History of the Second World War (32 page)

Unfortunately, the untested assumption that the combination was too difficult led to a complete division between the cruiser and f tank brigades in the next British offensive — which became a battle waged, on the British side, in two separate compartments.

CHAPTER 15 - ‘CRUSADER’

The frustration of the mid-summer effort of 1941 to gain a decisive victory in Africa, and sweep the enemy out of that continent, made Churchill more intent than ever to achieve that aim. He was determined to renew the effort as soon as possible, with stronger forces. To this end, he poured reinforcements into Egypt and brushed aside his military advisers’ reminders about the longstanding decision that the defence of the Far East, and particularly of Singapore, was the second priority after the defence of Britain itself, and before the Middle East. The Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, tried to remind Churchill of the carefully weighed decision, as between the two regions and risks, but was too gentle a personality and too deferential by habit to maintain it in face of Churchill’s force of personality, argument, and position.

Yet the danger in the Far East had now become acute, while the British forces there remained pitifully weak. Although Japan had stayed out of the war hitherto, the steps which Roosevelt and Churchill took in July to cut off her economic resources were bound to make her strike back in the only way possible for her — by force of arms. Her hesitancy allowed America and Britain more than four months’ grace for developing their defence in the Pacific, but they failed to profit by it — and in Britain’s case that neglect was largely due to the way that Churchill’s interest and efforts had become focused on North Africa. Thus Rommel indirectly produced the fall of Singapore — and as much by the personal impression he made on a personality-minded Prime Minister as by his potential threat to the Nile Valley and the Suez Canal.*

* For maps, see pp. 110-11.

For the renewed offensive in Africa, codenamed ‘Operation Crusader’, the British forces were much increased and also re-equipped. The four tank units were increased to fourteen, so that four complete armoured brigades (each of three units) were provided for the striking force, while the Tobruk garrison was given one brigade (of two tank units and an additional squadron), sent in by sea, for use in the breakout to meet the striking force. (For the main part the brigades were equipped with the new Crusader cruiser tanks or with the new American Stuart tanks, the fastest of any in the field, but there were four units of ‘I’ tanks, Matildas or Valentines.) Three more motorised infantry divisions were brought up, making a total of four, besides a fresh division in Tobruk — where the British 70th relieved the 9th Australian that had borne the brunt of the siege.

By contrast, Rommel received very few reinforcements from Germany, and no additional tank units to augment his original four. The 5th Light Division was rechristened the 21st Panzer Division, but was not given an increased scale of tanks, and all that he could manage in the way of enlarging his force was to improvise an unmotorised infantry division (at first called the Afrika Division, and later the 90th Light) out of some extra artillery and infantry battalions. The Italian force of three divisions (one armoured) was augmented by three more small infantry divisions — but their value was much diminished by their obsolete equipment and lack of motor transport, so that they could only be used in a static role, and were an awkward handicap on Rommel’s strategic freedom of manoeuvre.

In the air, also, the British now had a big advantage. Their strength was built up to a total of nearly 700 aircraft immediately available for the support of the offensive, against a total of 120 German aircraft and 200 Italian.

In armour, the British superiority was even greater. When the offensive was launched the British had more than 710 gun-armed tanks (of which some 200 were ‘I’ tanks), while the enemy had only 174 German gun-armed tanks and 146 Italian — which were of obsolete type, and little value. Thus the British had a superiority well exceeding 2 to 1 over the enemy as a whole, and more than 4 to 1 over the Germans — whose two panzer divisions, with their two tank units apiece, were regarded by the British Commander-in-Chief as ‘the backbone of the enemy’s army’. Moreover, Rommel had no tanks in reserve, other than a few under repair, whereas the British had some 500 in reserve or in shipment on the way — so that they were much more capable of maintaining a prolonged fight. In the outcome, that reserve eventually turned the scales of the battle.*

* The figures of the comparative tank strengths and resources are those tabulated in the British Official History, pp. 30-1. The figures given for the British operational strength — a total of 713 (including 201 ‘I’ tanks) were arrived at by deduction from a number of differing records, differently compiled. On another calculation from the records, the total conies to 756 (including 225 ‘I’ tanks).

Rommel’s chief asset, in countering the heavy odds against him in tanks, was that by the autumn two-thirds of his ordinary anti-tank guns were of the new long-barrelled 50-mm. type — which was about 70 per cent superior in penetration to his old 37-mm. gun, and 25 per cent superior to the British 2-pounder gun. Thus his defence was no longer so dependent on his handful of 88s as it had been in the summer.

Besides despatching large reinforcements to Egypt, and most of Britain’s newly manufactured equipment, Churchill also provided the striking force there with a new set of commanders. Four days after the failure of ‘Battleaxe’, Wavell was removed from command and replaced by Sir Claude Auchinleck, the Commander-in-Chief in India, while the force commander and the armoured division commander were replaced soon afterwards. Churchill had become increasingly impatient with Wavell’s cautiousness, and the disappointing result of ‘Battleaxe’ clinched his decision to appoint a new commander-in-chief. But he found, to his renewed irritation, that Auchinleck was firm in resisting his pressure for an early renewal of the offensive and insisted on waiting until fully prepared and strong enough to ensure a good chance of decisive success. So the next offensive, ‘Operation Crusader’, was not launched until mid-November, five months after ‘Battleaxe’. Meanwhile the greatly enlarged force was renamed Eighth Army, and command given to Lieutenant-General Sir Alan Cunningham — who had conducted the clearance of Italian Somaliland and the subsequent advance from the south into Ethiopia which led to the ejection of the Italians. The new army was divided into the 13th Corps under Lieutenant-General A. R. Godwin-Austen, and the 30th (armoured) Corps under Lieutenant-General C. W. M. Norrie. But with the exception of Norrie, a cavalryman, none of the new commanders had experience in handling tanks and in operating against armoured forces, and he was brought in as a substitute when the expert tankman originally chosen to command the armoured corps was killed in an air crash shortly before the offensive opened.

The 13th Corps included the New Zealand and 4th Indian Divisions, with a brigade of infantry tanks. The 30th Corps included the 7th Armoured Division with two armoured brigades (the 7th and 22nd), the 4th Armoured Brigade Group, the 22nd Guards (Motor) Brigade, and the 1st South African Division. The 2nd South African Division was in reserve.

The basis of the offensive plan was that the 13th Corps would pin down the enemy troops who were holding the frontier positions, while the 30th Corps swept round the flank of these fortified positions ‘to seek out and destroy’ Rommel’s armoured force — and then link up with the Tobruk garrison, seventy miles beyond the frontier, which was to break out to meet the 30th Corps. Thus the two corps, and their respective armour, would be operating in widely separate areas — rather than with combined effect. The most formidable part of the British armour, the brigade of Matildas and Valentines, would make no contribution to the armoured battle but merely be employed in small packets with the infantry. And when the advance developed this separated distribution soon spread into dispersion, with consequent weakness everywhere.

Thereby the British forfeited the opening advantage gained by their strategic outflanking move, which had taken the enemy by surprise and temporarily confused him. The British attack became disjointed — and to a large extent had disjointed itself. As Rommel caustically said: ‘What difference does it make if you have two tanks to my one, when you spread them out and let me smash them in detail? You presented me with three brigades in succession.’

The source of the trouble lay in the hoary maxim, long inculcated in every official military manual and at Staff College, that ‘the destruction of the enemy’s main armed forces on the battlefield’ is the prime objective, and the only sound one for a military commander. Between the wars that maxim came to be applied even more fervently by infantry-minded commanders when considering how they should use the tanks placed at their disposal, and they were apt to say: ‘Kill off the enemy’s tanks, and then we can get on with the battle.’ The persistence of that habit of thought was all too manifest in the instructions given to the Eighth Army, and its armoured corps: ‘Your immediate objective is the destruction of the enemy’s armoured forces.’ But an armoured force is not in itself suited to be an immediate objective. For it is a fluid force, not easily fixed — as infantry formations can be. The aim of destroying it is more likely to be attained indirectly, by drawing it to cover or retrieve some point of key importance. In trying to ‘kill’ Rommel’s elusive panzer forces in a too direct way, the British armour not only became stretched and scattered but let itself be drawn all too easily into his gun-lined tank traps.

The British 30th Corps crossed the frontier early on November 18 and then began a right wheel towards Tobruk ninety miles distant. The advance was covered by an ‘air umbrella’, but this protection against discovery and interference was not immediately needed, as a heavy storm in the night had swamped the enemy’s airfields and his aircraft were grounded. Nor, for the same reason, did it matter that the advance was slowed down by the bad going. Rommel had no inkling of the ‘storm of steel’ that was about to burst upon him. His mind was focused on the preparation for his own intended assault on Tobruk, and his striking force had moved thither in readiness to deliver it, although he had placed a strong covering force in the desert to the south as a check on interference.

By nightfall on the 18th the British armoured columns were astride the Trigh el Abd, and next morning pushed on northward — their thirty-mile frontage becoming stretched to fifty miles in the course of driving back Rommel’s screen. The ill-effects of that overstretch were not long in developing.

In the centre, the two leading regiments of the 7th Armoured Brigade reached and captured the enemy airfield on top of the escarpment at Sidi Rezegh — only twelve miles from the Tobruk perimeter. But the rest of the brigade and the division’s Support Group did not come up until next morning, the 20th, and by then Rommel had rushed up part of the Afrika Division, with a large number of anti-tank guns, to hold the top edge of the escarpment and block the path. No reinforcements arrived to build up the British force there. For the two other armoured brigades had run into trouble, one far to the west and the other far to the east, while the 1st South African Division had also been diverted westward.

What had happened on the western flank was that the 22nd Armoured Brigade had run into Italian tanks, and in driving them back had been led to attack the Italians’ fortified position near Bir el Gubi. The 22nd was a brigade composed of yeomanry regiments which had not long been mounted in tanks and also came fresh to the desert war. In a too gallant assault — carried out in the immortal spirit of the ‘Charge of the Light Brigade’ at Balaclava — they were heavily hammered by the Italians’ dug-in guns, and lost more than forty of their 160 tanks. Under the impression that the attack was going well, the corps commander diverted the South Africans thither to occupy Bir el Gubi.

On the eastern flank the 4th Armoured Brigade Group, which had become strung out over a twenty-five-mile stretch in chasing a German reconnaissance unit, had been suddenly taken aback by the appearance of a strong German armoured force near its rear — and its rearmost unit was badly mauled before one of the other two units returned to help in checking the enemy. This blow was the sequel to Rommel’s first countermove and was delivered by a strong battle-group (including the two tank units of the 21st Panzer Division) which had been sent southward to explore the situation.

It was lucky for the British armour on this flank that it did not have to meet a concentrated blow by the whole Afrika Korps next morning. That respite was due to a misleading report received by its commander, Cruewell, which led him to imagine that the most dangerous British advance was coming along the northerly route, the Trigh Capuzzo. So he moved both his panzer divisions thither, towards Capuzzo — and found the area empty. Blinded by lack of air reconnaissance, the Germans were still groping in the ‘fog of war’. Worse still, the 21st Panzer Division ran out of fuel on this eastward excursion, and was temporarily stranded. Only the 15th Panzer Division was able to return that day, and in the afternoon it struck the still isolated 4th Armoured Brigade at Gabr Saleh — so that this brigade for the second day in succession bore the brunt of the German counterblow, and suffered another mauling. Although the British higher commanders had good information about the enemy’s movements they were slow to take advantage of the respite, and opportunity, provided by the Afrika Korps’ temporary departure from the scene. No immediate step was taken to concentrate the three widely scattered armoured brigades. But towards midday, when the danger to the 4th Armoured Brigade became manifest, the 22nd was sent eastward to reinforce it, instead of moving up to join the 7th at Sidi Rezegh as previously intended. But the 22nd had a long way to go, on this switch from one flank to the other, and did not arrive until nightfall. It was thus too late to help in the fight.