Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (44 page)

The departing troops were told that there was little or no snow in the Narvik area. One can well imagine their dismay upon arrival in Harstad, seeing snow several feet deep all the way to the water’s edge. General Ironside had drafted General Mackesy’s instructions but neglected to coordinate or discuss these with the other service chiefs of staff. Ironside directed Mackesy to secure a foothold in Harstad, establish contact with Norwegian forces in the area if they existed, prepare the area for the arrival of additional forces, and then to proceed against the enemy in a deliberate manner. However, Ironside’s notes were themselves contradictory. In one place, Mackesy is urged to take bold advantage of naval action but in another place he is told, “It is not intended that you should land in the face of opposition.”
¹⁸

Admiral Cork had no written instructions, but he received verbal briefings from Admiral Pound, the Military Coordination Committee, and finally from Churchill. There was no doubt in Cork’s mind that he should seize Narvik as quickly as possible and that he should not hesitate to take risks in doing so. Churchill writes that neither he nor the Admiralty received copies of the instructions given to General Mackesy. In an obvious understatement, Churchill admits that the instructions given to Cork and Mackesy “were somewhat different in tone and emphasis.”
¹⁹

Unity of command was completely disregarded. General Ismay, one of the participants, has summarized neatly what transpired:
²⁰

Since there was no theater commander, decisions that would normally have fallen to him, were relegated to a large number of committees in London. What was even worse, there was no single commander for all services in the three areas of Norway where the Allies eventually operated. Since the army commanders in the three areas did not command any air or naval forces, they relied on cooperation from those services. The Germans also struggled with unity of command because of service rivalries, but their problems were largely overcome at the operational levels by subordinate commanders who worked together as professionals.

Admiral Cork and General Mackesy did not even meet before they set out for Narvik by separate conveyance on April 12. Cork departed from Rosyth on the cruiser
Aurora
while Mackesy departed from Scapa Flow on the cruiser
Southampton
. The remainder of the 24th Guards Brigade (two companies accompanied General Mackesy and the brigade commander on the
Southampton
) and the three battalions of the 146th Infantry Brigade left for Narvik on April 12 with a strong naval escort consisting of the battleship
Valiant
, cruisers
Manchester
,
Birmingham
and
Cairo
, and eleven destroyers.

Changing Allied Strategy and Plans

When we last looked at the confusing scene of Allied decision-making with respect to Norway, it appeared that they had settled firmly late on April 9 on making the recapture of Narvik—codenamed Rupert—the top priority while examining the possibility of landings at Namsos and Åndalsnes. However, the consensus was weak and open to outside influences that soon made themselves felt.

Prime Minister Reynaud was dubious about the early ability of the Allies to land sufficient forces in Norway. He was still preoccupied with the iron ore question and decided to send a diplomatic-military delegation to Sweden to try to convince that country to enter the war on the Allied side. The mission stopped in London on April 11 on its way to Sweden, and Chamberlain, who liked the French idea, decided a British delegation should join the venture.

The Swedes told the delegations that they would remain neutral under all eventualities but they did give advice as evidenced by a telegram from the French ambassador in Sweden on April 13: “The Allied missions here, and also the Swedes, are unanimous in their opinion that the most effective Allied help would be the recapture of Trondheim.” Admiral Evans, who headed the British delegation, expressed similar views in a telegram to the Foreign Office: “Most urgent is Trondhjem be re-captured forthwith, or both Norway and Sweden will completely lose faith in us…. Narvik could wait anyway a fortnight.”
²¹

The confusion in Allied ranks during these early days of the Norwegian campaign was not entirely due to lack of intelligence, as some British authors claim. The Allies had had no contacts with the Norwegian government since the German attack, and they made no concerted attempt in those early days to get in touch with the Norwegian military authorities. Contact was re established on April 12 when Ambassador Dormer linked up with the Nor wegian government near the Swedish border.

Dormer sent a message to the British Foreign Office via Stockholm in which he confirmed Norwegian resolve to carry on the war against the Germans. However, the message also stated that the Norwegians would only be able to cope with the Germans militarily if aid from the Allies arrived quickly, and it carried an urgent appeal from General Ruge for the recapture of Trondheim. Dormer wrote, “I venture to urge that military assistance at Trondheim is first necessity. Seizure of Narvik was of little assistance to Norwegian government.”
²²

The political and strategic reassessment caused by these messages now resulted in a change in plans with further confusion. For reasons that should have been obvious to all before April 12, Trondheim assumed a new importance. It was not only an ancient capital but it was also the third largest metropolitan area in Norway, and it formed the country‘s main communications hub. Both Germans and Norwegians considered the city the key military objective.

The only strategic importance of Narvik, in Norwegian view, was as a shipping port for iron ore. Narvik is located over 400 miles north of Trondheim. The German forces in Narvik were isolated and the only realistic hope of reinforcements was overland from Trondheim. The recapture of that city and Værnes Airfield would place Narvik beyond the range of any supporting German aircraft. The Norwegian forces mobilizing in North Norway were capable of isolating the Germans and then going on the offensive. Their greatest need was air and naval support. Some Allied forces were welcomed but the Norwegians felt that they could be put to far better use for both the overall campaign and the effort in Narvik if they were used to recapture Trondheim, removing any chance of German reinforcements and eliminating their air threat.

Some within the MCC—particularly Sir Cyril Newall, Chief of the Air Staff—had recognized the importance of Trondheim as early as April 9. He resurfaced the idea at a meeting of the committee on April 11 but it was reluctant to undo the planning and preparations undertaken the past two days. Churchill, while agreeing that the recapture of Trondheim should be studied, stressed that no decision be made until it was known what was required at Narvik. The MCC adjourned without making any changes to the plans and preparations.

Moulton writes that Churchill, Admiral Pound and Air Chief Marshal Newall went to see General Ironside at 0100 hours on April 12. Churchill and the others who have written about the Norwegian campaign do not mention this meeting. The visitors suggested that part of the force on its way to Narvik be diverted to Namsos as part of a drive on Trondheim. Ironside reportedly argued vehemently against this solution on dubious practical grounds. His reasoning was that it was not possible to divert an invasion force destined for one location to another. This would be true under normal circumstances, but in this case the force was not ready for immediate action at either destination.

The War Cabinet met the following morning and the messages from the political/military mission to Sweden and from Sir Cecil Dormer had arrived. Churchill argued for no action against Trondheim that would threaten the success in the operation against Narvik. He conceded that if that city was recaptured quickly, the French alpine troops could be diverted for operations against Trondheim. Chamberlain was impressed with the views expressed by the Swedes and Norwegians and suggested that forces to recapture Trondheim should be put ashore in Namsos. Churchill was quick to point to the lack of information on the military situation in that part of the country and that such information was vital before undertaking any operations. Apparently, none of those present had the courage to point out to Churchill that there was an equal scarcity of information about the military situation in the Narvik area. The decision to make Narvik the priority target was left standing, but not for long.

The War Cabinet met again in the afternoon. This time both Chamberlain and Halifax argued for the political necessity of retaking Trondheim. Ironside objected initially because the expedition would require troops that were now in France, but then he qualified his position by stating that diversion of some troops destined for Narvik would not imperil that operation. Most cabinet members now threw their support behind Chamberlain and it was decided that operations to retake Trondheim be undertaken while allowing the operation against Narvik to proceed. While Churchill and Ironside’s insistence on Narvik was strategically fallacious, no one had the wisdom or moral courage to go after the logical objective—Trondheim—with all available forces. This division of effort almost guaranteed failure of both undertakings.

We are getting a little ahead of ourselves, but when the news of the naval action on April 13 reached London, the decision makers became overconfident. They felt that the capture of Narvik would be relatively easy and only a few days away. They decided to divert the 146th Brigade—now only hours from Harstad—to Namsos to form the northern prong of the pincer movement envisioned against Trondheim. This caused additional problems and further confusion. The 146th Brigade had no maps of its new area of operation, much of its equipment was loaded on ships carrying the 24th Guards Brigade to Harstad, and the brigade commander and his staff had already landed in Harstad, over 300 miles from the brigade’s new destination.

The selection of the unit sent to Namsos also seems strange. If operations against Narvik were viewed as easy, it would make better sense to send the best troops—the 24th Guards Brigade—to Namsos instead of the poorly trained and equipped territorial brigade. As matters developed, the Guards sat in the Narvik area for weeks without taking part in operations.

Churchill intervened again. In a visit to Ironside at 0200 hours on April 14, he proposed yet another alternation to plans. He suggested a direct attack on Trondheim by landing a small force to seize the city in conjunction with landings at Namsos and Åndalsnes. Ironside, who had earlier agreed reluctantly to the diversion of the 146th Brigade, now had second thoughts about the wisdom of that agreement. He relented when Churchill pointed out that the suggestion was made in his capacity as Chairman of the MCC; in other words, as Ironside’s superior in the British wartime chain of command. The order from the Chiefs of Staff was sent out on the 14th. It covered the landings of the 146th Brigade at Namsos and called for reinforcement of that force with a half-brigade of Chasseurs Alpines (CA) that the French had reluctantly agreed to divert from Narvik.

The MCC considered Churchill’s suggestion to land inside the fjord near Trondheim on April 13. The naval staff’s assessment of the feasibility of such an operation was positive. They believed that the shore batteries at the fjord entrance could be dealt with easily, and plans for the operation were prepared. These plans envisioned the use of three battleships and two aircraft carriers with eighty aircraft. Bomber Command would make nightly attacks on Værnes Airfield, and the airfields at Sola and Fornebu would be given special attention just before and during the operational phase.

The plan—code-named Hammer—called for a landing near Værnes, at a village called Hell, by the 15th Infantry Brigade. This unit was part of the 5th Division located in France. A force of two Canadian battalions would land near the fjord entrance and capture the shore batteries. The 147th Infantry Brigade would serve as a reserve. Major General Hotblack, with a divisional headquarters, was designated the force commander.

In its larger scope, the plan called for the 146th Brigade and French alpine troops to advance from Namsos and link up with the 15th Brigade near Værnes. Simultaneously, the 148th Infantry Brigade would land at Åndalsnes and advance towards Dombås. Its mission was two-fold. First, it would block any push towards Trondheim by German forces in the south in case these were able to break through the Norwegian lines. Secondly, it was hoped that the Germans in Trondheim would send forces to meet this southern threat. Except for the rosy assumption that two battalions of poorly trained territorial troops, without artillery, air support, winter training, or winter equipment could traverse the 190 miles between Åndalsnes and Trondheim across snow-clad mountains, it was a good plan—the best the Allies had developed so far.

B
EACHHEAD
C
ONSOLIDATION AND
S
ECOND
N
AVAL
B
ATTLE

“I do not believe that soldiers were ever, in the history of warfare, sent against an enemy with such a useless weapon.”

A
DMIRAL
K
ARL
D
ÖNITZ ON THE
G
ERMAN
T
ORPEDO
P
ROBLEMS.

Admiralty Eagerness to Follow up on First Naval Battle

After receiving Warburton-Lee’s last message that one enemy cruiser and three destroyers were attacking him, Admiral Whitworth finally took action. He sent the cruiser
Penelope
, commanded by Captain Yates, and four destroyers to Warburton-Lee’s aid. They arrived too late to participate in the battle and did not enter Ofotfjord. The Admiralty sent a message directly to Captain Yates in the
Penelope
at 2012 hours on April 11: “If in light of experience this morning you consider it a justifiable operation, take available destroyers in Narvik area and attack enemy in Narvik tonight or tomorrow morning.”
¹