Closing the Ring (91 page)

2. At the earliest moment the 1st Armoured Division is to be reconstituted with its vehicles and brought up to full strength. The necessary training to restore its efficiency cannot be delayed. Let me have a programme and time-table. I understand that C.I.G.S. has already protested to General Eisenhower. Let me know exactly what happened, and what the answer was.

3. Are there any more units in this condition? Let me have a list of all divisional and separate brigade formations (
a
) in Northwest Africa and (
b
) in the Middle East, stating the condition of each and the task on which it is employed. What is the state of the South African Division? What has happened to the 201st Guards Brigade? Where is the 7th Armoured Division? Where is the 4th Indian Division? Is the New Zealand Division progressing to schedule? What stage has been reached in the movement of the Polish Division to Syria? How far are these divisions complete and equipped?

Prime Minister to Chief of the Air Staff
    16 July 43

I still do not understand why it is necessary to have 2946 crews on effective strength [in Fighter Command] in order to man 1732 serviceable aircraft, or indeed a total initial equipment of 1966.

See how different are the figures of Bomber Command, who are far more heavily engaged than the fighters, and who have only 1353 crews to an initial establishment of 1072 aircraft, and only 1095 crews operational for 1039 aircraft serviceable.

The losses in Fighter Command are not comparable to those endured by the bombers, and yet it has this enormous surplus of crews. How far does this personnel surplus extend into the ground staff?

Prime Minister to Lord President of the Council
    17 July 43

I have promised Lord Winterton a further communication about the building of the agricultural cottages. I now feel however that as I should like him to have a fuller explanation of the position than could conveniently be contained in a letter it would be helpful if you could see Lord Winterton yourself.
¹

(
Action this day.
)

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
    19 July 43

I do not feel very comfortable about the strength of the Dover garrison, which I visited on Saturday. There is only one battalion in Dover, and another at St. Margaret’s Bay. These can be reinforced by a brigade after some hours. There are of course plenty of troops farther back.

2. There is of course no question of invasion, but when I asked General Swayne what would happen if three or four thousand Storm Troopers of the Commando type came across one night, he was not able to give me a very reassuring answer. He said they would certainly get ashore, but would be turned out afterwards, and he also emphasised the shortness of the warning that would be received. This is not good enough. Dover is so near that perhaps half an hour is all the notice you would get by radar. I do not think the Germans are likely to try, but it would be a tremendous score if they did have possession of part of Dover for even three or four hours. It would produce an effect on public opinion ten times as bad as the
Scharnhorst
and
Gneisenan
incident.

3. I should be much against locking up too many troops even at this point on the coast, but it seems to me we have gone to the other extreme and are exposing ourselves to what might be a most vexatious affront. In my opinion, at least another brigade should be actually in the coast defences or the strong points, and available for immediate action should a landing be attempted. We should all look very silly if some of our valuable guns were blown up.

Pray go into this matter anew.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War and Minister of Information
    19 July 43

In difficult cases about releases from military service it is important that the rules should not be broken or relaxed. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State has a discretionary power, where the public service may be advantaged, to make exceptions in respect of high-class personnel whose contributions to the war effort may be greater in their civilian employment. In using this discretion he would naturally have regard to the fact that only a very small part of the Army is engaged in actual fighting, and that many transferences from civil life to the Army merely involve a change of non-combatant jobs.

2. It is the duty of Ministers to settle such matters by personal arrangement, and not to let them come to a point where either departmental antagonisms arise on small points or I am called upon to intervene.

Prime Minister to Minister of Information
    19 July 43

I saw again yesterday the two American Army films
Divide and Conquer
and
The Battle of Britain.
I think they are the best propaganda yet seen in this country. Moreover, They teach people about what happened in 1940, which few realised completely at the time and which is already beginning to fade in memory. I consider that these films should have the widest possible showing. Is there any difficulty in our picture houses taking them? What terms, broadly, would you arrange with them? If there is any monopolistic refusal, do not hesitate to come to me. I would ask for legislation if necessary.

2. Where are the other four films? Two have certainly been mentioned by name. I wish to see them. Why is there this long delay? Are the film companies making underground resistance? Please let me have a report on these second two films. What is holding them up?

3. As you know, I am willing to make a short statement introducing the films and praising the attitude of the Americans. But I wish to see the other two films first. I take much interest in this business, and I hope you will press it forward strongly.

Prime Minister to Chief of the Air Staff
    21 July 43

I am disposed to sanction this proposal of the Secretary for Petroleum. You
know I attach the greatest importance to the creation of a sufficiency of landing grounds specially adapted to meet fog conditions. I hope this is fully realised.

Prime Minister to First Lord
    23 July 43

I think it is rather a pregnant fact that out of forty-five thousand officers and ratings [in the Fleet Air Arm], of which over four thousand are officers, only thirty should have been killed, missing, or have been taken prisoners during the three months ending April 30. I am very glad of course that they have not suffered, but the whole question of the scale of the Fleet Air Arm is raised by this clear proof of how very rarely it is brought into contact with the enemy. When such immense demands are made upon us by the Fleet Air Arm in respect of men and machines, one is bound, however ungrateful the task may seem, to scrutinise its actual employment against the enemy. I am sure it is not the fault of the officers and men that they have not had more opportunity, and it may be the period in question was exceptional. We cannot however keep such a large mass of high-class personnel of the highest fighting quality in a condition of non-activity so far as actual contact with the enemy is concerned.

Pray give this matter your careful consideration, because I shall be returning to it in the near future.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    24 July 43

See now how all these difficulties [in Burma] are mounting up, and what a vast expenditure of force is required for these trumpery gains. All the commanders on the spot seem to be competing with one another to magnify their demands and the obstacles they have to overcome.

2. All this shows how necessary it is to decide on a commander. I still consider he should be a determined and competent soldier, in the prime of life and with the latest experience in the field. General Oliver Leese is, I believe, the right man, and as soon as the fighting in Sicily is over he should come back to this country for consultation. I consider Wingate should command the army against Burma. He is a man of genius and audacity, and has rightly been discerned by all eyes as a figure quite above the ordinary level. The expression “the Clive of Burma” has already gained currency. There is no doubt that in the welter of inefficiency and lassitude which has characterised our operations on the Indian front, this man, his force and his achievements, stand out, and no mere question of seniority must obstruct the advance of real personalities to their proper stations in war. He too should come home for discussion here at an early date.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    25 July 43

See the various telegrams about the ill-treatment of our people in North Russia. The only way to deal with this kind of thing is for ostentatious preparations to be made to withdraw the whole of our personnel without saying anything to the Russian authorities. Let a plan be made for this. As soon as the local Russians see that we are off, they will report to Moscow, and will of course realise that the departure of our personnel means the end of the Arctic convoys. If anything will bring them to their senses, this will. If not, anyway we had better be out of it, as it only causes friction. Experience has taught me that it is not worth while arguing with Soviet people. One simply has to confront them with the new fact and await their reactions.

Prime Minister to C.I.G.S.
    25 July 43

I am obliged to you for reviewing the strength of the Dover garrison. I had not taken into consideration the important forces mentioned by you. Are you sure that all these, especially the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force, are organised for immediate action at the shortest notice? Of course, it could only be by night.

The possibility I had in mind was a smash-and-grab raid by about two thousand Storm Troopers brought across in fast motor-boats. Provided you are satisfied that there is no danger of this, that the cliffs are unscalable and that the landing points and defences are adequately garrisoned, I am content.
²

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee
    26 July 43

It is vital and urgent to appoint a young, competent soldier, well trained in war, to become Supreme Commander [in the Burma theatre], and to reexamine the whole problem of the war on this front so as to infuse vigour and audacity into the operations.

2. I know the Chiefs of Staff fully realise what a foolish thing it now looks to go and concentrate precious resources from the Mediterranean in order to attack the one speck of land in the whole of this theatre, namely, Akyab, which the enemy are making a kind of Gibraltar and are capable of reinforcing up to an entire Japanese division. For this petty purpose, now rightly stripped of its consequential attempt upon Rangoon, we are to utilise the whole amphibious resources available in the Bay of Bengal for the whole of the year 1944. Even Ramree is to be left over until after the 1944 monsoon. A more silly way of waging war by a nation possessing overwhelming sea-power and air-power can hardly be conceived, and I should certainly not be prepared to take responsibility for such a waste of effort and above all of time.

3. The proper course for the campaign of 1944 is as follows: (
a
) Maximum air aid to China, improvement of the air route and protection of the airfields. (
b
) Maximum pressure by operations similar to those conducted by General Wingate in Assam, and, wherever [else] contact can be made on land, with the Japanese forces. (
c
) The far-flung amphibious operation hitherto called “Second Anakim,” which can be launched in regions where fighting is not interrupted by the monsoon season and where our naval and air powers can be brought into the fullest play. It is on this that the most urgent and intense study should now be concentrated by the Staffs.

4. The matter must now be brought up before the Defence Committee, in order that their views in principle may be ascertained before our conference at Quebec.

Prime Minister to President of the Board of Trade
    26 July 43

I am told that in spite of contributions from civilian supplies there is at present a shortage of playing cards for use by the forces and workers in industry. The importance of providing amusement for the forces in their leisure hours and in long periods of waiting and monotony in out-of-the-way places, and for the sailors penned up in their ships for months together, cannot be overstated. Nothing is more handy, more portable, or more capable of prolonged usage than a pack of cards.

Let me have a report on this subject, and show me how you can remedy this deficiency. It ought to mean only a microscopic drain on our resources to make a few hundred thousand packs.

Prime Minister to Secretary of State for War
(
to see
)
and C.I.G.S.
    26 July 43

I am willing not to send a personal telegram to Eisenhower on the state of the 1st Armoured Division in order that he may not think you were pressing me to do so. However, I can only agree to this if prompt and drastic action is taken, for I am determined that this fine unit shall be immediately brought to the highest state of efficiency and equipment. We shall need it all the more if large distances have to be covered rapidly in Italy, and especially if our front broadens out into the northern part of Italy and the valley of the Po.

2. Will you therefore inform General Eisenhower that I am deeply concerned in this matter, and procure a prompt and satisfactory settlement with him.

3. Will you also give me a programme of the re-equipment of the division, and thereafter let me have reports fortnightly on the progress made towards its becoming in all ways fit for action.
³

Prime Minister to Minister of Agriculture
    30 July 43

I shall be much obliged if you will give me a brief report on the harvest, both hay and corn.

Prime Minister to Colonel Price
    31 July 43

I do not consider that the date 1948 should now be mentioned as the hypothetical date for the ending of the war with Japan. This matter can be discussed between us during our conference at Quebec and on the way to it. Obviously the long-term projects of the Admiralty must be before us at the time of taking any such decisions.