Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World (73 page)
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Authors: Samantha Power
BOOK: Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World
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Vieira de Mello knew he was a more palatable salesman than any American and than certain members of the Governing Council itself. Nonetheless he had to be careful not to come across as a handmaiden to the occupation. When Arab journalists quizzed him as to whether the UN was there as “just a cover to the American invasion,” his temper flared: “The UN, its secretary-general, and the SRSG [Special Representative of the Secretary-General] are no tool and no cover for anyone. We are an independent organization. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and myself are independent from anyone. So do not suggest for any second that we are there supporting the United States or the Coalition.”
4
He rejected the charge that the Governing Council had been “handpicked” by the Americans. In fact, he insisted, the council was “as representative an institution of governance as one could imagine in the Iraq of today.” Those Arab governments that faulted the Governing Council because it had not been elected, he wrote in a draft op-ed he hoped to publish in the region, “should be prepared to promote the same principle in their domestic constituencies.”
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He convinced himself that he was making progress, as several Arab governments said that they were prepared to support the council if the occupiers really let it govern.
4
He rejected the charge that the Governing Council had been “handpicked” by the Americans. In fact, he insisted, the council was “as representative an institution of governance as one could imagine in the Iraq of today.” Those Arab governments that faulted the Governing Council because it had not been elected, he wrote in a draft op-ed he hoped to publish in the region, “should be prepared to promote the same principle in their domestic constituencies.”
5
He convinced himself that he was making progress, as several Arab governments said that they were prepared to support the council if the occupiers really let it govern.
His sales tour alarmed his staff in Baghdad and friends around the world who read about it. An August 2003 Gallup poll found that three-quarters of Iraqis thought that the policies of the Governing Council were “mostly determined” by the United States and the U.K., while only 16 percent deemed the body “fairly independent.”
6
“Here you had Sergio in public saying, ‘I helped create this Governing Council. I support this Governing Council,’ ” recalls Ramiro Lopes da Silva, his deputy in Baghdad. “And then the Governing Council did not really attempt to represent the concerns of the Iraqi population, as the members were probably more concerned with themselves. How did that make the UN look?” Timur Goksel, who was still spokesman for the UN in Lebanon some two decades after he had worked with Vieira de Mello in Naqoura, was shocked to hear Vieira de Mello’s defense of the council on Arab television. “I thought maybe he felt a bit too secure in Iraq,” Goksel recalls. “I thought something was going wrong. He dressed like an administrator. He talked like an administrator. He looked like one of them.” Goksel sent an e-mail to his friend urging him to break away from the formal structures and do as they had done in Lebanon. “Go to the coffee shops, Sergio,” he recalls writing. “Reach out to the men with the guns.” Omar Bakhet got in touch with Vieira de Mello to deliver the same message. Bakhet appealed to him to “stop trying to carve out a political role for yourself. No one in the Middle East is innocent.”
6
“Here you had Sergio in public saying, ‘I helped create this Governing Council. I support this Governing Council,’ ” recalls Ramiro Lopes da Silva, his deputy in Baghdad. “And then the Governing Council did not really attempt to represent the concerns of the Iraqi population, as the members were probably more concerned with themselves. How did that make the UN look?” Timur Goksel, who was still spokesman for the UN in Lebanon some two decades after he had worked with Vieira de Mello in Naqoura, was shocked to hear Vieira de Mello’s defense of the council on Arab television. “I thought maybe he felt a bit too secure in Iraq,” Goksel recalls. “I thought something was going wrong. He dressed like an administrator. He talked like an administrator. He looked like one of them.” Goksel sent an e-mail to his friend urging him to break away from the formal structures and do as they had done in Lebanon. “Go to the coffee shops, Sergio,” he recalls writing. “Reach out to the men with the guns.” Omar Bakhet got in touch with Vieira de Mello to deliver the same message. Bakhet appealed to him to “stop trying to carve out a political role for yourself. No one in the Middle East is innocent.”
But Vieira de Mello had invested too much to give up on the nascent council. Despite the evidence he saw daily, he told himself it would eventually succeed. “I wouldn’t be touring countries in the region trying to sell the Governing Council if I didn’t believe what I’m saying,” he told
The New Yorker
’s George Packer. “The last thing I need and the organization needs is to be marketing the interests of the United States.”
7
The New Yorker
’s George Packer. “The last thing I need and the organization needs is to be marketing the interests of the United States.”
7
But the Iraqi political landscape was changing in ways that he did not appreciate. Moqtada al-Sadr and other militants were gaining clout because they were delivering social services and physical security that the Coalition was not. While Vieira de Mello was selling the council in July, al-Sadr had taken to demanding its dissolution. He said that the Hawza, or the Shiite religious authority, should run Iraq, and on July 25 he gathered tens of thousands of Shiites in Najaf to show his strength and urge an end of the occupation. “The Iraqi Governing Council was set up by the Americans, and it must be disbanded,” al-Sadr told his followers.
8
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Vieira de Mello knew that in the three key areas where the Coalition was foundering—power sharing, policing, and economic development—the UN had made grave mistakes but had amassed unique expertise.Yet, to his amazement, the Coalition seemed uninterested in tapping it. On the law-and-order side, he liked to repeat what he had learned through years of frustration: “Soldiers make bad policemen.”Although the UN had trained local policemen in Cambodia, Bosnia, Kosovo, and East Timor, the Coalition did not request its assistance. Instead, the CPA gave a $50 million contract to DynCorp International, which was originally supposed to send six thousand trainers, but which eventually set just five hundred. One police chief from North Carolina, Jon Villanova, was given a staff of forty to train twenty thousand Iraqi policemen.
9
Electricity, water, and other utilities operated intermittently at best, lagging far behind public expectations. Vieira de Mello reminded Bremer that much of Kosovo and all of East Timor had been burned to the ground when the UN arrived, but the UN administrations had eventually managed to mobilize the resources needed for recovery. Still, Bremer seemed unreceptive to UN advice. “We could have helped,” Vieira de Mello told Packer in August. “We still can,” he said. “There’s still time.”
10
9
Electricity, water, and other utilities operated intermittently at best, lagging far behind public expectations. Vieira de Mello reminded Bremer that much of Kosovo and all of East Timor had been burned to the ground when the UN arrived, but the UN administrations had eventually managed to mobilize the resources needed for recovery. Still, Bremer seemed unreceptive to UN advice. “We could have helped,” Vieira de Mello told Packer in August. “We still can,” he said. “There’s still time.”
10
The one issue on which Vieira de Mello and Bremer clashed heatedly was the rights of detainees in U.S. custody. In Cambodia, Congo, and East Timor,Vieira de Mello had feuded with his friend Dennis McNamara over human rights issues. But in Iraq he behaved like the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights that he had reluctantly become. He talked constantly of “bringing the high commissioner’s post to the field.” He behaved as though he had acquired a new pride in, and perhaps a new understanding of, his Geneva job, as he saw that violations of human rights were the cornerstone of all that had been wrong with Saddam Hussein’s reign and all that
could
go wrong under the Coalition. “The moment we landed in Iraq,” recalls Mona Rishmawi, a UN human rights adviser, “he was a different man.” “Some people think that human rights are the UN’s soft underbelly,” he told aides. “But Iraqis know that human rights conditions will make or break Iraq.”
could
go wrong under the Coalition. “The moment we landed in Iraq,” recalls Mona Rishmawi, a UN human rights adviser, “he was a different man.” “Some people think that human rights are the UN’s soft underbelly,” he told aides. “But Iraqis know that human rights conditions will make or break Iraq.”
On July 15, 2003, he and Bremer were scheduled to discuss detainees. Sawers had counseled him to raise any concerns about excessive use of U.S. military force or prison conditions, not by criticizing but instead by asking Bremer, “How will you deal with criticisms?”
11
It was the only meeting in the Green Zone from which Bremer insisted on barring Prentice and Salamé. Vieira de Mello inquired about the conditions of the thousands of prisoners at the Baghdad airport who were crammed into inhumane facilities. He stressed the importance of creating a database for Iraqis in detention, and just as he had done with President Bush in March, he asked that family members and lawyers be granted access to the detainees. He urged that the detention period be reduced from twenty-one days to seventy-two hours, that status review be instituted, and that something like a public defender system be created. “I’m not accusing your soldiers of abuse,” he told Bremer. “I’m saying you don’t have the checks and balances in place to guard against abuse.” Bremer said he undertood the UN position but felt that it was being unjustly biased by “the Palestinian on your staff.” He was referring to Rishmawi, who carried a Jordanian passport but was of Palestinian descent and at recent international gatherings had been critical of U.S. detention practices. Vieira de Mello defended Rishmawi, who accompanied him to the meeting and was waiting outside. He argued that the Coalition was harming its own cause with its reckless approach to detainee issues. Nearly a year passed before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, forcing Bremer to address Rishmawi’s criticisms on the merits. Vieira de Mello was the first international official to warn Bremer of the potential for grave abuse and national embarrassment.
11
It was the only meeting in the Green Zone from which Bremer insisted on barring Prentice and Salamé. Vieira de Mello inquired about the conditions of the thousands of prisoners at the Baghdad airport who were crammed into inhumane facilities. He stressed the importance of creating a database for Iraqis in detention, and just as he had done with President Bush in March, he asked that family members and lawyers be granted access to the detainees. He urged that the detention period be reduced from twenty-one days to seventy-two hours, that status review be instituted, and that something like a public defender system be created. “I’m not accusing your soldiers of abuse,” he told Bremer. “I’m saying you don’t have the checks and balances in place to guard against abuse.” Bremer said he undertood the UN position but felt that it was being unjustly biased by “the Palestinian on your staff.” He was referring to Rishmawi, who carried a Jordanian passport but was of Palestinian descent and at recent international gatherings had been critical of U.S. detention practices. Vieira de Mello defended Rishmawi, who accompanied him to the meeting and was waiting outside. He argued that the Coalition was harming its own cause with its reckless approach to detainee issues. Nearly a year passed before the Abu Ghraib scandal broke, forcing Bremer to address Rishmawi’s criticisms on the merits. Vieira de Mello was the first international official to warn Bremer of the potential for grave abuse and national embarrassment.
At a subsequent meeting with Bremer he brought with him a local newspaper clipping that carried a photo of Iraqis who had been hooded in U.S. detention.“This is incredible,” he said, but Bremer looked confused.“What’s wrong with hooding?” he asked. Knowing that Coalition commander General Ricardo Sanchez and Bremer frequently clashed over their interlocking responsibilities,Vieira de Mello raised detainee practices with Sanchez as well, requesting that the UN be given the right to inspect U.S. prison facilities. Sanchez said he thought such external monitoring unnecessary. "My troops are among the best in the world,” he said.“I want to maintain these standards. I am proud of my troops, and I intend to remain proud of them.”
Throughout his career Vieira de Mello had always liked to be liked. On the issue of detainees, he conveyed all of his complaints to the Americans in private, at no time speaking out publicly. When he pushed for a visit to the Abu Ghraib prison, which the Coalition had renovated and reopened on August 4, he asked Bremer to accompany him.The morning of the visit, he presented Bremer with a cartoon he had cut out of the
International Herald Tribune
.The cartoon,
The Wizard of Id
, depicted the king who lived in isolation from his people, inspecting conditions in the dungeon. Entering the dungeon, the king was escorted by a guard into the dining area, where he was shown the types of “swill” from which prisoners could choose: “swill,” “fat-free swill,” “vegetarian swill,” and “kosher swill.” The guard explained: “The human rights people are coming in the morning.” Vieira de Mello convinced himself that his private pressure was paying dividends. He told reporters that a central data bank for detainees was in the works, showers had been built for four hundred of the Iraqis detained in sweltering tents, proper prison buildings would soon replace the tents, and the number of juvenile detainees in Baghdad had dropped from 172 to 30. But however much he hoped for progress, he could not get either Bremer or Sanchez to prioritize the fate of detainees.
International Herald Tribune
.The cartoon,
The Wizard of Id
, depicted the king who lived in isolation from his people, inspecting conditions in the dungeon. Entering the dungeon, the king was escorted by a guard into the dining area, where he was shown the types of “swill” from which prisoners could choose: “swill,” “fat-free swill,” “vegetarian swill,” and “kosher swill.” The guard explained: “The human rights people are coming in the morning.” Vieira de Mello convinced himself that his private pressure was paying dividends. He told reporters that a central data bank for detainees was in the works, showers had been built for four hundred of the Iraqis detained in sweltering tents, proper prison buildings would soon replace the tents, and the number of juvenile detainees in Baghdad had dropped from 172 to 30. But however much he hoped for progress, he could not get either Bremer or Sanchez to prioritize the fate of detainees.
The one area on which the Coalition proved amenable to UN help was elections. Vieira de Mello persuaded Carina Perelli, one of his favorite people from UN Headquarters in New York, to lead a delegation to Iraq on August 1. Perelli (a brash, chain-smoking, heavyset ex-revolutionary) and Vieira de Mello (an immaculate, health-obsessed company man) were an unlikely pair. But they had come to respect and even adore each other while managing East Timor’s elections. In Baghdad they completed each other’s sentences in the office and bantered to ease the tension. “I need a quickie with you,” Vieira de Mello would say if he saw Perelli in the hallway when he wanted to discuss the election lists.“At my age, I don’t do quickies anymore,” she would answer.
Perelli and her team spent almost three weeks touring Iraq so as to be able to assess whether the UN Electoral Assistance Division could reasonably contribute. Just before leaving Baghdad in mid-August, she drove with Vieira de Mello to the Green Zone for a meeting with Bremer. On the drive there her friend urged her to be straight. “Bremer still sees elections as a technical matter and not a wholly political one,” Vieira de Mello said. “You have to educate him like you educated me . . .The problem with you election people,” he continued, smiling, “is that you are an acquired taste.”
In the meeting Bremer presented his plan: The unelected Governing Council would draft an electoral law, and the Iraqis would ratify the law in a referendum. Perelli disagreed vehemently with the sequencing the Coalition had in mind. “You have to be very careful with referendums in transitions,” she said.“They become public opinion polls, which, on the basis of my conversations with Iraqis, is not in your interest.”
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She left the meeting optimistic that the Coalition would request UN assistance.Vieira de Mello liked to quote Yassir Arafat saying,“Give me a square kilometer, and I’ll control the country.” As Perelli recalls, “We saw we had a window. We knew it was not the front door.” The challenge for the UN would be to figure out how to open the window. Vieira de Mello assured her that he would pull the plug on UN electoral assistance if she came to believe the Americans were sacrificing core principles. Perelli had a different worry: Vieira de Mello, her chief ally in the UN, would be leaving Baghdad in six weeks’ time, and she would be stuck on her own. “If you abandon me,” she said, “I’ll have to deal not only with Bremer but also with whatever jerk they replace you with. I can handle the Americans, but I can’t handle both.” He assured her that he would stand up for her from Geneva. “I’ve got to get out of here,” he said. “This place is getting to me, and I want to start my life with Carolina.”
In previous missions he had helped offset flagging staff morale by making himself available after hours for drinks with close staff. But in Baghdad he socialized only rarely. Larriera had arrived in mid-June, toting the items he had asked her to bring: large stashes of chocolate, his Sony portable stereo, a Discman for his runs, a Brazilian music CD collection, a James Bond Gold DVD collection that she had given him for Christmas, photographs from East Timor, and, for good luck, two small iron Buddha statues that they had bought together in Thailand. He held two wine and cheese parties in his office at the Canal, but he typically hurried home to the drab oasis that he and Larriera had established in their suite at the Cedar Hotel. She was working as an economics officer with the mission, but also preparing to start a master’s program in August. “You study,” he would say when they reached the hotel. “I’ll cook!” And so he did. Before leaving the Canal, the couple would pick up aluminum trays of leftover lunchtime food at the cafeteria, and he would heat them up on a tiny electric burner. Or he would prepare breaded veal, steaks, and potato omelets of his own. The staff grumbled that he was reclusive. Salamé pushed him at least to go out for Friday lunches. But on one occasion when he thought he was having lunch with Salamé alone, he arrived at the restaurant and found a table filled with UN staff. He waited out the meal stiffly and later instructed Salamé, “Next time tell me who’s coming to lunch.” Once Salamé phoned to tell him that he had tracked down an Iraqi book of photographs for him and was leaving it at the hotel reception desk. “No,” Vieira de Mello said, “come up and have a scotch.” Salamé’s room abutted Vieira de Mello’s, yet this was the only occasion that he was invited inside.
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