Losing Vietnam (12 page)

To be an “A” or “B” hamlet with respect to friendly military presence, the reaction time for the nearest friendly ground reaction force during the hours of darkness when called upon for support by local security forces had to be shorter than two hours 65 percent of the time. Obviously, for this capability a military unit would have to be stationed in close proximity to the hamlet. In January 1973 there were 12,091 hamlets in South Vietnam, of which only 750 were under VC control—these numbers give a sense of how extremely difficult it was to provide reasonable security. That January 2,248 hamlets (18.6 percent) were in D, E, V, or N categories, whereas of the 19,390,753 people, only 8.1 percent were in hamlets/villages given these categories.
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A review of the population under Government of Vietnam (GVN) control (HES ratings A and B) from January 1973 (14,764,410) to February 1975 (14,554,723) indicates a peak of control in March 1974 (16,666,540).

The State Department always highlighted the necessity for the control of population and territory; thus, this was where the South Vietnamese government and the military placed their emphasis. The peace treaty did not provide an answer to the all-important question of who would ultimately control South Vietnam. Therefore, to obtain legitimacy and bargaining power the North Vietnamese, both before and after the signing of the Paris accord, sought to seize and control population. In counterattacks, the RVNAF fought to deny the enemy this control.

The RVNAF was under tremendous strain to defend more than twelve thousand widely dispersed hamlets, many in difficult terrain. These static defenses greatly sapped its combat capabilities, while the enemy was free to choose its objectives and in almost all cases to amass a local preponderance of troops and firepower. As long as the enemy retained even a modest military capability in an area, pacification was impossible. Strong military and civic action efforts integrated with
the South Vietnamese pacification program achieved notable results. As an aside, all U.S. military units in South Vietnam participated in civic action programs to some degree. The 9th Division pacification program,
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for example, had at its foundation five major civic action themes: psychological operations to win the hearts and minds of the people, assistance to victims of the war, assistance in health matters, educational support, and repair and construction of facilities. The individual American soldier has always helped to alleviate the suffering and anguish caused by wars, and Vietnam was no exception.

The Pacification and Rural Development Program (PRD) was the centerpiece of the GVN and U.S. policies in South Vietnam. It required the total integration of military and civic action efforts. As such, it was a great success, and by mid-1974 almost all of the major populated areas of South Vietnam were pacified. This included the absorption of almost 750,000 refugees driven from their homes by the 1972 general offensive. The areas under government control had been expanded, and the security provided brought about confidence in the South Vietnamese government. The relative stability of the rural areas plus economic aid substantially improved the living conditions of the rural populace.

The PRD program took the combined efforts of the United States and South Vietnamese utilizing all available resources and capabilities. It required the total integration of civilian and military means, for without security there could be no development. By 1973 the government had trained more than 2 million local personnel in the PSDF, and, coordinating with the territorial forces, they provided the security for the hamlets, which enabled many social and economic programs to take hold.
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A measure of the success of the Pacification and Rural Development Program is the index of agricultural production. In 1967, agricultural production was at 91 percent of 1961–1965 levels, and it gradually improved, until 1973, when it was 115 percent.

It was obvious that the Pacification and Rural Development Program was a success, particularly since the 1975 COSVN Resolution emphasized the importance of a fundamental defeat of South Vietnam's pacification program and indicated that the communists would give
top priority to counterpacification.
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The North's stated requirements for fundamentally defeating pacification were to kill one-third of South Vietnam's main, regional, and popular forces in 1975 and to neutralize one-third to one-half of the PSDF.

The enemy understood that there could be no pacification without security, and the territorial forces, some five hundred thousand troops, had security as their major objective. To protect all the hamlets and villages from the enemy, they had to remain colocated with the people. To accomplish this, they established outposts (5,453 of them) to interdict the enemy; operational and fire support bases to protect larger concentrations of people and support the outposts; and ARVN main force units to intervene, support, and attack major enemy incursions. It took time, months, to eliminate enemy local forces; thus, the majority of all troop strengths were stuck in static situations. The ennui of prolonged periods of static duty severely denigrated the aggressive spirit of many friendly main force units. The areas to be secured were vast, so a linear defense protected the perimeter of South Vietnam. Almost all military units were committed, and none of the four corps had a satisfactory reserve.

The COSVN current affairs committee assessed the situation in the third quarter of 1974:

Naturally, COSVN always exaggerated the situation, but there was fact to this assessment.

Although the strategy of protecting all of the national territory and maintaining control over all the population was a flawed concept, it did work very well until the enemy had the strength and the resources necessary to initiate major unit combined arms attacks, shifting from a
guerrilla war to a conventional one, which they were able to do because of their increased artillery and armor and the serious diminution of friendly airpower. Thus, in late 1974 the RVNAF was spread woefully thin with little defense in depth and no strategic reserves. The success of the Pacification and Rural Development Program, which required the military to provide local security for pacification areas, became a major drawback to an effective combat capability.

By early 1974 it had become obvious to USSAG that in addition to assisting with tactical matters, we had to do everything possible to help both Cambodia and South Vietnam, with their U.S. advisers' support, to reduce current expenditure levels so that they would have the funding with which to procure essential supplies and equipment. This was war by budget! That in itself is not bad, if the budget fits the combat situation. In FY 74, the budget was tight but workable. We had to ensure that our allies maximized their combat power within the budget restrictions. Currently, the rates of ammunition expenditures in both South Vietnam ($544 million) and Cambodia ($301 million) were far greater than the approved congressional funding would support, thereby necessitating the undesirable drawdown of ammunition stocks as well as precluding the requisitioning of other necessary items. The major expenditures creating across-the-board funding shortfalls were in ammunition, so this was where we concentrated.

The estimated quantity of conventional ammunition required per day to sustain operations in an active theater is called a day of supply (DOS). A DOS is calculated by multiplying the weapons density by the supply rate. The force structure that determines the weapons density and the rate of supply are the key factors. Some ammunition definitions are in order. First, required supply rate (RSR) is the amount of ammunition expressed in rounds per weapon per day for ammunition to support tactical operations. Authorized supply rate (ASR), now called the controlled supply rate, is the amount of ammunition estimated to be available to sustain operations of a designated force for a specified time if expenditures are controlled at that rate. Daily expenditure rate is the average rate of expenditures per day, over a given
period of time. And, finally, intensive combat rate is the amount of ammunition expressed in rounds per weapon per day required to sustain heavy-intensity combat.

All of the supply rates in Southeast Asia varied with combat intensity, which could be seasonal and/or dependent upon friendly and enemy actions. The DOS varied with the weapons densities. The optimum situation was to have sufficient ammo so that the controlled supply rate (ASR) equaled the tactical commander's requirements (RSR) and to have daily expenditure rates equal to or below the ASR. However, in Southeast Asia the unavailability of funding, transportation, or stockage levels required the authorized supply rate to be below tactical requirements (RSR), and, generally, the daily expenditure rate was in excess of the authorized supply rate.

Our first step was to compare the RSRs of the ARVN and the Cambodian armed forces (FANK) to those of the United States.
Table 8
compares the Cambodian and South Vietnamese rates at the time with those of the United States under inactive combat. Both Southeast Asia RSRs were significantly below the lowest level of American RSRs. Measured against U.S. standards, ammo expenditures in South Vietnam and Cambodia were low. However, measured against the restrictive congressional funding levels, they were excessive.

Table 8.
Comparative Required Supply Rates, Rounds per Weapon per Day, October 1973

Source
: Authorized country RSRs as of October 1973.

In mid-December 1973, General Vien, the RVNAF chief of staff, asked Major General Murray if the DAO could make an analysis of army artillery expenditures. Murray passed this request to USSAG, knowing that we were already attempting to get a handle on the Cambodian ammunition situation. It was obvious to all concerned that with the reduced FY 74 funding levels some solution concerning ammunition expenditures had to be found. Since artillery ammo made up 75 percent of ARVN ammo tonnage and more than 50 percent of the costs, artillery was the critical line item in South Vietnam.

In South Vietnam, shortly after the cease-fire and before the full departure of American forces, the JGS arrived at the understanding that there had to be a cutback in ammunition expenditures. On 12 March 1973 a JGS memorandum from General Vien with the subject of “Restricted Employment of Artillery and Tactical Air” was distributed to all corps, divisions, and major units as well as the air force. It stated that if responsible officials did not restrict the usage of ammunition, a shortage would certainly come and that artillery and air should be employed only when the unit's organic crew-served weapons (machine guns, mortars, and recoilless rifles) had been fully employed. It also restricted the use of harassment and interdiction fires. Units were authorized to fire only within their prescribed ammo loads. The memorandum concluded: “The abundant and nearly unlimited artillery and air support in the recent past does not exist at present, so it is necessary to get the troops morally prepared to accept it and to get familiarized with our restricted means in this phase of self-sufficiency and self-development.”
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The RVNAF was indeed predisposed to the conservation of ammunition—they just required assistance in getting a handle on the problem. The question, then, was whether current artillery expenditures were reasonable and whether steps could be taken to ensure adequate firepower at reduced rates. There are many factors in the ammunition equation: rates of supply, density of weapons, organization of forces, types of ammunition, cost of line items, conservation measures, and levels of combat. Of these, only the level of combat was in part dictated by the enemy—all
other factors were under friendly control. Therefore, it was important to relate artillery responses to known combat activities. The ARVN had kept excellent data on enemy attacks by fire and ground contacts. USSAG then considered four types of activities that resulted in artillery expenditures: counterbattery in response to enemy attacks by fire, artillery support of minor contacts, artillery support of major contacts, and harassment and interdiction fires. Close air and artillery support of troops in contact is a function of the intensity of conflict and is less for minor contacts and more for prolonged intensive fighting. In late 1973, this was still a war of attrition; 50 percent of all ground contacts reported resulted in one or fewer casualties—that is, friendly killed or wounded or enemy killed. Not much artillery should be employed in support of minor contacts. However, in major contacts, where fierce fighting often occurred over prolonged periods, a large amount of artillery support was absolutely essential to meaningful fire and maneuver tactics. There was obviously a requirement for counterbattery fires in response to enemy attacks by fire and also a requirement for limited interdictive fires.