Hitler’s Pre-Emptive War: The Battle for Norway, 1940 (45 page)

Whitworth apparently had his fill of the Admiralty dealing directly with his subordinates. He sent a message that did not mention the breach of the chain of command but complained that he had received three tasks, and they appeared incompatible. He mentioned that he had orders to prevent the Germans from leaving Narvik, to prevent reinforcements from reaching Narvik, and to attack the Germans in Narvik. He asked for some clarification and added that he considered an attack on Narvik risky and that it would interfere with what he saw as his primary mission of keeping reinforcements from reaching Narvik. Admiral Forbes adopted an attitude of diplomatic silence by not sending a message supporting Whitworth. The Admiralty simply ignored Whitworth’s pique.

Captain Yates appears to have had doubts about his orders. Warburton-Lee’s message about an enemy cruiser in the Narvik area worried him, and the destroyer
Bedouin
had reported the presence of electrically controlled mines in the fjord and possible German shore defenses on Barøy. The explosions that
Bedouin
reported as mines were actually torpedoes fired at it by
U25
. The torpedoes were not observed from the destroyer, missed their target and exploded nearby without causing any damage. So far, the British had not observed any submarines, so this threat did not add to the total of Yates’s concerns.

The Admiralty had waited over 13 hours after receipt of the message from
Hostile
before prodding Captain Yates to attack Narvik. Despite their own sluggishness, they were asking him to make an immediate attack, either that night or early in the morning. Yates sent a diplomatic response about three hours after he had received their suggestion:
²

On April 12, he would face the same navigational obstacles, the same enemy, and they would have had time to make repairs and prepare their defenses in the interim. Yates may have shared the views of his superior, Admiral Whitworth, about the risks involved in an immediate attack. He used the speculative and inaccurate assessment by Lieutenant Commander McCoy in the
Bedouin
to end any possibility of a quick attack on Narvik. At 0930 hours on April 11, he signaled the Admiralty: “Bedouin is of the opinion that the operation on the lines of yesterday’s attack could not be carried out successfully. In light of this report I concur and regret that I must reverse my decision given in my 2310/10th.”
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The German Naval Situation

Commander Bey’s report to Naval Command West was received with dismay, despite the fact that significant losses had been expected and ruled acceptable. The operational status of the German destroyers in Narvik after the naval battle on April 10 was as follows:

Wilhelm Heidkamp
. In the process of sinking. Eighty-one dead.

Dieter von Roeder
. Immobile after five hits. Forward guns were still operable and the ship could be used as a floating battery. Not refueled. Thirteen dead.

Anton Schmitt
. Sunk. Fifteen killed.

Hermann Künne
. Undamaged but not refueled.

Hans Lüdemann
. Sustained two hits. One gun destroyed and aft magazine flooded. Not refueled. Two killed.

Georg Thiele
. Badly damaged by seven hits. Severe damage to hull and engines. Two guns and fire control system not reparable. Magazines flooded. Not refueled. Thirteen killed.

Bernd von Arnim
. Badly damaged by five hits. Un-seaworthy because of hull damage and one boiler out of action. Refueled. Fifty-two killed.

Wolfgang Zenker
. Undamaged but not refueled.

Erich Giese
. Undamaged but not refueled.
Erich Koellner
. Undamaged but not refueled.

The German Naval Staff realized its worst fears. The quick return of the destroyers was thwarted by the failure of one tanker to reach Narvik. It is surprising that the Germans had not made allowances for one or two additional tankers to be at Narvik. This would have increased the probability that more than one tanker would be in position when required. Furthermore, it would have permitted quicker refueling and allowed the destroyers to head back home while the enemy was still in a state of confusion. Now, almost half of Germany’s destroyer force appeared trapped. The Luftwaffe facilitated the return of warships from ports in western and southern Norway by keeping British surface units at a distance, but there was little help from the Luftwaffe in the Narvik area.

Jan Wellem
had miraculously escaped the carnage in Narvik harbor on April 10. Refueling could therefore continue but at the same slow rate as on April 9. Shortage of ammunition was also a serious concern for Commander Bey. The destroyers had used over half of their ammunition supply. German hopes for resupply by sea were dealt a final blow on April 11 when the British destroyer
Icarus
captured the supply ship
Alster
in Vestfjord.

Commander Bey reported to Naval Command West in the afternoon of April 10 that none of his damaged destroyers would be ready to attempt a breakout in time to link up with the two battleships that evening. Only two of the surviving destroyers would be refueled by dark,
Wolfgang Zenker
and
Erich Giese
.

Commander Bey did not appear anxious to attempt a breakout with the two refueled destroyers. Naval Command West believed that he failed to appreciate the deadly trap in which he found himself. They finally resorted to an unusual procedure for a command that normally left tactical decisions to the senior commander at sea. They sent Bey a curt message at 1712 hours on April 10 to leave with
Wolfgang Zenker
and
Erich Giese
as soon as it was dark. If he needed further persuasion, Naval Command West transmitted, two hours later the very precise intelligence that in addition to the
Renown
and
Repulse
, three more British battleships were headed for the Lofoten area. The second message may not have served its intended purpose. Instead, it may have convinced Bey that a breakout was futile.

The two German destroyers ordered to break out departed Narvik at 2040 hours. They proceeded westward at high speed at about the same time as
U25
, whose commander did not know that a breakout was in progress, confronted two British destroyers on patrol near Barøy. The British destroyers withdrew when they began to suspect that they were near a minefield. This left an unintended opening for the two German destroyers, which passed through the area about one hour later and turned south through Vestfjord. Within a few minutes of entering the fjord, the Germans sighted the silhouettes of three warships, one identified as a cruiser. The visibility was excellent despite the onset of darkness and Commander Bey decided that a breakout was not achievable. The German destroyers turned around within 7,000 meters of the British ships and headed back to Narvik while laying smoke. The British ships, which were probably the cruiser
Penelope
and the destroyers
Bedouin
and
Eskimo
, did not see the German destroyers.

German Torpedo Problems

U25
, when she confronted
Bedouin
and
Eskimo
prior to Bey’s unsuccessful breakout attempt, fired four torpedoes at the British warships at a range of no more than 1,200 meters. Lieutenant Commander Schütze, the
U25
commander, heard explosions and assumed his torpedoes had found their targets at that very close range. They had not. Two exploded in the vicinity of the British ships and one detonated against the shore. The two destroyer captains became sufficiently concerned that they withdrew from the area. The British apparently did not considered that there could be a submarine in the area and
Bedouin’s
skipper, Lieutenant Commander McCoy, sent a message suggesting that the explosions were mines or torpedoes fired from shore batteries on Barøy. This message had—as we have seen in the case of Captain Yates on the
Penelope
—considerable impact on British plans.

The German destroyer crews were extremely dissatisfied with the service provided by their submarines, and the submariners were especially upset with their research and development services. No provisions were made for direct communications between the destroyers in Narvik and the German submarines operating in the area. This problem was finally overcome when Commander Bey contacted Naval Command West and arranged for a personal meeting with Lieutenant Herbert Sohler, captain of the submarine
U46
, on April 11.

Arrangements were made for direct communications between the destroyers and the submarines to include radio warnings transmitted in the clear of an enemy approach. Sohler assured Bey that the submarines would provide better support to the destroyers in the future. The fact that this was not to be cannot be blamed on the submarine commanders’ lack of effort.

Another submarine,
U51
, attacked a British destroyer near Tranøy about 0200 hours on April 11. The torpedoes either missed or failed to function.
U51
had another opportunity within half an hour, but the result was the same. The
U47
, commanded by Lieutenant Günther Prien, fired two salvos of four torpedoes each against a large transport and cruiser at anchor near Bygden in Vågsfjord between 2200 and 2400 hours on April 15, but scored no hits. She then developed engine troubles and had to return to Germany. Southwest of Vestfjord, she encountered the battleship
Warspite
and two escorting destroyers. Prien fired two torpedoes at a distance of only 900 meters, again without results.

These are only a few examples of the 31 submarine attacks carried out against British warships during these critical days. The German Navy concluded that 20 of these attacks would certainly have hit their targets, which included one battleship, seven cruisers, seven destroyers, and five transports, but for the malfunctioning of the torpedoes.

It was discovered later that the new magnetic pistols that allowed the torpedo to be detonated by the magnetic field of a ship’s hull when it passed underneath, without requiring a direct impact, were ineffective at these northern latitudes. It was also discovered that the depth-regulator mechanism did not function as intended. This also applied to the destroyer torpedoes as shown by their failure against British destroyers on April 10. The failure of the submarine torpedoes to function properly had a serious effect on operations around Narvik, and certainly on the psychological confidence of the submarine crews. On his return to Germany, Prien summed up succinctly the confidence crisis in the torpedoes among submarine commanders: “One cannot again expect him [submarine commander] to fight with an air gun.”
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German Destroyers Trapped

By noon on April 11,
Wolfgang Zenker
,
Erich Koellner
,
Hermann Künne
, and
Hans Lüdemann
were ready to sail from Narvik.
Erich Giese
was also ready but developed a minor engine problem. However, Commander Bey continued to maintain that conditions for a breakout were unfavorable. Some writers have suggested that the lives of his sailors were uppermost in his mind and that he felt they had a better chance to survive if the ships remained in Narvik. However, he also knew that he was expected to uphold the honor of the German Navy by fighting to the end.

Naval Command West was becoming impatient at what they must have viewed as Commander Bey’s procrastinations. They issued Bey an order in the afternoon of April 12 to make use of the first opportunity of reduced visibility and bad weather to break out. However, Bey maintained that any attempt to break out was futile in view of the overwhelming British naval presence at the entrance to Ofotfjord. This may have been his view all along.

All discussions of a breakout at this time appear to have focused on a southwest passage through Vestfjord, an area heavily guarded by the Royal Navy. There was another possible route that the destroyers could have used to reach the open sea without the danger of running the British gauntlet in Vestfjord. The narrow strait of Ramsund, between Tjeldøy and the mainland, leads to the broader Tjeldsund, and that strait exits into the Vågsfjord just southeast of Harstad. The entrance to Ramsund is inside Ofotfjord and at least ten miles from the British patrol line. The distance from where Tjeldsund intersects with Vågsfjord to the open sea is not more than five miles. The British Navy did not reach Vågsfjord in force until April 14, and the route to the open sea would therefore be relatively clear for the German destroyers. The
U49
in Vågsfjord could provide intelligence on British naval activities.

After the German destroyers had reached open sea on a southwesterly course, it would have been very difficult for the British to intercept them. The destroyers, in moderate weather, were capable of speed of 36 knots and the British did not have heavy units capable of that speed. It seems strange therefore, that Bey and Naval Command West appear not to have considered this escape route. Navigation through Ramsund or Tjeldsund at night would be very tricky, but possible.
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