Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (22 page)

Hoth had his hands full, especially since he simultaneously commanded the Ninth Army for the temporarily ailing Strauss. Help arrived in the form of V Corps, which relieved 12th Panzer, but the infantry soon found themselves in uneven combat against the 23rd, 46th, 134th, 144th, 153rd and 229th Rifle Divisions. The VII Corps also showed up to join the fighting. Near Solovevo, bits and pieces of the Soviet 19th and 20th Armies, plus the rump of the 5th Mechanized Corps, managed to keep open an escape route from Smolensk through the weak cordon. Inside the pocket, Lukin s men put up a stiff defense, while NKVD troops policed the rear areas and managed to scrape together over 100,000 stragglers, deserters and other ‘lost Red Army troops to stiffen the defenses.
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Artillery

Artillery (to include rocket launchers, etc.) is the greatest casualty producing weapon on the modern battlefield. However, second only to horse fodder, artillery ammunition took up the bulk of rail and other logistical capacity. During Barbarossa, by far the mass of German artillery was horse drawn. This proved to be a considerable liability, both in attack and defense. However, in mechanized units, prime mover vehicles, normally half-tracks, towed artillery in order to keep pace with the panzers. These in turn often gave way later in the war to indirect-fire weapons actually mounted on armored vehicle chassis. Soviet artillery has been described as ‘The Red God of War’, and the Wehrmacht could never hope to match the number of tubes employed by the enemy. The Germans countered this mass with speed and accuracy.

The standard German divisional piece was the 105mm leFH 18 gun. Early versions fired a 15kg shell over 10,000m, but by 1943 the weapon had been lightened and improved, now with a range closer to 13,000m. Corps and army artillery units for general support missions fired the 150mm sFH 18. Midway through the Nazi-Soviet War, the Germans introduced the ‘stinging insect family of vehicles. The Wespe (Wasp) mounted the 105mm gun on a PzKw II chassis, and proved to be a very effective and widely used self-propelled (SP) artillery piece. The larger Hummel (Bumblebee, a name later forbidden by Hitler) mounted the 150mm sFH 18/1 on various PzKw III/IV chassis. The Germans had their own answer to the Soviet Katyusha, the 150mm rocket launcher Nebelwerfer (‘smoke projector, a code name meant to conceal its real purpose from enemy intelligence). Less accurate than tube artillery, these area weapons caused widespread damage and terrorized troops in its impact zone.

The Germans made all types of panzer chassis into turretless anti-tank or assault gun Sturmgeschütze. First conceived by von Manstein during the 1930s, these weapons realized the Napoleonic goal of having artillery accompany infantry in the attack. As such, assault guns belonged to the artillery branch rather than the Panzerwaffe. They were cheaper and faster to make and could mount larger caliber guns than corresponding panzer variants, in all cases due to the lack of relatively delicate turret mounting and traverse considerations. As the war dragged on, armored support often came in the form of these simple vehicles rather than panzers.

Anti-aircraft artillery (Flak) played a critical role in the blitzkrieg as early as Guderian s move through the Ardennes in 1940. The Red Army Air Force proved undaunted by the Germans, and soon recovered from the beating it took in Barbarossa s opening days. By 1943, the Luftwaffe was seldom seen over the battlefield, and Flak became ever more important for protecting troops on the ground. Here too, earlier slow and towed models gave way to guns mounted on fully or half-tracked vehicle chassis. Calibers ran the gauntlet from 20mm, 37mm, 50mm all the way to 88mm. Of these, the 37mm struck the best balance of size, firepower and economy. Guns were mounted singly, in pairs and in quad versions.

In 1941, 37mm Pak 35/36 (anti-tank) guns had already been revealed to be completely useless against Allied tanks and the 50mm Pak 38 was not far behind in becoming obsolete. For much of the war, the 75mm Pak 40 took over most of the anti-tank duties, although in later years, they too were growing inadequate. They were frequently augmented by captured Soviet 76mm weapons. The most famous German anti-tank gun was the dual-purpose 88mm Flak 36/37, initially mounted on the high-profile Luftwaffe version, but later attached to a low-slung and therefore, more easily concealed, army model, the Pak 43. A later development was the Raketenwerfer 43, a crew-fired recoilless rifle system, deadly out to 700m. Again, these weapons were frequently mounted on panzer chassis. Two of the best-known SP anti-tank AFVs were the 75mm Jagdpanzer 38(t) (based on the Czech tank, unofficial nickname, Hetzer) and the 88mm Hornisse (Hornet – also called Nashorn, Rhinoceros – built on a PzKw III/IV chassis). After the war, the Swiss Army purchased 150 Hetzer, and these continued to serve until 1970. The Hornisse were employed in heavy anti-tank battalions and over 1,200 were made.

On 20 July, Stavka decided to launch a large counteroffensive in order to encircle the Germans trying to encircle Smolensk. Stalin told Zhukov he wanted ‘operations by larger groups’, while the attackers were occupied fighting in and around Smolensk. Four of the five groups attacked Third Panzer Army:

Group Maslinnikov (29th Army: 252nd, 256th, 243rd Rifle Divisions plus the 31st Aviation Group and Armored Trains 52 and 82), attacking from the Toropets area on 23 July.

Group Khomenko (30th Army: 242nd, 251st, 25th Rifle Divisions, supported by 122nd Fighter and 190th Aviation Assault Regiments), the main effort, also beginning on the 23rd, aiming for Dukhovshchina.

Group Rokossovsky (38th Rifle and 101st Tank Divisions, forty old tanks) attacking toward Yartsevo.

Group Kalinin, (24th Army: 89th, 91st and 166th Rifle Divisions) with orders to exploit Khomenko’s ‘success’.

As usual, things were not as easy as they seemed, and the ‘Timoshenko Offensive’ got off to a slow and staggered start. Khomenko and Kalinin attacked on 24 July; Rokossovsky ran into the 7th Panzer supported by VIII Fliegerkorps, halted, then started again on the 28th; Maslinnikov finally moved out on the 29th. For a change, German intelligence was good and they knew of Timoshenko’s plans; the Luftwaffe interdicted Soviet assembly areas before the offensive even began. Due to the delays, the attacks were uncoordinated and piecemeal. Hoth managed each successive crisis and by the evening of 27/28 July, he and Guderian had completed the Smolensk Kessel. Stavka gave all concerned a new mission: get the encircled garrison out of danger. Although a few Soviet soldiers managed to escape until about 4 August, by the end of July Stavka realized the offensive had no real chances of success and quietly called it off.
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Stalin had grown weary and saw the futility of tactical counterattacks of only a couple of divisions. Although Timoshenko employed fourteen divisions (granted, of uneven size), the fact that the offensive spanned nearly a 300km front drastically weakened its impact. Meanwhile, in Third Panzer’s northern area of operations, the Germans had been expanding their salient near Nevel since 7 July. LVII Panzer Corps received orders to push on past Nevel and on to Velikie Luki. Only the 19th Panzer and half of the 14th Motorized Divisions could participate. The 19th moved out on 13 July. Roads through the terrible terrain were practically non-existent. Relatively heavy panzers routinely collapsed weak bridges, but pioneers could find no timber in the swamps with which to make repairs. The division took Nevel two days later. General of Panzer Troops Adolf Kuntzen left the 14th there while 19th Panzer continued northeast. The 53rd and 54th Cavalry Divisions, newly arrived from the Caucasus, had little will to fight but nonetheless frustrated the Germans. Seldom a team player, von Bock wanted no part in this ‘useless venture’ to help Army Group North. He therefore directed von Kluge and Hoth not to take part in an attack against Velikie Luki. Too late: by 20 July the 19th Panzer had already taken the city.

Von Bock ordered it abandoned; the city would have to be recaptured a month later by the same men at a much higher cost.
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Answering the question ‘What to do next?’ had vexed the German high command even before the conclusion of the Battle of Smolensk. In its original concept, Barbarossa would halt along the central axis while Hitler eliminated the politically valuable objective of Leningrad in the north plus the economically (and politically) valuable objective of the Ukraine in the south. He therefore issued directives in late July and early August, that in relevant part, sent portions of Third Panzer northeast to assist Army Group North. Specifically, Hoth lost XXXIX Panzer Corps, or one-third of his mechanized strength. Part of the reason OKH did not send more Third Panzer assets to von Leeb was the difficulty Hoth’s men had in containing the various Soviet counterattacks. It is interesting to contemplate, if instead of the half measure as executed, the impact that all of Third Panzer, or even the bulk of its forces, would have had on the fighting for Leningrad. In late August and early September, while Second Panzer and Second Army headed for Kiev and the Ninth Army struggled around Yelnia, Third Panzer enjoyed relative quiet. Except for refighting the battle for Velikie Luki by Group Stumme (newly arrived XL Panzer Corps under Lieutenant General Georg Stumme), Hoth’s sector of the front remained uneventful. Velikie Luki netted 34,000 POWs and 400 guns captured when the town fell on 22 August, and 20th Panzer occupied the important nearby communications center of Toropets a week later,
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but these maneuvers only left Third Panzer’s strength spread out just when it needed most to be massed. Time for the penultimate assault on Moscow grew nigh.

Another debate broke out among the fractious German leadership over the depth of the encirclement that marked Operation Typhoon’s opening stages. Von Bock (with Guderian’s backing) wanted a deep penetration and a larger pocket. Hitler and OKH wanted a shallower maneuver, one that would close near Viazma. The latter argument won out. With the Soviets defending along the Smolensk–Moscow highway, von Bock would go around those positions to the north (Hoth) and south (Hoepner’s newly arrived Fourth Panzer Army). As usual, the plan was to destroy the defenders before they could retreat. Down at the troop level, more mundane questions arose: Landsers of the 6th Infantry wondered if they were going into winter quarters or not? The answer came on 26 September with orders to march on Moscow. In fact, far from going to winter quarters, the 6th would lead the breakthrough attempt. Hoth commanded the familiar V and VI Corps plus the new XLI and LVI Panzer Corps. Both panzer corps had just arrived from Army Group North after a 700km march over poor terrain. There had been no time for maintenance so operational rates for panzers were terrible and that for artillery prime movers
was similarly bad.
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Third Panzer would be subordinated again to Ninth Army, giving both responsibility for the far northern pincer of Typhoon. Von Bock scheduled d-day for 2 October.

Third Panzer’s front that day opened with 100 tubes per kilometer artillery barrage. By 0530 hours Hoth’s men were on the move, ably supported overhead by the VIII Fliegerkorps. The Soviets had not yet recovered from the Timoshenko Offensive and were ill-prepared for a defensive struggle. By twilight (approximately 1700 hours at that latitude), the 7th Panzer’s reconnaissance battalion won a bridgehead over the Vop River (again!) and 6th Panzer was even more successful. A lieutenant in the 6th Panzer’s artillery regiment remembered that day:

Peacefully, the first light hit positions of both sides. The troops talk about the cold night. Then suddenly death and ruination spews from the throats of countless batteries upon the rows of unsuspecting enemy. Furiously but uncoordinated, the enemy artillery shoots back. Our own heavy artillery of all calibers plus waves of bombers and Stukas cover the enemy batteries. The infantry succeeds in overcoming the front lines of the enemy to clear the extensive minefields and clear the way for the panzer’s main attack.
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The 1st Panzer Division had also achieved a breakthrough by evening. Hoth scored an operational coup by ripping apart the 19th and 30th Armies, pitting 12 German divisions (including 415 panzers), against 4 Soviet. Southwest of Bely the assault stalled temporarily as it struck well-prepared positions held by stubborn defenders. To compound matters, near that same town, Konev’s Western Front hit Hoth’s flank with the 126th and 152nd Rifle, 101st Motorized and 126th and 128th Tank Divisions. To no avail, however; XLI Panzer requested permission to bypass this obstacle to the south and Hoth approved. By the second day of Typhoon, Third Panzer had penetrated into Konev’s second echelon and reached the upper Dnepr. By 4 October, LVI Panzer Corps managed to lever the 103rd Tank Brigade away from the river and establish a bridgehead. At precisely this time, Hoth’s formations ran out of fuel and had to wait over 24 hours for resupply. Although Third Panzer Army resumed its advance the next day, Konev used the pause to request permission to withdraw from his exposed positions. The 5th also marked Hoth’s last day at the helm of the panzer army. He departed for Army Group South that day to take command of the Seventeenth Army. Reinhardt moved up from XLI Panzer Corps, while Model in turn succeeded him.
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Red Army Chief of Staff, Marshal Shaposhnikov, concurred with Konev’s request and on 6 October, Konev passed down the order for 16th and 19th Armies
to withdraw. He sent a similar order to the remainder of the Western Front the next day. As usual, the blitzkrieg moved too fast for the Soviet command and control mechanism. On the morning of 7 October, Reinhardt’s 7th Panzer and Hoepner’s 10th Panzer linked up at Viazma, bagging elements of the 16th, 19th, 20th and 32nd Armies. Rokossovsky, commanding the 16th Army, received the unrealistic order to keep the neck of the bottle open so his comrades could escape. He could not. Also on the 7th, OKH ordered von Bock to take up pursuit operations toward Moscow while the Red Army struggled to regain its footing. The field marshal believed he could do both that mission and reduce the twin pockets. At Viazma and Bryansk, Army Group Center had ripped a 450km hole in Moscow’s defenses. Neither side quite knew how Zhukov would plug that gaping hatchet wound or with what. But it soon became evident to the Germans at least, that clearing each Kessel would take more time and manpower than previously assumed. Autumn rains began in the northern portion of the army group’s sector on the 7th and 8th,
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slowing the army, grounding much of the Luftwaffe and worsening the logistic situation.
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