Importing Diversity: Inside Japan's JET Program (15 page)

There is a sense, however, in which the JET Program can best be categorized as a "reactive" policy. Without Nakasone's deep interest in foreign affairs and the catalysts of U.S.-Japan trade friction and the Maekawa Report, it is doubtful that the JET Program would have ever materialized in
its present form. It was generated largely by pressure from the outside: its
goal was to demonstrate Japan's commonality with other countries in
order to protect what Nakasone himself described as Japan's "vulnerable
security system and international economic encirclement."` Consequently, there were people in each of the sponsoring ministries who were not
thrilled by its announcement, and I was continually struck by how frequently the passive voice and the phrases "have to" and "must" (shi-
nakereba naranai koto) were used when Ministry of Home Affairs and
local officials explained the origins of the program.41

It is also important to stress that the JET Program involves three government ministries, identifying and targeting a problem that cannot be
solved through ordinary sectoral policies. Insofar as the program transcends
sectoral boundaries, creates new institutional structures and patterns of interaction, and requires new forms of behavior, it can be categorized with
those innovative approaches that have been termed "megapolicies."`'6 Yet
intersectoral policies cannot just supersede existing policies. They must always be adapted to conflicting sectoral policy goals.

In addition, the three sponsoring ministries were not equal partners.
The Ministry of Home Affairs took firm control of the budget and overall
coordination of the program. Because diplomatic relations and strengthening Japan's role and image in the world often receive high priority in policy formation at the national level, the voice of the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs was also strong. Indeed, it was the growing realization that preparation for world citizenship as conceived by the Ministry of Education did
not accommodate Japan's new global needs that provided much of the initial impetus for the JET Program-and that ministry was clearly placed on
the defensive by its adoption.

In spite of conflict and compartmentalization, the refusal of any ministry ultimately to undermine the policy speaks to the power of the concept
of internationalization itself. For the politicians and bureaucrats concerned,
pressured as they were by outside forces, proclaiming the existence of the
JET Program was at least as important as the details of the policy's execution-not because they were hypocritical but because they realized the
substantial symbolic significance of political actions. Wada Minoru himself
confessed, "Since we have proclaimed the high ideals of internationalization, at the very least we must go through the motions of accommodating
those ideals. But," he added, "and I'm sure I'll be criticized for saying this,
I don't think Japan will change that much. We're not going to become like
other countries."47

Dozens of flights converged on Narita Airport on 31 July 1987 carrying
hundreds of Japan Exchange and Teaching Program participants, many of
whom had flown business class.' Private buses whisked the new arrivals to
the luxurious Keio Plaza Inter-Continental Hotel, where they were
greeted, in the glare of the media spotlight, by the ministers of foreign affairs, education, and home affairs and the governor of Hyogo Prefecture.'
Following the official introductions, all the JET participants, as well as a
host of current and former Japanese officials connected with the program,
were treated to a gourmet dinner reception. The beer flowed nonstop, and
an elegant buffet was served by kimono-clad hostesses.

The Japanese speakers, by and large, expressed their expectation that the
participants were to be "cultural ambassadors," indeed reformers of Japanese society. One noted, "It is my honest wish that through mixing with
local people you will play your part as a stone in protecting the castle of
peace." Another told the group, "You are participating in this great experiment. The process of internationalization is here to stay, and that is why
you will be welcomed all over the country.... The understanding you can
bring is so vitally needed in this turbulent world of today." Over the next
four days of workshops on the nuts and bolts of teaching a foreign language or working in government offices, the theme of change was constantly in the air and a spirit of goodwill dominated.

But by the end of August, when the JET participants had finally settled
in local schools and communities, the positive atmosphere had begun to
dissipate. For assistant language teachers (ALTs), life in Japanese secondary
schools seemed focused on preparing for entrance exams to the neglect of
spoken English. Some coordinators for international relations (CIRs) arrived in prefectural offices to find that the "coordinator" part of their title was something of a misnomer: their employers had little clue as to what
they might do other than translate documents and teach English to prefectural employees. Prefectural conditions of employment varied greatly, and
school visitation schedules seemed to promote superficiality. Negative reports about the JET Program began to surface in the national media, and
questions were raised about the commitment of CLAIR and of the Ministry of Education to racial and gender equality and about the capacity of
bureaucrats to provide the human touch. The first few years of the program were thus marked by numerous problems and misunderstandings as
the reform-minded participants, most of whom spoke no Japanese and had
little understanding of Japanese culture, vented their frustrations to anyone who would listen.

These program-related complaints were directed primarily at the small
cadre of Japanese officials and alumni of the Mombusho English Fellows
Program and British English Teaching Scheme at CLAIR who had been assembled to administer the program. This chapter examines the administrative and cultural problems that arose during the first three years of the
program from the vantage point of national-level officials. What issues
were raised by JET participants and their brokers at CLAIR, the program
coordinators? What were the major concerns on the part of Japanese officials at the Ministry of Education and at CLAIR? Most important, through
what process were conflicts actually defused, and with what effect on each
of the parties concerned?

It is important to remember that the initial CLAIR staff numbered
fewer than twenty and was anything but the stereotypical Japanese organization-a cohesive, tight-knit group. While the influence of the Ministry
of Home Affairs was great, only three of the five ranking Japanese officials
(yakuin) hailed from that ministry. As a group, the yakuin had only minimal experience with internationalization and were simply anxious to get
through the start-up year without major problems. Most did not consider
being posted to CLAIR as a step up in their career ambitions; instead, they
usually viewed it as a lateral move, or even as removal from the career ladder entirely. In addition, there were eight staff members (uneiiin) representing local governments from as far away as Kumamoto Prefecture and
as near as the Tokyo Metropolitan office. Though they were ostensibly appointed to CLAIR to acquire know-how for internationalization, these
local government officials saw their stay primarily as a chance to develop
ties with the central authorities that could later benefit their locality.

Finally, there were three foreigners chosen as program coordinators for
the pilot year: Philip, a soft-spoken American who had spent three years teaching in Saga Prefecture in the MEF Program and had married a Japanese woman; Caroline, an outspoken American who had spent two years in
Chiba Prefecture in the MEF Program after graduating with a major in Japanese studies from a small midwestern liberal arts college; and Ben, a native of Britain and an alumnus of the BET Scheme. They would be responsible for designing all English-language materials for the program and
handling most of the direct interaction with JET participants. Having
worked hard to promote English language reform and cosmopolitan attitudes in their respective prefectures, they were excited about the great
changes that the JET Program would make possible.

The composition of CLAIR was thus even more complex than that of
the agencies John Campbell has described as "pseudo-uchi"-agencies
that cross ministerial jurisdictions in order to deal with recurring or permanent problems.; There was no natural community of interest among
the initial staff at CLAIR; on the contrary, the potential for fragmentation
was tremendous. Yet this group with diverse interests quickly became focused on the shared task of managing an extremely complex and unwieldy program.

THE RISE OF AJET AS A PRESSURE GROUP

The very first development unanticipated by Japanese officials was the establishment by JET participants of a quasi-union/support group at the 1987
Tokyo Orientation. While similar organizations had existed earlier, no one
guessed that MEF and BET participants who stayed on under the JET Program would be so successful in mobilizing incoming JET participants to
their cause. With the stated purpose of providing support and assisting
CLAIR and the Ministry of Education in responding effectively to a variety
of program-related problems, the Association of Japan Exchange and Teaching (AJET) convinced over 8o percent of JET participants to pay the $1oo
dues required to join during their first year. Prefectural, regional, and national representatives were elected, and AJET immediately began publishing
a monthly newsletter. By 1988 this publication had become a "magazine"
that provided "a forum for sharing teaching ideas, travel tips, complaints,
triumphs, humor and even recipes." The August 1988 issue began with a letter from the group's chair describing the rationale and purpose of AJET:

The program is simply too large to be carried out effectively given the
present government's administrative provisions. Another body is necessary, one which addresses the needs of program participants. In fact, such an association exists. AJET is an independent, self-financed support organization which exists to represent the interests of participating ALTS and CIRs.

AJET is a network which addresses the personal and professional
needs of its members through a three-tiered hierarchy of representatives. There are seven Block Representatives and 47 Prefectural Representatives serving in addition to the four National Officers (a Chairperson, a Vice-chairperson, a Treasurer and a Secretary). These
representatives seek solutions to problems on the program participants' behalf and attempt to preempt those which threaten to disturb
our well-being.... AJET is independent and self-governing, it need
not concern itself so extensively with the spectre of censorship which
looms at official levels.

It should be mentioned here that AJET is not a labor union. No wage
bargaining will ever be attempted, no wild-cat strikes called, no buttons
issued, no love-ins or walk-outs sponsored; foreign unions are by law
forbidden in this country. If we were ever to appear to conduct ourselves as such, one can be certain that we would be directed to pack our
omiyage [souvenirs] and take our respective brands of native English
elsewhere.4