Lion of Jordan (49 page)

Regardless of whether Hussein was unwilling or unable to prevent the attacks from his territory, the Israeli conclusion was the same: to strike at the Fatah bases. Having chased the fedayeen from the West Bank, the Israelis pressed the offensive with raids against their positions on the East Bank inside Jordan proper. The process of escalation reached its climax with a massive attack on Karameh, a village about four miles east of the Jordan River where Fatah's headquarters were located. Jordanian intelligence alerted Fatah to an imminent Israeli attack on the village and suggested that they make themselves scarce. Fatah's reply was that it was their duty to set an example and to prove that Arabs are capable of courage and dignity. At dawn on 21 March 1968 a massive Israeli armoured force, supported by helicopters and infantry, attacked Karameh. There were only about 300 Fatah men, but they were well prepared and ably supported by Jordanian artillery, which was stationed near by.
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The casualties were heavy on all sides: 28 Israelis, 61 Jordanians and 92 fedayeen were killed. But all the glory went to Fatah.
Karameh
is the Arabic word for ‘honour', and by their brave stand the fedayeen were seen to have redeemed that of the Arabs. The Arab media presented the battle as a turning point and as the first defeat inflicted on the IDF by the Arabs. In the forty-eight hours after the battle, 5,000 new recruits applied to join Fatah. Hussein could not afford to go against the tide and was driven to express his sympathy with the fedayeen in public. ‘It is difficult to distinguish between fedayeen and others,' he said. ‘We may reach the stage when we shall all become fedayeen.'

However, the aims of Hussein and the fedayeen remained incompatible. He wanted to recover his land, whereas they challenged Israel's very
existence. After Karameh they acted more independently in mounting operations against Israel, and these provoked Israeli reprisals. Hussein was thus caught between the Palestinian militants, who were encouraged by Syria, and Israel's insistence that he had to bear the responsibility for their hostile acts. Israel bombarded Fatah positions in the Jordan Valley and Jordanian Army bases, as well as the towns of Salt and Irbid, inflicting heavy civilian casualties. These punitive raids, especially the ones involving aircraft (against which Jordan had no defence), undermined Hussein's position. On the one hand he recognized the right of the Palestinians to resist occupation. But on the other, as he recalled,

we had a very turbulent internal situation; we had continuous reprisals and fire-fights on the long front, essentially from the Dead Sea or just south of the Dead Sea to the northernmost part. And we were hit by both sides. We had an internal problem, we had an external problem, our army was being hit, and one was trying one's best to ameliorate this situation or save the situation from deteriorating… The Israelis considered that they had to retaliate against actions from Jordan. I kept saying that these actions were by people resisting occupation but it didn't necessarily mean that Jordan was fighting. Jordan was deployed on the longest border and its army was trying its best to see what could be done. But we had our own problems… I was very worried at the increase of what was almost perpetual fighting until the Egyptians started the so-called War of Attrition.
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This endless chain of fedayeen raids and Israeli counter-raids greatly complicated the search for a peaceful solution to the Arab–Israeli conflict.

Remarkably, although in the aftermath of the June War it held very few cards, Jordan became a major player in Arab diplomacy. How did such a small, impoverished and insignificant country come to occupy such a prominent part in regional and international politics? The answer largely lies in the personality and policies of King Hussein. He was a strong, energetic and charismatic leader who commanded the attention of the great powers by sheer persistence and force of personality. Hussein's unique brand of personal diplomacy enabled Jordan to exert an influence in foreign affairs that was out of all proportion to its real power. Hussein was the only Arab ruler who had intimate relations with America and relations of any kind at all with Israel, the greatest taboo in Arab politics. And he positioned himself very carefully between the Arab world, the United States and Israel. It was a difficult balancing act but one that Hussein succeeded in sustaining. Other Arab rulers, including Nasser, knew about Hussein's contacts with their problematic neighbour only what he himself chose to tell them. Nasser needed Hussein as a channel both to Washington and to Jerusalem, and Hussein carried on his contacts with Israel in a way that did not exclude him from the Arab fold. He did not overstep the mark by going public, as Anwar Sadat had in the 1970s, and he did not pay the price that Sadat had for making a separate peace with Israel: the expulsion of Egypt from the Arab League. Hussein developed a network of bilateral relations, and he alone knew where he stood with each of his partners.

Whereas before 1967 the Israelis needed Hussein more than he needed them, after the war it was he who desperately needed something from them: his land. Despite all the obstacles along the road, he never despaired of reaching a peaceful settlement. He requested direct contact with Israel at the highest possible level. Prime Minister Levi Eshkol was
reluctant to go in person, but the cabinet eventually agreed to send the foreign minister to a meeting with Hussein in London. Abba Eban was instructed to stress that he could put forward only private proposals without the approval of the cabinet. The meeting took place at the home of Dr Herbert in St John's Wood on 3 May 1968. Eban was accompanied by Dr Herzog and Hussein by Zaid Rifa'i, his private secretary. Zaid was the eldest son of the former prime minister Samir Rifa'i. He had been educated at the Bishop's School and Victoria College, where he formed a close friendship with the future king, and at Harvard, where he took a degree in political science and international law. Zaid Rifa'i was to play a key role alongside his friend the king in the conduct of the secret talks with Israeli officials over the next two decades. He was the adviser, the organizer, the note-taker and the negotiator. His thoughts on these talks, which were related to the present author, therefore merit serious attention.

To understand the course of the next thirty years, Rifa'i believed, one first of all had to understand Hussein's personality. Hussein was truly a man of peace who hated war. He was intelligent, shrewd and pragmatic enough to know that the Arab–Israeli conflict could not be settled by violence. Only through negotiations and agreement would it be possible for their two peoples to live together in peace. This was Hussein's frame of mind before and after the June War. The loss of Jerusalem hurt him more than anything else: it had been under Arab sovereignty and was lost on his watch. Regaining it, therefore, was of paramount importance to him. Here again he realized that this could not be done through war, feeling very strongly that only through negotiations and agreement would it be possible for him to get Israel to withdraw from the West Bank and East Jerusalem.

Rifa'i believed that, from the outset, Hussein doubted that Israel's intentions in going to war in 1967 were as claimed: to defend itself from an imminent Arab attack or to gain recognition from the Arab countries. Rather, Hussein started to suspect that the Israelis had wanted to expand all along. What disturbed him most was the Israeli response to an offer he made at their early post-war meetings and kept repeating: to sign a formal peace treaty in return for Israel's complete withdrawal from the West Bank and East Jerusalem. Hussein realized he was taking a big risk, but he was willing to chance it and to accept the judgement of his people, the Arab nation and history. He also thought that his offer was
a very major sacrifice because it would have meant the breaking of an Arab taboo. And he was shocked when the Israeli response was that they were willing to sign a peace treaty with Jordan but only if Jordan agreed to cede parts of the West Bank and all of Arab East Jerusalem to them.

At Rifa'i's first meeting with the Israelis the question was how the recent war could be used as a window for making peace. It was clear to him from the beginning that it was going to be exceptionally difficult: ‘Both sides were interested in making peace: one party wanted to annex Jerusalem and some areas in the West Bank, and the other was not willing even to consider making any territorial concessions. That was the deadlock right from the beginning. The intent for peace was there, but His Majesty was adamant that Israel must return
all
the territories captured in the war. And the Israelis were unwilling to accept it.'
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Rifa'i's allegation of Israeli territorial expansionism and diplomatic intransigence after the war is fully supported by the Israeli documentary record.

According to the Israeli record of this first meeting, Abba Eban said that he had come not to negotiate or to make commitments but to clarify two questions. First, could Jordan negotiate and sign a peace treaty with Israel on a separate basis without being dependent on another neighbour? And second, what could the king do to ensure an end to terrorist activities? Hussein's answer to the first question was that ‘It is not impossible.' But before taking such a difficult step, he needed to know what kind of a settlement Israel was prepared for. Eban's answer was evasive: his government saw no reason to come to a binding decision until and unless it was convinced that it had a serious Arab partner for peacemaking. There were three schools of thought, Eban elaborated: those who wanted to keep all the territory west of the Jordan River; those who favoured a settlement with the Palestine Arabs; and those who favoured peace with Jordan on the basis of a new, agreed and secure frontier. Even the last school of thought insisted on four conditions: no return to the borders of 4 June 1967; the changes would take account of security needs and historic association; the area west of the Jordan River would have to be demilitarized; and Jerusalem would remain united as the capital of Israel.

Hussein ignored the specific terms and merely suggested that they meet under the auspices of Gunnar Jarring, the UN mediator, as well as privately. He also wanted to consult with Cairo before proceeding with
separate negotiations. Rifa'i was more militant and seemed worried that Hussein had not reacted to the substance of Eban's presentation. ‘All your ideas, including the third,' Rifa'i told Eban, ‘are for Arab surrender, not for agreement.' Jordan's starting point would be the 4 June territorial situation with minor changes and on a reciprocal basis. There had to be Arab, and not merely Muslim, status in parts of Jerusalem. Israel's security would lie in a full peace settlement, not in topography. Hussein's final words were that a further effort should be made to get enough Egyptian consent to enable open negotiations to take place.
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Two days later Herzog took the initiative in arranging a follow-up meeting with Rifa'i. Herzog was evidently very impressed with Rifa'i, describing him in his report to the cabinet as a shrewd and even brilliant man who knew his subject inside out. At the second meeting Rifa'i stressed that Cairo's approval was vital for them because their hands were tied by the Khartoum decisions – no recognition, no negotiation and no peace with Israel. They could not go to New York for talks with Israeli representatives under Jarring's auspices unless the Egyptians went along with them. When the king visited Nasser in Cairo on 6–7 April, the Egyptian president had expressed scepticism about meeting with the Jews but agreed to reconsider if the Jordanians insisted. Nasser wanted Egypt to be present at the first meeting with Dr Jarring but he did not rule out independent Jordanian negotiations subsequently. Rifa'i talked at length about Nasser. During the king's last visit to Cairo, Nasser told him that he did not want young Egyptians to continue to sacrifice their lives. He was willing to end the state of war if Israel withdrew from all the occupied territories. But he would never agree to meet with the Israelis face to face. Israel and the West had defeated him militarily and economically; if he met with them, he would be defeated politically too. Should Israel continue to refuse to withdraw, he estimated that he would be ready to take military action at the end of 1969 or the beginning of 1970.
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On the following day, 6 May, the two men met again. Rifa'i reported that he had received a message from Cairo in which Nasser said the following: ‘Don't trust the Jews. First, they will not carry out the Security Council resolution. Second, they will not give up Jerusalem. Third, they will not give up Gaza. Fourth, they will not withdraw to the borders of 4 June 1967. This whole business is an illusion and a danger. But, if you insist, I, Nasser, will order my permanent representative at the UN
to meet with Jarring, not with the Israelis, and we'll see. I'll give you this chance.' Rifa'i emphasized Nasser's moral debt to Jordan: he had involved them in the war and thus he could not stop them from proceeding to peace talks. In practical terms this meant two stages. In the first the Jordanian and Egyptian representatives would meet with Jarring. In the second the Egyptians would withdraw and the Jordanians would move forward to substantive talks. On his return home Herzog gave a detailed report to the cabinet on the three meetings and on the procedure proposed by Jordan for moving to a settlement. In the subsequent discussion a multitude of opinions were expressed. The most telling remark came from the mouth of the prime minister. Levi Eshkol repeated what he had told his colleagues many times before: ‘I fear the day when we have to sit face to face and conduct negotiations.'
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Herzog was allocated the task, which he executed with considerable skill and ingenuity, of maintaining the contact with the king and his adviser but without making any concrete proposals and without entering into negotiations. At his meeting, in London with Rifa'i on 19 and 20 June, arrangements were made for a trip by Hussein to the Gulf of Aqaba on 8 August.
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The meeting was to take place on a ship 500 metres south of Coral Island.
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But on 4 August the Israeli Air Force twice bombed the Fatah camps near Salt, on the East Bank, inflicting heavy civilian casualties and hitting four ambulances. Two days later a cable arrived from Dr Herbert, who was on holiday in Crete, to say that the consultation was cancelled owing to the hostilities. During a visit to London two weeks later, Hussein saw his doctor and discussed having another meeting there. At first Hussein said that he would see Herzog only if Herzog had something new to say, but he later changed his mind. Rifa'i told Herzog at a meeting on 22 August that the king wanted to see him on the 24th at 6 p.m. at the doctor's home. That evening, close to midnight, Herzog and Rifa'i met again for a summing-up talk. Herzog read his notes on the position stated by the king and received Rifa'i's comments. The doctor was present throughout all these meetings.