Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (28 page)

Against this fleet the United States could marshal in the Western Pacific sixteen battleships,
[2]
twenty-three cruisers, 115 destroyers, and eighty submarines, with five airplane carriers. The battleships mounted in the aggregate 170 big guns, namely twenty-two of 12-inch, 124 of 14-inch, and twenty-four of 16-inch calibre. In speed they were inferior to the Japanese, none having a legend velocity above twenty-one knots, while the older ships, in spite of new boilers, were not good for more than twenty knots. On the other hand, five of the Japanese battleships could steam at twenty-three knots and two at twenty-two knots. To the five Japanese battle-cruisers the Americans could oppose no ships of equivalent speed and armament. If, therefore, the Japanese battle fleet was outnumbered numerically and in gun-power, its higher mobility conferred upon it a tactical advantage of the greatest importance.

In all other types the two navies were fairly well matched. Since the Japanese destroyers, as a class, were larger, swifter, and more heavily armed than the American boats, these attributes went far to balance the disparity in numbers. The United States battle fleet, it will be noticed, had not been increased by new construction. Four battlecruisers, of 52,000 tons each, had been designed early in the war, but, for the same reasons which had restrained the Japanese from proceeding with their new capital ships, these American vessels were built at a very slow rate, and at this time were not even launched. The main constructional effort had been devoted to smaller craft, the demand for which was insatiable. Of these a considerable number was now in service. At one stage of the war the re-armament of several battleships with guns of a larger calibre than those already on board had been seriously contemplated, on the strength of reports which declared the Japanese to have equipped several of their battleships —
Fuso
,
Yamashiro
,
Ise
, and
Hiuga
— with eight 16-inch guns apiece, in place of the twelve 14-inch weapons originally carried. While these reports were accepted as authentic by many naval officers, who seem to have overlooked the technical objections involved, they were scouted by Admirals Muller and Harper, to whose firm opposition it was due that the dangerous experiment of re-arming six American battleships with heavier guns than they were designed to carry was never attempted.
[3]

In regard to
personnel
, that imponderable factor which nevertheless counts for much more than material, there seemed little to choose between the rival fleets. During the preceding eighteen months the American crews had been trained to a high standard of proficiency. The percentage of “green” men was now negligible. If the American system of discipline was less draconic than the Japanese, it appeared to give excellent results. As for the officers, the most striking difference was that the average age of American senior line executives was considerably above that of corresponding Japanese ranks. Some of the American captains were elderly men. Not a few of the Japanese captains were still in their thirties; several of the Japanese flag officers were barely over forty. Although the impending battle was to be fought at a period when Japan had sustained a series of reverses, there was nothing indicative of a decline in the morale of her sailors. All the evidence points the other way. Practically every Japanese commentator insists that the Navy as a whole was thirsting for battle and supremely confident of victory. But the conduct of the Japanese fleet during the action itself renders this assurance superfluous. As most American critics generously admit, had the enemy possessed an additional squadron of battleships the outcome of the duel might have been other than what it was. The Japanese did all that brave and skilful seamen could have done, proving themselves worthy successors of the men who had built up Nippon’s sea-power at the Yalu and Tsushima. From every angle of view, the great naval action off Yap was an historic event to which both combatants may look back with sentiments of patriotic pride.

CHAPTER XIX

OCTOBER — NOVEMBER, 1932

Both fleets prepare for an early conflict — Americans make a false attack on Yap — Japanese main fleet leaves Manila for Yap — Its composition — Japanese discover they have been outwitted and must fight

FOR the American naval command it now remained only to make the last and decisive move in their well-conceived plan of campaign. If this succeeded, they could count with some confidence on sweeping the Japanese main fleet from the board, either by destroying it or reducing it to a state of military impotence. Its disappearance might not bring the war to an immediate end, but it would inevitably pave the way for measures certain to achieve that purpose at no distant date. Now that the Japanese fleet was known to be at Manila, no time was lost in pressing matters to a conclusion. Admiral Hiraga’s presence there was taken as evidence of Japan’s determination to fight a general action rather than submit to the loss of further territories in the South Seas. And so the obvious method of tempting him out was adopted: namely, the dispatch of an expedition to Yap, which lay some three hundred miles to the north-east of Angaur. Though the operations in view entailed certain risks, there was no hesitation in accepting them. The month following the arrival of the Japanese fleet at Manila was a period of strenuous preparation at every American base. Since Angaur was within airplane radius of the Philippines, the ships detailed for the expedition were ordered to assemble at Truk, where they would be less liable to observation. Once more the squadron of imitation battleships was allotted a highly important
rôle
. This time, however, they were to be joined by a real battleship, the
Florida
, for an object that will duly transpire. Twelve of the freight steamers which had taken part in the feigned attack on Guam were also to be employed again in the guise of “transports.” According to the plan, this composite force, attended by a division of cruisers and screening destroyers, was to reach Angaur from Truk on November 16. If it were there observed by Japanese air or submarine scouts, no harm would result; in fact, it was very desirable that this should happen.

Twenty-four hours later, the expedition was to sail for Yap, and not merely approach to within range of the island, but so manoeuvre as to suggest that a landing was about to be attempted. The port was to be shelled by the
Florida’s
12-inch battery, aided by the light guns with which her make-believe consorts had been equipped for the sake of appearance. If the fire was returned — and the Japanese were known to have fortified the island — at least one of the false battleships was to simulate damage, but the
Florida
was forbidden to expose herself to serious punishment. The sham attack was to be continued for several hours, and at a suitable opportunity three of the “transports” would move in as though about to disembark troops. As it was more than likely that these ships would be heavily attacked, and perhaps even sunk, they were manned by crews who had specially volunteered for the duty.

In the meantime news of the attack would promptly reach Japanese headquarters at Manila, for Yap possessed a high-powered radio plant with which the Americans had studiously refrained from interfering, though their airplanes from Angaur might easily have destroyed it had this appeared desirable. Further, it was probable that the expedition would have been sighted and reported by Japanese scouts while on its way to the island. There was scarcely any doubt that the Japanese battle fleet would hasten at full speed to the relief of Yap. They might suspect a stratagem, it was true, but having no means of verifying that suspicion, they would almost certainly elect to take the risk. If, as was surmised, the Japanese Commander-in-Chief had explicit orders to prevent at all costs the enemy’s seizure of fresh territory, he would have no option but to take his fleet in the direction of Yap the moment he heard of the peril which seemingly threatened the island, without pausing to determine whether the attack was genuine or merely a ruse, such as had been practised in the case of Guam.

From Manila to Yap is a voyage of 1,160 miles. It was accordingly calculated that the Japanese fleet, steaming at eighteen knots, would appear on the scene in sixty-five hours. Of course it might happen that Admiral Hiraga would travel at his utmost speed, in which case he would be liable to arrive ten hours earlier, that is, at 5 p.m. on the 20th. There was the further possibility that he might be cruising away from his base when the news reached him, a contingency not to be disregarded in view of the fact that American patrol submarines had already sighted his fleet at sea a week after its first arrival at Manila. In these circumstances a rigid schedule of movements was not feasible.

The most that could be done was to arrange for the timely appearance of the United States battle fleet at the critical moment. Fortunately, this was not difficult. Admiral Templeton was instructed to sail from Truk on November 15, steering a course towards Angaur. While his battleships were not to go nearer than one hundred miles, most of the destroyers and other vessels that had need to replenish their bunkers would enter the harbour at Angaur and quickly re-fuel there, what time the battleships, screened by the remaining destroyers, held their position at sea until the smaller craft rejoined. This done, the entire force would make for a specified position seventy miles to the east of Yap, its arrival being timed to coincide with the approach of Admiral Hiraga towards the same island. Ample margin was provided for an earlier or later coming of the enemy.

To ensure early warning of his approach, no less than twenty American submarines were strung out on a longitudinal line of patrol 150 miles to the west of Yap. Through some section of this line the Japanese fleet was bound to pass, and whether it came in daylight or in darkness, the chance of its getting through unobserved was very slight, for every submarine was equipped with hydrophones. The boats, it should be added, had strict orders not to attack any hostile ships steaming eastward, that is towards Yap. They were to reserve their torpedoes for the enemy on his return from the impending battle.

When word of the Japanese approach came to Admiral Templeton, he was to head north at full speed, and, passing between the islands of Yap and Uluthi, stand towards the north-west until precise intelligence of the enemy’s position and course came to hand. In this way, it was hoped, he would be able to interpose his entire force between the Japanese and their Philippine bases before action was joined. Meanwhile the decoy squadron off Yap was to remain there until ordered to retreat by radio signal from the Commander-in-Chief; but the signal would not be given until the Japanese fleet was within a few hours of the island, since a premature withdrawal of the squadron might decide Admiral Hiraga not to continue his run to the eastward, the immediate peril to Yap having passed. While the false battleships and transports, their mission fulfilled, were to return to Angaur under light destroyer escort, the subsequent movements of the
Florida
were to be determined by events. If possible she was to rejoin the main fleet on its passage north about Yap.

Such, then, were the dispositions which, it was hoped, would compel the enemy to accept action in waters remote from his bases and thus enable a decisive result to be obtained. At this time, it should be remembered, the Japanese firmly believed two of the best United States battleships to be at the bottom of the Pacific. Moreover, if they did not know positively of the absence of other vessels in American dockyards, they could be virtually certain that one or two capital ships were undergoing repair and therefore not immediately available. They thus assumed that Admiral Templeton had at most fourteen battleships under his command, and probably not more than thirteen. As we know, however, he had sixteen. Since the Japanese themselves could muster twelve capital ships, all of which were swifter than the American vessels, it is not surprising that they should welcome the opportunity of giving battle under what seemed to them highly propitious conditions.

On the American side there was no tendency to minimise the formidable nature of the operations that lay ahead. It was one thing to force an encounter with the hostile fleet; it would be quite another to defeat that fleet when it was encountered. The American superiority in number of heavy ships and weight of broadside was none too great, while the higher speed of the Japanese would give them a tactical advantage which, if skilfully exploited, might well prove decisive. The Japanese Admiral could take advantage of this extra speed either to choose his own range or to make good his retreat if the American fire became too hot.

So far as the United States fleet was concerned, its sole chance of getting in a mortal blow lay in developing from the very outset an accurate and overwhelming fire. These considerations having long been evident to the American naval command, every effort was made to improve the shooting of the fleet. Gunnery practice had taken place frequently during the previous year, special attention being paid to firing at extreme range. The turret-gun elevation in eight ships had been raised from 16 degrees to 25 degrees, thus increasing their effective range by 4,000 to 5,000 yards. This change had been proposed as far back as 1923, but reasons of international policy had caused it to be deferred until the outbreak of war. To avoid unduly weakening the Fleet by detaching several vessels simultaneously, each ship was dealt with in turn. The process had therefore occupied nearly eighteen months, and there still remained five vessels which had not yet had their guns raised. Spare guns were held ready to replace those worn out by frequent target practice, with the result that the artillery of the fleet was at all times maintained in a thoroughly efficient condition. As the war progressed, various improvements prompted by experience were made in the fire-control installations. In short, nothing that human foresight could suggest for the improvement of gunnery had been neglected. That the Japanese had also devoted attention to this branch of naval preparedness was deemed highly probable. But even if the quality of the shooting on both sides were fairly equal, it was felt that the American preponderance of fifty-six big guns ought to turn the scale. Finally, the fleet possessed in the
Lexington
and
Saratoga
two airplane carriers of unrivalled speed and capacity.

All initial dispositions having been made, the Yap expeditionary force, commanded by Rear-Admiral Hubbard with his flag in the
Florida
, sailed from Angaur at 7 a.m. on November 17. At the same moment Admiral Templeton, a hundred miles to the east, was preparing to take his fleet to the appointed position near Yap, there to await intelligence that might herald the clash of battle. The force from Truk had not proceeded far when it received proof of the enemy’s vigilance. Torpedoes were fired at the leading ship by a submarine, fortunately without result, the intruder being driven off by destroyers. But twenty minutes later, the American radio operators were intercepting messages in a strange code: it was the submarine scout flashing word of what he had seen to Admiral Hiraga at Manila. Two hours afterwards, a couple of large Japanese airplanes, probably from Mindanao, came in sight, but did not attempt to attack. Since there was no longer any question as to the discovery of the expedition, it was rightly conjectured that the Japanese fleet would very soon be speeding towards Yap.

Steaming at fourteen knots, and zigzagging to confuse the aim of lurking submarines, Admiral Hubbard held on towards the north-east until early on the morning of November 18, when the island came within sight. His squadron was promptly assailed by Japanese airplanes, which were met and repelled by combat planes from the
Alaska
before they could get within attacking distance. Leaving his “transports” astern, in charge of half the destroyers, Admiral Hubbard, with his ships in battle formation, steamed slowly past the harbour and, at a range of 18,000 yards, opened with his 12-inch guns. Drawing no response, he closed in to 14,000 yards, at which distance the 6-inch guns of his dummy ‘‘battleships’’ were able to join in the cannonade. Thereupon a battery ashore began a slow but well-directed fire, the height of the splashes denoting shells of 7-inch or 8-inch calibre. When one of these pitched uncomfortably near the
Florida
, Admiral Hubbard turned away, for his orders forbade him to imperil this ship. As he turned, his next astern, the pseudo
Arizona
, was hit in the funnels. The position of the battery having been signalled by one of the spotting planes aloft, the
Florida
endeavoured to silence it, but the need for husbanding ammunition prevented a really effective bombardment from being maintained. Though it received at least two direct hits, the shore battery continued to fire at intervals all day and succeeded in hitting three of the dummy battleships — one of which, as prearranged, left the line and steamed slowly out to sea, listing heavily as she went. The fact that yet another enemy battleship had been disabled was doubtless communicated immediately to Admiral Hiraga, whose confidence in a coming victory for his fleet must have soared at the news.

At 6 p.m. three of the “transports” approached the shore and manoeuvred as if on the point of lowering boats, while to cover the operation the
Florida
and her consorts increased their fire. But at this stage of the proceedings several light guns on the island, hitherto silent, began throwing salvos with great accuracy. Before the three “transports” could withdraw, all were hit more or less severely, the
Roanoke
being holed repeatedly and having a number of casualties. Had the hidden guns ashore been of heavier calibre — they were 12-pounder field pieces — nothing could have saved the ships from destruction. As it was, the
Roanoke
foundered during the night, though not before the survivors of her volunteer crew had been taken off.