Emperor of Japan: Meiji and His World, 1852’1912 (118 page)

The education of sons of the nobility was also reconsidered at this time. It had previously been assumed that graduates of the Gakush
ū
-in would become officers in the military or members of the House of Peers, but Konoe Atsumaro (1863–1904), who had been appointed as principal of the school in 1895, believed that the Gakush
ū
-in should also train future diplomats for service in the different countries of Europe. To this end, he proposed modifying the curriculum, and in June 1896 he received permission. Courses to be added included sociology, the history of Western and European diplomacy, public and private law, and foreign languages; but Eastern and Western philosophy, Japanese and Chinese literature, aesthetics, and other “useless” subjects were to be dropped from the curriculum.
⁷
The decision had been made that even young aristocrats must receive a modern education.

Meiji’s busyness, the cause of his inability to find time to see his daughters, was probably due to both external and internal causes. Among the external causes none was more time-consuming than the situation in Korea. King Kojong continued to live through 1896 in the Russian legation in Seoul, showing no signs of returning to his palace, even though he had clearly outstayed his welcome. Russian influence in Korea kept growing, and in order to maintain whatever influence they still possessed, the Japanese had no choice but to join with the Russians in guaranteeing Korea’s independence and promising mutual supervision of its internal affairs. Komura Jutar
ō
, the Japanese resident minister, and Carl Waeber, the acting Russian minister, signed a memorandum to this effect on May 14. They agreed that the king should soon return to his palace, at which time they would urge him to appoint tolerant and moderate ministers and to govern humanely.
⁸
They also agreed to limit both Russian and Japanese military strength in Korea and to withdraw all troops once the country was entirely peaceful.

The coronation of Nicholas II in May was the occasion for further Russo-Japanese discussions on the future of Korea. The emperor sent Yamagata Aritomo as his personal representative to the coronation. On May 22 Yamagata had an audience with the czar at which he presented a letter from Emperor Meiji. In accepting the letter, the czar said that he was well aware of Yamagata’s special qualifications for such a mission. He probably did not know, however, that in April 1895 Yamagata had strongly recommended an alliance with Russia to Foreign Minister Mutsu Munemitsu. He believed that Japan could not single-handedly maintain supremacy in the East, and he was sure that the Russian crown prince’s visit to Japan in 1891 had been inspired by friendly feelings. The incident at
Ō
tsu was unfortunate, but far from making this a pretext for hostile measures, the Russians had demonstrated that they desired friendly relations promoting the interests of both countries. Yamagata urged that Japan change its foreign policy and ally itself not with England but with Russia.
⁹

Nothing seems to have come of Yamagata’s suggestion, but it probably was not forgotten. At the same time he was informed that he would be sent to the coronation as a special ambassador, he was directed to take the opportunity to engage in basic discussions with the Russians on the defense of Korean independence. On May 24, the day after his audience with the czar, Yamagata met the Russian foreign minister, Aleksei Lobanov-Rostovskii, and gave him a draft proposal for the two countries’ future cooperation in Korea. He was unaware that a few days earlier Lobanov-Rostovskii had secretly concluded with Li Hung-chang (who also had come for the coronation) a treaty of alliance between China and Russia. The main purpose of the treaty was to secure Chinese consent to the Russians’ building a railway from Siberia through Mongolia and northern Manchuria to Vladivostok. The Chinese were offered in return a promise by the Russians to defend Chinese territory from any aggressive action by Japan.
¹⁰
Lobanov-Rostovskii, naturally not mentioning the treaty, reached an agreement with Yamagata on matters connected with the Korean financial crisis.

The agreement between Japan and Russia had two secret provisions. The first provided that in the event of disturbances or threatened disturbances to peace and order in Korea, the two countries, by mutual agreement, might send additional troops into the country. In such a case, so as to prevent a clash between units of the two countries, there should be a buffer zone occupied by neither. The second provided that until a force of Korean soldiers had been trained to defend their country, Japan and Russia might station the same number of troops in Korea to protect their citizens.
¹¹
The Russians, however, did not abide by their promise to cooperate with the Japanese; instead, they took exclusive control of training Korean troops and of managing Korean finances and replaced with Russians the British advisers to the government.

Domestic problems were even more perplexing to the emperor. Foreign Minister Mutsu resigned because of ill health.
¹²
Prime Minister It
Ō
decided that since he had to replace his foreign minister, he should take advantage of the opportunity to change other members of the cabinet. He appointed Matsukata Masayoshi as finance minister and
Ō
kuma Shigenobu as foreign minister. When Home Minister Itagaki Taisuke learned of these appointments, he declared that if
Ō
kuma entered the cabinet, he would resign. It
ō
considered appointing only Matsukata, but Matsukata said that unless
Ō
kuma was appointed at the same time, he would not accept his post. It
ō
was faced with a difficult choice. If, despite Itagaki’s opposition, he appointed both
Ō
kuma and Matsukata, this would cause a break with the Jiy
ū
- t
ō
. But if he decided not to appoint
Ō
kuma, he would cut himself off from the Shimpo-t
ō
, the other important party. Unable to reach a decision, he tendered his resignation on August 20, alleging ill health.

Now it was left to the emperor to decide which course to follow. In the end, he appointed both Matsukata and
Ō
kuma but accepted It
ō
’s resignation, even though It
ō
was the politician he most trusted. He replaced him with the president of the Privy Council, Kuroda Kiyotaka, to serve as provisional prime minister, in addition to his Privy Council post, until a new prime minister was selected. The appointments of
Ō
kuma and Matsukata aroused consternation in some quarters; it was alleged that the intent was to exclude the Ch
ō
sh
ū
faction from the new cabinet.
¹³
Yamagata, the senior Ch
ō
sh
ū
leader, was asked to confer with other members of the new cabinet on a successor to It
ō
. The emperor in fact intended to appoint Yamagata as the prime minister, but when Yamagata learned this, he declined, saying he was ill and unequal to the demands of the position.

Nobody seemed to want to succeed It
ō
as prime minister. The emperor, unwilling to become further involved in the matter, left it to the Genr
ō
to choose the successor. At this point Baron Sonoda Yasukata (1850–1924), the superintendent general of the Metropolitan Police, deploring a situation in which no one was willing to assume the duties of the office, sent a letter to the emperor stating his belief that this was not a time for reticence. He urged the emperor to step forward and reveal plainly to the world what was meant by personal rule. The German kaiser had announced, “I am the prime minister of my cabinet.”
¹⁴
Sonoda hoped that the emperor would exercise personal control over the cabinet and not leave the appointment of ministers to the Genr
ō
. He declared that although cabinet ministers were supposedly appointed by the emperor, this was not in fact the case; men were able to take their places in the cabinet, regardless of whether they had the emperor’s trust. Sonoda said the cabinet was the scene of endless conflicts that disturbed the peace of the nation. If the emperor were to assume personal control, who would object? He urged the emperor to take this step and appoint trusted people to help him. He termed this the emperor’s most urgent task.
¹⁵

Personal government by the emperor had been an ideal of the Restoration, but with the promulgation of the constitution and the establishment of the Diet, this ideal had been forgotten and replaced by a conception of the emperor as a distant, ultimate authority, not as an active participant in political affairs. The emperor’s powers were, in principle, absolute, but he rarely chose to exercise them. The “reticence” of which Sonoda complained had become his chosen stance. There is no record of the emperor’s reactions to the letter; probably there were none. Fortunately, he in no way resembled the tyrannical kaiser.
¹⁶

The crisis over finding a new prime minister was resolved when Matsukata Masayoshi was appointed simultaneously as prime minister and finance minister. Matsukata was extremely reluctant to accept the post of prime minister because he could think of no solutions to the problems facing the government. At first, after much soul-searching, he refused the command with the usual display of awe and trepidation. But the emperor, not taking no for an answer, directed Matsukata to discuss the matter with Kuroda. Matsukata finally yielded. The new cabinet, sworn in on September 20, consisted almost entirely of familiar faces. The emperor was particularly concerned about the choice of a minister of the army, reminding Matsukata that armaments were being expanded and troops were still being shipped to Taiwan. It was essential that the new minister get along with the general staff and be able to deal efficiently with army administration. Matsukata appointed as army minister Takashima Tomonosuke, who had served in the same capacity in the first Matsukata cabinet.
¹⁷

The most controversial figure in the cabinet was
Ō
kuma Shigenobu. He favored greater freedom of speech, assembly, and the press and believed that expansion of the army should be limited to twelve divisions, out of which three brigades would be stationed in Taiwan. He also proposed that finances be regulated, declaring that if these views were not acceptable to other members of the cabinet, he would refuse appointment. His views were opposed by the army minister, who objected to limiting future expansion, but in the end
Ō
kuma’s conditions were met.

The first major test of the new freedom of the press came when a magazine in
Ō
saka published in October a stinging attack on Hijikata Hisamoto, the imperial household minister, listing his misdeeds. The article was reprinted the following month in the newspaper
Nihon
, giving it wide circulation. Hijikata tendered his resignation, at the same time denouncing the story as a fabrication and claiming that it sullied the dignity of the imperial house. He appealed to Matsukata and members of the cabinet to mete out severe punishment to the offenders, by which he probably meant not merely suppression or (at the very least) suspension of the magazine and newspaper but charges of lèse-majesté and libel of a government official.

Matsukata asked the cabinet if an administrative disposition was an appropriate way of deciding whether to ban the periodicals.
Ō
kuma opposed any such action as contravening the principle of freedom of the press, which the government had adopted. Other members of the cabinet expressed the view that banning the periodicals was unavoidable. The minister of justice, Kiyoura Keigo, who had studied the legal aspects of the matter, opposed sending the dispute to the courts. The article had slandered the imperial household minister but had not directly criticized the imperial house; therefore it did not constitute lèse-majesté. Moreover, if the writer were prosecuted for having libeled an official, this would magnify the incident and give the defendant and his counsel the opportunity to attack the Imperial Household Ministry in court, leading to a real profanation of the dignity of the imperial house.

Matsukata informed Hijikata that the cabinet had decided not to deal with the matter either administratively or legally. Hijikata naturally was upset. However, the chief chamberlain and Kuroda Kiyotaka joined to persuade Matsukata that administrative action was unavoidable, and in the end, the offending magazine was banned and the newspaper suspended publication. Hijikata was not mollified; he thought that the punishment was still too light. The general public was disappointed that despite its stated policy of freedom of speech, the cabinet had acted otherwise.
¹⁸

The last echoes of the Sino-Japanese War were heard at a party the emperor attended in December at the house of Prince Sadanaru. It was a gala occasion. The two outstanding n
ō
actors of the time, H
ō
sh
ō
Kur
ō
and Umewaka Minoru, performed
Kosode Soga
and other plays. At the emperor’s request Umewaka Minoru sang “Seikan no eki” (The Battle of Song-hwan), the war song written by the emperor, and H
ō
sh
ō
Kur
ō
sang the empress’s n
ō
play
Heij
ō
(Pyong-yang).
¹⁹
The music for both, newly revised by Umewaka Minoru, exalted the bravery of the Japanese troops. On December 21 the ban on travel to Korea was lifted because the country was now completely calm.