Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (121 page)

The stalemate between the cabinet and the Diet led to an unexpected development. A new political party, the Kensei-t
ō
(Constitutional Government Party), was formed by a union of the erstwhile enemies, the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
and the Shimpo-t
ō
. At a gathering on June 16
Ō
kuma and Itagaki delivered speeches on the urgent reasons for joining the two parties, and on the twenty-first, both parties were dissolved in preparation for the formation of the new party on the following day. The official announcement stated,

It will soon be ten years since the promulgation of the constitution and the opening of the Diet. During this period the Diet has been dissolved no fewer than five times, and constitutional government has yet to bear fruit. The political parties likewise have made no progress, and as a consequence, the lingering evils of the domain cliques are still frozen solidly. This has shattered the harmony between the government and the people and delayed matters of state, something that all men who love their country deeply deplore. We, in consideration of the situation at home and abroad, have dissolved the Jiy
ū
and Shimpo parties in order to organize one large political party, rallying men of like mind. We hope that renewal and renovation will create a fully constitutional government.
¹⁰

Of the nine points of the new party’s program, the most important was the second: in the future, cabinets would be formed by a prime minister chosen from the strongest political party, in place of the prevailing practice of the emperor’s choosing as prime minister someone who was from either Satsuma or Ch
ō
sh
ū
, normally a man who had rendered service at the time of the Restoration.

It
ō
’s first reaction to this program was to initiate plans for a political party of his own, which would consist of businessmen and public-spirited patriots. He quickly received the support of members of his cabinet. They pointed out, however, that in order to appeal to voters in the coming election, It
ō
would have to deliver speeches all over the country and explain the government’s policies. He was also reminded how little time was left for campaigning before the election. Kuroda Kiyotaka promised that if It
ō
founded a political party, he would accompany him wherever he gave speeches, although he was now so old he would have to hobble around, leaning on a cane.

When Inoue Kaoru visited Yamagata to ask his support, he answered, “It is not improper for people of the same mind to form a political party, but to allow a political party to form a cabinet would be to destroy the history of the Meiji government and to violate the imperial constitution. If this is done, we shall undoubtedly share the fate of countries like Spain and Greece.”
¹¹
Yamagata rejected It
ō
’s plan in such strong terms that Kuroda changed his mind about supporting a new party, and It
ō
himself finally abandoned the project.

After the Kensei-t
ō
had been formed, the army minister, Katsura Tar
ō
, who was resolved to maintain the existing political system, met with Yamagata, Inoue, and Saig
ō
. After expressing regret that It
ō
intended to resign if his desire to form a political party was rejected, he suggested that if It
ō
could not deal with the political situation, the
genr
ō
must step into the breach. If the Diet continued to oppose the government, it could be dissolved, and if necessary, the constitution could also be suspended.
¹²

The emperor, deeply disturbed by the situation, summoned a meeting on June 24 with It
ō
, Kuroda, Yamagata, Saig
ō
, Inoue, and
Ō
yama Iwao. At the meeting It
ō
said that the new political party of
Ō
kuma and Itagaki had a majority in the Diet and that there was no way to avoid asking the two men to form a cabinet. Yamagata and Kuroda strongly opposed It
ō
, sure that if forming a cabinet were left to
Ō
yama and Itagaki and their cabinet was based on the program of a political party, this would be a contradiction of the national polity and a gross violation of the spirit of the imperial constitution.

The debate in the emperor’s presence continued without reaching a resolution. The emperor grew increasingly apprehensive and summoned It
ō
after the meeting had ended in order to reveal his own opinions. He thought that while remaining as prime minister, It
ō
should ask the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
to cooperate with him, as it had in the past. It
ō
replied that this was no longer possible because of the two parties’ merger. He suggested that the best plan was to let
Ō
kuma and Itagaki take responsibility for dealing with the difficult situation. It
ō
asked not only to resign but also to return his rank and title.
¹³

On June 25 the emperor summoned Yamagata, Kuroda,
Ō
yama, Saig
ō
, and Inoue. He announced that It
ō
could not be dissuaded from resigning. According to It
ō
, the consensus of opinion was that there was no choice but to recommend
Ō
kuma and Itagaki as his successors. Seven cabinet ministers immediately asked to resign. That night, It
ō
met
Ō
kuma and Itagaki privately, briefing them on the extremely critical situation, both internal and external. He said that he had recommended them to the emperor because they controlled a majority in the House of Representatives, which would enable them to pass necessary legislation for dealing with the crisis. He urged them to accept if the emperor asked them to serve. On the following day they informed him that they would not decline the responsibility, heavy though it was. On June 27 the emperor commanded
Ō
kuma and Itagaki to form a cabinet. The two men vowed to exert themselves to the utmost to repay their debt to the emperor.
¹⁴

On June 28
Ō
kuma and Itagaki, at an audience with the emperor, reported that they had completed their selection of cabinet ministers. Looking over the list, the emperor asked questions about the personalities of the men they had chosen. Most were Diet members, and there was no need to ask about their official career, court rank, or decorations, but the emperor wished to know what they were like as human beings.
Ō
kuma and Itagaki by turns described the different men. When the emperor reached the name of Ozaki Yukio, he expressed surprise, asking how it happened they had recommended as a cabinet member a man who some years earlier had been condemned to disciplinary punishment and who had not yet been pardoned.
¹⁵
The next day when
Ō
kuma and Itagaki visited the palace, the emperor reiterated that the office of cabinet member was of such importance that anyone appointed to this position must perform his duties with the utmost devotion and make no mistakes in dealing with matters of state, perhaps an indirect criticism of Ozaki.

It
ō
had become convinced that there was no way to prevent the majority party in the Diet from appointing the cabinet. He knew that this would mean the end of the domination of Satsuma and Ch
ō
sh
ū
and of rule by old friends with whom he had been closely associated since the days of the Restoration. The emperor also was distressed by the new state of affairs. Matsukata later told friends that he had never seen the emperor look so sad.
¹⁶

No sooner did it become apparent that a cabinet controlled by a political party would become a reality than it was predicted that it would not last. This proved to be true of this particular party cabinet: the cabinet was destined to fall apart, not because the members belonged to political parties, but because the beliefs of
Ō
kuma and Itagaki were irreconcilable. On June 30 the new cabinet was invested by the emperor. Among those sworn in,
Ō
kuma became both prime minister and foreign minister; Itagaki, home minister; and Ozaki Yukio, education minister.

Shortly after taking office,
Ō
kuma called a meeting of prefectural governors at which he explained the special features of a party cabinet and promised fair elections and a reform of prefectural administration. He particularly stressed the elections as the bone marrow of constitutional government and said that in order to ensure fair elections, strict controls would be maintained over elections in order to forestall the violence, bribery, intimidation, and the rest that had marred previous elections.
¹⁷

On July 14 Sasaki Takayuki visited the palace with the two princesses who had been left in his care. After the audience granted by the emperor, Sasaki, one of the few people with whom the emperor spoke freely, said that he could imagine how upset the emperor had been by the change in the cabinet. The emperor replied, “The present major change in the cabinet, like a tidal wave that sweeps in a moment over the shore, was of irresistible force. It had been brought about by the times, and that was why I listened to It
ō
’s recommendation and commanded
Ō
kuma and Itagaki to form a cabinet. I believed at first that because
Ō
kuma was the head of the Shimpo-t
ō
and Itagaki the president of the Jiy
ū
-t
ō
, the two of them would lead and guide the Kensei-t
ō
and select cabinet appointees. This was definitely not the case. Their strength within their party is nil, and their wishes are paid not the slightest attention. The selection of members of the cabinet was made at party headquarters. Moreover, the Jiy
ū
and the Shimpo factions have yet to resolve their differences. If the Jiy
ū
faction recommends something, the Shimpo faction disapproves, and if the Shimpo faction advocates something, the Jiy
ū
faction is against it.
Ō
kuma and Itagaki can do nothing about it. They are constantly being manipulated by party members and harassed by their demands. As long as the two of them are at cabinet sessions, everything is peaceful, but once they return to their residences, dozens of party members, relying on their numbers, are there to ask for various favors, and their demands never stop. At first I thought that if I entrusted the situation to
Ō
kuma and Itagaki, they would suitably reorganize general affairs and would be able to carry out the administration, but I was completely mistaken.”
¹⁸

Sasaki asked if, considering the present lamentable state of affairs, the coalition would in the future be able to manage state business. The emperor replied that it was difficult to predict the future, but there were likely to be problems. The worst of all would probably be the Ministry of Education: “People say that Toyama Masakazu, who served as minister and earlier as assistant minister, is a scholar and that Kikuchi Dairoku is a skillful administrator. Hamao Arata apparently had no special ability. They say that the new minister, Ozaki Yukio, is a good match for Hamao, although he may have some ability. The general opinion is that there is not much chance that his coping with problems at the ministry will lead to any advancement in education.”
¹⁹
The emperor’s sarcasm directed at Ozaki Yukio seems to reflect a deep personal dislike.

On July 8 the grand duke Kiril Vladimirovitch, a cousin of Nicholas II, paid a state visit. He was suitably received by the emperor and empress, although such visits had become so common that they no longer aroused much interest at the court. On August 5 Itagaki asked
Ō
kuma to relinquish his post as foreign minister, claiming that he had been allowed to occupy the post in order to facilitate receiving and entertaining the Russian grand duke. Now that the grand duke’s visit had ended, it was time for
Ō
kuma to give up this second post and reestablish parity between the two parties. Itagaki favored Hoshi T
ō
ru or Ebara Soroku as the new foreign minister.
Ō
kuma’s reluctance to step down caused the first clash within the coalition. The emperor was consulted as the final court of appeal. He thought that
Ō
kuma should remain as foreign minister. The emperor’s decision was, of course, obeyed but deepened the rift between the two factions.

The next clash between the two factions of the Kensei-t
ō
came when the Shimpo faction proposed that the Metropolitan Police Office be abolished. Itagaki composed a statement for the emperor stating the reasons why it should not be abolished. No action was taken. In this and later clashes of opinions, the Jiy
ū
faction, despite its traditions of liberalism, showed itself to be fundamentally more conservative than the Shimpo faction.

On August 11 the Ministry of Education abolished all the various ministerial ordinances, official notices, unofficial notices, directives, private instructions, and so forth that it had issued since 1881 to control freedom of assembly, speech, association, and the like. Explaining this sweeping action, Ozaki Yukio said that many of these ministerial orders had been rendered unnecessary by the enactment of related laws. Other orders, intended to remedy some specific abuse of their day, had become obsolete because of the changes brought about with the passage of time. A few, it is true, still were relevant, but he considered that educational problems were best resolved by school principals, teachers, and other persons engaged in education. Ozaki believed that the ordinances were a burdensome legacy of the past and, by abolishing them, hoped to reform education.
²⁰