Lion of Jordan (22 page)

For Israel's leaders the overthrow of Nasser and the defeat of his army were the primary aims but Jordan featured in their thinking as a possible secondary target. Their view of Jordan was in a state of flux. With King Abdullah they had had a solid strategic partnership that had stood the test of time and brought rich rewards. Consequently, support for the survival of the Hashemite monarchy in Jordan became a basic tenet of Israeli defence policy. As a result of Hussein's apparent shift from the conservative to the radical Arab camp, however, this policy began to be reassessed. There were serious doubts about the capacity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan to preserve its independence and territorial integrity against its covetous neighbours. At the same time, Israeli leaders were developing their own designs for territorial expansion at Jordan's expense. David Ben-Gurion recorded in his diary that Moshe Dayan, the chief of staff, was ‘in favour of reaching an agreement with the English regarding the whole of the Middle East, destroying Nasser and partitioning Jordan between us and Iraq'.
⁶
This was completely outside the realm of possibility. Ben-Gurion, however, warmed to the idea and developed it into a comprehensive plan for a new political order in the Middle East. Although he admitted that this big plan might sound fantastic at first, he returned to it time and again in his diary and tried to sell it to his French co-conspirators in the course of plotting the attack on Egypt.

The tripartite collusion took place in a private villa in Sèvres on the outskirts of Paris from 22 to 24 October. At the first meeting with the French leaders, before the arrival of Selwyn Lloyd, the reluctant British
representative, Ben-Gurion presented his big plan for the reorganization of the Middle East to the French hosts. Jordan, he said, was not viable as an independent state and should therefore be divided. Iraq would get the East Bank in return for a promise to settle the Palestinian refugees there and to make peace with Israel, while the West Bank would be attached to Israel as a semi-autonomous region. Lebanon suffered from having a large Muslim population, which was concentrated in the south. The problem could be solved by Israel's expansion up to the Litani River, thereby helping to turn Lebanon into a more compact Christian state. The Suez Canal area should be given an international status, while the Straits of Tiran in the Gulf of Aqaba should come under Israeli control to ensure freedom of navigation. A prior condition for realizing this plan was the elimination of Nasser and the replacement of his regime with a pro-Western government that would also be prepared to make peace with Israel.
⁷

Whether fantastic or not, this plan is highly revealing of Ben-Gurion's inner thoughts about Israel, the European powers and the Arab world. It revealed his craving for an alliance with the imperialist powers against the forces of Arab nationalism; it exposed an uninhibited desire to expand by force at the expense of his neighbours and to expand in every possible direction – north east and south; and it exhibited a cavalier attitude towards the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Arab states in general and of Jordan in particular. Lebanon and Egypt were to lose some of their territory, and Jordan was to be snuffed out completely. A British official named Sir John Troutbeck once described King Abdullah as ‘a born land-grabber', but the term fitted Israel's founding father equally well. Far from Jordan threatening Israel's security, it was Ben-Gurion and his belligerent chief of staff who were plotting to dismember the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and to divide up the spoils with the Hashemites of Iraq.

The outcome of the secret deliberations in the suburban villa was recorded in a three-page document that came to be known as ‘The Protocol of Sèvres'; only the Israeli copy survived. This document constitutes the smoking gun of the conspiracy to attack Egypt. It makes the meeting at Sèvres the best-documented war plot in history. Most of its clauses detail the series of steps by which war was to be instigated: an Israeli strike against Egypt, an Anglo-French ultimatum to the combatants to withdraw from the Canal Zone and allied intervention following
the inevitable Egyptian rejection of the ultimatum. Jordan, however, also features in the protocol. If Israel were to attack Jordan, Britain would have been obliged to go to Jordan's rescue under the terms of their treaty. For Eden this was the nightmare scenario. Article V tried to reconcile these conflicting commitments. Israel undertook not to attack Jordan during the period of operations against Egypt. But in the event of a Jordanian attack on Israel, Britain undertook not to come to the aid of Jordan.
⁸
The decks were now cleared for tripartite aggression against Egypt.

Israel launched its attack on the Egyptian forces in the Sinai Peninsula in the early hours of 29 October. Jordan was taken by complete surprise. A state of emergency was immediately declared. Hussein sent a telegram of support to Nasser. Hussein was nearly hysterical with anger and could hardly contain his rage. ‘During this crucial time,' he said in a radio broadcast, ‘our nation is facing on the dear land of Egypt an unjust attack by the oppressive Zionism and tyrant Judaism, ally of evil and enemy of peace.' General Amer, the commander-in-chief of the three armies, issued a mobilization order to the Syrian and Jordanian units associated with what came to be known as ‘Operation Beisan'. The plan envisaged a rapid armoured thrust across Israel's most vulnerable point, its ‘wasp waist' from the West Bank to the Mediterranean. This was intended to relieve some of the pressure on the Egyptian forces in the south. Hussein pressed for the immediate execution of General Amer's order, but he met with resistance from Ali Abu Nuwar. The chief of staff considered it too risky to venture alone and counselled waiting until the arrival of the Syrian troops.
⁹

Nabulsi had been prime minister for less than a week when called upon to face a crisis of the greatest magnitude. The king asked him to support Egypt by opening a second front against Israel. Although Nabulsi was ‘a leftist', to use the king's word, he refused a direct order from the king to launch a military offensive against Israel. The government was divided. Some of its members argued that opening a front in the war from the Jordanian side would lead to a break with the West and expose the country to the risk of invasion by the Jews. Others thought that it was necessary to consult with Syria and to contact Iraq in order to make a united stand.
¹⁰
These differences were bridged by a formula that said that Jordan's first duty to the Arab cause was to defend its own frontiers. Nabulsi himself came down on the side of caution. He
was aware of Jordan's military weakness. He knew that the Jordanian troops were no match for the Israelis. He had his doubts about the reliability of the Syrians, and he was altogether opposed to the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan. Finally, he also took seriously Britain's warning that it would not come to Jordan's aid if Jordan attacked Israel.

The memoirs of Anwar al-Khatib, the minister of public works in Nabulsi's government, throw additional light on the discussions of the cabinet and on the positions of the principal protagonists. He relates that Hussein was very eager to open a Jordanian front in order to relieve the pressure on the Egyptian Army. Hussein chaired a long meeting of the cabinet, accompanied by the new chief of staff, Abu Nuwar. The king opened the meeting by saying that they could not abandon Egypt to fight alone and that they had a duty to open a new front and to join in the fighting. The tone of his voice suggested that he was very determined. At this point Khatib asked the king to allow the chief of staff to give his assessment of the situation. Abu Nuwar began his survey with the following observations: ‘The Hebron district will fall into the hands of the enemy in the first twenty-four hours of the war because of the great difficulty of protecting it. After that the Nablus district will also fall. As for Jerusalem, we'll defend it to the last man and to the last drop of blood.' After Abu Nuwar completed his survey, Khatib turned to the king and said, ‘Are we in a position to take on more refugees? Can we allow ourselves to lose more land after the loss of the land of Palestine? The picture presented to us by the commander of the army obliges us to behave sensibly and to wait. We all want to relieve the burden on Egypt, but our participation in this manner would only increase the load on Egypt and make it necessary for her to come to our aid while she herself is facing her ordeal.' Nabulsi was torn by conflicting considerations: his sense of responsibility pointed in one direction, while his sense of solidarity inclined him towards participation in the struggle and in the fighting. The protracted deliberations ended with a decision to hold another meeting in the royal court to allow Salah Tuokan, the minister of finance, to present an assessment by the Jordanian treasury and to consider whether it could bear the cost of war. This took place the following day, and when Toukan finished his report, the king looked crestfallen.
¹¹

The second stage of the war consisted of an Anglo-French attack on Egypt following its anticipated rejection of their ultimatum to withdraw
from the canal. Collusion between the colonial powers and Israel was widely suspected at the time, and public opinion in Jordan was in a state of great agitation. Hussein was furious and thought he had been double-crossed by the British, as indeed he had, although the proof did not emerge until a decade later. Hussein sent a telegram of support to Nasser. Charles Johnston, the new British ambassador to Amman, soon discovered that Hussein was ‘more resentful and distressed about our action over Suez than the most anti-British of his Ministers and subordinates'.
¹²
In his fury, Hussein called Nasser and told him that he was ready to declare war on Israel. Nasser expressed his appreciation but declined the offer because he had already given his army the order to withdraw from Sinai. Hussein's anger was cooled only when Nasser begged him not to risk Jordan's army against overwhelming odds. The military position was hopeless, said Nasser, but he thought he might yet secure the withdrawal of the invading forces by diplomatic means.
¹³

The desperate military situation led Nasser to countermand General Amer's initial order. On 1 November, while Egypt's airfields were being bombed by the allies, Amer issued new instructions to the Jordanian and Syrian chiefs of staff: ‘Halt the offensive preparations. Postpone Operation Beisan until further orders. Secure borders and prepare defenses against every possible invasion.'
¹⁴
The majority of the ministers greeted the new order from Cairo with a sigh of relief. They had been under considerable strain since the outbreak of the crisis, with daily cabinet meetings, all of them dominated by the question of an eastern front. The ministers understood that the war between Israel and Egypt was now transformed into a much bigger one as a result of the intervention of Britain and France. Thus, according to Khatib's account, the cable from Cairo helped to calm the strained nerves and to settle the tense debate within Jordan.
¹⁵

From his side of the hill, General Dayan noted that Jordan reinforced its defence system along the border with Israel and that every position that had formerly been manned by a company was now garrisoned by a battalion. ‘From the operational point of view, this move of Jordan is definitely defensive… It offers no sign of serious preparation for war.'
¹⁶

There is no way of knowing what might have happened had Hussein gone ahead and opened a second front against Israel. History does not reveal its alternatives. But it is arguable that Hussein's brave stand during the Suez crisis and his loyalty to Nasser greatly enhanced his
credentials as an Arab nationalist, especially when compared with the more cautious approach of the leftist prime minister and chief of staff. Abu Nuwar claimed many years later that he had been ready to honour the terms of the new alliance with Egypt and Syria, and had prepared and positioned enough troops ‘to give the Israelis a very rough time'. But ‘when Nasser said “stop” and the King was urging me every minute to attack, I said “no, Your Majesty, this would be suicide.” '
¹⁷
Hussein was young and impetuous, and he acted with a rush of sudden energy. He had the scent of battle in his nostrils and was bitterly disappointed by the attitude of his advisers. Prince Hassan recalls Hussein's frustration: ‘My brother wanted to make his own mark… he was thwarted by not having a confrontation in 1956.'
¹⁸

What the king did do was to invite the Syrian, Saudi and Iraqi governments to sent troops to reinforce Jordan's defences. In response to this request, a ragbag army of allies poured into Jordan, ‘each with different equipment, different methods, different orders and profoundly different motives'.
¹⁹
The Syrian troops arrived on 4 November, but, to the great disappointment of the Jordanians, they were a disorderly mob, wholly unprepared for battle and probably more trouble than they were worth. The Saudi troops did not arrive until the fifteenth, long after the fighting had ended. The arrival of the Iraqis was the cause of the first row between the king and his prime minister. Nabulsi objected to the entry of Iraqi troops into Jordan on the grounds that Iraq was not a member of the Amman pact. The king made it clear to Nabulsi that the deployment of the Iraqi troops inside Jordan was a royal decision and that the cabinet had to accept it. Nabulsi replied that decisions of this kind were the prerogative of the cabinet, not the king. Nabulsi prevailed, and by the end of the month all the Iraqi troops had withdrawn from Jordan.
²⁰

With the British and French acceptance of the United Nations order for a ceasefire on 7 November, the Suez crisis subsided. The Jordanian government requested the withdrawal of all foreign troops, but only the Iraqis complied. Syrian and Saudi forces remained in the country after the military reasons for their presence had disappeared, creating the disturbing impression that they were simply positioning themselves to secure the best results in an eventual carve-up of Jordanian territory.
²¹
The Syrians soldiers continued to prove the most difficult of the foreign guests. According to one account, they started to bring their families, they took over the Jordan Army cantonment in Mafraq, and they gave
the impression of intending to remain in the country permanently. Under the cover of Arab patriotism, they seemed to be preparing to grab what they could for themselves.
²²
Whatever else it might have been, the Amman pact was not a serious threat to Israel's security.