Blood of Tyrants: George Washington & the Forging of the Presidency (22 page)
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Authors: Logan Beirne
Tags: #American Revolution, #Founding Fathers, #George Washington, #18th Century
BOOK: Blood of Tyrants: George Washington & the Forging of the Presidency
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If captured by the British, the members of the Continental Congress would surely be hanged as traitors. So they began to scatter: John Adams and Thomas Jefferson returned to their homes, while Franklin was off lobbying the French for more assistance. In fact, so many congressmen were absent, on account of flight or illness or sheer exhaustion, that there were often not enough members for a quorum. The bold Continental Congress that had issued the Declaration of Independence only months earlier was now just a nervous shadow of itself, as the last holdouts anxiously milled within Independence Hall.
This rump Congress became more erratic. They ordered Washington to publicly refute the “false and malicious” report that they were about to flee Philadelphia.
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Washington, however, realized that his controlling mother was acting a bit batty and thus disobeyed. He politely responded that following Congress’s order would “not lead to any good end” and that he would “take the liberty to decline.” As if already asserting his growing power as commander, he instead recommended that Congress would be wise to evacuate.
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Little did Washington know, they already had.
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Washington, however, realized that his controlling mother was acting a bit batty and thus disobeyed. He politely responded that following Congress’s order would “not lead to any good end” and that he would “take the liberty to decline.” As if already asserting his growing power as commander, he instead recommended that Congress would be wise to evacuate.
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Little did Washington know, they already had.
Congress resolved to reconvene in Baltimore, approximately one hundred miles farther from Howe’s men. The fact that they transferred to this backwater was itself another sign of desperation. At the time, Baltimore was a rough, dirty boomtown that was known more as a smelly haven for pirates than as a political center. The intellectual John Adams was appalled by what he described as the population’s crude quest for profit by any means. Another delegate described Baltimore as “the damnedest hole on earth.”
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But the brutal realities of war had morphed from a far-off, virtuous battle for liberty in Boston and New York, into a very real and very near threat.
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But the brutal realities of war had morphed from a far-off, virtuous battle for liberty in Boston and New York, into a very real and very near threat.
Fearing for their own lives, as well as for the American cause, the congressmen realized that their experiment with a weak commander had failed. The limits placed on Washington’s control over his own army’s tactics were hampering the war effort and endangering Congress itself. It had become painfully obvious that they needed their commander to protect them.
They had jealously clung to power and nervously watched Washington’s every move, but now Congress changed course. The attempt to conduct the war by congressional committee—rather than granting full military authority to the commander
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had reduced the civilian leadership to this desperate state. And so, while in flight to Baltimore, Congress temporarily ceded its military authority to Washington.
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had reduced the civilian leadership to this desperate state. And so, while in flight to Baltimore, Congress temporarily ceded its military authority to Washington.
In a groundbreaking resolution, the congressmen voted that “General Washington be possessed of full power to order and direct all things relative to the department, and to the operations of war,” until they reconvened a week later.
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Finally, the commander in chief had full command of his own army, if only for a brief time. With this resolution, Congress threw out the mold for a weak American commander and launched their first experiment with an empowered one. Even though they gave him only a week, Congress had basically unleashed Washington for a run around the yard. They would never get him back on that tight leash again.
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Finally, the commander in chief had full command of his own army, if only for a brief time. With this resolution, Congress threw out the mold for a weak American commander and launched their first experiment with an empowered one. Even though they gave him only a week, Congress had basically unleashed Washington for a run around the yard. They would never get him back on that tight leash again.
Washington’s tone shifted in his writings to the states and Congress.
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In a circular he wrote to the neighboring states about his shortage of weaponry, his tenor was less suppliant, more commanding. Previously he had pleaded for supplies, but now he insisted, “proper Steps should be immediately taken in your State to Collect all that can be purchased from private People.” He reminded the states to make sure they obtained quality equipment rather than “light trash Arms” as he had received before.
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Left to their own devices, the states had imperiled his army with deficient supplies, so Washington grew more forceful. The emboldened leader next turned to Congress.
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In a circular he wrote to the neighboring states about his shortage of weaponry, his tenor was less suppliant, more commanding. Previously he had pleaded for supplies, but now he insisted, “proper Steps should be immediately taken in your State to Collect all that can be purchased from private People.” He reminded the states to make sure they obtained quality equipment rather than “light trash Arms” as he had received before.
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Left to their own devices, the states had imperiled his army with deficient supplies, so Washington grew more forceful. The emboldened leader next turned to Congress.
Washington had beseeched Congress for more troops and supplies for months, and by December 20, 1776, he had had enough of begging. “I have waited with much Impatience to know the determinations of Congress on the Propositions made some time in October last for augmenting our Corps of Artillery and establishing a Corps of Engineers,” he wrote in one of his longest letters to Congress, adding that further delay would cause “greatest injury to the safety of these states.”
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These were strong words for a southern gentleman.
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These were strong words for a southern gentleman.
Washington would wait no more. Exercising his new power, he ordered that three artillery battalions be recruited, since cannon, mortars, and howitzers had been proving decisive in battle. While the Americans were mostly firing little musket balls and missing their targets more often than hitting them, the British were tearing holes in the patriot lines with artillery fire. Aim mattered little when you sent large balls of lead hurling towards your foe. Raising battalions had been Congress’s prerogative and they had bungled it, leaving the army lacking.
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But now, Washington could take such matters into his own hands.
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But now, Washington could take such matters into his own hands.
He even went further and started to spend Congress’s money. Without consulting the politicians, Washington promised pay raises to certain regiments. He wrote that such an unprecedented measure “may appear to Congress premature, and unwarrantable; but . . . the Execution could not be delayed till after their Meeting at Baltimore.”
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And he was not done tugging on Congress’s purse strings. Determining that he desperately needed even more cannon in particular, Washington took it upon himself to order that they be cast.
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Rather than ask Congress, he would see to it himself and inform Congress of his actions afterward.
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And he was not done tugging on Congress’s purse strings. Determining that he desperately needed even more cannon in particular, Washington took it upon himself to order that they be cast.
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Rather than ask Congress, he would see to it himself and inform Congress of his actions afterward.
The American commander in chief was becoming a bold one. Washington admitted, “I am going a good deal out of the line of my duty to adopt these Measures, or advise thus freely,” but said that necessity required it. “The Enemy are daily gathering strength from the disaffected [Americans who joined their cause]; this strength like a Snow ball by rolling, will Increase.”
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And so Washington seized the chance to act. He wrote to Congress, “It may be said that this is an application for powers that are too dangerous to be Intrusted. I can only add that desperate diseases require desperate Remedies; and with truth declare, that I have no lust after power . . . .”
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The commander had to assert his authority if America was going to stand a chance. So he did.
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And so Washington seized the chance to act. He wrote to Congress, “It may be said that this is an application for powers that are too dangerous to be Intrusted. I can only add that desperate diseases require desperate Remedies; and with truth declare, that I have no lust after power . . . .”
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The commander had to assert his authority if America was going to stand a chance. So he did.
Washington even began to criticize Congress’s command structure. Its labyrinth of committees had attempted
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largely ineffectually
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to micromanage the war. He criticized the actions of “Committees without any kind of Controul,” and singled out the committee that oversaw prisoner exchange. Prisoners were being handled in an embarrassingly disorganized fashion; some even wandered around without any one person policing their whereabouts. And Washington blamed Congress’s setup, in which the commanding officer was “obliged to attend to the business of so many different departments as to render it impossible to conduct that of his own with the attention necessary.” Revealing his frustration, he added, “nothing can be more Injurious.”
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In contrast to his timidity in the beginning of the war, Washington was now ready to take control from Congress and work to fix such inefficiencies. It had become painfully clear that the politicians would not do so on their own.
—
largely ineffectually
—
to micromanage the war. He criticized the actions of “Committees without any kind of Controul,” and singled out the committee that oversaw prisoner exchange. Prisoners were being handled in an embarrassingly disorganized fashion; some even wandered around without any one person policing their whereabouts. And Washington blamed Congress’s setup, in which the commanding officer was “obliged to attend to the business of so many different departments as to render it impossible to conduct that of his own with the attention necessary.” Revealing his frustration, he added, “nothing can be more Injurious.”
17
In contrast to his timidity in the beginning of the war, Washington was now ready to take control from Congress and work to fix such inefficiencies. It had become painfully clear that the politicians would not do so on their own.
When it came time for Congress to rescind Washington’s temporary war powers just days after they had bestowed them, the delegates reconsidered. It was at this opportune time that Washington’s officer and confidant, Nathanael Greene, made a direct appeal to Congress on his commander’s behalf.
Greene was a thoughtful and intelligent young Quaker who had become one of Washington’s most trusted officers and closest friends. He was a handsome man whose long, thin nose pointed down to a bow mouth that contrasted with the sharp angles of his rectangular face. This was fitting, since he indeed was a man of contrasts. Bucking his religion’s pacifist doctrine, Greene had taught himself military history and strategy—much to the chagrin of his fellow Quakers. But Greene, unrepentant, jumped to join the patriot cause. A likable, dependable, down-to-earth man, Greene did not always offer the best military advice, but Washington knew he could always count on Greene to be trustworthy and courageous.
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Like many in America, and especially in the military, Greene was fed up with Congress’s inefficacy. He wrote to Washington, “There is so much deliberation and waste of time in the execution of business before this assembly, that my patience is almost exhausted.”
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He took matters into his own hands, requesting that the politicians relinquish military control to Washington. In his typical commonsense way, Greene urged, “Greater Powers must be lodged in the Hands of the General than he has ever yet exercised,” reasoning that the commander could not “be in Readiness so early as General Howe” unless the congressmen would “delegate to him full Power to take such Measures as he may find Necessary to promote the Establishment of the New Army. Time will not admit nor Circumstance allow of a reference to Congress.”
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He took matters into his own hands, requesting that the politicians relinquish military control to Washington. In his typical commonsense way, Greene urged, “Greater Powers must be lodged in the Hands of the General than he has ever yet exercised,” reasoning that the commander could not “be in Readiness so early as General Howe” unless the congressmen would “delegate to him full Power to take such Measures as he may find Necessary to promote the Establishment of the New Army. Time will not admit nor Circumstance allow of a reference to Congress.”
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Congress listened. The new concept of an “American commander in chief ” was an experiment, and its initial phases had failed miserably. New York had been lost along with most of the Continental Army. The American cause was on the brink of destruction. Practical men, they realized that the American commander in chief needed sweeping military control in order to protect the United States from her foes.
By late December 1776, Congress had concluded that the rule-by-committee approach did not work. They not only extended the duration of Washington’s power, but also expanded its scope:
This Congress, having maturely considered the present crisis; and having perfect reliance on the wisdom, vigour, and uprightness of General Washington, do, hereby,Resolve, That General Washington shall be, and he is hereby, vested with full, ample, and complete powers to raise and collect together, in the most speedy and effectual manner, from any or all of these United States, 16 battalions of infantry . . . ; to appoint officers for the said battalions; to raise, officer, and equip three . . . and to establish their pay; to apply to any of the states for such aid of the militia as he shall judge necessary; to form such magazines of provisions, and in such places, as he shall think proper; to displace and appoint all officers under the rank of brigadier general, and to fill up all vacancies in every other department in the American armies; to take, wherever he may be, whatever he may want for the use of the army, if the inhabitants will not sell it, allowing a reasonable price for the same; to arrest and confine persons who refuse to take the continental currency, or are otherwise disaffected to the American cause; and return to the states of which they are citizens, their names, and the nature of their offences, together with the witnesses to prove them . . .
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While initially limited to six months, these plenary powers would be renewed again and again as the war raged on, since it was abundantly clear that the American commander needed full authority over the nation’s war machine. Washington was empowered to raise new regiments, set their pay, call for the states’ militia, take private property, arrest Loyalists, and appoint and dismiss officers.
Congress viewed control over officer rankings as a particularly dangerous power. They relinquished it grudgingly, retaining appointment authority for the highest positions—brigadier general and above. For the rest, soldiers would no longer be obliged to curry favor with the civilians in Congress for promotion. Now their military careers were dependent on pleasing their general. This was especially alarming to Congress since many soldiers scorned Congress’s inefficacy and would no longer need to feign loyalty to them. Their general already held the troops’ admiration and now he also controlled their careers and future. His power over his soldiers was complete, and some feared he could use this power to destroy the republic.
For all intents and purposes, Washington was able to make whatever military decisions were necessary to fight the war. To reinforce this sweeping authority, Congress sent a circular letter to the states explaining why General Washington’s powers had been expanded and asking them to “give him all the aid in their power.”
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Many believed that those expanded powers “constituted him in all respects a military Dictator.”
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In fact, Washington’s new mandate was seen as so sweeping that one enemy leader, in a speech at the British House of Commons, claimed that the Continental Congress had made Washington the “dictator of America.”
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Many believed that those expanded powers “constituted him in all respects a military Dictator.”
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In fact, Washington’s new mandate was seen as so sweeping that one enemy leader, in a speech at the British House of Commons, claimed that the Continental Congress had made Washington the “dictator of America.”
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Originally derived from the Latin “dictare,” which meant “to prescribe” or “to command,” the term “dictator” was rooted in ancient Rome. And dictatorship was not always seen as negative.
Many of the American leaders were well versed in the classics and, unsurprisingly, looked to history as they experimented with the new American republic. Prior to the establishment of the Roman emperors, beginning with Augustus in the first century B.C., Rome had been a republic for nearly five centuries. Although the aristocratic class dominated this ancient republic, free Roman men at least had the opportunity to vote for their leaders. In turn, these leaders followed a largely unwritten, complex constitution based on separation of powers, with checks and balances, among three branches of government. In times of emergency, however, they dissolved their republican government and replaced it with a dictatorship. Their dictator held virtually absolute power over the state, albeit for just six months, after which his powers would lapse and the republic would be reinstated.
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During his tenure as dictator, he could do just about anything necessary to save the nation from military defeat.
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During his tenure as dictator, he could do just about anything necessary to save the nation from military defeat.
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