Closing the Ring (28 page)

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

28 Sept. 43

We agree that the long-term surrender document should be kept secret for the present. I have no doubt U.J. will concur, but it would be well if you told him our views, speaking for both of us.

We think it would be a mistake to talk about making Rome an open city, as it may hamper our forward movement, and will anyway not bind the enemy.

*  *  * *  *

The situation was at first bewildering for our troops on the spot. The Italians had been their enemies for more than three
years. By joining the United Nations they had in the space of a few weeks acquired a new status, and some of them assumed a new attitude. Requisitioning was no longer possible. Accommodation was denied to British troops, and food refused to officers without Italian ration cards. British military currency was treated with suspicion. Senior officers who had held the rank of Military Governor now became mere liaison officers with the Italians, from whom they could request but no longer compel the facilities which they needed. Much of this was the growing pains of the new régime in Italy, and was presently rectified by high authority, but some Italian civilians were ready to take the fullest advantage of the changes which had occurred. The President and General Eisenhower felt that a public declaration was needed in order to explain “co-belligerent” status to the Italians, and indeed to the world. I welcomed this.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

30 Sept. 43

I agree that we should make a joint announcement, but would it not be a good chance of getting U.J. in too? It is clear now that he does accept the Italians as co-belligerents. It is true that we may lose a few days in communicating with Moscow, but this delay seems relatively unimportant compared with the value of Russian participation.

If you agree, would you put it to Stalin in the form that we wish an announcement of the kind made; will he join with us in making it, or would he prefer us to go ahead without him? Of course, we should consider any drafting alterations he might wish to propose.

I myself would like to see several changes, and my immediately following telegram embodies these. If you see no objection to them, would you, if you agree to approach Stalin, put the text to him in this form?

  The text of the declaration which I drafted read as follows:

  The Governments of Great Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union acknowledge the position of the Royal Italian Government as stated by Marshal Badoglio, and accept the active co-operation
of the Italian nation and armed forces as a co-belligerent in the war against Germany. The military events since September 8 and the brutal maltreatment by the Germans of the Italian population, culminating in the Italian declaration of war against Germany, have in fact made Italy a co-belligerent, and the American, British, and Soviet Governments will continue to work with the Italian Government on that basis. The three Governments acknowledge the Italian Government’s pledge to submit to the will of the Italian people after the Germans have been driven from Italy, and it is understood that nothing can detract from the absolute and untrammelled right of the people of Italy by constitutional means to decide on the democratic form of government they will eventually have.

The relationship of co-belligerency between the Government of Italy and the United Nations Governments cannot of itself affect the terms recently signed, which retain their full force and can only be adjusted by agreement between the Allied Governments in the light of the assistance which the Italian Government may be able to afford to the United Nations’ cause.

  This was approved by both President Roosevelt and Stalin.

*  *  * *  *

Count Sforza now entered the Italian scene. Before the Fascist Revolution he had been Foreign Minister and Ambassador in Paris. During Mussolini’s régime he had been an exile. He had become an outstanding figure among Italians in America. He had declared himself in favour of bringing Italy into the war on the side of the Allies, and had, in a letter which he had recently written to a high State Department official, expressed his willingness to work with Badoglio. As the situation sharpened, he saw his opportunity to gain the chief power in Italy, and was convinced of his right to it. He commanded a good deal of American support, and some of the American-Italian vote. The President hoped it might be possible to bring him into the new system of government without upsetting the King and Badoglio, upon whom our military thought about the Italian campaign was based.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

30 Sept. 43

Referring to your telegram in regard to Sforza playing with the team, his public speech was, to say the least, not complimentary to the King of Italy. I find however in a recording of his September 26 speech the following extracts, which indicate that he may be useful to our war effort:

“With the present leaders of Italy, if they behave well, if they wage war well, our duty is to go to war, all of us, and to oust the Germans out of Italy.

“I say so out of my only main desire to do a thing which helps victory. We may rally round any Government which enjoys the confidence of the Allies if this Government for the time being proves that it is able to wage a war and to oust the Germans out of Italy.

“If I had to proclaim a republic to-morrow I would say, ‘No. First of all we must oust the Germans out of Italy. This is what the Italians want; but when Italy is free the Italians will decide.’ ”

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

1 Oct. 43

Your telegram about Sforza. He seems to be saying all sorts of things, many very different to what he wrote in his letter. He really should make up his mind whether he is going to try to help the Royal Badoglio Government or try to discredit it. We ought to know where we are before we build him up. Would it not be a good thing for you to route him to Italy via the United Kingdom and let us give him further friendly treatment here? I don’t see much use in having him go to Italy merely to undermine whatever small fighting head against Fascism and the Germans Eisenhower has been able to produce out of the Italians.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

2 Oct. 43

Your telegram in regard to Sforza. I am informed that he, with his son, expects to arrive by airplane at Prestwick, October 3, en route to Marrakesh.

I hope you can effectively indoctrinate him during his stop in United Kingdom.

I am this date sending the following to Esenhower:

“Inform Badoglio that it is the view of this Government that Grandi’s presence in Badoglio Government at this time would not be acceptable. Even though Grandi was perhaps the chief figure in
deposition of Mussolini, he had been so closely associated with Fascism that to place him now in Brindisi Government would cause much adverse comment and misinterpretation. First accretions to Badoglio Government should be men of unequivocal liberal and democratic principle. It is only through the use of such men in responsible positions that this Government can feel justified in supporting the present Italian Government.

“Germany has already taken active belligerent steps against Italy, and the chief strength of Badoglio’s Government is its announced determination to rid Italy by force of the German invader. An immediate declaration of war by the Italian Government on Germany is necessary if Italy is to be given the status of a co-belligerent.”

  I had a long conversation with Count Sforza on his way through London, and believed we had reached an agreement whereby he was to work loyally with the King and Badoglio until we were in a position, following on the capture of Rome at the earliest moment, to form a broad-based non-Fascist Government. I thus steadily held to our charted course. We intended to sustain the Monarchy until the liberation of Italy, to bring an Italian Government in on our side in the struggle against Germany, to strengthen that Government by adding representative and resisting elements, and to associate the Russians with our immediate arrangements about Italian affairs.

*  *  * *  *

While these exchanges went on, I pressed for the fullest use of Italian man-power and shipping.

Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary

26 Sept. 43

Ought we not to make a convention with the Italian Government in respect of the use of Italian prisoners of war and manpower? We cannot allow these large numbers of Italians to be freed from discipline and control and left at large in Britain or North Africa. There is no means of repatriating them without straining our shipping. Meanwhile we need their man-power. We cannot have the operations in Africa cumbered up with heavy masses of prisoners to guard. Our 1st Armoured Division has been
virtually destroyed by being used as mere guards to prisoners.

There is empty shipping coming back from Africa to the United Kingdom. We should ask that the process of shipping prisoners to the United Kingdom should continue pending some new arrangement with the Italian Government. I am quite prepared to consider a change of status for the Italians, provided they continue to do the same work as now and that the discipline is effective.

Prime Minister to First Lord, V.C.N.S., and Admiral Cunningham

2 Oct. 43

We cannot afford to allow units of the Italian Navy to remain idle, whether at Alexandria or elsewhere. My present idea is that we suggest to the Americans that the
Littorios
go to the United States to be fitted for the Pacific warfare and to be used there by them. I would also suggest to the President that after the war these ships be ceded to us, because, first, we have had the main part of the war against them; secondly, we have had heavy losses in capital units; and, thirdly, we have discontinued building capital units in order to further current short-term operations. I am sure such proposals will be received in a most friendly spirit. I should like your advice about all this, and also of course about the structure and value of these ships.

2. With regard to cruisers and other vessels, they must all be put to the highest use. We cannot have valuable ships lolling about in the Mediterranean harbours. The most valuable and modern should be brought into service and our older ones laid up. The older Italian battleships may also have a part to play in the inshore bombarding squadrons, which will certainly be required, though only for short periods during 1944, both in the Channel and the Indian Ocean.

*  *  * *  *

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt

4 Oct. 43

Now that Uncle Joe has come in with us about the Italian declaration, it appears of the highest importance to compel the King to declare war as soon as possible. This is, as I know, your view. I suggest that instructions be given to Eisenhower to put the fullest pressure upon him. There should be no nonsense about waiting until Rome is taken. It seems to us high time that the Italians
began to work their passage. If you are in agreement, pray give the necessary orders without further reference to us.

  The President acted promptly.

President Roosevelt to Prime Minister

8 Oct. 43

On October 5, I informed Eisenhower as follows:

“The President and Prime Minister are in agreement that the King of Italy declare war on Germany as soon as possible. There appears to be no necessity for waiting until Rome is occupied. You will therefore put pressure on the Italian Government for an early declaration of war without waiting for further successes.”

  Accordingly on October 13, the Royal Italian Government declared war on Germany.

*  *  * *  *

Prime Minister to Mr. Macmillan (Algiers)

23 Oct. 43

… Our policy is to abandon the base and increase the Leftward emphasis of the Italian Government. We have very little information here about the personalities who are already available. You will be watching all this and should keep me fully informed.

I am clear that any reconstruction of the Italian Government had better wait until we are in Rome. In Rome lie the title-deeds of Italy and of the Roman Catholic Church. Badoglio and the King reinstated there will have a far better chance of rallying such elements of Italian strength as exist. There is the place for us to make our deal and for them to issue their prospectus.

In the meanwhile, be careful that nothing is done to make the King and Badoglio weaker than they are. On the contrary, we must hold them up and carry them forward with our armies. Meanwhile, all search for strengthening elements can continue.

Prime Minister to President Roosevelt

6 Nov. 43

All my information goes to show that we should lose a lot in breaking up the present King-Badoglio show. Victor Emmanuel is nothing to us, but his combination with Badoglio did in fact deliver the Italian Fleet, which is rendering very useful service now, and this same combination is at this moment holding the loyalties of a very large part of the unhappy Italian Army and people, and of course of Italian diplomatic representatives everywhere. Why should we add to the burden of our British and United States soldier on the march to Rome by weakening any of those aids? We ought not, in my personal opinion, to countenance a change in the Badoglio-King régime till we are seated in Rome and a really broad-based Italian Government can be formed.

I understand Eisenhower in the main inclines to this view. Surely we should stick to what we have got till we are sure we can get something better, and this can only be ascertained when we have Rome in our possession.

  Such was the fragile state of Italian affairs when I set out for Cairo and Teheran.

¹
The Goebbels Diaries
, page 378.

²
President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill, in their messages to each other often used “Uncle Joe,” “U.J.,” and “Uncle J.,” in referring to Stalin