Closing the Ring (12 page)

Although I have frequently spoken of the line of the Po or of the Alps as being desirable objectives for us this year in Italy, it is not possible to see so far at present. A very great advantage will have been gained if we stop at the Leghorn-Ancona line. We should thus avoid the danger which General Wilson has pointed out of the immense broadening of the front which will take place as soon as that line has been passed. The estimate which has been given me of twenty-two divisions was presumably formed for this broad front. What is the estimate needed to hold the Leghorn-Ancona line? If we cannot have the best, there are very good second-bests. From such a position we could by air supply a fomented rising in Savoy and the French Alps, to which the young men of France would be able to rally, and at the same time with our right hand we could act across the Adriatic to stimulate the Patriot activities in the Balkan peninsula. It may be necessary for us to accept these limitations in order that the integrity of Operation “Overlord” shall not be marred.

*  *  * *  *

On August 17, the President and Harry Hopkins reached Quebec, and Eden and Brendan Bracken flew in from England. As the delegations gathered, further news of Italian peace moves came out to us, and it was under the impression of Italy’s approaching surrender that our talks were held. The Chiefs of Staff had been at work with their American coleagues in the Citadel since August 14, and had drafted a comprehensive progress report on the future strategy of the war for 1943/44. In fact “Quadrant” was a series of technical Staff conferences, the results of which were surveyed in two meetings between the President and myself and our Service chiefs.

The first plenary session was held on August 19. Highest strategic priority “as a prerequisite to ‘Overlord’ ” was given to the combined bomber offensive against Germany. The lengthy discussions upon Operation “Overlord” were then summarised in the light of the combined planning in London by General Morgan. The Chiefs of Staff now reported as follows:

O
PERATION
“O
VERLORD
”

(
a
) This operation will be the primary United States-British ground and air effort against the Axis in Europe. (Target date, May 1, 1944.) After securing adequate Channel ports, exploitation will be directed towards securing areas that will facilitate both ground and air operations against the enemy. Following the establishment of strong Allied forces in France, operations designed to strike at the heart of Germany and to destroy her military forces will be undertaken.

(
b
) Balanced ground and air force to be built up for “Overlord,” and there will be continuous planning for and maintenance of those forces available in the United Kingdom in readiness to take advantage of any situation permitting an opportunistic cross-Channel move into France.

(
c
) As between Operation “Overlord” and operations in the Mediterranean, where there is a shortage of resources available, resources will be distributed and employed with the main object of ensuring the success of “Overlord.” Operations in the Mediterranean theatre will be carried out with the forces allotted at “Trident” [the previous conference at Washington in May], except in so far as these may be varied by decision of the Combined Chiefs of Staff.

We have approved the outline plan of General Morgan for Operation “Overlord,” and have authorised him to proceed with the detailed planning and with full preparations.

  These paragraphs produced some discussion at our meeting. I pointed out that the success of “Overlord” depended on certain conditions being fulfilled in regard to relative strength. I emphasised that I strongly favoured “Overlord” in 1944, though I had not been in favour of “Sledgehammer” in 1942 or “Round-up” in 1943. The objections which I had to the cross-Channel operation were however now removed. I thought
that every effort should be made to add at least twenty-five per cent to the first assault. This would mean finding more landing-craft. There were still nine months to go, and much could be done in that time. The beaches selected were good, and it would be better if at the same time a landing were to be made on the inside beaches of the Cotentin peninsula. “Above all,” I said, “the initial lodgment must be strong.”

As the United States had the African command, it had been agreed between the President and me that the commander of “Overlord” should be British, and I proposed for this purpose, with the President’s agreement, General Brooke, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, who, it may be remembered, had commanded a corps in the decisive battle on the road to Dunkirk, with both Alexander and Montgomery as his subordinates. I had informed General Brooke of this intention
early in
1943. This operation was to begin with equal British and American forces, and as it was to be based on Great Britain, it seemed right to make such an arrangement. However, as the year advanced and the immense plan of the invasion began to take shape, I became increasingly impressed with the very great preponderance of American troops that would be employed after the original landing with equal numbers had been successful, and now at Quebec, I myself took the initiative of proposing to the President that an American commander should be appointed for the expedition to France. He was gratified at this suggestion, and I dare say his mind had been moving that way. We therefore agreed that an American officer should command “Overlord” and that the Mediterranean should be entrusted to a British commander, the actual date of the change being dependent upon the progress of the war. In August 1943 I informed General Brooke, who had my entire confidence, of this change, and of the reasons for it. He bore the great disappointment with soldierly dignity.

*  *  * *  *

As to Italy, the Chiefs of Staff proposed that there should be three phases in our future operations. First, we should
drive Italy out of the war and establish airfields near Rome, and if possible farther north. I pointed out that I wanted it definitely understood that I was not committed to an advance beyond the Ancona-Pisa line. Second, we should seize Sardinia and Corsica, and then press hard against the Germans in the north of the peninsula to stop them joining in the fight against “Overlord.” There was also “Anvil,” a projected landing in Southern France in the neighbourhood of Toulon and Marseilles and an advance northward up the Rhone Valley. This was to lead to much controversy later on. Recommendations were made about supplying Balkan and French guerrillas by air, intensifying the war against the U-boats, and making more use of the Azores as a naval and air base.

*  *  * *  *

On the major question of the Southeast Asia Command, the original proposals of the British Chiefs of Staff had been considered. The plan of a Supreme Commander found favour, and the following recommendations were made:

  (
a
) That the Combined Chiefs of Staff will exercise a general jurisdiction over strategy for the Southeast Asia theatre and the allocation of American and British resources of all kinds between the China theatre and the Southeast Asia Command.

(
b
) That the British Chiefs of Staff will exercise jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to operations, and will be the channel through which all instructions to the Supreme Commander are passed.

*  *  * *  *

There was a spirited argument at our first plenary meeting on the whole question of Far Eastern strategy, on which the work of the Chiefs of Staff was to centre in the following days. Japan’s island empire must be crushed mainly by the application of maritime power. No army could be engaged without first winning control of Japanese waters. How could the air weapon be used? Opinions diverged sharply. There were some close to President Roosevelt who advocated making the main assault through Burma into China. They argued that ports and air bases in China would be indispensable for intensive and sustained air attacks against the mainland of Japan. Although politically attractive in American eyes, this idea ignored the impossibility of deploying large armies, most of which would have to be found by Britain, in the jungles of Burma, and also the presence of very strong Japanese forces in China operating on interior lines of communication, and above all the relatively minor contribution which could be made to such an undertaking by the expanding seapower of the United States.

Alternatively we could make a direct attack by sea against Japan’s island barrier in the Central and South Pacific. The burden of this would fall mainly on the Navy and the maritime air forces. Such a thrust would be aimed first at the Philippines, which to all Americans offered an attractive goal. With the Philippines once more in American hands, Japan would be isolated from many of its chief sources of supply and the garrisons in the outlying islands of the Dutch East Indies would be cut off from all hope of rescue. They would eventually wither and die without the need for costly fighting.

From the Philippines the encirclement of the Japanese homeland could begin. New bases on the China coast, in Formosa, and in the small islands south of Japan might all be necessary, but once these were obtained the full-scale invasion of Japan became practicable. The bold sweep of this conception was the more attractive in that it rested squarely on the might of American sea-power. Very large naval forces would be needed, but only in the final phase would great armies be required, and by then Hitler would be overthrown and the main strength of Britain and the United States could be hurled against Japan.

I was anxious to state my views on this occasion before the remaining meetings of the Chiefs of Staff. The British planners were proposing in the coming winter to extend the operations of Wingate’s forces into Northern Burma, and I was convinced that this should be supplemented by the seizure of
the tip of Sumatra. I said at the meeting that I was convinced that “the attack on Sumatra was a great strategic blow which should be struck in 1944. This operation, ‘Culverin,’ would be the ‘Torch’ of the Indian Ocean. In my opinion it would not be beyond the compass of our resources. We should be striking and seizing a point of our own against which the Japanese would have to beat themselves if they wished to end the severe drain which would be imposed on their shipping by our air action from Sumatra.” The President seemed to think that such an operation would be heading away from the main direction of our advance towards Japan. I pointed out that the alternative would be to waste the entire year with nothing to show for it but Akyab and the future right to toil through the swamps and jungles of Burma, about the suggested reconquest of which I was very dubious. I emphasised the value of the Sumatra project, which I compared, in its promise of decisive consequences, with the Dardanelles operation of 1915. The idea of trying to tie up all our amphibious resources in the Indian Ocean in 1943/44 in order to retake Akyab seemed to me not to be right.

The next day I minuted:

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S. Committee

20 Aug. 43

We are not yet agreed among ourselves about the policy to be pursued in Akyab, “Culverin,” etc., and in my opinion the whole matter has been insufficiently studied. I am still studying it myself. In the meanwhile it is not possible to come to any decision with the Americans in the matter. I hope the Chiefs of Staff will beware of creating a situation where I shall certainly have to refuse to bear any responsibility for a decision which is taken on their level. This would entail the whole matter being referred to the War Cabinet at home after our return. I remain absolutely where I was at the last Conference, and where we all were, that a campaign through Rangoon up the Irrawaddy to Mandalay and beyond would be most detrimental and disadvantageous to us. The capture of Akyab without such a campaign is only an act of waste and folly. …

The situation I wish to have at this time next year is that we are masters of “Culverin,” that Wingate is in touch with the Chinese in Yunnan, that the communications in Upper Burma have been improved as far as possible, and that we have a free option where to strike next amphibiously, having regard to the reactions from the enemy, which by then will have been apparent.

  Two days later I telegraphed home:

Prime Minister (Quebec) to Deputy Prime Minister

22 Aug. 43

The President and General Marshall are very keen on Mountbatten’s appointment, which it is certain the United States Government will cordially accept. Our Chiefs of Staff concur. There is no doubt of the need of a young and vigorous mind in this lethargic and stagnant Indian scene. I have no doubts whatsoever that it is my duty to make this proposal formally and to submit Mountbatten’s name to the King. Mountbatten and Wingate working together have thrown a great deal of new light upon future plans. It is essential that following upon this conference an announcement should be made in a few days. I hope my colleagues will feel this is the best course to take.

2. We have also cleared up to our satisfaction the difficulties about the Southeast Asia Command. Broad strategic plans and major assignments of forces and supplies will be decided by the Combined Chiefs of Staff subject to the approval of their respective Governments. But all operational control will be vested in the British Chiefs of Staff acting under His Majesty’s Government, and all orders will go through them.

3. We have not been able to reach a final conclusion about the extent to which the floods will have delayed the proposed operations in North Burma, nor have we yet given sufficient detailed study to the first stage of Operation “Culverin” to decide whether that should be given priority in amphibious operations during 1944. At least another month’s intense study is required. The discussions however have been most friendly, and there is no doubt that the United States Chiefs of Staff are gratified at the constructive interest which we have shown in war plans against Japan in 1944. Soong arrives on Monday, but will in principle be told no more than what is contained in my immediately following.