Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program (16 page)

Though AJET's elected leaders assiduously avoided the label "union,"
arguing that the group was necessary simply to coordinate and facilitate
smooth implementation of the program, it was never entirely clear to Japanese officials whether this was to be a support group or a pressure group.
Privately, several of the Japanese officials I interviewed confessed that initially they perceived AJET as a vote of no confidence on the ability of Japanese officials to handle the program. It is clear from even a cursory look at
AJET's activities during the first few years that the organization began
pressing CLAIR and the Ministry of Education for change on a host of controversial issues. AJET not only took up the problems of taxes, insurance,
and pensions but also established special interest groups for minority JETs
and for female JETs, as well as a peer support network to fill the perceived
gap in counseling services.

Private opinions aside, the issue for CLAIR and ministry officials
quickly became how to manage AJET. How much formal recognition and
support should be accorded? How much leverage should AJET representatives be allowed over program policies? How should AJET be explained to
prefectural and municipal officials? AJET's struggle for a formal and legitimate role in program administration was a recurring theme during the
early years of the program.

There was by no means unanimity in the Japanese camp on how to handle this development. Initially, Wada Minoru at the Ministry of Education
was quite unsympathetic to AJET requests for a greater role in determining speakers and the content of sessions at the Tokyo orientation, the
midyear block seminars, and the renewers' conference. The first secretarygeneral at CLAIR also adopted a wait-and-see attitude toward AJET, and
even forbade program coordinators at CLAIR from contacting AJET representatives directly without first going through the relevant Japanese prefectural official. Finally, at AJET's request, CLAIR did send out official notification to each prefecture explaining the association and asking for
cooperation in facilitating meetings of prefectural and district AJET representatives. Yet prefectural receptivity to and understanding of the purpose
of AJET varied tremendously.

In 1988, however, under a particularly sympathetic secretary-general,
CLAIR's strategy began to change. In effect, Japanese officials at CLAIR
decided that it would be counterproductive to take an overly confrontational stance toward AJET; rather, they would monitor AJET activities and
cooperate when possible. CLAIR even granted AJET a small budget and
agreed to host three "evaluation meetings" each year that brought a small
group of JET participants to Tokyo to provide feedback on the program.
These meetings, which are attended by all top-ranking officials at CLAIR,
are now an important source of input from the JET participants. Moreover,
AJET was granted an additional day at the renewers' conference, with hotel
rooms subsidized by CLAIR, during which they could schedule their own
speakers, hold meetings of their interest groups, and elect officers.' By 1989
the question "What's AJET's stance on this?" was asked automatically of
almost any proposed change in program policy. While CLAIR and Ministry of Education officials were often far from willing to capitulate to AJET
demands, AJET had at least established its legitimacy as a conduit through
which concerns of program participants could reach the ears of Japanese officials.

ADMINISTRATIVE SNAFUS AND INTERMINISTERIAL RIVALRIES

In her case study of intercultural friction in a U.S-Japan joint venture company, Tomoko Hamada provides a fascinating account of a disagreement
over how to calculate for tax purposes the depreciation of newly purchased
equipment. She describes how Japanese officials preferred the method of
their parent company, which spread the depreciation over a number of
years. The American side, however, was under considerable pressure to show short-term profit to the company's stockholders and thus preferred
an accounting method that allowed for the largest possible tax deduction
immediately. In the end, a seemingly trivial distinction in calculating taxes
led to a series of misunderstandings that proved highly significant in shaping mutual perceptions. The JET Program, too, was full of seemingly "neutral" administrative procedures that led to much questioning of intentions
and motives.

The Australian Tax Controversy

The first mini-administrative crisis involved a controversy over the tax
status of Australian participants during the first year of the program.' According to Japanese law the JET participants could be exempt from Japanese
income tax for their first two years of employment, and the government
had advertised the year in Japan as tax-free income. In the haste of the
start-up, however, they had overlooked the fact that Japan had no bilateral
agreement on taxes with the Australian government. Moreover, Australian
tax laws made it clear that nationals residing outside the country were required to pay taxes either at home or abroad. Any change in this policy
would require nothing less than an act of Parliament.

By the time Australian participants arrived in Tokyo in August 1987,
the rumor mill had begun to whirl. Up to 40 percent of their JET income
would have to be forked over to the government on their return home!
Even if they paid Japanese taxes, they would be held responsible for the difference, since the Australian tax burden was higher! Calls to the Australian
embassy or to CLAIR asking for clarification seemed to lead nowhere. All
this created a panic among Australian participants, some of whom had already signed a form exempting them from Japanese taxes. They began to
confront CLAIR officials as well as local board of education personnel and
school principals. AJET got involved, petitions were signed, letters of
protest were written, and an Associated Press reporter was brought into
the fray. Several Australian participants threatened to resign unless the
issue was resolved by a specific date. Miriam was one:

We had all kinds of meetings at orientation about the tax problem and
for six months afterwards as well. It was a horrible way to start what
should have been a wonderful experience. We'd been told when we applied that we were all tax-free, but they obviously didn't do their
homework. CLAIR kept saying, "Don't worry, as far as we're concerned
you won't have to pay taxes," but they wouldn't give us any evidence.
Finally I told my boss, "Look, you're not going to be there when I have to pay my tax. Get me something in writing by the end of this month,
or I'm going home in January." That got his attention. It seems the
only time they respond to us is when we give them ultimatums.

Pressured both by the Australian embassy and by educational administrators in the prefectures to do something about the tax problem, CLAIR
officials contacted the Australian Taxation Department (via the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs via the Japanese consulate in Canberra) to ask if an exception to the tax laws could be made for the JET Program. After all, the Japanese government was doing Australia a favor by including their citizens in
it. The reply from Canberra was clear: this was Japan's problem, and the
burden of accommodation rested on the Japanese government. But Australian officials did suggest that if JET participants were to pay taxes in
Japan, they would be exempt from taxation in Australia. The only difficulty came with the relatively large percentage of Australian participants
who were public school teachers. As civil servants, they could not be exempted from Australian tax unless they were "consultants" to a foreign
government.

After months of deliberation, correspondence, and visits among all the
relevant agencies, including the Finance Ministry, Home Affairs officials
and the secretary-general of CLAIR decided on their course of action. They
would raise the actual salary of the Australians by the amount required to
pay Japanese taxes. This would ensure that after Japanese taxes were deducted, their salaries would remain the same as those of other JET participants. The solution to the predicament of those who were teachers in Australia involved a more substantial dose of administrative sleight of hand.
CLAIR advised local governments to change the official status of Australian ALTs to CIRs on all tax forms, thereby qualifying them as "consultants to a foreign government."

Yet the fallout from the Australian tax problem was heavy. During the
months that CLAIR had been negotiating their tax status, the Australian
participants themselves had been in limbo, receiving little in the way of
consistent or reliable information. Frustrated by the bureaucratic inertia
and by the teaching conditions at local levels, their reports back home were
far from glowing. While more than i,ioo applications had been received
from Australians in 1987, the number fell to barely 250 the following year.
There was also a significant decrease in requests for Australians by prefectural offices of education fearing unpleasant confrontations and extra administrative work. This placed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in a very difficult position. Eighty-three Australians had been hired to participate in
the program in 1987, and it would hardly do if in 1988 the number were to
decrease. An Osaka board of education official recalls, "After the Australian
tax problem many prefectures didn't want Australians but Foreign Affairs
called us and said, 'Please take one or two because if you don't it will look
bad for Japan.' It was a real difficult situation because of the diplomatic
considerations (gaiko ga aru kara muzukashii). So we ended up requesting
a few Australians even though they weren't our first choice." In the end,
143 Australian participants were admitted to the JET Program in 1988, but
the percentage of Australian participants relative to the total JET population later fell steadily, from 9.79 percent in 1987 to 4.9 percent in 1991.'

Health Insurance and Pensions

A second controversial question involved health insurance and pension
payments for the foreign teachers. During the first year of the program the
amount that JET participants were required to pay for health insurance
varied greatly among prefectures, ranging from as little as $3o to nearly
$200 per month. JET participants began complaining to CLAIR immediately after their arrival: individuals asked why they should have three or
four times as much taken from their salary for health insurance as friends
in the neighboring prefecture.

The discrepancy arose because prefectural offices and municipalities
were choosing between two insurance plans, the "Kenpo" (Seifu Kansho
Hoken) plan and the "Kokuho" (Kokumin Kenko Hoken) plan. The former
is the government-operated insurance plan designed for nonregular employees (regardless of nationality) who are employed for more than two
months in the public or private sector. The latter applies to anyone employed for less than two months or to those who are self-employed. According to Japanese law, the Kenpo plan is compulsory for any public or
private organization employing personnel for a period of more than two
months. In reality, though, many prefectures and municipalities were enrolling all their nonregular employees (not only JET participants) in the
Kokuho plan because it was cheaper.

In 1987 the Social Insurance Agency (Shakai Hoken Cho) notified local
governments that they must comply with the law, and the National Audit
Board began investigating health insurance procedures in host institutions.
Prefectures and municipalities that had been using the Kokuho plan saw
the audit coming and switched to the more expensive policy. This solved the problem of discrepancies between prefectures, but some JET participants were outraged by their new high premiums. Moreover, those premiums were automatically deducted from every employee's salary. When
several prefectures switched the health insurance of their renewing JET
participants without notice, renewers charged that they had not been accurately informed of the terms of their new contracts.

The switch also created an entirely new and even more intractable problem: the Kenpo plan required JET participants to pay into a pension fund
even though they would receive no pension. Indeed, that contribution is
what makes the Kenpo plan considerably more expensive than the Kokuho
plan. The "pension issue" became a perennial sore point during the early
years of the program. The CLAIR Newsletter and the AJET Magazine ran
regular updates on developments in the debate. In a 1989 letter to the JET
Journal, one CIR summed up the indignation felt by many JET participants:

While I am sure none of us totally reject the idea of paying for an insurance policy, I believe many of us find almost criminal the fact that
half of the actual insurance premium we pay each month is for the purpose of a pension fund payed [sic] to retired individuals. It is simply the
principal [sic] involved. Why should we be required to pay for a pension fund which we will never benefit from? Unless we have aspiring
Kent Gilberts among us (Kent is the quintessential gaijin-turned-
Nihongo star to be watched almost nightly on TV), we are in Japan on a
temporary basis and will certainly not be here when we retire.'

Japanese officials at CLAIR were completely stymied by this problem.
Most agreed that there was a logical inconsistency in the policy, and one
secretary-general even told me that he ranked it the major unresolved
issue of his tenure at CLAIR. Yet the outspoken, even self-righteous, manner in which some JET participants pressed their claims seemed to catch
CLAIR officials off guard. From their point of view, the JET participants
were guests in Japan, and fairly well-paid ones at that: to press monetary
demands in this way seemed highly inappropriate. Japanese officials were
also quick to point out that the same situation existed in many other countries.

Nevertheless, by May 1988 CLAIR had already approached the Social
Insurance Agency to request that it reconsider the pension requirement.
But CLAIR was clearly at the mercy of more powerful external agencies.
Because the pension payment was prescribed by Japanese law, any changes would require the introduction of new legislation in the Diet, and in the
late 198os the Social Insurance Agency seemed to be in no mood to consider such action. For the time being, JET participants were forced to swallow the bitter pill of paying over a hundred dollars per month into a fund
from which they would never benefit.