South Vietnamese aircraft with twenty-five SA-7 firings; with this as an example, the danger to U.S. evacuation aircraft is clear.

We learned several important lessons from the evacuation. First, in a rapidly deteriorating military situation a flexible operational plan with decentralized command and control arrangements is necessary. The midday initiation, unexpected increase in evacuees at the embassy, restriction of the embassy's landing zones, breakdown in smooth helicopter flow, difficulties of night operations, and continuing enemy harassment by fire extended the operation well beyond the time anticipated. Yet, the participants quickly and effectively adapted to these situations. Second, there was occasional confusion between controlling agencies, as some used local time and some used Zulu time (Greenwich Mean Time). The planning and execution of an operation should always be in accordance with Department of Defense/International standards—that is, Zulu time. Third, the late requirement to provide detailed information to higher headquarters on a real-time basis complicated the command, control, and communications task. This was a high-interest operation, and many agencies required current information. A review of the communications log shows how higher headquarters from the National Military Command Center, CINCPAC, and others took over the radio net—mostly on minor matters—contributing to occasional saturation of communications.
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During the planning phase, agencies should agree as to the frequency and content of reports required. Finally, directives to execute the operation came through CINCPAC to both COMUSSAG/7AF and to the Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Fleet. This dual channel of command allowed the unilateral interpretation of alert postures, making it difficult to coordinate joint forces. Authority for the overall operational control of a joint operation should be centralized at the lowest possible joint command.