Body of Secrets: Anatomy of the Ultra-Secret National Security Agency (108 page)

27 A team set up in Nanjing. ..
"poor hearability": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra,

"Comint and the PRC
Intervention in the Korean War,"
Cryptologic Quarterly

(Summer 1996), p. 4.

27  the British had been secretly
listening: ibid., p. 6.

28  "clear and convincing
evidence": NSA, "Korea," p. 44.

28 Sigint reports noted that some
70,000 Chinese troops: NSA, "Comint and the

PRC Intervention in the Korean
War," p. 11. 28 "Very little": ibid., p. 15.

28 twenty troop trains were
heading: ibid., p. 14. 28 "We are already at war here": NSA,
"Korea," p. 44.

28  intercepts during the first
three weeks: NSA, "Comint and the PRC Intervention in the Korean
War," p. 18.

29  AFSA reports demonstrated
clearly: ibid., p. 17.

29 "No one who received
Comint product": ibid., p. 1.

29 "During the Second World
War, MacArthur had disregarded": ibid., p. 21.

29  NSA later attributed this
caution: NSA, "Korea," p. 55.

30  "The ... last three
major": ibid., p. 36.

30 "It has become
apparent": NSA, "The Korean War: The Sigint Background"

(June 2000), p. 15. 30 A year
later NSA director Ralph Canine: NSA, "So Power Can Be Brought into

Play: Sigint and the Pusan
Perimeter," p. 15. 30 "gravely concerned": CIA, Top
Secret/Codeword memorandum, "Proposed

Survey of  Communications
Intelligence Activities"  (December  10,   1951)

(HSTL, President's Secretary's
File, Intelligence, Box 250).

30  Truman    ordered    the   
investigation:    National    Security    Council,    Top Secret/Codeword
memorandum, "Proposed Survey of Intelligence Activities" (December
13, 1951) (HSTL, President's Secretary's File, Intelligence, Box 250).

31  put it together again: For the
Brownell Report, see Committee Appointed to Survey Communications Intelligence
Activities of the Government, Top Se-cret/Comint Channels Only, "Report to
the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense" (June  13,  1952)
(National Archives, Record Group 457, Special Research History 123).

31  "step backward":
ibid.

31 meeting with the president:
White House, President's Appointment Schedule for Friday, October 24, 1952
(HSTL, Files of Mathew J. Connelly). Secretary of State Dean Acheson was giving
a speech on Korea at the UN General Assembly at the time of the meeting (HSTL,
Secretary of State Dean Acheson Appointment Book, Box 46).

31 leaving a voting booth: White
House, President's Appointment Schedule for Tuesday, November 4, 1952 (HSTL,
Files of Mathew J. Connelly).

31 "The 'smart money' ":
NSA, Tom Johnson, "The Plan to Save NSA," in "In Memoriam: Dr.
Louis W. Tordella" (undated), p. 6. In fact, only four days before NSA
opened its doors, the FBI's J. Edgar Hoover sent a snippy letter to the
National Security Council complaining about the new agency: "I am
concerned about the authority granted to the Director of the National Security
Agency" (FBI, Personal and Confidential letter, Hoover to James S. Lay,
Jr., Executive Secretary of the NSC [October 31, 1952]) (DDEL, Ann Whitman
File, NSC Series, Box 194).

Page

33  "With all the electrical
gear": Bruce Bailey, "From the Crow's Nest,"
Air & Space
(September
1994), p. 33.

34  "an ugly,
overweight": ibid.

35  Nicknamed Project Homerun:
Details of the project are drawn from R. Cargill Hall, "The Truth About
Overflights,"
MHQ: The Quarterly Journal of Military History,
vol.
9, no. 3 (Spring 1997), pp. 36-39.

37  "The stringent security
measures imposed": CIA, Secret Noforn report, "The CIA and the U-2
Program, 1954-1974" (1992), p. 2.

38  "The weather was gorgeous":
Paul Lashmar,
Spy Flights of the Cold War
(Gloucestershire, England:
Sutton Publishing Ltd., 1996), p. 84.

38  "The guns won't
work": ibid., p. 85.

39  "the first major
test": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn report, "The Suez Crisis: A Brief
Comint History" (1988) (Special Series, Crisis Collection, vol. 2), p. 1.

39 his long experience with pack
mules: "Ralph J. Canine,"
The Phoenician
(Fall 1992), p. 12.

39  "People were scared of
him": NSA, Secret Comint Channels Only, "Oral History of Colonel
Frank L. Herrelko" (November 8, 1982), pp. 31, 42.

40  agreed to by Israeli prime
minister David Ben-Gurion, defense minister Shimon Peres, and armed forces
chief of staff Moshe Dayan: Donald Neff,
Warriors at Suez
(Brattleboro,
Vt.: Amana Books, 1998), pp. 342-44.

40 intercepts from Spain and
Syria: White House, Top Secret/Eyes Only memorandum for the record (August 6,
1956), p. 3.

40  "communications between
Paris and Tel Aviv": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Noforn report, "The Suez
Crisis: A Brief Comint History" (1988) (Special Series Crisis Collection,
vol. 2), p. 19.

41  To make matters worse: NSA,
Top Secret/Umbra/Talent/Keyhole/Noforn report, "American Cryptology During
the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle for Centralization
1945-1989" (1995), p. 236.

41  "1956 was a bad
time": ibid.

41  "about as crude and
brutal": Department of State, memorandum of telephone

call to the president (October 30,
1956) (DDEL, Papers of John Foster Dulles,

Telephone Calls, Box 11). 41 
"It was the gravest": Department of State, memorandum of telephone
call from

Allen Dulles (October 30, 1956)
(DDEL, Papers of John Foster Dulles, Box 5). / 41  "It would be a complete
mistake": White House Top Secret memoranduni,

Discussion at the 302nd Meeting of
the National Security Council (November

1, 1956), pp. 6-13. (DDEL, Ann
Whitman File, NSC Series, Box 8). 41 Harold Stassen objected: ibid. 41 
"One thing at least was clear": ibid.

41  "As for crisis
response": NSA, Top Secret Umbra/Talent/Keyhole/ Noforn report,
"American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle
for Centralization 1945-1989" (1995), p. 239.

42  consultants from McKinsey and
Company: ibid.

42 "modified geographical
concept": NSA, Top Secret/Umbra/Talent/Key-hole/Noforn report,
"American Cryptology During the Cold War, 1945-1989. Book 1: The Struggle
for Centralization 1945-1989" (1995), p. 239.

42 Internal organization: See
James Bamford,
The Puzzle Palace: A Report on America's Most Secret Agency
(Boston:
Houghton Mifflin, 1982), pp. 90-91.

42  "Canine ... stands
out": NSA, Secret/Comint Channels Only, Oral History of Dr. Howard
Campaigne (June 29, 1983), p. 125.

43  Details of Powers's wait on
the airstrip come from Francis Gary Powers with Curt Gentry,
Operation
Overflight: The U-2 Spy Pilot Tells His Story for the First Time
(New York:
Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1970), p. 76.

43  "He would sometimes cut
out": Richard M. Bissell, Jr., Oral History (November 9, 1976), p. 11
(DDEL).

44  "the System-V unit worked
well": CIA, Top Secret/Codeword mission folder 4019 (December 22, 1956)
(contained in CIA/U2P, p. 126).

44 "We usually flew from
Turkey": Powers with Gentry,
Operation Overflight,
pp. 46-47.

44  "The equipment we carried
on such occasions": ibid.

45  Powers locked his canopy: His
preparations for the U-2 flight are described in Powers with Gentry,
Operation
Overflight,
p. 78.

45 "Minister of Defense
Marshal Malinovsky reporting": Strobe Talbott, ed.,
Khrushchev
Remembers
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1974), pp. 443, 444.

45 "Shoot down the
plane": ibid.

45 "We were sick and
tired": ibid.

45 A missile launch was
considered: CIA, Colonel Alexander Orlov, "A 'Hot' Front in the Cold
War,"
Studies in Intelligence
(Winter 1998-1999), web pages.

45  "An uncomfortable
situation": ibid.

46  "Shame!": ibid.

46 "If I could become a
missile": ibid.

46 "I was sure": Powers
with Gentry,
Operation Overflight,
p. 80.

46  "In view of the
improving": CIA, Top Secret/Talent report, "Annex to the report of
DCI Ad hoc Panel on Status of the Soviet ICBM Program," August 25, 1959
(DDEL, Office of Staff Secretary, Intelligence, Box 15).

47  "Evidence
indicates": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the
442nd Meeting of the National Security Council, April 28, 1960" (April
28,1960), p. 8. (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National Security Council series, Box
12).

47 "Destroy target":
Orlov, "A 'Hot' Front," web pages.

47 "My God, I've had it
now!": Powers with Gentry,
Operation Overflight,
p. 82.

47  "Instinctively I grasped
the throttle": ibid.

48  "I reached for the
destruct switches": ibid., p. 83. Powers was killed on August 1, 1977, at
the age of forty-seven, in the crash of a helicopter he was flying for a Los
Angeles television station. He was buried with honors in Arlington National
Cemetery. A decade later the U.S. Air Force awarded him posthumously the
Distinguished Flying Cross.

48 "The plane was still
spinning": ibid., p. 84. 48 "It was a pleasant": ibid.

49  "He's turning
left!": Jack Anderson,  "U.S. Heard Russians Chasing U-2,"
Washington
Post,
May 12, 1960.

50  "the hideout": White
House, Top Secret memorandum, "Notes for Use in Talking to the Secretary
of State about the U-2 and the NSC" (June 14, 1960) (DDEL, White House
Office, Box 18).

51   "Following cover
plan": Top Secret memorandum (No addressee; May 2, 1960) (DDEL, White
House, Office of Staff Secretary, Box 15).

52  the president huddled: This
and other details of the events following the U-2 shootdown are from White
House, Top Secret/Limited Distribution, "Chronological Account of Handling
of U-2 Incident" (June 14, 1960) (DDEL, White House Office, Box 18).

52 "we had an
understanding": Colonel William D. Johnson and Lieutenant Colonel James C.
Ferguson, Andrew J. Goodpaster Oral History (January 9, 1976), p. 45 (U.S. Army
Center for Military History).

52  Walter  Bonney  was  forced: 
Michael  R.  Beschloss, 
Mayday: Eisenhower, Khrushchev and the U-2 Affair
(New
York: Harper & Row, 1986), pp. 51-52; David Wise and Thomas B. Ross,
The
U-2 Affair
(New York: Random House, 1962), p. 83.

53  "Almost instantly":
Richard Strout, "T.R.B.,"
New Republic,
May 16, 1960. 53
"While the President": Department of State, telephone calls, May 9,
1960

(DDEL, Papers of Christian A.
Herter, Telephone Calls, Box 10). 53 "I would like to resign": Ann
Whitman diary, May 9, 1960 (DDEL).

53  Dulles, Eisenhower said: The
account in this paragraph is from Department of State, telephone calls, May 9,
1960 (DDEL, Papers of Christian A. Herter, Telephone Calls, Box 10).

54  "Our reconnaissance was
discovered": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the
444th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 9, 1960" (May 13,
1960), p. 2 (DDEL, Ann Whitman File, National Security Council series, Box 12).

54 "extensive aerial
surveillance": Department of State, Press Announcement, May 9, 1960
(DDEL).

54 "Call off": The
quotations in this paragraph come from Department of State, memorandum of
telephone conversation with General Goodpaster, June 1, 1960 (DDEL, Christian
A. Herter Papers, Telephone Calls, Box 10).

54  "It was as though":
Talbott, ed.,
Khrushchev Remembers,
p. 451.

55  "We couldn't
possibly": ibid., p. 452.

56  "It appeared": White
House, Top Secret memorandum, Gordon Gray meeting with the president, May 24,
1960 (DDEL, Office of the Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, Box
4).

56 "The President": This
and the preceding description of a typical NSC meeting draw on Robert Cutler,
No
Time for Rest
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1965), p. 302.

56 The description of the NSC
meeting draws on photos from DDEL.

56 "to play up the U-2
incident": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the
445th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 24, 1960," p. 3 (DDEL,
Ann Whitman File, National Security Council Series, Box 12).

57 "It was clear":
ibid., p. 5. 57 "Administration officials": ibid., p. 5. 57
"Some investigators": ibid., p. 17. 57 "No information":
ibid., p. 8.

57 "What's more ... that's
under oath": Thomas Gates Oral History, Columbia University Oral History
Project.

57  "The investigation, once
started": White House, Top Secret memorandum, "Discussion at the
445th Meeting of the National Security Council, May 24, 1960," p. 8 (DDEL,
Ann Whitman File, National Security Council Series, Box 12).