Great Pacific War: A History of the American-Japanese Campaign of 1931-33 (20 page)

Li’s old opponent, General Wang-Tsu, at this time was far away in the south of China with the best of his troops, engaging in crushing an incipient revolution. Probably, therefore, the issue would have turned in favour of Li; but before any decisive action had been fought, news was received that a serious revolt had broken out in Northern Manchuria, where influences from the Russian Far Eastern Republic had long been at work fomenting discontent. Stimulated by American gold, the spirit of resistance only needed the opportunity presented by the withdrawal of Li Ping-hui’s soldiery to become active. Arms, ammunition and experienced leaders were imported from across the Amur, and in a very short time the whole of the northern province of Ho-lung-kiang was in a blaze, which extended rapidly southward into Kirin. The garrisons which had been left in a few of the more important places, such as Harbin, Kirin and Tsisihar, were able to hold out, but the districts away from the railway were speedily overrun by the insurgent peasantry. Leaving to some future date the settlement of his quarrel with the Government of Peking, Li Ping-hui hastily returned with the bulk of his troops to Mukden, there to concert measures with his Japanese advisers for dealing with the rebels who so seriously threatened his rule.

For the second time Japan’s plans had miscarried, and she was now forced to content herself with the influence she was able to bring to bear upon the local governors of such provinces as Shantung, Hupeh, and Yunnan, where were situated the principal sources of supply for iron, petroleum, and copper. Though this method was expensive, and less satisfactory than dealing with the Central Government, it was found to answer sufficiently well for the moment, in so far as it ensured that the Japanese shipbuilding and munition programmes would not be held up by lack of raw materials.

In connection with the transport of petroleum from Hankow to Japan there were few difficulties, as the River Yangtze offered an excellent channel of communication, but one incident occurred which is worth recounting. Both the United States and Japan had for many years maintained gunboats on the Yangtze for police purposes and to protect their commercial interests, nor had the outbreak of war affected the position on this neutral waterway beyond causing each side to keep a watchful eye upon the other. But the apprehensions of a Japanese merchant captain now caused an explosion which was with difficulty localised.

On December 29, 1931, the Japanese oil tanker
Yudachi
Maru
had just left Hankow with a full cargo when she noticed that the United States gunboat
Palos
was some distance astern, apparently in pursuit, though as a matter of fact her movements were afterwards proved to have no reference to those of the oil tanker. No doubt the Japanese captain had been misled by imaginative stories circulating in Hankow as to the steps which the Americans were prepared to take to interfere with the traffic in which he was engaged. At any rate, he imagined himself to be chased, and having armed his crew with rifles which were carried as a protection against Chinese pirates, he actually ordered them to fire upon the
Palos
. The bullets were mostly wide or short of the mark, but one or two hit the hull of the
Palos
. Her captain, Lieutenant-Commander O’Halloran, was naturally indignant at this unprovoked attack, and fired a warning shell over the
Yudachi
Maru
, which in the meantime had increased speed to the utmost. Probably the affair would have ended more or less tamely had not the Japanese gunboat
Fushimi
, which was lying off the town of Wu-sueh, taken in the frantic radio appeals for help which the
Yudachi
Maru
was broadcasting, and hastened up river under a full head of steam. Arriving just as the
Palos
had fired, the situation appeared clear, and the
Fushimi
answered the shot without hesitation. Thus protected, the
Yudachi
Maru
speedily quitted the scene, leaving the two gunboats to fight it out. They were not unequally matched. Both carried identical armaments, namely, two 6-pounder guns, and neither could steam at much over thirteen knots. The
Palos
displaced 190 tons, just ten tons more than the
Fushimi
; and each carried a crew of about fifty. Neither ship had any armour protection, and as the range was short, casualties soon began to occur.

The
Palos
was getting somewhat the better of it, having set the
Fushimi
on fire, when a newcomer intervened — again in response to the signals of the
Yudachi
Maru
. This was the Japanese gunboat
Hodzu
, of 340 tons, built in 1923, and armed with two 12-pounders. Fearing he would soon be overmatched, and determined to settle with at least one of his opponents, Lieutenant-Commander O’Halloran closed with the
Fushimi
, keeping her between him and the
Hodzu
. Owing to the smoke in which she was enveloped, and their preoccupation in fighting the flames, the
Fushimi’s
people made no attempt to avoid the
Palos
, which rammed her amidships and opened a large rent in her hull. As the United States gunboat backed away, she came under a severe fire from the guns of the
Hodzu
, a shell from which killed the gallant O’Halloran. Finding the ship was leaking badly in the bows, which had been crumpled by the impact, the warrant officer who was now left in charge of the
Palos
beached her at a convenient spot just above Wu-sueh, leaving to the
Hodzu
the task of rescuing the crew of the sinking
Fushimi
. The
Palos
herself was a complete wreck, the whole of her upper works being shattered, while less than twenty men were left on their feet.

The local Chinese authorities, making no secret of their hostility towards the Japanese, were prompt in rendering assistance to the survivors, who received every care and attention, while an armed guard of Chinese soldiers was placed over the wrecked American gunboat. But for this she would probably have been taken possession of by the Japanese, who were much incensed at the loss of the
Fushimi
, and were with difficulty deterred from attacking the Chinese sentries.

After some days of angry correspondence through the usual diplomatic channels, the Chinese persuaded both sides to submit the dispute to the British Consul-General at Hankow. His investigations showed clearly that the whole affair arose through the baseless misgivings of the master of the
Yudachi
Maru
, who in consequence found himself rather unpopular in Japanese official circles, though the chauvinistic section of the public were disposed to regard him as a hero. To avoid a repetition of such incidents, it was arranged that the contending Powers should keep the British consular representatives advised of all intended movements of their gunboats on Chinese rivers, so that each be informed through neutral channels of the whereabout of the other, and so avoid unexpected encounters.

CHAPTER XIV

American squadron under Captain Appleton sent to Samoa — Japanese squadron with transports enters neighboring zone — U. S. S. Columbia taken at a disadvantage and sunk — Sound American tactics — Japanese squadron destroyed at Battle of Rotumah — Captain Appleton promoted and reinforced

EVENTS in the Southern Pacific must now be noticed. Captain Appleton’s instructions included certain confidential references to the projected expedition to the South Sea Islands, for which his force was intended to pave the way. He had under his command, in addition to the new cruisers
Albany
and
Columbia
, the aircraft-carrier
Wright
and eighteen destroyers. He was ordered to take every precaution to avoid rousing Japanese suspicions as to the ultimate object of his movements, and to make sure that no regular patrol of the area to the east of Truk was being carried out by the enemy. Compared with this the attack upon Japanese trade with Australia was to be regarded as a secondary consideration, to be dealt with when convenient. At the same time it would furnish a plausible explanation of movements which might otherwise set the enemy thinking.

Strangely enough, these orders coincided with a Japanese plan for seizing the American possessions in the Samoa group. In Tokyo it had been suggested that the most effective way of preventing the United States Navy from carrying out its rumoured intention of attacking the important Australian trade was to occupy Tutuila, the only position capable of being used as a base for such attack. A small expedition had been fitted out, comprising in all some 5,000 troops, mainly
Kobi
(reservist) infantry. These, with artillery and munitions, were accommodated in ten transports, ships of moderate size, whose average speed fell below eleven knots. They were convoyed by a squadron made up of the four obsolete cruisers
Iwate
(flagship of Rear-Admiral Karuma),
Idzumo
,
Yakumo
, and
Azuma
, with ten second-class destroyers. The cruisers were all over thirty years old, and had long been relegated to subsidiary duties, but for an expedition of this kind they were quite useful ships. A couple of scouting seaplanes had been added to the equipment of each, and they had been otherwise modernised to a certain extent. Each was armed with four 8-inch and eight 6-inch guns. The destroyers were old 30-knotters of some 600 tons apiece.

The expedition assembled at Jaluit during the last week in February. It was timed to reach Tutuila at daybreak on March 5, when a landing, so the Japanese thought, could be effected without difficulty, having regard to the advantage of surprise and the absence of a strong garrison. Nor was there any reason why this programme should not have been carried through with complete success, but for the coincidence of Captain Appleton's mission in the same waters. On arriving at Tutuila that officer was employed for some days in arranging for the reception of the troops to be dispatched from Hawaii as part of the Truk Expedition. It had been decided to place most of the soldiers under canvas, and camp sites had to be selected within easy reach of water supplies. Although the area of Tutuila is only forty square miles, this task kept Captain Appleton occupied for nearly a week in consultation with the Governor, who was also a naval officer. During this time the
Albany
,
Wright
, and two divisions of destroyers remained at Pago-Pago. The
Columbia
(Captain Parker) and the remaining six destroyers, having re-fuelled, were directed to cruise on a line to the north-westward.

On March 1 the
Columbia
ran upon an uncharted shoal some two hundred miles north of the island of Rotumah. She appeared to have scraped over a ridge of coral, upon which her after part still rested. Destroyers attempted to tow her clear, while her own engines worked at full speed, but no appreciable movement resulted. An inspection by divers showed the vessel to be firmly wedged between two masses of coral. It was then decided to lighten her by pumping five hundred tons of oil fuel and water from her after tanks; this having been done, a second attempt was made to tow her off, but again without success. As night had now fallen, operations had to be suspended.

In the meantime Captain Appleton, advised by radio of the
Columbia’s
plight, had ordered the
Wright
to proceed to her assistance, he himself intending to follow next day with the
Albany
and his remaining destroyers. At daybreak renewed efforts were made to drag the
Columbia
off the shoal, and at length, after hours of strenuous labour, she floated clear. But the damage she had sustained proved to be very extensive; portions of the keel had been torn away, and all four propellers were injured. It was at this juncture that two airplanes were observed coming from the northwest; and a machine from the
Columbia
, going up to investigate, sighted a squadron of enemy warships, convoying a number of merchant steamers. Closer scrutiny showed the hostile force to consist of a destroyer flotilla and the
Iwate
,
Idzumo
,
Yakumo,
and
Azumay
old cruisers averaging 9,600 tons. Their speed was low, but they had good armour protection, and their batteries of 8-inch and 6-inch guns, though of obsolete models, were likely to prove formidable in close action. The
Columbia
, being a ship of much later design, had a more powerful battery of 8-inch high velocity guns, but she was practically destitute of armour protection. True, her big guns were fitted with splinter-proof shields, but these afforded little or no real shelter to the crews, and more often than not they merely served to detonate shells which might otherwise have passed through without exploding.

These drawbacks notwithstanding, Captain Parker would have had small cause for anxiety if his ship had been good for her original speed of thirty-three knots or more, for he would then have been able to fight at his selected range, or alternatively to avoid action altogether. As things were, however, the crippled cruiser could barely travel at half her designed speed. It was therefore with a full knowledge of his dangerous situation that Captain Parker ordered his destroyers to leave him, and try to make contact with Captain Appleton’s squadron, which was known to be on the way from Pago-Pago.

The Japanese squadron, leaving several destroyers to guard the convoy, now approached the
Columbia
at full speed. In order to make the most of his initial advantage in range, Captain Parker stood towards the eastward at his best speed, while the Japanese, changing their formation from line ahead to line abreast as the range shortened, were soon able to bring their forward 8-inch guns to bear. In the meantime the
Columbia
had endeavoured to knock out the leading Japanese ship before her low-powered guns could get into action. Despite a smoke screen thrown across the course of the advancing enemy cruisers by their attendant destroyers, which were steaming some distance to windward, the concentrated fire of the
Columbia’s
heavy guns did a considerable amount of damage to the
Azuma
. One shell penetrated her deck and ignited a quantity of ammunition which had been brought up in readiness for closer action. The explosion and fire which followed put the
Azuma
practically out of action until she had repaired damages. She dropped astern, and did not appear again until the fight was nearly over.

But her consorts were now beginning to find the range, though for some time their practice was poor, probably because these ships were manned largely by elderly reservists and youths fresh from the training establishments. As they overhauled the
Columbia
, their 6-inch batteries were also brought into play. Still, for some time the
Columbia
contrived to hold her own, thanks to her superior fire control gear and more powerful guns. Unfortunately, this advantage was largely negatived by the Japanese airplanes, which by reporting the fall of each salvo enabled their ships to develop a most accurate fire, until the
Columbia
was being smothered with shell. She was soon in a deplorable state. Half her guns were out of action, and the crews of those still intact had been renewed more than once, so that she was no longer able to maintain a rapid or an accurate fire.

In spite of all efforts to localise outbreaks, fires were raging at three points, and casualties had become so numerous that the medical staff could no longer cope with them. Some of the wounded, who had to be left where they fell, suffered a cruel death in the flames, for their comrades engaged in fighting the fires were either unaware of their plight or unable to reach them. Captain Parker and several of his officers had been killed early in the battle by a salvo from the
Iwate
, which wrecked the bridge and brought down the foremast and a funnel. Lieutenant-Commander Isaacs, the senior officer surviving, continued to fight the ship from a less exposed position until he in turn fell, badly wounded by a splinter. In fear that some unauthorised person might offer to surrender before the ship sank — for it had been reported to him that she was leaking badly from hits on the water-line, and that the pumps could scarcely hold the water — he had given directions for the seacocks to be opened.

But the matter was taken out of his hands by the Japanese Admiral, who, observing the
Columbia’s
fire to have slackened, and her manifest state of distress, promptly signalled his destroyers to attack. To supplement their efforts and at the same time to distract the attention of the American gunners, the eight airplanes which had hitherto been on spotting duty were also launched against the unhappy
Columbia
. A considerable number of bombs fell around her, but only four found the target, and these were too small to inflict serious damage, though they caused further casualties. But the doomed ship could still make her teeth felt, and she received the attacking destroyers with a slow but well-aimed fire. One shell exploded in the boiler-room of the
Tachibana
, putting her out of action and causing the only deaths which occurred on the Japanese side during this phase of the action. This, however, was the
Columbia’s
expiring effort. At least four torpedoes appear to have struck her, and before the second division of destroyers came within range it was apparent that she was about to founder. Rear-Admiral Karuma now signalled orders to cease fire, and sent his destroyers close to the sinking vessel. All her boats were smashed, and but for the timely help rendered by the enemy there would have been few survivors. As it was, the Japanese entered into the task of saving life with as much zeal as they had previously displayed in fighting, and the majority of those Americans left alive were rescued before the cruiser took her last plunge.

Rear-Admiral Karuma, in pursuance of his orders, continued his voyage to Samoa as soon as he had repaired damages. The
Tachibana
, which was the only ship in serious case, was taken in tow by a transport. When the squadron was sighted next day by the scouting seaplanes of the
Wright
, and it was apparent that another fight was impending, everything of value was removed from the crippled destroyer, her crew were distributed amongst the rest of the Japanese ships, and she was scuttled.

The battle that followed will long be remembered as a masterly example of sound tactics on the part of the American leader. Before closing with the enemy Captain Apple-ton had resolved to secure command of the air, for which purpose he concentrated his whole flying force — two seaplanes from the
Albany
and twelve from the
Wright
— upon the Japanese machines. These were all accounted for after a gallant fight, though not until they had shot down two of the American planes.

This much accomplished, Captain Appleton proceeded to hang on the flank of the Japanese squadron, pounding away methodically with his 8-inch guns. His speed advantage of about fifteen knots enabled him to evade with ease all the enemy’s efforts to close the range, and Admiral Karuma found himself in the trying position of being hit continually without being able to touch his opponent. Captain Appleton’s tactics were to train three of his guns upon each of the Japanese cruisers, thus keeping the whole squadron under a distant but accurate fire, for his spotting aircraft were able to do their work without the least interference.

Stoically enduring his punishment in the hope that some lucky chance would give him relief, the Japanese Admiral refrained from useless endeavours to get to grips with his elusive adversary, and held doggedly on his course eastward, keeping his warships between the
Albany
and the transports. Had nightfall been nearer he might yet have won through; but as it was, his position soon became desperate. Turn and twist as he might, he could not for long avoid the regular salvos of the American cruiser, nor did the smoke screen put up by his destroyers have the desired result. In no long time all four of the Japanese cruisers began to feel the effect of this relentless hammering.

Moreover, at this stage of the action Admiral Karuma was confronted by a new peril, for he noticed that the American destroyers were working round his flank to get within range of the transports. To counter this threat, he ordered his own boats to attack the American flotilla, which was considerably the stronger, and in the ensuing
mêlée
the Japanese destroyers would have been wiped out had not Karuma led his cruisers to the rescue. While two of the Japanese boats were crippled in this first brush, the Americans did not suffer to anything like the same extent, since in conformity with orders they broke off the conflict immediately the hostile cruisers joined in. In the course of this fighting, one of the transports was hit by a torpedo, an incident that added to Admiral Karuma’s embarrassments. These were crowding upon him thick and fast, for while his attention had been engaged with the saving of his destroyers, the
Albany
had so altered her position that the transports now bore the brunt of her fire for several minutes. Heavy casualties were suffered by these ships, their decks being crowded with Japanese soldiers who were watching the fight; and two of the transports received structural injuries which caused them to leak, thus further reducing the speed of the squadron.