Closing the Ring (67 page)

I hope therefore you will act most promptly now, draft the King a good declaration, make him dismiss Puric and Company, repudiate all contact with Mihailovic, and make him form a stopgap Government not obnoxious to Tito. Thus we may have a forlorn hope of making a bridge between them in the next five or six weeks. We are not justified in withholding military forces that wish or can be induced to fight with the partisans because of the complexities of Serbian politics.

  It was not until nearly the end of May that Mihailovic was dismissed, and a moderate politician, Dr. Subasic, the former Governor of Croatia and member of Dr. Macek’s Peasant Party, was asked to form a new administration.

Prime Minister to Marshal Tito
(
Yugoslavia
)      17 May 44

This morning, as the result of British advice, King Peter II dismissed M. Puric’s administration, which included General Mihailovic as Minister of War. He is now about to form an administration or found a Council of State under the Ban of Croatia (Dr. Ivan Subasic). This of course has the strong approval of His Britannic Majesty’s Government.

We do not know what will happen in the Serbian part of Yugoslavia. Mihailovic certainly holds a powerful position locally as Commander-in-Chief, and it does not follow that his ceasing to be Minister of War will rob him of his influence. We cannot predict what he will do. There is also a very large body, amounting perhaps to two hundred thousand, of Serbian peasant proprietary who are anti-German but strongly Serbian, and who naturally hold the views of a peasant’s ownership community, contrary to the Karl Marx theory. My object is that these forces may be made to work with you for a united, independent Yugoslavia, which will expel from the soil of Yugoslavia the filthy Hitlerite murderers and invaders till not one remains.

It is of importance to the common cause and to our relations with you that these changes should be given a fair chance to develop in a favourable way to the main object. I should greatly regret it if you were at all in a hurry to denounce them in public. Crucial events impend in Europe. The battle in Italy goes in our favour. General Wilson assures me of his resolve to aid you to the very utmost. I feel therefore that I have a right to ask you to forbear from any utterances adverse to this new event, at least for a few weeks till we can have exchanged telegrams upon it.

Brigadier Maclean, who is with me now, will be with you in less than three weeks, with all the views he has gathered here, and I hope that at the very least you will await his return.

Meanwhile, I congratulate you once more upon the number of enemy divisions which you are holding gripped on your various fronts. You will realise, Marshal Tito, that the war will soon come to a very high pitch of intensity, and that British, American, and Russian forces will all hurl themselves on the common foe. You must be at your strongest during this climax. While I cannot guarantee a speedy breakdown of the enemy’s power, there is certainly a chance of it.

  And on the 24th:

Prime Minister to Marshal Tito
    24 May 43

The King has sacked Puric and Company, and I think the Ban of Croatia will rally a certain force round him. My idea is that this Government should lie quiet for a bit and let events flow on their course. This, I think, was rather in accord with your idea in the first telegrams we exchanged. I am keeping the Russians and Americans informed of all that goes on between us.

Give my love to Randolph should he come into your sphere. Maclean will be coming back soon. I wish I could come myself, but I am too old and heavy to jump out on a parachute.

  Here then we may leave this scene for others not less convulsive but larger.

10
The Anzio Stroke

The Germans Engaged on the Cassino Front___The Anzio Surprise Landing___The Disastrous Pause___Kesselring’s Critical Position___Delay at the Beachhead___Renewed Attacks at Cassino___Frustration at Anzio___My Questions to General Wilson of February
6___
My Telegram to Field-Marshal Dill, February
8___
Immense Number of Vehicles in the Beachhead___Disappointment and Casualties___German Effort to Drive Us into the Sea, February
16___
The Deadly Battle Won___Kesselring Accepts Failure, March
1___
My Account to Parliament, February
22, 1944___
Smuts’ Message of February
23___
My Reply of February
27___
Important German Forces Diverted from France to Italy.

T
HE FIRST WEEKS OF
J
ANUARY
were spent in intensive preparations for Operation “Shingle,” as Anzio was called in our codes, and preliminary operations by the Fifth Army to draw the enemy’s attention and reserves away from the beachhead. To that end the Army carried out a series of attacks which, it was hoped, would carry them across the rivers Garigliano and Rapido, while the French Corps on the right swung round to threaten the high ground north of Cassino. Fighting was bitter, for the Germans clearly meant to prevent us from breaking into the Gustav Line, which, with Cassino as its central feature, was the rearmost position of their deep defensive zone. In these rocky mountains a great fortified system had been created, with lavish use of concrete and steel. From their observation posts on the heights the enemy could direct their guns on all movement in the valleys below.

After preliminary attacks in severe winter weather, the Fifth Army opened their main offensive on January 12, with the French Corps making a ten-mile advance on the northern Rank. Three days later, the IId United States Corps occupied Monte Trocchio, the last barrier before the river Liri, across which they formed, but could not retain, a bridgehead. Then the Xth British Corps crossed the lower Garigliano, and captured Minturno and the outskirts of Castelforte, but were held in their further attempts to advance northward. Nor could their right wing take San Ambrogio.

All this however had the desired effect on the enemy. It distracted their attention from the approaching threat to their vulnerable seaward flank and caused them to bring up three good divisions from reserve to restore the situation. They attacked the Xth British Corps, but failed to throw it back. By the afternoon of the 21st, the convoys for Anzio were well out to sea, covered by our aircraft. The weather was well suited to a concealed approach. Our heavy attacks on enemy airfields, and especially at Perugia, the German air reconnaissance base, kept many of their aircraft grounded. General Westphal, who was Kesselring’s Chief of Staff, gives a vivid picture of the position at German Headquarters during these days:

On January 21, Admiral Canaris, Chief of the German Intelligence, visited Army Group Headquarters, where he was pressed to communicate any information he might have about the enemy intentions in regard to a landing. In particular we wanted to know about the positions of aircraft-carriers, battleships, and landing-craft. Canaris was unable to give any detail, but thought that there was no need to fear a new landing in the near future. This was certainly his view. Not only air reconnaissance, but also the German counter-espionage, was almost completely out of action at this time. A few hours after the departure of Canaris the enemy landed at Anzio.
¹

*  *  * *  *

It was with tense, but I trust suppressed, excitement that I awaited the outcome of this considerable stroke.

  
To Stalin I telegraphed:

Prime Minister to Premier Stalin
    21 Jan. 44

We have launched the big attack against the German armies defending Rome which I told you about at Teheran. The weather conditions seem favourable. I hope to have good news for you before long.

  Presently I learned that the VIth Corps under the American General Lucas, had landed on the Anzio beaches at 2
A.M.
on the 22d, the 3d United States Division south of the town and the 1st British Division north of it. There was very little opposition and practically no casualties. By midnight thirty-six thousand men and over three thousand vehicles were ashore. “We appear,” signalled Alexander who was on the spot, “to have got almost complete surprise. I have stressed the importance of strong-hitting mobile patrols being boldly pushed out to gain contact with the enemy, but so far have not received reports of their activities.”

I was in full agreement with this, and replied: “Thank you for all your messages. Am very glad you are pegging out claims rather than digging in beachheads.”

*  *  * *  *

But now came disaster, and the ruin in its prime purpose of the enterprise. General Lucas confined himself to occupying his beachhead and having equipment and vehicles brought ashore. General Penney commanding the British 1st Division was anxious to push inland. His reserve brigade was however held back with the Corps. Minor probing attacks towards Cisterna and Campoleone occupied the 22d and 23d. No general attempt to advance was made by the Commander of the expedition. By the evening of the 23d, the whole of the two divisions and their attached troops, including two British Commandos, the United States Rangers, and parachutists, had been landed with masses of impedimenta. The defences of the
beachhead were growing, but the opportunity for which great exertions had been made was gone.

  Kesselring reacted quickly to his critical situation. The bulk of his reserves were already committed against us on the Cassino front, but he pulled in whatever units were available, and in forty-eight hours the equivalent of about two divisions was assembled to resist our further advance.

The German General Westphal’s comments on the way in which this was done are illuminating.

  At the moment of the landing south of Rome, apart from certain coastal batteries standing by, there were only two battalions. … There was nothing else in the neighbourhood which could be thrown against the enemy on that same day. The road to Rome was open. No one could have stopped a bold advance-guard entering the Holy City. The breath-taking situation continued for the first two days after the landing. It was only then that German counter-measures were effective. What was their nature? In December 1943 the [German] Army Group had issued a comprehensive plan of emergency for the whole of Italy. In it was laid down what troops and columns should move against the possible landing-points, on what roads and times, and what tasks they should undertake. It was only necessary to issue the code-word “Case Richard” to put into effect these prearranged plans. In fact, most of the troops, in spite of icy roads over the Apennines, arrived before schedule. The German High Command helped by sending troops from France, Yugoslavia, and the homeland. … The enemy kept surprisingly quiet. They were apparently engaged in building up a bridgehead. It was thus possible to build up a new front opposite them. The command of this sector was taken over by the general headquarters of the Fourteenth Army, up to now based in Northern Italy and under General von Mackensen.
²

The threat to his flank did not weaken Kesselring’s determination to withstand our assaults at Cassino. The German
intentions were made crystal-clear by an order from Hitler captured on the 24th:

The Gustav Line must be held at all costs for the sake of the political consequences which would follow a completely successful defence. The Fuehrer expects the bitterest struggle for every yard.

  He was certainly obeyed.

*  *  * *  *

On the 25th, Alexander reported that the beachhead was reasonably secure. The 3d United States Division was four miles from Cisterna and the British 1st Division two miles from Campoleone, and contact was continuous along the entire front. On the 27th, serious news arrived. Neither place had been taken. The Guards Brigade had beaten off a counterattack of infantry and tanks and had gone forward, but they were still about a mile and a half short of Campoleone, and the Americans were still south of Cisterna. Alexander said that neither he nor General Clark was satisfied with the speed of the advance, and that Clark was going to the beachhead at once. I replied:

Prime Minister to General Alexander
    28 Jan. 44

I am glad to learn that Clark is going to visit the beachhead. It would be unpleasant if your troops were sealed off there and the main army could not advance up from the south.

  This however was exactly what was going to happen.

*  *  * *  *

Meanwhile, our attacks on the Germans in the Cassino positions continued. The Xth British Corps having drawn to its front most of the enemy reinforcements, it was decided to attack farther north so as to seize the high ground above Cassino and envelop the position from that side. Good progress was made. The IId United States Corps crossed the river Rapido above Cassino town, with the French Corps on their right keeping
abreast of them, and took Monte Castellone and Colle Majola. Thence they attacked southward against Monastery Hill, but the Germans had reinforced and held on fanatically. By early February, the IId Corps had expended its strength. General Alexander decided that fresh troops would be needed to restore impetus to the assault. He had already ordered a New Zealand Corps to be formed, under General Freyberg, composed of three divisions brought over from the Eighth Army on the Adriatic. Indeed, that army, which had attempted to pin the enemy on their front by offensive action, had had to send no less than five divisions to sustain the heavy fighting on the west coast, and for the next few months had to remain on the defensive.

Further severe battles obviously impended on both fronts, and it was necessary to find more troops. The 3d Polish Carpathian Division was due to arrive on the main front at the beginning of February. General Wilson had ready the 18th Infantry and the 1st Guards Brigade in North Africa. By January 30, the 1st United States Armoured Division had landed at Anzio and the 45th United States Division was on its way. All this had to be done over the difficult beaches or through the tiny fishing port. “The situation as it now stands,” signalled Admiral John Cunningham, “bears little relation to the lightning thrust by two or three divisions envisaged at Marrakesh, but you may rest assured that no effort will be spared by the navies to provide the sinews of victory.” This promise, as will be seen, was amply redeemed.