Blood of Tyrants: George Washington & the Forging of the Presidency (26 page)
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Authors: Logan Beirne
Tags: #American Revolution, #Founding Fathers, #George Washington, #18th Century
BOOK: Blood of Tyrants: George Washington & the Forging of the Presidency
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Howe was delighted with his new prize. He, Mrs. Loring, and his troops eagerly set up camp for the winter in the elegant homes that had been abandoned by the fleeing patriots. Just as he did in New York, he would enjoy the city’s pleasures with parties and rum. But foremost, he was happy in knowing that he had dealt a psychological blow to the patriots.
Many Americans were indeed gravely disheartened by the loss. Cuttingly, Adams criticized Washington’s “injudicious Maneuvre” and denounced “timorous, defensive [action], which has involved us in so many Disasters.”
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But Washington was unrepentant. He reasoned that “while we have an Army in the field,” Britain’s conquest of the cities “will avail them little. It involves us in difficulty, but does not, by any means, insure them conquest. They will know, that it is our Arms, not defenceless Towns, they have to Subdue, before they can arrive at the haven of their Wishes.”
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But Washington was unrepentant. He reasoned that “while we have an Army in the field,” Britain’s conquest of the cities “will avail them little. It involves us in difficulty, but does not, by any means, insure them conquest. They will know, that it is our Arms, not defenceless Towns, they have to Subdue, before they can arrive at the haven of their Wishes.”
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While Congress realized that empowering the American commander was necessary to wage war effectively, many remained nervous. Some of the politicians believed that Washington’s “influence was already too great; that even his virtues afforded motives for alarm; that the enthusiasm of the army, joined to the kind of dictatorship already confided to him, put Congress and the United States at his mercy.”
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Some feared that Washington would act less like Cincinnatus than like Julius Caesar, who became
dictator perpetuo
, or “dictator in perpetuity,” after gaining control of Rome in the first century B.C. Even Adams, who had nominated Washington for the post and defended him, feared that the “Idolatry and Adulation” for Washington might grow “so excessive as to endanger our liberties” and pave the way for monarchy. In fact, Adams went as far as to applaud Washington’s dearth of great victories because it meant the nation could “allow a certain citizen to be wise, virtuous and good without thinking him a deity or a savior.”
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dictator perpetuo
, or “dictator in perpetuity,” after gaining control of Rome in the first century B.C. Even Adams, who had nominated Washington for the post and defended him, feared that the “Idolatry and Adulation” for Washington might grow “so excessive as to endanger our liberties” and pave the way for monarchy. In fact, Adams went as far as to applaud Washington’s dearth of great victories because it meant the nation could “allow a certain citizen to be wise, virtuous and good without thinking him a deity or a savior.”
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Regardless of their fear, Congress had little choice—a weak American commander would spell defeat. Washington needed to be powerful to fight the return of the British monarchy and so Congress reaffirmed his authority again and again. The states followed suit.
The New York legislature wrote to Congress concerning the fact that they had “invested a military officer with dictatorial powers.”
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Such a declaration would have stirred outrage at the start of the war, but now the Americans were more comfortable with it. New York was acknowledging Washington’s authority rather than criticizing it, and added, “no objection has, that we know of, been made by any State to [this] measure. Hence we venture to conclude, that other States are in sentiment with this.”
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Thus far, Washington had demonstrated that the experimental republican commander could wield expansive military power without undermining civilian rule. And he would continue to do so.
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Such a declaration would have stirred outrage at the start of the war, but now the Americans were more comfortable with it. New York was acknowledging Washington’s authority rather than criticizing it, and added, “no objection has, that we know of, been made by any State to [this] measure. Hence we venture to conclude, that other States are in sentiment with this.”
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Thus far, Washington had demonstrated that the experimental republican commander could wield expansive military power without undermining civilian rule. And he would continue to do so.
Although he had certainly become more forceful, Washington remained largely respectful of Congress and the other civil authorities. The American commander was a powerful one, but still a republican one. Although he had extensive powers, he need not always use them.
When the army’s chief surgeon recommended establishing military hospitals, Washington responded, “altho’ the Congress have vested me with full powers . . . and I dare say would ratify whatever appointments and Salaries I should fix; yet I do not think myself at liberty to establish Hospitals, upon such extensive plans and at so great an expense, without their concurrence.”
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Washington was being careful not to extend his powers further into matters that were arguably tangential to warfare. He believed that the politicians retained authority over the nation’s purse and was therefore deferential when it came to pecuniary concerns.
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Washington was being careful not to extend his powers further into matters that were arguably tangential to warfare. He believed that the politicians retained authority over the nation’s purse and was therefore deferential when it came to pecuniary concerns.
Although he had previously promised the soldiers pay raises and had ordered cannon, he generally did not feel that he should spend the states’ and Congress’s money without their approval. “Money matters are not within the Line of my duty,” he wrote, even when they were “intimately connected with all Military Operations.”
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Intent on protecting the republic, this dictator purposefully confined his powers to the military.
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Intent on protecting the republic, this dictator purposefully confined his powers to the military.
Even regarding issues explicitly delegated to him, Washington still acted respectfully. One such issue was AWOL soldiers. Suffering defeat after defeat, Washington faced mass desertion as his exhausted, starving troops grew eager to return to their homes. When a large number of soldiers fled to eastern Pennsylvania, he refused to impose martial law and directly punish them. Congress had granted him power to try deserters, but he did not want to get into the business of hunting down Americans in their own towns.
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Instead, he left the matter to the civil authorities, whether those authorities were fully functioning or not.
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Instead, he left the matter to the civil authorities, whether those authorities were fully functioning or not.
He deferred to local government even if it was “extremely weak” and chaotic, saying, “I am not fully satisfied of the legality of trying an inhabitant of any State by Military Law, when the Civil authority of that State has made provision for the punishment of persons taking Arms with the Enemy.”
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As will be addressed further in Parts IV and V, Washington’s powers over enemies and military tactics were plenary, but he did not see the American commander in chief—even the empowered one that developed over the course of the war—as having authority over American citizens.
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As will be addressed further in Parts IV and V, Washington’s powers over enemies and military tactics were plenary, but he did not see the American commander in chief—even the empowered one that developed over the course of the war—as having authority over American citizens.
Washington also continued to convey his demands with respect for the civil authorities. For example, when he was empowered to call forth militiamen directly from the states, he did so delicately. Demanding soldiers from the states was a worrisome power, and at the beginning of the war it would likely have been perceived as an appalling encroachment on state sovereignty. Now, the states had become more obliging, but Washington was nevertheless sensitive to their concerns. “I would not wish to distress the States, but when there is an absolute necessity,” he wrote almost apologetically; “but from the present poor prospect of an early reinforcement to the Continental Army, I fear I shall be obliged to make the demand. If I do, I am confident that your State, notwithstanding their former exertions will contribute their quota.”
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After Washington’s initial six-month “dictator” term expired, Congress reaffirmed his extensive powers repeatedly throughout the war.
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For example, when Congress contemplated perilous battles in the southern and mid-Atlantic states, they made it clear that they expected their commander to wield great authority and trusted him to do what was best to defend the nation. Specifically, Congress resolved that Washington “consider himself at liberty so to direct the military operations of these states as shall appear to him most expedient.”
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This was indeed a recurring theme.
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For example, when Congress contemplated perilous battles in the southern and mid-Atlantic states, they made it clear that they expected their commander to wield great authority and trusted him to do what was best to defend the nation. Specifically, Congress resolved that Washington “consider himself at liberty so to direct the military operations of these states as shall appear to him most expedient.”
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This was indeed a recurring theme.
Confident in their decision to make the American commander into a powerful one, Congress granted Washington additional powers as the war progressed. For example, while Washington had already taken the lead in dealing with captured enemy combatants, Congress explicitly gave him the power to negotiate the exchange of prisoners. Congress also removed a restriction that confined his fighting to the United States theater.
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Washington was finally the master of his troops in conducting an international war.
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Washington was finally the master of his troops in conducting an international war.
Whether fighting in the United States or in a foreign nation, the commander in chief had the ultimate say over war tactics. The president of Congress explained to Washington:
Congress confide fully in your Excellency’s Prudence and Abilities; and I am directed to signify to you their wish, that neither an undue Degree of Delicacy or Diffidence may lead you to place too little Reliance on your own Judgment, or pursuade you to make any further Communications of your Designs than necessity or high Expedience may dictate.
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And America’s empowered commander in chief used that judgment to make the nation proud.
The founding generation’s understanding of “commander in chief ” developed gradually. At the outset of the war, in addition to appointing officers, Congress retained the “sole and exclusive right and power” to direct military operations.
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They feared that the army would crush the fragile new republic, so they experimented with a weak commander in chief who was essentially a congressional puppet. But their experiment failed. Congress’s attempts to micromanage Washington were a disaster. The limited commander they had envisioned was simply incapable of defending the country. They learned from their mistakes.
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They feared that the army would crush the fragile new republic, so they experimented with a weak commander in chief who was essentially a congressional puppet. But their experiment failed. Congress’s attempts to micromanage Washington were a disaster. The limited commander they had envisioned was simply incapable of defending the country. They learned from their mistakes.
The restrictions on Washington’s control over military tactics evaporated as the war progressed and Washington proved that a strong commander could still be a republican one. Congress acquiesced to his exercise of greater power and formally granted him more military authority. The shift away from congressional control was made anxiously. But if the American war effort was to overcome its schizophrenia, it needed one master. And that master was Washington.
From this tug of war over military power emerged a strong American commander with broad discretion over military decisions. Congress and the states controlled the military’s purse strings,
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oversaw all civil matters, and expected to be consulted and informed by their commander whenever feasible. For his part, the American commander possessed authority over military tactics and enemy treatment.
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And Washington used this authority to defend his nation fiercely—and virtuously.
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oversaw all civil matters, and expected to be consulted and informed by their commander whenever feasible. For his part, the American commander possessed authority over military tactics and enemy treatment.
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And Washington used this authority to defend his nation fiercely—and virtuously.
Washington lived up to the challenge of being America’s first republican commander. He promised, “whatever Military Powers shall be intrusted to me, shall ever be exerted first to establish and then protect the Civil.”
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And he lived true to his word, exercising his military powers with great restraint and respect for the civil authorities. “While acting in my Military capacity,” he wrote, “I am sensible of the impropriety of stepping into the line of civil Polity.”
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As will be discussed in greater detail in Parts IV and V, Washington used his expansive mandate to guard the rights of his people rather than trample them. The nation’s worries about a powerful commander subsided.
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And he lived true to his word, exercising his military powers with great restraint and respect for the civil authorities. “While acting in my Military capacity,” he wrote, “I am sensible of the impropriety of stepping into the line of civil Polity.”
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As will be discussed in greater detail in Parts IV and V, Washington used his expansive mandate to guard the rights of his people rather than trample them. The nation’s worries about a powerful commander subsided.
The Framers revisited the issue of commander-in-chief authority after the war. When drafting the Constitution, they drew upon their vivid memories of the Revolution, recalling, “Such was the situation of our affairs then, that the power of dictator was given to the commander-in-chief, to save us from destruction. This shows the situation of the country to have been such as to make it ready to embrace an actual dictator.”
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And that dictator had saved the United States from destruction. The founding generation had learned the hard way that the American commander in chief needed to be a powerful one if he was to defend his nation, and that “war powers needed to be fixed to guarantee effective common defense.”
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And that dictator had saved the United States from destruction. The founding generation had learned the hard way that the American commander in chief needed to be a powerful one if he was to defend his nation, and that “war powers needed to be fixed to guarantee effective common defense.”
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So when they designated the president as “Commander in Chief of the Army and the Navy of the United States” in 1787, it was clear to the American people what this meant: the role that General Washington had forged amidst battle. The wartime American commander was to be a new kind of deferential republican dictator—he had broad authority to lead the military in defending the nation, while Congress and the states held authority over the American people.
“The task of facing and fighting the enemy was enough for the ablest of men,” observed one early biographer, “but Washington was obliged also to combat and overcome the inertness and dullness born of ignorance, and to teach Congress how to govern a nation at war.”
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He defined the role of the American commander in chief not only for Congress but also for posterity.
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He defined the role of the American commander in chief not only for Congress but also for posterity.
Back on Wall Street in New York City, Washington is honored for his bravery in forging the nation. The grand statue in front of Federal Hall reminds New Yorkers and throngs of passing tourists that the nation’s Constitution and prosperity can be attributed in great part to his heroism as the first American commander in chief. Ironically, had he been granted his dictatorial powers initially, the great man depicted by the statue may have used them to torch all of Manhattan.
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