Lion of Jordan (48 page)

On his way back from the US, Hussein stopped in London and there he renewed his contact with the Israelis after an interval of four months. In the intervening period Israel had received offers to arrange a secret meeting with Hussein from several quarters but it deflected all of them. The most persistent efforts to get the two sides together were made by Julian Amery, now minister of aviation, but the Israelis kept stalling. Amery was valuable to them because of his senior position in the Conservative Party and his close contacts with the intelligence community, but they did not need him as a link man to Hussein and so they kept fobbing him off with various excuses. They also kept him in the dark about Dr Emanuel Herbert, whom they preferred as their link man because he was not a politician and because he did not have his own agenda. Herzog's account of all the conversations he had with and about Amery fills up twenty pages. The one mildly interesting point to emerge is that Hussein expressed a wish to meet Moshe Dayan and to talk to him as one soldier to another, and that Abba Eban and Levi Eshkol opposed the idea because of their political rivalry with Dayan. But the basic reason for Herzog's reluctance to meet with Hussein was quite simple – he had nothing to say to him. He believed that it was in Israel's interest to delay the contact with Hussein for as long as possible.
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Despite these reservations Herzog had not one but two meetings with Hussein in London. The meeting on 19 November took place in the home of Julian Amery and the one on the following day took place in the home of Dr Emanuel Herbert. Also present at Amery's home was Sir Erik Bennett, Hussein's friend and former air adviser. Hussein and Herzog pretended that this was their first meeting, but Hussein gave the
game away by asking Herzog whether he had stopped smoking. Herzog opened the meeting with a long review of the Middle East scene designed to destroy any hope that Hussein might have had of help from the Russians or from Nasser. After the survey Herzog said that the prime minister had instructed him to meet the king in order to ask whether he had reached a decision on direct negotiations with Israel that might lead to a peace treaty. Hussein replied that he had always felt that the resources of the countries of the Middle East should be concentrated on constructive efforts, and he still held to this view. In close coordination with Nasser, he had succeeded at Khartoum in getting a decision to seek a political settlement of the problem. After Khartoum he and Nasser remained in regular contact. They both agreed to a settlement comprising the end of belligerency; recognition of Israel in return for its evacuation of the territories it had occupied; freedom of passage for Israeli shipping in the Suez Canal and in the Gulf of Aqaba; and a settlement of the refugee problem that was part of the state of war.

Hussein said that the Middle East was at a turning point. Without a settlement, extremist policies would prevail. ‘I do not think of today but of the distant future,' he said. ‘After all that has passed over me I do not care what happens today. I hope that history will judge that I was true to my principles. I hope you will understand that we have gone to the utmost limit.' He and Nasser were in agreement about their approach, and the other Arab States had promised not to interfere. He hoped that Israel would not prove too obstinate and now make the same mistake the Arabs had over many years. If a settlement were not found, the Middle East would be thrown into turmoil and become an arena of conflict between East and West.

Herzog belittled the significance of Hussein's achievements and argued that his proposals amounted to no more than the armistice agreements that had not been fulfilled for twenty years. He gave another version of the lecture that Hussein had heard before about the Jewish link with the Land of Israel. At the root of the Arab–Israeli problem, he said, lay the refusal of the Arabs to acknowledge the nature of this link. Israel insisted on direct negotiations as a symbol of recognition. Hussein agreed that direct negotiations should be official and public but he repeated his advice to Israel not to be obstinate. Herzog asked whether Hussein would enter into negotiations with Israel on his own in the event of his failing to carry his colleagues with him. Hussein replied that he would
if the people of the West Bank approached him. But he could not go into negotiations without knowing in advance where he stood. What were the limits to Israel's claims to the land? This was the question that Herzog had dreaded and to which he could give no answer. He had to confess that he had been sent to listen and not to pronounce. All he could do by way of background was to tell the king that there were differing views in Israel. Some thought that the present position should continue unchanged. Others felt that Hussein had no rights whatsoever on the West Bank and that Israel should seek a settlement with the Palestinians. Yet others considered that in order to achieve peace with Jordan, they should negotiate with him on the West Bank. Even the last school of thought, the minimalists, emphasized security considerations as well as historical associations with the land. In Herzog's view this was not expansionism, though one is left to wonder what would have constituted expansionism in his view. The meeting, in any case, ended inconclusively. Hussein remarked that the question of Jerusalem was crucial. Herzog did not react because he wished to leave him with the impression that this was not even a matter for discussion.
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In the evening Hussein went to Dr Herbert's home on his own initiative and asked to see Herzog again. By the time that Herbert found Herzog it was too late so they met the following morning. It was not clear why Hussein wanted the meeting because he said very little at the beginning, as was his custom. Herzog explained that he had met him at Amery's home only because Amery claimed that he had requested the meeting. Hussein looked embarrassed and said he hoped that Amery did not know about their secret channel through Dr Herbert. Herzog then referred to the Fatah incursions across the Jordan River in the Beisan area and warned that these guerrilla operations could have serious consequences. Hussein replied that he gave the army orders to put an end to these operations and that they had already arrested 150 Palestinian fighters. Herzog summed up what he thought they had agreed the previous day: the UN mediator would move between the capitals with a view to bringing the two sides to direct negotiations. Hussein confirmed this understanding. They also agreed to avoid Julian Amery and to continue to use Dr Herbert as their link.
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With the approach of the Security Council debate, both sides stepped up their lobbying: Jordan for a strong resolution and Israel for as weak a resolution as possible. Hussein remained actively involved in the
discussions and the drafting behind the scenes with American, British and Arab diplomats. In the end a British resolution was unanimously adopted by the Security Council on 22 November 1967. In Jordan this came to be called ‘the Jordanian resolution'. It was considered a great triumph for Hussein and became the cornerstone of Jordanian foreign policy. Resolution 242 was the most significant international pronouncement on the Arab–Israeli dispute after the June War. The preamble to the resolution emphasized the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by force and the need to work for a just and lasting peace. Article 1 stated that a just and lasting peace should include two principles: (i) ‘withdrawal of Israeli armed forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict' and (ii) respect for the right of every state in the area ‘to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force'. The resolution went on to affirm the necessity for guaranteeing freedom of navigation and for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem. The resolution supported the Arabs on the issue of territory and Israel on the issue of peace. Basically, the resolution proposed a package deal in which Israel would get peace in exchange for returning to the Arab states their territories.

The resolution was a masterpiece of British ambiguity, and it was this ambiguity that won for it the support of the United States, the Soviet Union, Jordan and Egypt, though not of Syria. Israel had many successes on the long road that led to the adoption of this resolution. It defeated a series of Arab and Soviet proposals that called for withdrawal without peace. Another success was to avoid the requirement of withdrawing from ‘the territories' or ‘all the territories' occupied in the recent war. The final wording in the English text was ‘withdrawal from territories', and this gave Israel some room for manoeuvre. The French text of Resolution 242 spoke explicitly of withdrawal from
les territoires
– from
the
territories. This made it absolutely clear that the drafters of the resolution had in mind Israel's withdrawal from
all
the territories it had occupied in the war. Everyone except Israel understood the resolution in this sense. Israel, however, exploited the ambiguity in the English text to defy international pressure for complete withdrawal. Israel's interpretation of Resolution 242 also differed from the Arab interpretation in other respects. Egypt and Jordan agreed to peace but insisted that the first step must be complete Israeli withdrawal. Israel insisted that before it would withdraw from any part of the territories, there
must be direct negotiations leading to a contractual peace agreement that incorporated secure and recognized boundaries. In sum, 242 invited Israel to trade land for peace, but Israel was more interested in keeping the land than in achieving peace.

Dr Gunnar Jarring, the Swedish ambassador to Moscow, was appointed by the UN secretary-general to promote an Arab–Israeli settlement on the basis of Resolution 242. Having rejected 242, Syria declined to participate in his mission. The other Arab states had high expectations of Jarring, whereas Israel had no expectations at all, perceiving him as personally unimaginative and ineffectual. But the real problem was that Israel had no trust in the impartiality of the UN or in its capacity to mediate. The Israeli tactic was to keep feeding Jarring with proposals and documents to which he was to obtain Arab reactions. The aim was to keep his mission alive and prevent the matter from going back to the UN, where Israel would be blamed for the failure. Abba Eban's colleagues were happy to leave it to him to conduct the elaborate exchange of notes with Jarring as long as he did not make any substantive concessions. Eban understood better than any of them both the limits and the possibilities of Jarring's mission. ‘Some of my colleagues', noted Eban, ‘did not understand that even a tactical exercise fills a vacuum. Even diplomatic activity that is not leading anywhere is better than no diplomatic activity at all. Activity itself gives Arab moderates an alibi for avoiding the military option.'
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A diplomatic vacuum there certainly was but a vacuum of Israel's making. The urbane and witty Eban liked to say that the Arabs never missed an opportunity to miss an opportunity for peace, but after 1967 this description fitted Israel much better than it did the other side. Hussein's hope of using the Jarring mission to pave the way to direct negotiations between the moderate Arab states and Israel bore no fruit because Israel had no interest in any kind of purposeful diplomacy.

Fearful that Hussein was about to sell them out at the conference table, Fatah and the more extremist groups resumed guerrilla raids against Israel in the autumn of 1967. First they tried to instigate a popular liberation war on the West Bank, but when this failed they moved their operational bases to the East Bank of the Jordan and to Lebanon and started mounting hit-and-run raids against the Israelis from there. They enjoyed a great deal of popular support, and attracted floods of volunteers from Palestinian and non-Palestinian communities
throughout the Arab world.
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After the defeat of the regular Arab armies, they became the standard-bearers of Arab nationalism. The Palestinian cause as a whole began to attract more international sympathy and support. In the past the conflict was perceived as one between the large Arab states and little Israel. After 1967 it was increasingly perceived as a conflict between an oppressed people and an oppressive, colonialist state. The biblical image of David and Goliath was reversed, with Israel assuming the unaccustomed role of Goliath.

The Palestinian guerrilla organizations also commanded support at all levels of Jordanian society. Ex-prime minister Wasfi Tall was a member of a royal consultative committee created to advise the king on strategy and policy in the wake of the June War. Tall believed that Israel had no intention of withdrawing from the lands it occupied and no real interest in a political settlement with the Arabs, since this would entail withdrawal. He therefore concluded that the Arabs had no alternative but to resort to prolonged guerrilla warfare in order to drive Israel out. Active resistance, argued Tall, was necessary to provide the Arabs with the ‘psychological umbrella' to proceed to a political settlement in the unlikely event that Israel changed course. Above all, the ‘psychological umbrella' was essential to re-establish the king's authority over his people and to provide the nation with some hope and purpose. Tall's argument was that a peace based on humiliation would not endure and that any Arab leader who accepted it would be repudiated.
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Within the army the urge to expiate the defeat and to purge the humiliation was particularly acute. Although there was no direct challenge to the king's authority, his orders were not invariably obeyed. The official policy was to stop Palestinian guerrilla organizations from using Jordan as a springboard for attacks on Israel. Army commanders stationed in the border areas, however, often gave passive and sometimes even active support to the guerrilla fighters.

Trapped between Israeli hardliners and Palestinian radicals, Hussein complained that ‘Jordan had given everything and got nothing' from the United States. With the US stalling on his request to resume arms supplies, he again hinted that it might be necessary to move towards the Soviets. It was unusual for him to play hardball, but his credibility with the army was at stake. He was also beginning to give up hope that the US would use its muscle to prevent the Israelis from presenting him with a massive fait accompli on the West Bank. His confidence in the Johnson
administration began to crumble. Walt Rostow informed Lyndon Johnson that ‘Hussein is wondering whether a Soviet ring around Israel wouldn't better bring Israel to terms. This is, of course, the thinking of an increasingly desperate man who sees his choices diminishing.'
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In his despair Hussein began to relax the policy of reining in the fedayeen. Sometimes he would be very tough on them, at other times very lenient. The Israelis noted this change in policy. In the past the Jordanian authorities regarded the fedayeen as an element that endangered the regime. They used to monitor them and to carry out arrests. But they came to see fedayeen harassment of the Israeli forces and settlers on the West Bank as something that helped Jordan domestically and in the inter-Arab arena.
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