Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (19 page)

That the American aircraft had only intervened at this belated stage of the fight was due to their previous engagement with the
Kasagi
, the ship, it will be recalled, which had been detached by Admiral Isomura to raid the transport fleet. Probably she would never have got within range of the objective had the
Saratoga
been able to send up her planes promptly, but the huge aircraft carrier had first to endure a determined attack by four Japanese flying boats which bombed her from a low ceiling, inflicting considerable damage. They were soon driven away, but on account of injuries to the flight deck her planes could only be flown off with difficulty, and meanwhile the
Kasagi
was playing havoc among the defenceless transports. On first approaching she was met by the destroyers
Hopewell
,
Evans
,
Farragut
, and
Zeilin
, which rushed headlong to the attack; but so well-directed was her fire that the two latter were sunk and the others beaten back, none of their torpedoes making a hit. One of her earliest victims was the destroyer tender
Melville
, blown up by a shell which evidently touched off the war-heads in her torpedo magazine. Other ships sunk by the
Kasagi’s
shells were the
Lake
Champlain
,
Spokane
Falls
, and
West
Point
, while the
Cheyenne
Bridge
and three others were more or less badly hit.

Just when it seemed as though nothing could save the whole convoy from annihilation, the first planes from the
Saratoga
came swooping down to the rescue. It was no time for caution, and the American airmen, entirely disregarding the
Kasagi’s
anti-aircraft guns, held on until they could be sure of hitting the mark. Their heavy gas bombs, which had been intended for the batteries at Port Lloyd, crashed into the Japanese cruiser, whilst other missiles, each containing six hundred pounds of explosive, destroyed her topworks. More than one of the low-flying planes, caught in the blast of its own bombs, fell into the sea; bur the rest continued to attack until every bomb had been expended. By then the
Kasagi
was in a hopeless ease. Four-fifths of her crew had been stricken down by the gas, and there was no one left to point a gun when the five remaining destroyers of the convoy guard charged forward to administer the death-blow. Three torpedoes sufficed. As the enemy ship lay deep in the water just before foundering, it was noticed that only a score or so of men made any effort to save themselves. Hundreds of their comrades, overcome by gas, went down with the ship, mercifully unconscious of their doom.

The action was now over, and it remained to count the cost. Of the four cruisers which had comprised Admiral Isomura’s squadron, all but one had been sunk. According to Japanese statements after the war, their loss in personnel in this fight exceeded 1,200. On the American side the
Minneapolis
had gone, together with the tender
Melville
. The
Marblehead
, already in a sinking condition, eventually had to be despatched by a torpedo; and the
Concord
, with extensive damage to hull and machinery, was just able to move, but no more. Only the
Cincinnati
had escaped serious hurt. Eight of the destroyers had sunk, and three others were scarcely seaworthy. Upwards of a thousand officers and men had perished in the squadron. Apart from injury to her flight deck, the
Saratoga
was still in battle trim.

It was, however, upon the troop-ship convoy that the worst blow had fallen. Here there was a ghastly list of casualties. Including men drowned in the three sunken transports, the loss of life throughout the convoy reached a total of 4,000, while thousands more were wounded. Nor was this all. Some of the vessels were so battered by gunfire that they could no longer move, whilst others could steam only with difficulty. And the danger of further attack still existed, for there was no telling what new enemy forces might yet be in pursuit. Had Admiral Isomura’s squadron been the vanguard of the enemy’s battle fleet? And, if so, how long would it be ere his battleships came up to blow the remnants of the convoy out of the water? These were the ominous questions that were heard in the transports. With only one cruiser, a few destroyers, and the
Saratoga
in condition to fight, no defence worth the name could be offered in the event of a fresh assault. But, in fact, the worst was now over, for the Japanese battle-cruisers had been ordered to abandon the pursuit when radio signals from the American battle fleet were intercepted.

At 3 p.m. on the 9th the big dirigible
Chicago
, scouting in advance of the battle fleet, came in sight of the convoy, and after communicating with Captain Miller proceeded to reconnoitre towards the west. Four hours later this airship, then two hundred miles to the west, reported that no enemy ships were in sight. It was clear, therefore, that the pursuit was not being pressed. Most fortunately the weather continued to be favourable, since had another gale arisen some of the shattered transports must have been lost.

With the few surviving destroyers guarding either flank, and with the disabled ships in tow, the convoy steamed slowly in the direction of Wake Island. During the morning of the 10th it was twice attacked by submarines, the
Concord
receiving the
coup
de
grâce
, and one torpedo narrowly missing the
Cincinnati
, whilst another hit, but failed to sink, the transport
Garfield
. Driven off by destroyers, the enemy did not renew the attack. At dusk on the following day the 10,000-ton cruisers
Portland
,
Indianapolis
, and
Kansas
City
came up. They had been sent ahead by the Commander-in-Chief to guard the convoy over the last stage of the journey.

With the coming of these powerful warships there remained only the peril of submarine attack, and even this risk would disappear when contact was made with the destroyers of the battle fleet. Having been kept informed of the progress of events, and knowing that there was no longer any chance of meeting the Japanese main body, Admiral Dallinger had reduced his speed to twelve knots, with a view to saving fuel. He had also ordered two of the battleship divisions to return to Wake, coming on himself with the flagship, the
Colorado
,
Maryland
, and
California
, accompanied by two hospital ships. The convoy was sighted at 4 p.m. on the 13th, and after the worst of the wounded cases had been transferred to the hospital ships, the combined force continued its voyage. At Wake Island, which was reached on the 15th, tankers and supply ships were found waiting. Here a stay of two days was made, while the ships were re-fuelled and damaged hulls temporarily repaired. It was found necessary to scuttle two of the half-disabled transports. Then, on the 17th, the remaining ships of the original convoy sailed for Hawaii, under a strong escort of destroyers. Honolulu was reached on January 25. The ill-starred expedition was over, and to this day its survivors still marvel that any one of them lived to tell the tale.

CHAPTER XIII

Admiral Morrison resigns, and is succeeded by Admiral Muller as Chief of Naval Operations — Rear-Admiral Harper becomes Assistant Chief — Admiral Templeton replaces Admiral Dallinger as Commander-in-Chief — Decision to attack Japanese commerce — More warships ordered — Plans for a new expedition — Failure of “stop-the-war” agitation — Japan’s troubles in China — Gunboat action on the Yangtze

THE United States Government, spurred to drastic action by public clamour for a change in the conduct of the war, was not slow in taking to heart the lessons of the disaster to the Bonin expedition.

Admiral Morrison, who had practically staked his reputation on the success of the enterprise, resigned his post as Chief of Naval Operations immediately definite news of its failure was made public. To succeed him the choice of the Secretary of the Navy fell upon Admiral Lincoln B. Muller, an officer whose reputation for sagacity and sound judgment rendered it in the highest degree unlikely that he would advise the Government to embark upon any undertaking which did not offer reasonable prospects of success. For the position of Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (left vacant by the resignation of Rear-Admiral Hubbard), a popular selection was made in the person of Rear-Admiral Joseph Harper, the former Governor and Commandant of Guam, who had only lately been promoted to flag rank. Before the war he had been regarded as an authority on naval strategy, and by his skilful conduct of the defence of Guam he was proved also to be the possessor of tactical abilities of no mean order. A man of strong personality, he exercised considerable influence over all with whom he came in contact, including his Chief. Throughout the period of their association these two fine officers worked together in perfect harmony, with results that proved them to be an absolutely ideal combination. In the campaign that followed, it may reasonably be concluded that Rear-Admiral Harper supplied the driving force and most of the plans, which Admira1 Muller tempered by his caution and farsightedness.

As a further concession to public opinion, Admiral Dallinger was relieved of his command, and given the less considered appointment of President of the Naval Examining and Retiring Boards. Hard though it may seem for a distinguished flag officer to be thus superseded as the result of a disaster which he had forseen and done his best to avert, the Government no doubt felt that it would be unwise to continue in his command one who had come to be regarded by the public as an unlucky admiral. Such things often happen in war, and it was in keeping with his character that Admiral Dallinger should have loyally accepted the verdict of his superiors without complaint or apparent dissatisfaction, unlike some instances known to history. His successor in the chief command of the United States fleet was Admiral Templeton, who, it will be remembered, had taken the Scouting fleet from Hampton Roads to San Diego by way of the Straits of Magellan. Certain other changes were also made, but these were of less importance, and need not be noticed here.

One of the first matters to occupy the attention of the new Chief of Naval Operations and his Assistant was the problem of attacking the enemy’s seaborne commerce, pending the organisation of a new expedition which had already been determined upon. To arrange for immediate interference with the Japanese trade in European waters was by no means an easy task, since all the modern cruisers in the United States Navy were in the Pacific, in which area, indeed, they were most needed as scouts for the battle fleet. But there were available several passenger vessels belonging to the United States Lines, possessing qualities, such as speed and fuel endurance, which made them suitable for conversion into auxiliary cruisers. These ships were the
Leviathan
, of nearly 60,000 tons gross and 23 knots speed, one of the two largest ships in the world; the
George
Washington
, of 23,788 tons gross and 18 knots; and the
Mount
Vernon
, 18,372 tons and 20 knots. There were also the twelve American-built steamers of 14,100 tons and 17 knots, named after various Presidents; some of these ships had already been utilised as transports for the Pacific, but five were available for use in the campaign against Japanese commerce. They were the
President
Cleveland
,
President
Jefferson
,
President
Madison
,
President
Pierce
, and
President
Taft
. These eight steamers were taken in hand for conversion at the Atlantic Navy Yards as rapidly as possible. Their withdrawal from commercial service had the unavoidable effect of making a present to neutral interests (mainly British and German) of the whole of the American trans-Atlantic passenger traffic.

In the Pacific the enemy’s trade was also to be harassed. Two newly-completed 10,000-ton cruisers, the
Albany
and
Columbia
, under the command of Captain Appleton (of the former ship) as senior officer, were ordered to operate against Japanese trade with Australia, using Tutuila as their principal base. They were also to search for and destroy any Japanese cruisers they might encounter in this direction, an order that was to prove particularly fruitful, as will in due course be seen.

The activities of the Bureau of Construction and Repair were further increased, work being accelerated as much as possible on the ships already laid down, while additional units were ordered as follows:

6 cruisers of 12,000 tons with Diesel engines.

50 destroyers of 1,500 tons.

4 aircraft carriers.

20 ocean-going submarines.

6 auxiliaries (supply ships and tenders).

To remedy the immediate deficiency in scouting vessels in the Pacific, a number of suitable merchant steamers on that side were armed for employment as auxiliary cruisers.

We must now turn to the main plan of campaign which had been devised by the Naval Operations Bureau, in consultation with their military
confrères
. This, in effect, was an adaptation of certain of the features of two earlier schemes, and the secret of its ultimate success lay in the care with which these features were selected and modified.

The two plans referred to, which had been prepared long before, but had not found favour hitherto, may be briefly summed up as follows:

(
a
) An invasion of Hokkaido, the northernmost island of Japan Proper, by an army to be assembled in Alaska, the landing to be covered by a fleet based on Dutch Harbour, whence the expedition would take its final departure.

(
b
) The seizure of the island of Ponapi, in the eastern portion of the Caroline group (held by Japan under the Versailles mandate), and its conversion into an intermediate base from which either Guam or the Philippines, or both, could be threatened.

There were inherent difficulties about both schemes, but more particularly the first, owing to weather conditions in the waters to be traversed between Alaska and Hokkaido. As a matter of fact plan (
a
) was never seriously entertained by the American naval and military authorities, but to cloak their real intentions it was essential that the enemy should be deceived on this point. With the object of persuading the Japanese that plan (a) was being followed, the most elaborate arrangements were made. Several thousands of men, including those who for one reason or another could not be treated as first-class troops, were transported to Puget Sound, a few going direct to Dutch Harbour, the chief Unalaskan port, while every expedient that the united ingenuity of naval and military experts could suggest was put into operation for the benefit of possible enemy observers.

An appearance of secrecy was given to the proceedings by dispatching all transports from San Francisco, Portland, and Seattle under sealed orders, a practice which, once established, was found extremely useful when it was required to send troops and munitions to another quarter for the real expedition. For convoy purposes on the Alaskan route it was found necessary to employ the older cruisers and destroyers, the latter being relieved of their coastal patrol work further south by armed yachts and other auxiliary craft. Dutch Harbour soon became a centre of naval activity, and it was allowed to leak out, for the benefit of enemy agents, that the battleships
Arkansas
,
Wyoming
,
Florida
, and
Utah
were to be dispatched there at a later stage in the proceedings, where, anchored behind booms and mine-fields, they would add to the appearance of preparation for something big. Rumors were permitted to escape into suspected quarters of projected fleet movements in the direction of Dutch Harbour, and naturally the reported presence of four battleships was exaggerated until it was whispered that the greater part of the United States Navy had been concentrated there. Stringent orders were at the same time issued that all naval movements were to be kept secret, a measure that went far to convince enemy agents of the imminence of serious attack from the direction of Alaska. Japanese submarines which endeavored to reconnoitre Dutch Harbour were driven off by patrol ships and airplanes — of which a large number had been directed to guard against such attempts — without being able to learn anything definite. All this added to the uneasiness which began to be felt in Japanese official quarters, and although at first it was scarcely credited that the Americans would venture upon such a hazardous enterprise, the persistent reports of activity in Alaska, combined with remembrance of the previous daring attempt upon Port Lloyd, gradually encouraged a belief in the reality of an impending attack from the north-east. Well-planned strategy thus reaped its reward, and for as long a period as could possibly have been hoped the enemy was kept in a state of apprehension of a blow from a direction entirely opposite to the actual zone of activity.

In planning the real attack some use was made of plan (
b
), which was not, however, adopted in its entirety. Rear-Admiral Harper, whose knowledge of the various islands of the Pacific was extensive and peculiar, had carefully weighed the advantages and disadvantages of many of them as
points
d’appui
, and strongly urged the rejection of Ponapi in favour of Truk (also known as Hogolu). This small subgroup, which is also part of the Carolines, lies some 450 miles to the westward of Ponapi, and although offering better facilities for harbouring a large squadron, is less well known than Ponapi, and therefore seldom visited by trading vessels. Its distance from Guam (600 miles) and from the east coast of Mindanao, the nearest of the Philippines (about 1,700 miles), also rendered it preferable to Ponapi. If, as was believed, it could be seized and firmly held for a sufficient length of time, its possession would go far towards repairing the situation created when Guam was lost.

It was decided that the expedition sent against the island must be launched from Tutuila, the nearest American possession, where it was found possible to concentrate the necessary forces without arousing enemy suspicions. The troops were provided mainly from the garrison of Hawaii, the pick of whom were gradually withdrawn and secretly transferred to Tutuila, while it was allowed to leak out that their destination was Alaska. The place of these troops was taken by newer formations, for which Hawaii became the training ground until they, too, were required for active service. Recruiting had meanwhile been proceeding on both a voluntary and compulsory basis, volunteers being called for at the same time that powers were reserved to draft any additional numbers needed. The first call was for 250,000 recruits, and the response was so excellent that a million men were examined at their own request at various enlistment bureaux throughout the States. Those selected reached a very high standard, both mentally and physically. Recruits considered fit only for garrison duty were drafted to special units, which were later sent to Alaska as part of the arrangements made for deceiving the enemy.

In the meantime, Japan was not without her troubles. China, having found that it was possible to create friction between Japan and neutral interests over questions of contraband of war and kindred matters, lost no opportunity of doing so. She found her chance in connection with certain neutral concessions for raising minerals which Japan needed for the prosecution of the war. American interests were active in endeavouring to prevent the export of such products to Japan, mainly by means of contracts with the neutral concessionnaires which bound them to deliver to other customers. Japan did not scruple to put pressure upon the Chinese Government to exercise their option of commandeering supplies irrespective of concessionaires’ engagements, a manoeuvre made possible by a clause in the sale contracts reserving the right of cancellation by the concessionnaires in such event. But the Government at Peking, weak though it might be, was expert in procrastination and evasion, and Japan feared the effect on neutral opinion if she proceeded to use force to compel compliance with her wishes.

In these circumstances Japan endeavoured to gain her ends by a policy of mingled threats and bribery; but this had little effect, as American influence was at work behind the scenes, with a longer purse to back it. Recourse was then had to Li Ping-hui, the nominal Governor of Manchuria, who was for all practical purposes a vassal of Japan, and had an old score to settle with the Chinese Government. On the pretext that he was dissatisfied with the Central Government’s methods in dealing with Manchurian external affairs, and ignoring the fact that Peking had no real voice in such matters since Japan had extended her influence over the country, Li Ping-hui demanded the resignation of the Premier, Hun Ying-fu, and his Cabinet, and the appointment of his own nominees to succeed them. On being met with a refusal, he set his armies in motion, and was soon in occupation of a number of villages in the province of Pechihli, beyond the Great Wall which divides Manchuria from China Proper. His troops were not only more numerous than those of which Peking could dispose at this juncture, but were superior in arms and equipment, and had the advantage of having been drilled by Japanese instructors.