Read Belisarius: The Last Roman General Online
Authors: Ian Hughes
Upon reaching Syracuse, Procopius met an old friend who was in business there. The man reported that his servant, who had returned from Carthage three days previously, claimed that the Vandals were totally unaware of the expedition. Furthermore, they had recently sent 5,000 of the best men of their army under Gelimer’s brother, Tzazon, to Sardinia to crush the rebel Godas.Gelimer was staying at Hermione in Byzacium, four days’ journey from the coast. It would be possible to sail to and land in Africa before the Vandals were aware of their presence. Taking the servant with him, Procopius travelled to Caucana, where Belisarius could question the servant in person.
When they arrived, they found the army in mourning. Dorotheus,
magister militum per Orientem,
had died of illness and the troops suffered a great sense of loss. So did Belisarius, as Dorotheus was one of his best commanders. Despite this, upon hearing Procopius’ news, Belisarius had the trumpets sounded and the army embarked. They passed the islands of Gaulus (Gozo) and Melita (Malta) beforefinallymaking landfall at Caput Vada (Ras Kabudia) near Ruspe, on the coast of Byzacena.
Prior to landing, a conference was held aboard Belisarius’ ship, where the attendees agreed to his suggestion that they should land and establish a strong, fortified base. They therefore landed and on the same day completed a ditch and rampart behind which the army camped for the night. Whilst constructing the base, their digging unearthed a spring. Procopius claimed that this was an omen that God was with them (Proc,
Wars,
III.xv.32–36).
At this point Belisarius showed that he had learned from the mistakes of the past; he posted watchmen around the ramparts and on the ships, and ordered a protective screen of light fast vessels to sail around the fleet. This expedition would not be surprised by fireships, as had happened to Anthemius in 468. After around three months of travelling, the Byzantines had finally landed.
The Vandal Response
Gelimer does not appear to have taken the threat of Byzantine military action against Africa itself too seriously. However, recognising that the rebellion in Sardinia may attract imperial attention, he dispatched his brother Tzazon with 5,000 troops and a large proportion of the fleet to retake Sardinia before support could arrive from the east. The rebellion in Tripolitania was less serious, although the lack of manpower meant that this could only be suppressed once the troops had returned from Sardinia. Even so, it only appeared a matter of time before the situation returned to normal. In Autumn, 533, whilst Belisarius was in Sicily with the invasion fleet, Gelimer was in Hermione, four days’ travel from the coast, having recently sent an envoy to Theudis, king of the Visigoths in Spain, to propose an alliance (Proc,
Wars,
III.xxiv.7).
Upon learning that Belisarius had landed in Africa, Gelimer reacted with commendable speed. He sent word to his brother Ammatas in Carthage to execute Hilderic and the other captives, and ordered him to gather troops in order to trap the Byzantines at Ad Decimum (Proc,
Wars,
III.xxvii.ll). He then ordered Bonifatius to place his treasure on board a ship, with instructions to sail for Spain if the Vandals were overcome. Having given his orders, Gelimer travelled to join his troops for the battle against the Byzantines.
Chapter 7
The Vandalic War
The Vandal Army
The composition and recruitment of the Vandal army was completely different to that of the Byzantines. Whilst the Byzantines had a huge manpower pool, and by the era of Belisarius could rely on volunteers to fill the ranks, the Vandals had no such luxury. Their army was the ‘nation in arms’, with every able-bodied warrior joining the army when necessary.
We have no clear figure for the total Vandal population, and it should be remembered that the numbers given here, as well as elsewhere, are based upon logic and conjecture. Although reasonable, there is no guarantee that they are accurate.
Procopius
(Wars,
III.v.18) states that the Vandals had eighty
chiliarchs
(Germanic
thusundifath –
leader of 1,000). A plausible case has been made for the
thusundifath
being in control of 1,000 people, rather than 1,000 armed men, so giving us a total of 80,000 for the nation (Boss, 1993) although it must be remembered that they ruled a considerably larger number of ‘native’ Africans who did not contribute militarily to the state. This does not tell the whole story.
The post of
thusundifath
probably predates the Vandal invasion of Africa. Since the Vandals’ increased in numbers whilst in Africa, as there were fewer major wars and the people could live at peace in a prosperous country with plenty of food, it is possible that the population may have climbed as high as 100,000 people. Rather than creating new
thusundifaths,
the swelling population would be allocated to the existing
thusundifaths,
whose allocation would have rapidly increased to more than 1,000 people. If each
thusundifath
only gained 250 people over the century in Africa, this would give us our total of 100,000.
This would allow for a plausible military base of approximately 25,000 men. However, unlike the Roman case, this was the total manpower available. Any military reverses would eat into this base, and only time would allow the numbers to recover as children aged and reached maturity, so enabling them to serve in the army. Furthermore, the number would have constantly varied due to the age, health and ability of the Vandal soldiers.
As has been seen, the Vandals were to suffer two heavy defeats at the hands of the Moors. The loss of manpower is unknown, since no accounts of the battles survive, yet if the Vandals only lost 5,000 men in the two defeats (such a casualty rate among the defeated being unexceptional in battles of the period)
this would leave their army at around only 20,000 men. In this context, the 20,000 men allocated to conquer the province under Belisarius appears to be a realistic force for the invasion. Unfortunately, most historians have tended to follow Procopius’ assessment of Vandal strength and consequently see the number allocated by Justinian as too small for the task.
Organisation
If the
thusundifath
were in charge of 1,000 (possibly more) people, this would give a reasonable strength of around 300 fighting men per
thusundifath
if all of the adult males are included, although it must be remembered that these may have been of variable quality. The Germanic nations may have adopted a decimal system for their organisations, either mirroring or influencing the Roman and Byzantine changes, so it is possible that there were 10 men led by a decurion, 100 men led by a centurion, and 300 men led by a
thusundifath.
Such figures are mere conjecture, since no record of Vandal organisation survives, but it is interesting to note that if there were eighty
thusundifath,
each leading 300 men, this would give 24,000 troops. With the inclusion of the king, the nobles, and their personal retinues, the figure rises to around 25,000.
When deploying for battle, it would be natural for the king and his nobles to take control of a varying number
of thusundifath,
depending upon the strategy and tactics being employed. As we will see, this flexibility suited the nature of Gelimer and his desire for elaborate battleplans.
Defensive Equipment
The Vandals had reached Africa via Gaul and Spain. Their travels in the west had done little to alter the style of their military equipment. Their isolation in Africa and their focus upon the western Mediterranean resulted in their being insulated from the Steppe influences that had transformed the Roman army.
Helmets
The Vandals appear to have relied upon simple spangenhelm designs for their helmets. These were cheap and easy to manufacture and had been used by Germanic tribes since before the Vandals began their perigrinations through the empire.
Body armour
Armour appears to have comprised of the traditional chain and scale mail, with the emphasis probably being upon the former. Given the nature of their attacks upon the western empire after having settled in Africa, it is possible that the vast majority of the troops would have armour that they had inherited or looted whilst raiding. Again, their tendency to refrain from attacks upon the eastern empire would have limited their contact with new trends and designs.
We have no information on additional equipment such as greaves and vambraces. Whilst it is possible that they were in use by the Vandals, there are no literary references to such equipment and none appear to have been found archaeologically.
Shields.
The Vandals appear to have retained the traditional large circular shields of their ancestors – there was simply no need for them to change. These would have been manufactured in much the same way as the Roman shields described in Chapter 3.
Offensive Weapons
In a similar manner to defensive equipment, Vandal swords would have been of traditional style. The
spatha
design was already ancient among the Germanic nations and had since been adopted by the western Roman army, wherein it had now been common for at least two centuries. Again, their raids on the west would have resulted in there being an abundance of such weapons available for the army.
It is in their use of the spear that the Vandals differed most from the Romans and Byzantines. They do not appear to have used the spear as a missile weapon, instead always retaining it in the hand for combat. The description of Germanic warriors in the
Strategikon
of Maurikios has them using their spears overarm
(Strategikon,
3.5), a style also reflected in art.
Cavalry
The limited evidence available for the Vandals in Africa indicates that they may, uniquely amongst the Germanic nations, have converted their army into one based entirely upon cavalry. Probably in response to the mobility of their main enemies on land, the Moors and the Saharan Bedouin, their conversion to cavalry can be seen as an attempt to meet these on a more equal footing. In this situation their limited reserves of manpower would have been of great help; having the whole of the province of Africa in which to rear horses for only 25,000 men would have made the enterprise relatively straightforward, enabling the whole force to become cavalrymen.
The description of Vandal raiding parties attacking Europe and the Mediterranean islands fighting on foot do not prove the existence of infantry in Africa. The difficulty of transporting horses would have resulted in raiders being forced to leave their horses behind and necessitated their fighting on foot. Furthermore, at any time, members of the cavalry would have been able to dismount, depending upon the situation, although their response to the camels used by the Moors (described below) implies that such a situation was extremely rare.
Therefore, Belisarius and his army would be faced by an opponent composed of heavily-armed cavalry who expected to charge the enemy and engage them at close quarters with their spears. The flexibility of the Vandal army and the mobility of its mounted forces would make it a formidable opponent.
Yet it had one major drawback. Their defeats at the hands of the Moors showed that they were at a disadvantage when faced with opponents who relied upon skirmishing and the use of large quantities of missiles. In a surprising twist, the Moors had taken advantage of this weakness by surrounding their troops with a line of camels. When the Vandals attacked, their horses refused to approach the camels and the Moors were able to devastate the Vandals with missile fire from behind the camel screen. Having no missile troops of their own with which to counter this tactic, the Vandals eventually broke under the hail of missiles.
Training
The Vandals do not appear to have introduced regimented training regimes, such as those found in the Roman army. Each individual would practice with their friends and relatives, becoming adept at fighting with spear, sword and shield as well as riding a horse. However there appears to have been only limited training, if any, in unit manoeuvres and battlefield dispositions, an omission which the Vandals would regret when fighting the Byzantines under Belisarius.