Hitler's Panzer Armies on the Eastern Fron (39 page)

Fourth Panzer Army

Notes

Introduction

1. One panzer division had more radios (
c
. 500) than the entire German Army in 1914, Walther Nehring,
Die Geschichte der deutsche Panzerwaffe
, Propyläen Verlag, 1969, Appendix 6.

2. Isabel Hull,
Absolute Destruction: Military Culture and the Practices of War in Imperial Germany
, Cornell University, 2006, p. 160. The Germans ‘glorified surprise’, John English,
On Infantry
, Praeger, 1984.

3. Hull,
Absolute Destruction
, pp. 116–17, 145, 172. For the best discussion of Boyd, see Mike Spick,
The Ace Factor
, Avon Books, 1989.

4. Hull,
Absolute Destruction
, p. 166.

5. In this usage,
Vernichtung
(exterminate) does not refer to genocide.

6. Hull,
Absolute Destruction
, p. 12.

7. Nehring,
Die Geschichte der deutsche Panzerwaffe
, pp. 61, 79, 87. The French Army never eliminated this false heavy and ‘legere’ distinction. ‘Light’ in this case should not be confused with German light, or Jäger, divisions employed later in the war.

8. Many histories of the 1940 campaign instead merely perpetuate the Guderian and Rommel cults of personality.

9. Nehring,
Die Geschichte der deutsche Panzerwaffe
, Appendix 4.

10. Victor Madej,
Russo-German War, Summer 1944
, Fedorowicz, 1987, p. 1.

11. Horst Boog et al.,
Germany and the Second World War
, Vol. IV,
Attack on the Soviet Union
, Clarendon Press, 1998, p. 313, speech 21 February 1941.

Chapter 1

1. Klaus Maier (ed.),
Germany and the Second World War
, Vol. II,
Germany’s Initial Conquest of Europe
, Clarendon Press, 1991, p. 240. As it turned out, even the German’s autumn 1939 plan could have probably beaten the French.

2. Armored strength favored the Allies 3,100:2,700, but the Germans dominated in the categories of aircraft (2,000:4,200) and flak (1,500:9,300). Nehring,
Die Geschichte der deutsche Panzerwaffe
, p. 109.

3. Martin Evans,
The Fall of France: Act with Daring
, Osprey, 2000, p. 48. Florian Rothbrust,
Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps and the Battle of France
, Praeger, 1990, pp. 26, 27.

4. The goal of Vernichtungskrieg was the destruction of enemy forces in the field, not the ‘command paralysis’ so often discussed by interwar theorists such as Fuller or Liddell–Hart.

5. CR Davis,
von Kleist: From Hussat to Panzer Marshal
, Lancer Militaria, 1979, p. 12; von Kleist’s Panzer Group was the largest massed armor command in the
world at the time. Len Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, Triad, 1980, p. 275; Maier,
Germany and the Second World War
, Vol. II, pp. 244, 247, 249; Alan Shepperd,
France 1940, Blitzkrieg in the West
, Osprey, 1990, p. 21

6. Karl–Heinz Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist and the Breakthrough in France, 1940, in Michael Krause and R Cody Philips (eds),
Historical Perspectives on the Operational Art
, Center for Military History, 2005, p. 171; Alistair Horne,
To Lose a Battle: France 1940
, Macmillan, 1990, p. 239.

7. Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, pp. 169–70; Kurt Mehner (ed.),
Die Geheimen Tagesberichete der deutschen Wehrmachtführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg, 1939–1945
, Biblio Verlag, 1993, Vol. 1, p. 8.

8. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, pp. 273, 275; Peter Monsoor, ‘The Second Battle of Sedan, May, 1940’,
Military Review
, 26 January 1989; Shepperd,
France 1940
, pp. 37, 44.

9. Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 174; Rothbrust,
Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps
, p. 63; Edward Luttwak, ‘The Operational Level of War’,
International Security
, Winter 1980–81, p.70; Shepperd,
France 1940
, p.43.

10. Rothbrust,
Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps
, pp. 64, 67.

11. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, p. 289; Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 172.

12. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, pp. 290–91; Evans,
The Fall of France
, p. 51; Friesen, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 172; Horne,
To Lose a Battle
, p. 287; FW von Mellenthin,
Panzer Battles
, Ballantine Books, 1971, p. 18.

13. Evans,
The Fall of France
, pp. 53, 58, 60; von Mellenthin,
Panzer Battles
, pp. 17, 19.

14. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, p. 293; Evans,
The Fall of France
, p. 60; Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 173; Heinz Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, Ballantine Books, 1968, p. 83; von Mellenthin,
Panzer Battles
, p. 19. The 3rd Armored Division had only been in existence for six weeks.

15. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, pp. 286–87, 309; Freiser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 174; Maier,
Germany and the Second World War
, Vol. II, p. 285; Mehner (ed.),
Die Geheimen Tagesberichete der deutschen Wehrmachtführung im Zweiten Weltkrieg
, Vol. 2, p. 13; Shepperd,
France 1940
, p. 59.

16. Shepperd,
France 1940
, pp. 62–3.

17. Evans,
The Fall of France
, p. 63; Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 176; Guderian,
Panzer Leader
, p. 86; Maier,
Germany and the Second World War
, Vol. II, p. 287; Rothbrust,
Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps
, p. 83; Shepperd,
France 1940
, p. 62. After the battle, a debate emerged as to whether or not Reinhardt had fully pressed his advantage, Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, p. 288.

18. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, pp. 310–11; Horne,
To Lose a Battle
, pp. 332, 337; Rothbrust,
Guderian’s XIX Panzer Corps
, p. 87; Shepperd,
France 1940
, pp. 64, 67, 69.

19. Davis,
von Kleist
, p. 12; Frieser, ‘Panzer Group Kleist’, p. 177; Horne,
To Lose a Battle
, pp. 419–20; Shepperd,
France 1940
, p. 75. German intelligence
(Fremde Herre West)
was correct in discounting the danger at Stonne, Horne,
To Lose a Battle
, p. 418.

20. Deighton,
Blitzkrieg
, pp. 312–13; Evans,
The Fall of France
, pp. 73–74; Maier,
Germany and the Second World War
, Vol. II, p. 287; von Mellenthin,
Panzer Battles
, p. 21. With the deception at the Ardennes complete, Hoepner’s XVI Panzer Corps
transferred south. De Gaulle did not counterattack on the 16th as stated by Guderian, Horne,
To Lose a Battle
, p. 403.