Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (78 page)

The battalion commander decided to strike at the German flanks with the main attack consisting of Cos 1 and 7 from the east, while Co 2 attacked from the north to seize Hill 794 and the ridge between it and Kuberget. One machinegun platoon supported Co 2 while the rest of the machinegun Co supported the two-company attack from the east. The Norwegian maneuver made the German position on Hill 860 untenable and it was abandoned around 1800 hours on May 15.

Company 2 started its advance at 1430 hours. The plans called for one platoon to seize Hill 794 while two platoons captured the western part of Kuberget as well as the ridge between it and Hill 794. The resistance was heavy and by 2000 hours, the company was still well short of its objectives.

Companies 1 and 7 began their advance at 1400 hours but the attack faltered after the commander of Co 7, Lieutenant Liljedahl, was seriously wounded around 2100 hours. The question of pulling back from Kuberget was under discussion at Dietl’s headquarters and the Germans had already started withdrawing from some of their positions under Norwegian pressure, but reoccupied them quickly when the Norwegian attack began to waver.

A reshuffling of forces took place within the 1/16th Inf during the fighting for Kuberget that is difficult to understand. It appears that Co 1 was pulled out of the line on May 16 and used to bring provisions forward. The company, reinforced with a machinegun platoon from the 1/12th Inf, was directed to relieve Co 7 and prepare to attack Kuberget. Company 1, instead of attacking Kuberget, was moved to the high ground south and east of Lake 796. It remained in this area until the Germans withdrew during the night of May 22. Company 7 was also pulled back and assigned a security mission between Hill 796 and Hill 1097 on the Swedish border.

The redeployment of the two companies, which reduced Norwegian combat power in the Kuberg area, was apparently not connected to any planned offensive operations in this area. It seems that they were sent into the long mountainous stretch between Kuberget and the Swedish border for security reasons. This movement was one reason why the Germans rushed forces to fill the vacuum on their right flank.

The Norwegians made several unsuccessful attacks against Kuberget over the next few days. A determined German defense, periods of fog, and German close air support frustrated all attempts until Co 2 captured Hill 794 around 2200 hours on May 16, after bitter close-quarter fighting. A small German force had held this hill earlier until Lieutenant Trautner’s ski platoon rejoined its parent unit on May 15. This ski platoon was down to 14 men. The Norwegian losses were light. Lieutenant Trautner was among the fallen Germans. From Hill 794, the Norwegians placed effective fire on the southern slopes of Kuberget and this made it extremely difficult for the Germans to supply their forces. It was therefore important for the Germans to retake Hill 794 quickly. Von Schleebrügge ordered Lieutenant Hans Rohr to recapture the hill with his own men and the remnants of Lieutenant Stautner’s ski platoon.

Rohr managed to drive the Norwegians off the summit but failed to secure the hill completely. The fighting continued during the unusually bright night and the Germans were particularly exposed to Norwegian sharpshooters. Hovland quotes from Rohr’s journal:

Company 13, commanded by Captain Schönbeck, was ordered to join Rohr’s men and clear Hill 794 in the morning of May 17. This was Norway’s Independence Day and the Norwegians were able to exact some revenge on the German company that had inflicted so much damage on the 1/12th Inf in Gratangen more than three weeks earlier. The German attack was repelled with seven killed and another seven seriously wounded. The bitterness of the fighting is attested to by the fact that among the original 23 men in Rohr’s unit, six were killed, 12 wounded, and three captured.

The Germans rushed reinforcements into the area southeast of Kuberget for fear of a Norwegian breakthrough on the German right flank that would threaten their base at Bjørnefjell and the railroad connection to Sweden. The division reserve, Co 3/138th, was sent towards the right flank at 0100 hours on May 17. This unit occupied Hill 529 in the afternoon, after driving off a small Norwegian security force, and Hill 620 on the night of May 18-19. Two naval companies occupied Rundfjell and Haugfell, the two mountains immediately north of Bjørnefjell.

Three officers and 63 men of the German 1st Para Co, under the command of Lieutenant Becker, were parachuted into the Bjørnefjell area around noon on May 14. Six hours later, General Dietl ordered these paratroopers to Kuberget. They were assigned to the right flank on Kuberget, with their front curving southward to meet the Norwegian threat from the east. A second part of the 1st Para Co, under Lieutenant Mösinger, arrived at 0100 hours on May 19 and was sent off quickly to join the rest of the company on Kuberget. These paratroopers were well armed with at least 12 light machineguns but they were not dressed or equipped for the climate and had no experience in mountain warfare.

The Germans withdrew from Kuberget in the early morning of May 21 and the Norwegians quickly occupied the hill. The decision to withdraw was due to events further west and in accordance with a decision to retire to a new defensive line. The Germans had taken considerable losses in the fighting around Kuberget. The Norwegians found a mass grave and several German dead were found on the southwestern slope of Hill 794, leading to Skitdalsvann. Major Schleebrügge’s report to the 3rd Division on May 18 lists the casualties for the last three days as 13 killed, 25 wounded, 27 missing, and six cases of frostbite. This was almost half of the German troops involved in the fighting.
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The 1/16th remained in position from Kuberget to the Swedish border until friendly units to the west reached Jernvannene.

The 2/16th Inf, commanded by Major Munthe-Kaas, spent May 15 clearing German snipers from the area west of Storebalak. Subsequently, the battalion attacked with three companies forward: Co 5 on the right with Storebalak (Hill 763) as its objective, Co 6 in the center with Kobberfjell as its objective, and Co 8 and the heavy weapons remaining, for the time being, in positions on Hill 717. Company 3 became the brigade reserve, and along with a mortar squad from the 1/12th Inf was placed at the disposal of 2/16th and located on the left flank near Co 8.

Storebalak fell to the Norwegians around 2100 hours on May 15. One Norwegian and five Germans fell in the fighting. The German defenders retired to Hill 648. Company 6 attacked Kobberfjell in the morning of May 17 while the reinforced Co 5 made a supporting attack against Hill 648. The attacks met heavy resistance and were repelled. By nightfall, Co 5 was located on the southern slopes of Storebalak and in contact with enemy units on or near Hill 648. Company 6, supported now by Co 8, was located on Kobberfjell’s northern slope while Co 3 was located on the northeast slopes of that same mountain.

It had become obvious that the best way to secure Kobberfjell itself was by threatening the defenders’ line of retreat, since the very steep mountainsides would make a frontal assault very costly. Lieutenant Colonel Berg ordered the attacks delayed pending the outcome of “negotiations at higher levels” about a large-scale joint action, apparently with the 7th Brigade and the French. Munthe-Kaas writes, “As many times before during the campaign, nothing came of the coordinated attack.”
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Major Munthe-Kaas and his men used the pause to bring additional fire-support into place. They hoped to bring two of the four howitzers in the 8th Field Artillery Battery across the Vassdal River, now in flood. They managed to bring one howitzer across a snow-bridge before it collapsed. The howitzer was disassembled and a 72-man workforce managed, with the use of ropes and pulleys, to bring it up the precipitous 1500-foot north side of Storebalak within a period of two hours. The howitzer was quickly reassembled and firing on the surprised Germans on Kobberfjell.

A coordinated battalion attack was launched at 1100 hours on May 18. When the forces on the right flank began to stall, the battalion commander switched all but one platoon of Co 3 to that flank to bolster the attack. The fighting subsided around midnight because of a heavy fog. The Norwegians succeeded in seizing a hill about 300 meters northwest and across a small lake from the German positions on Hill 648. Major Munthe-Kaas writes in his report to the brigade on May 19:

Berg had a meeting with the Alta Bn commander on the same day, to coordinate their operations. They decided that the 6th Brigade would continue its two-battalion attack against Kuberget and Kobberfjell while the 1/12th advanced through the steep valley between Storebalak and Lillebalak and attacked Hill 648. Simultaneously, the Alta Bn would attack and seize Lillebalak (Hill 572) and Hill 482. It was anticipated that the French would attack towards Fiskeløsvann and Hill 482 from their positions west and south of Hartvigvann. According to Norwegian sources, one company made this attack on the night of May 17-18 but was stopped by heavy German air attacks. This attack is not mentioned in French sources.

The Alta Bn’s attack order issued in the evening of May 19 stated that it would attack southward that night while a French battalion attacked in the direction of Nedre Jernvann from Trældal. This was apparently the 14th Bn CA, which had arrived in Liljedal by ALCs and a destroyer that morning. The Alta Bn’s attack was to be carried out by three companies. Company 1, on the left, would cross the river and seize Lillebalak. It would dig in and support the attacks on German positions near Kobberfjellvann and Hill 336 with its heavy weapons. Company 2, in the center would attack one hour after Co 1 and seize Hill 336. Company 3, on the right, would make a concealed approach one hour after Co 1 began its advance, to attack positions northwest of Hill 482.

The brigade notified Major Munthe-Kaas at 2350 hours on May 19 that the attacks by the 1/12th Inf against Hill 648 and by Alta Bn against Lillebalak and Hill 482, were in progress. The 2/16th was unable to participate in or witness the attacks because a heavy fog blanketed the areas above 500 meters. Contact between the two 2/16th and 1/12th was established at noon on May 20. The 2/16th began its attack at 1500 hours, after the fog had lifted. It continued its attacks against Kobberfjell and Hill 648 in the evening of May 20 but encountered heavy resistance from both objectives.

Company 1, Alta Bn seized Lillebalak and Co 2 also captured its objective, Hill 336. There was contact between Co 2, Alta Bn and the right flank company of the 1/12th Inf. A little over three hours after securing Lillebalak, the Norwegians came under heavy artillery fire and withdrew from the hill. Two soldiers were killed and another three wounded. Soon thereafter, Co 2 on Hill 336 came under heavy mortar fire from the hills south of Hartvigvann. It appears that French artillery and mortar fire caused both incidents. The French had difficulties in differentiating between the grey-green uniforms worn by both Germans and Norwegians. Sometimes, even Germans and Norwegians experienced this difficulty. Special markings were agreed on between the Norwegians and the French, but these were apparently misunderstood or not seen. There was a direct telephone line between the French forces and the Alta Bn and the latter had notified the French at 1300 hours that Norwegian forces had occupied Lillebalak, but word did not filter down to the gun batteries.

The results of the Alta Bn’s attacks were disappointing. The Norwegian troops withdrew back across the river to rest while only a picket line was left on the northern slope of Lillebalak and Hill 336. The Germans reoccupied Lillebalak and their machineguns put a stop to the advance of the 1/12th Inf in the valley between Lillebalak and Storebalak.

The two battalions of the 6th Brigade had so far been almost solely responsible for the high plateau operation. Except for the abortive effort against Lillebalak and Hill 336 in the morning of May 20, the 7th Brigade remained relatively inactive. The advance of the 1/12th Inf was brought to a halt and the major combat elements of the Alta Bn were either withdrawn back to their starting positions or remained passive on the northern slopes of their objectives. The French had not undertaken any offensive operations. Nothing came of the coordinated attack on the high plateau supposedly worked out between Generals Fleischer and Béthouart on May 14. There is no evidence of attempts to carry out “maneuver warfare.”

The troops in the 6th Brigade had reached almost the limits of their endurance, as noted in an extract from Major Munthe-Kaas’ report to the brigade in the evening of May 21: