Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (109 page)

58  "Accordingly ... the
investigation": ibid., p. 8. 58 "Mr. Dulles": ibid.

58 "The speech": ibid.,
p. 9.

58 "Congress could be
told"-, ibid., p. 5.

58  "The impression":
ibid.

59  "We handed
Khrushchev": David Wise and Thomas B. Ross,
The U-2 Affair
(New
York: Random House, 1962), p. 172.

60  "trace the chain":
Michael R. Beschloss,
Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(New
York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 315.

60 "What the CIA": ibid.

60 "heartily approved of the
inquiry": White House, memorandum of Congressional breakfast meeting, May
26, 1960 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, Eisenhower diaries).

60  "just
gobbledy-gook": Beschloss,
Mayday,
p. 314.

61  Dillon's boss went much
further: U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations,
Events
Incident to the Summit Conference: Hearings Before the Committee on Foreign
Relations,
86th Cong., 2d sess., May 27, 31, June 1, 2, 1960, p. 103.

61  "They were all
sworn": Beschloss,
Mayday,
p. 314.

61  "You now stand":
Thomas Powers,
The Man Who Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA
(New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), pp. 304-305.

62  "very disturbed":
Department of State, memorandum of telephone conversation, June 1, 1960 (DDEL,
Christian A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 10).

62  "At the present
time": White House, Clark Clifford memorandum for the record, January 24,
1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #22).

63  "In the long run":
Department of Defense, Robert S. McNamara memorandum to President Kennedy,
January 24, 1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #22).

63 The only answer: Lemnitzer's
private summary, p. 6.

Page

64 By daybreak: Details of the
preparation for the Inauguration are drawn from Department of Defense, General
Order No. 1, Inaugural Parade (January 20, 1961), pp. 1—84; JCS, Memorandum for
General Lemnitzer, "Summary of Inaugural Activities, 20 January 1961"
(January 17, 1961) (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University). 65 Quarters
1: What was then Quarters 1 is today Quarters 6.

65  "The presence of a benign
and popular General of the Army": Donald Janson and Bernard Eismann,
The
Far Right
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 1963), p. 6.

66  Warren should be hanged:
ibid., p. 138.

66  One of those was Major General
Edwin A. Walker...
The Overseas Weekly,
charged that Walker:
"President Kennedy and the Ultra Right Extremists," web site
http://www.geocities.com/CapitolHill/4035/disunity.htm.

67  "It seems in this
Administration": Drew Pearson, "Another Admiral's Speech
Censored,"
San Francisco Chronicle,
February 21, 1961.

67 "Studious, handsome,
thoughtful-looking": Bill Henry, "Doughboy Will Have His Day,"
Los
Angeles Times,
August 19, 1960.

67 "The most important
military job": "Who Envies Gen. Lemnitzer?"
Los Angeles
Times,
October 2, 1960.

67 "He thoroughly enjoyed
himself": personal letter, Lemnitzer to Lois and Henry Simpson, January
14, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).

67  "bordered on
reverence": L. James Binder,
Lemnitzer: A Soldier for His Time
(Washington,
D.C.: Brassey's, 1997), p. 239.

68  he ordered his Joint Chiefs
Chairman: ibid., p. 242. 68 find a way to secretly torpedo: ibid., p. 252.

68  "I have been involved in
some very rugged": personal letter, Lemnitzer to Ernest Lemnitzer, March
3, 1960 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).

69  "The
Certain
Trumpet":
Binder,
Lemnitzer,
p. 236.

69 "Here was a president with
no military experience": General Lyman L. Lemnitzer Oral History (March 3,
1982) (LBJL).

69  "Nearly all of these
people were ardent": Admiral Arleigh A. Burke Oral History (November
1972-January 1973) (U.S. Naval Institute, Annapolis).

70  "I would offer the
suggestion": Letter, Lemnitzer to Victor Henderson Ashe II, August 22,
1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University).

70  Lemnitzer and the Chiefs knew:
JCS, Top Secret report,  "Evaluation of Possible Military Courses of
Action in Cuba," January 16, 1961 (FRUS Vol. X, #19).

71  passed the Secret Service
booth: Frank M. Matthews, "Private Citizen Ike at His Farm,"
Pittsburgh
Post-Gazette,
January 21, 1961.

72  "This is the first
known": NSA, Secret/Kimbo intercept, February 1, 1961. 72 "What is
required is a basic expansion of plans": White House, Top Secret

memorandum of conference with the
president, January 25, 1961 (JFKL, National Security Files, Chester V. Clifton
Series, JCS Conferences with the President, Vol. I, drafted on January 27 by
Goodpaster) (FRUS 1961-1963, Vol. X, #26).

72  "I'm not going to
risk": Michael R. Beschloss,
The Crisis Years: Kennedy and Khrushchev,
1960-196}
(New York: HarperCollins, 1991), p. 114.

73  "We can confidently
assert": CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the
Cuban Operation," October 1961, p. 60.

73 "the Agency was driving
forward": ibid., p. 50.

73 elaborate   instructions:  
Drew   Pearson,   "Merry-Go-Round,"  
San Francisco

Chronicle,
February
21, 1961. 73 eight-page biography: Lemnitzer biography, prepared as part of his
testimony

before the House of
Representatives, Committee on Science and Astronautics,

March 23, 1961.

73 
"Planners are afunny
lot":
Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense University.

74  "In view of the rapid
buildup": Lemnitzer's private summary, p. 8. 74 "Evaluation of the
current plan": ibid., pp. 10—11.

74  twenty-minute discussion:
ibid., p. 36.

75  insisted that the choice of
Zapata for a landing site: ibid., pp. 22—23.

76  "The [NSA] effort was
very small": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Harold L.
Parish (October 12, 1982).

77  "possibly arrived at a
Cuban port": NSA, Secret/Sabre intercept, April 10, 1961.

77 U-2s were crisscrossing: CIA,
Secret/Noforn report, "The CIA and the U-2

Program, 1954-1974" (1992),
p. 198. 77 NSA voice-intercept operators: CIA, Top Secret report, "An
Analysis of the

Cuban Operation by the Deputy
Director (Plans)," January 18, 1962, Section

V, "The Assessment of the
Adequacy of the Plan," p. 3. 77 "Arms urgent": This and the
other quotations in this paragraph come from

CIA, Top Secret report,
"Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation,"

October 1961, p. 109.

77  "It wasn't much that was
done": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Harold L. Parish
(October 12, 1982), p. 29.

78  "We are out of
ammo": CIA, Top Secret report, "Inspector General's Survey of the
Cuban Operation" (October 1961), pp. 32-33.

78 "In water. Out of
ammo": ibid.

78 scores of their comrades: A
total of 114 brigade members were killed and 1,189 were wounded.

78  "Am destroying all
equipment"; convoy heading for the beach reversed course: CIA, Top Secret
report, "Inspector General's Survey of the Cuban Operation" (October
1961), pp. 32-33.

79  "those employees on
it": CIA, Secret, Richard Bissell memorandum for the record, November 5,
1961 (FRUS, Vol. X, #272).

79 "The traditional civilian
control of the military": Janson and Eismann,
The Far Right,
p.
184. On April 10, 1963, Lee Harvey Oswald, who seven months later would
assassinate President Kennedy, attempted to assassinate Walker as he sat at his
desk in his Dallas home. Using the same rifle with which he killed Kennedy,
Oswald shot at Walker through a window but missed by inches. Walker died in
relative obscurity in Dallas on October 31, 1993.

79  "extreme right-wing,
witch-hunting": ibid., p. 194.

80  Foreign Relations Committee
... warned: David Burnham, United Press International wire report, July 20,
1961.

80 "thesis of the nature of
the Communist threat": ibid. 80 "an example of the ultimate
danger": ibid.

80  "Concern had grown that a
belligerent": Janson and Eismann,
The Far Right,
p. 197.

81  "I had  considered
sending this information": Letter,  Personal/Confidential/Eyes Only,
Lemnitzer to Norstad, February 28, 1961 (Lemnitzer Papers, National Defense
University).

81  "You and Charlie are
probably wondering what": ibid.

81  "civilian hierarchy was crippled":
Walter S. Poole, JCS, General Lyman L. Lemnitzer Oral History (February 12,
1976) (U.S. Army Center of Military History, Washington, DC.).

82  "The Bay of Pigs fiasco
broke the dike": Janson and Eismann,
The Far Right,
pp. 6-7.

83  "could  think  of  
manufacturing  something":   White   House,   Top   Secret, memorandum of
meeting with the president, on January 3, 1961 (January 9, 1961).

83 Lansdale was ordered:
Department of State, Top Secret/Sensitive memorandum, "The Cuba
Project," March 2, 1962 (FRUS, Vol. X, #309).

83  "World opinion":
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn report, "Report
by the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff Representative on the
Caribbean Survey Group to the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Cuba Project,"
March 9, 1962 (ARRB).

84  "the objective is":
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Top Secret/Special Handling memorandum, Craig to
Lansdale, February 2, 1962 (ARRB).

84 "a series of well
coordinated": ibid.

84 "We could blow up a U.S.
ship": JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn, Note by the Secretaries to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff on Northwoods, Annex to Appendix to Enclosure A,
"Pretexts to Justify U.S. Military Intervention in Cuba" (March 12,
1962), p. 8 (ARRB).

84  "We could develop a
Communist Cuban terror campaign": ibid., pp. 8—9.

85  "Exploding a few plastic
bombs": ibid., pp. 9—10.

85  "create an incident which
will": The plan is in ibid., pp. 9—11.  86  "It is recommended":
JCS, Top Secret/Special Handling/Noforn memorandum, Lemnitzer to McNamara,
March 13, 1962 (ARRB).

86  At 2:30 on the afternoon of
... March 13: Lemnitzer's official diary for March 13, 1962 (Lemnitzer Papers,
National Defense University).

87  Kennedy told Lemnitzer:
Department of State, Secret memorandum, written by U. Alexis Johnson and dated
March 16; attached to "Guidelines for Operation Mongoose" (March 14,
1962) (FRUS, Vol. X, #314). Ironically, President Gerald Ford in 1975 appointed
Lemnitzer to a blue-ribbon panel to investigate domestic activities of the CIA.
87 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that the Cuban problem must be
solved":

JCS, Top Secret/Special
Handling/Noforn memorandum, Lemnitzer to McNamara, April 10, 1962, pp. 1-2
(ARRB).

87 "The Joint Chiefs of Staff
believe that the United States": ibid. 87 "[T]he Joint Chiefs of
Staff recommend": ibid.

87  "I am the senior military
officer": Binder, Lemnitzer, p. 279.

88  Lemnitzer ordered Gray to
destroy all his notes: ibid., p. 273.

89  "A contrived 'Cuban'
attack on an OAS": Office of the Secretary of Defense, Top
Secret/Sensitive policy paper, "War Between Cuba and Another LA
State" (1963), p. 1 (ARRB).

89 "Any of the contrived
situations described above": ibid., p. 3. 89 "The only area remaining
for consideration": ibid.

89  "a possible
scenario": Department of Defense, Top Secret/Sensitive memorandum,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs Paul Nitze to
Bundy, May 10, 1963 (JFKL, National Security Files, Meetings and Memoranda
Series, Standing Group Meeting) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #337).

90  "If the U.S. did
institute": ibid.

90 About a month later: Department
of State, Top Secret/Eyes Only, Acting Secretary of State George Ball to the
president, June 25, 1963 (JFKL, National Security Files, Countries Series,
Cuba) (FRUS, Vol. XI, #352).

Page

93 ADVA and GENS were combined;
new organizational structure: James Barn-ford,
The Puzzle Palace: A Report
on NSA, America's Most Secret Agency
(Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp.
90-91.

93 U.S. intelligence budget
reached $2 billion: White House, Top Secret/Eyes Only memorandum,
"Discussion at the 473rd Meeting of the National Security Council, January
5, 1961," p. 3.

93 $1.4 billion: ibid., p. 2.

93 proclaimed that NSA was a ship:
"An Old Timer Is One Who . . . ," NSA,
Cryptolog
(November
1982), p. 17.