History of the Second World War (34 page)

Rommel’s stroke has often been criticised, after the event, as rash. But the history of war shows that a stroke of this kind has many times been successful — especially through its moral effect on the opposing troops and, even more, on their commanders. It was supported, too, by Rommel’s own experience. Twice previously, in April and June, he had produced a British retreat — in the first case a collapse — by a similar strategic thrust that was made in lesser strength and did not reach such a threatening position. Two months later — in January 1942 — he produced another collapse by a fourth deep thrust — although it did not go so far as the November one towards cutting the British line of retreat. Moreover, when he launched his November thrust the opposing forces were more scattered and splintered than in any of the three cases when his strategic ripostes were successful.

The causes of his failure on this occasion have already emerged in the account of those crucial days — the delay of the 15th Panzer Division and the inertia of the Italian Mobile Corps in backing up the Rommel-led drive of the 21st Panzer Division; the consequent loss of momentum and spread in the exploiting ‘shock-wave’; the fumbling and futile action on the frontier: due in part to lack of accurate information, wireless breakdowns, and misinterpreted orders; the creation by the British of a threat to their opponent’s rear; Auchinleck’s determination to continue the battle, and press this counter-threat, instead of retreating; the replacement of the Eighth Army’s commander at a critical moment. His successor, being appointed in such circumstances, was bound to continue the battle whatever the risks — and this turned out a fortunate decision, although it might have proved fatal. (Two months later, the successor’s reaction to a lesser threat was similar to his predecessor’s in November.)

There is another factor which deserves attention, and emphasis, in any military analysis of the episode, and its lessons. The decision to continue the battle would have been of no avail, and merely led to worse disaster, if the stampede which Rommel produced had become more widespread. But most of the ‘fragments’ of the 30th Corps which were not in his path stayed in or near their previous positions, even though isolated, and so did those of the 13th Corps. The very fact of being so split up, and in the 30th Corps so stunned by the battering suffered in the previous days, helped to check the usual tendency of such scattered bodies to fall back towards their base. In this case, the enemy had so clearly outstripped them in his eastward drive that it must have seemed safer to ‘stay put’, on the edge of the whirlpool, even though the continued arrival of supplies was uncertain.

When Rommel’s strategic counterthrust failed to achieve its purpose, the first question was whether he could recover from the miscarriage, and the next question was whether he could possibly regain the upper hand. Astonishingly, in view of his weakness, he succeeded in his answer to both questions. Yet he was unable to profit by his regained advantage, and had to retreat in the end, through the accumulating effects of attrition. That eventual issue tends to show that he was right in trying his deep, and seemingly rash, strategic counterthrust of November 24 — as the one move that offered a good chance of tilting the scales decisively in his favour.

When the Afrika Korps turned back westward, with its sixty remaining tanks (of which a third were light tanks), its chances of retrieving the situation at Tobruk by direct action looked dim, while its own situation appeared very precarious. For the New Zealand Division’s westward advance, supported by nearly ninety Valentine and Matilda tanks, broke through Rommel’s investing curtain on the night of the 26th and linked up with the British force at Tobruk — which comprised more than seventy tanks (including twenty lights). Meanwhile a fresh delivery from the base had brought the tank strength of the 7th Armoured Division up to nearly 130, so that in all the British now had a superiority of 5 to 1 in tanks (and 7 to 1 in gun-armed tanks). If they had been used in a fully concentrated way the Afrika Korps would have had a poor prospect of survival, and the 7th Armoured Division alone should have been able to crash it.

The Afrika Korps was in jeopardy during the first stage of its withdrawal, and all the more because the 21st Panzer Division was delayed by a blocking position on its route, and could give no aid to the 15th Panzer Division when this was intercepted and assailed on the afternoon of November 27 by the two armoured brigades of the 7th Armoured Division — with three times as many tanks as it had. One brigade (the 22nd) barred its path, while the other (the 4th) attacked the marching column from the flank, and caused havoc among the transport Although the Germans managed to check the attack after some critical hours, their own westward march along the Trigh Capuzzo track was brought to a halt. But as dusk approached the British tanks withdrew southward into the desert to lie up for the night in a protective leaguer, in accordance with their usual practice. That allowed the Germans to push on westward under cover of darkness. On the next day the British armoured brigades renewed their attack, but were kept at bay by the enemy’s anti-tank screen — and when night came the Germans were again able to push on unopposed.

Thus by the morning of the 29th the Afrika Korps linked up again with the rest of Rommel’s forces, and relieved the pressure on them. Next day Rommel concentrated against the isolated 6th New Zealand Brigade on the Sidi Rezegh ridge, while using the Ariete Division to cover his flank, and his operation, against interference from the British armour lying to the south. His tanks, having got round to the far side of the position, struck from the west while his infantry attacked from the south. By evening the 6th New Zealand Brigade had been driven off the ridge, but a remnant got away and re-joined the main part of the division in the valley below, near Belhamed. The British armour, although brought up to strength again by a fresh delivery of tanks and concentrated under the 4th Armoured Brigade, made no vigorous effort to break through Rommel’s ‘curtain’ and come to the rescue. The commanders had been lured so often into traps, and suffered so much from the enemy’s skilful combination of tanks with anti-tank guns, that they had now become excessively cautious.

Early on December 1 Rommel’s forces closed in around the New Zealanders at Belhamed, cutting the ‘corridor’ between them and the Tobruk force. About 4.30 a.m. the 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered to drive north ‘with all speed’ at first light and ‘at all costs’ engage the enemy tanks. It moved off about 7 a.m., reached the Sidi Rezegh airfield at 9 a.m. and, after descending the escarpment, made contact with the New Zealanders. A counterattack was then planned against the enemy tanks — estimated as ‘about forty’. But by this time part of the New Zealanders had been overrun, and a general withdrawal was ordered. What was left of the New Zealand Division retreated eastward to Zaafran (and then during the night to the frontier), while the 4th Armoured Brigade made a southward withdrawal of twenty-five miles to Bir Berraneb.

The outcome of this third round of the battle was an astonishing achievement on the part of an enemy force that had been outnumbered 7 to 1 in fighting tanks at the start of the round, and when it ended was still outnumbered 4 to 1 by the total of those on the British side.

Auchinleck now flew up to Eighth Army headquarters again. Correctly gauging the underlying weakness of Rommel’s forces, he was determined to continue the battle, having fresh forces, and reserves of tanks, which he could bring up for the purpose. The 4th Indian Division was relieved on the frontier by the 2nd South African, and sent forward to join the 7th Armoured Division in an outflanking move to cut Rommel’s line of supply and retreat.

When Rommel received news of this new and strong threat, he decided to pull back westward, and concentrate his remaining tanks in a stroke to dislocate the British outflanking move. So on the night of December 4 the Afrika Korps slipped away to the west, abandoning the investment of Tobruk.

That morning the leading brigade of the 4th Indian Division had launched an attack on the Italian position at Bir el Gubi (twenty miles south of Sidi Rezegh), but the assault broke down under the defenders’ fire. The assault was renewed next morning, but again repelled. During these operations the British armour had covered the northern flank of the attack against interference from Rommel, but unfortunately it moved back to leaguer in the afternoon of the 5th, with the intention of trying out a new system of leaguering. At 5.30 p.m. Rommel’s panzer forces suddenly appeared on the scene, at Bir el Gubi, and overran part of the unshielded Indian brigade — the rest managed to escape as darkness fell.

Following this setback, the commander of the 30th Corps, Nome, decided to postpone his intended flank advance to Acroma — a postponement that forfeited the chance of cutting Rommel’s line of retreat. The 4th Armoured Brigade was ordered to seek and destroy the enemy’s armour before a renewed advance was attempted. But the aim was not achieved, and examination of the records reveals little evidence of effort to fulfil it, although a fresh delivery of forty tanks had brought the brigade’s total up to 136 — almost three times the remaining strength of the Afrika Korps. The brigade spent the next two days in position near Bir el Gubi, with occasional short moves hopefully but vainly intended to draw the enemy into a direct assault on the gun positions of the 4th Indian Division.

On December 7, Rommel decided to withdraw to the Gazala line, having been notified that no reinforcements were likely to arrive before the end of the year; that night the Afrika Korps began to disengage. The British were slow to realise what was happening, and it was not until December 9 that their armour started on a drive for ‘Knightsbridge’, the road-junction south of Acroma. It was checked by an enemy rear-guard eight miles short of Knightsbridge — and showed more concern to protect itself than to trap the enemy. By the 11th Rommel’s forces had got back safely to Gazala, where a defensive position had earlier been prepared, as a reserve line.

On December 13, Godwin-Austen’s 13th Corps, which had now taken over charge of the pursuit, launched its attack on the Gazala line. The frontal attack was checked, but the Italian Mobile Corps covering Rommel’s inland flank gave way rapidly under pressure, and the British left wing reached Sidi Breghisc, fifteen miles behind the Gazala line. But a panzer counterattack then brought the envelopment to a halt.

On the 14th, before renewing the assault, Godwin-Austen sent the 4th Armoured Brigade on a wider flank circuit — to Halegh Eleba, a multiple track junction midway between Gazala and Mechili. This move to get astride Rommel’s rear started at 2.30 p.m., and the brigade lay up for the night after trekking twenty miles due south. Starting again at 7 a.m., with sixty miles to cover in its circuit, it was delayed by bad going and did not reach Halegh Eleba until 3 p.m., four hours late by timetable — and too late to aid the main attack by drawing off Rommel’s panzer reserve as planned. Moreover, it then sat tight and did nothing to make itself felt, so that the enemy did not become aware of its presence until next morning.

Meanwhile the main attack on the 15th had been a failure. An assault near the coast had gained a foothold in the Gazala position, but an enveloping attack was upset by a panzer counterstroke at midday, which nipped off an advanced part of the attacking force.

The British higher command still hoped that the strong armoured brigade it had placed in the enemy’s rear would have decisive results by the next day. But on the morning of the 16th the brigade moved twenty miles south in order to refuel in complete security, and when it returned in the afternoon at a point nearer the front, it was checked by an anti-tank screen — and retired southward again to leaguer for the night. It recorded an interchange of fire, at long range, but no casualties. The impression left on the analyst is that the predominant desire was to see the enemy go — and he went, along the open path that was left for his passage.

For even the small losses incurred in the successful panzer counterstroke on the 15th had left the Afrika Korps with barely thirty tanks, whereas the British now had nearly 200 on the scene. Weighing the situation, Rommel saw that it was impossible to hold on for long to the Gazala line, and decided to take a long step back, and get well out of reach, while awaiting reinforcements. He would go back to the Mersa Brega bottleneck on the Tripolitanian frontier, a position ideal for defence. It had also been the springboard for his first offensive, and would serve that purpose again. So on the night of December 16 he began his withdrawal — the Afrika Korps and the Italian Mobile Corps travelling by the desert route while the Italian infantry divisions marched back along the coast-road.

The pursuit was slow to get moving. The 4th Armoured Brigade did not start until 1 p.m. next day, and two hours later halted for the night twelve miles short of its earlier position at Halegh Eleba, while administrative preparations were made for a further advance. On the 18th it advanced along a desert route to a point south of Mechili, but on swinging northwards just missed catching the tail of the enemy’s retreating columns.

Meanwhile the 4th Indian Division, mounted in motor transport and accompanied by infantry tanks, pressed on nearer the coast, through the rugged hill-country of the Jebel Akhdar. Derna was taken on the morning of the 19th — but the bulk of the enemy’s foot-marching columns had already passed safely through the bottleneck, An attempt to intercept them farther west was hampered by the difficult country and shortage of petrol, and only a few fragments were caught. A large proportion of the pursuing forces were now grounded for lack of petrol.

Motorised infantry were employed to lead the chase across the desert chord of the great Benghazi bend. Reaching Antelat on December 22 they found the enemy’s panzer force (with thirty tanks) posted near Beda Fomm — to cover the coastwise retreat of the Italian foot-marching forces — and were kept at bay until the 26th, when Rommel’s rear-guard fell back another thirty miles to Agedabia. Meanwhile the re-equipped 22nd Armoured Brigade had come up to reinforce the pursuit force. Following up the enemy rear-guard, the Guards Brigade launched a frontal assault on Agedabia — which failed — while the 22nd Armoured Brigade made a turning move thirty miles deeper in the desert, through El Haseiat. This suffered an unexpected reverse. For on the 27th its own flank was suddenly assailed by a German panzer force, and then surrounded in further fighting three days later. Although some thirty of the British tanks managed to escape, sixty-five were lost. In making this riposte Rommel had been helped by the arrival of two fresh tank companies (thirty tanks) which had been landed at Benghazi on the 19th, just before the port was evacuated — the first reinforcement which had reached him since the opening of ‘Crusader’.