Battleship Bismarck (74 page)

Moreover, Group West will be charged with examining the captured whalers and, if satisfactory, providing one of them for use in the former capacity and
Schiff 13
and
24
in the latter.

The severe shortage of shipping tonnage caused by newly arisen transport missions will make it scarcely possible to prepare other, special ships for this purpose, but the question will be examined by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine, as will the deployment of
Schiff 23
and
Togo
for scouting purposes.

c)  
Aircraft Mother Ships

The question of deploying such ships (catapult; two to three aircraft, landing mat) will be examined by the Oberkommando der Kriegsmarine. The existing catapult ships
Friesenland
and
Schwabenland
are not suitable.

d)
Supply Ships

During the last operation the deployment of supply ships for tactical cooperation with the fleet formation proved extremely useful. Nevertheless, these ships should be used for this mission only if all other possibilities fail, as their loss would have critical consequences, not only for this operation but also for subsequent ones with large formations. Moreover valuable cargoes (munitions) would be in jeopardy. With this warning, however, their deployment is left up to the Fleet Commander.

The same applies to fleet oilers.

7)  
Ermland
is available as a supply ship,
Heide, Weissenburg, Brehme, Esso, 111, Spichern
, and
Lothringen
as fleet oilers.

Care is to be taken that the requisite readiness dates are not upset by modifications or the installation of equipment. If necessary, ships undergoing such work and unable to meet the schedule must be deployed as reserve tankers.

Thorn
and
Egerland
, which have been prepared for other uses, will not be available at first.

Uckermark
probably cannot be made available because she is deployed with the cruiser
Lützow
; other supply ships (
Dithmarschen, Kärnten, Passat
) probably will not be operational until a later date (1.7, 1.9, 1.10).

8)   The group commands have operational control in their zones. The Fleet Commander has control at sea, the U-boat groups attached to him will be under his tactical command for the duration of the joint operations (the Commander-in-Chief, U-Boats, will detail a U-boat officer to the Fleet Commander’s staff for the duration of the operation).

9)   The groups will contact as soon as possible the Fleet Command and the Commander-in-Chief, U-Boats, regarding the execution of the operation and will report the result from such contact to the Seekriegsleitung at least fourteen days before the operation begins.

IV.   As already indicated under I, the objective must be to confront the enemy with new situations created by wide-ranging changes of the areas of operations.

Upon further confirmation of the manner of conduct of the war up to now, consideration may be given to extending the next-following operation as far as the South Atlantic.

When the need to respect the PanAmerican Neutrality Zone has passed, the intersection of the route from North and Central America to Freetown and Central Africa (important military supplies) with the La Plata route, and also with the Cape-Freetown route, will offer promising operational possibilities.

The prerequisite for the execution of such a distant operation is the deployment of the greatest possible number of auxiliaries. The Seekriegsleitung will initiate appropriate measures.

Such a shift in the area of operations may prove necessary if, as a consequence of the next operation and those past, the North Atlantic routes that we have been attacking become more strongly defended by the enemy.

Until
Tirpitz
becomes operational, attacks against strongly defended
convoys on the main supply lines in the North Atlantic will not have good prospects for success.

The time for extending operations to the south must remain open at the moment. The reason for announcing the intention is that it will enable Group Command West and the fleet to evaluate their experiences with regard to this new area of operations.

s
RAEDER

Commander-in-Chief of the Kriegsmarine

s
SCHNIEWIND

Chief of the Seekriegsleitung

s
FRICKE

Chief of the Seekriegsleitung Operations Section

*
Seekriegsleitung Operations Section, Chief Operations Officer, Order Number 410/41, Commands Only, Commanders’ Eyes Only.

*
The invasion of the Soviet Union

B    General Orders for the Atlantic Operation

(Annex I to “Operations Order of the Fleet Commander for the Atlantic Operation with
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
—Exercise Rhine,” Fleet Order 100/41 Al, Secret—Commands Only, Commanders’ Eyes Only, 22 April 1941.)

1.
The object of the operation
is to do the greatest possible damage to the enemy by destroying his merchant shipping, especially that proceeding
towards
England.

2. The operation conducted with the battleships
Gneisenau
and
Scharnhorst
from January until mid-March 1941 showed that, in spite of information provided by the B-Dienst regarding the sailing dates and routes of convoys, it is extremely difficult to intercept a convoy in the vast ocean spaces with the few units available for this purpose, and it depends on coincidence and luck.

Therefore, I do not intend to restrict the deployment of the ships exclusively for attacking convoys, but also from the outset for capturing or destroying ships steaming independently. However, as far as time permits, they will be deployed in the area of operations in such a manner that there is a prospect of intercepting a convoy.

3.
Attacks on Convoys

Some of the convoys encountered by the battleships during the operation were escorted by a battleship and, in one case, by two cruisers and two destroyers also. Escorts of comparable strength must be anticipated in the future. The operational directives of the See
kriegsleitung and Group West allow
Bismarck
only to
tie down
a battleship escorting a convoy, insofar as that is possible without fully engaging, and that only in the event such action gives
Prinz Eugen
the possibility of success against the rest of the escort or against the convoy.

Accordingly, when
Bismarck
and
Prinz Eugen
attack a convoy, they must do so from opposite sides. In every case, tactical and attack orders will come from the Fleet Commander.

Without coming in battle contact, the exact strength of a convoy’s escort can usually be determined only by shipboard aircraft. This deployment is, however, dependent upon the tactical situation and the weather and therefore rarely possible on the Halifax-England route. It must, therefore, be anticipated that, in making an attack,
Prinz Eugen
will encounter escorting cruisers even if
Bismarck
succeeds in drawing off the big ship. In this event, the cruiser’s attack on the convoy is to be broken off and an immediate report made. But even when only one big ship is escorting the convoy, the enemy, if he follows good tactics, will stay in the immediate vicinity of the convoy and
protect it from all sides.
In this case there can be no question of an attack by the cruiser; that may occur only if the big ship allows the
Bismarck
to draw her so far from her charges that the cruiser has a chance of getting within effective shooting range of the convoy.

If the ships are in search sectors and
Prinz Eugen
sights a convoy, she should report it by short signal at close range and stay at the extreme edge of visibility (smokeless). With respect to the necessity for
later surprise attacks
, it cannot be the task of the cruiser to ascertain the strength of the escort. That must be left to the
Bismarck.
In an attack on a convoy, the main objective must be to sink as many steamers as possible. When a
weakly
escorted convoy is attacked, the convoy commander will certainly disperse his charges. In this case, the first objective must be to disable the largest possible number of steamers by gunfire. (They can be sunk later.) For this, all batteries are to open up with exact firing directions and at the lowest possible range appropriate to the caliber. (Main and secondary batteries with nose-fuzed and base-fuzed projectiles, heavy flak nose-fuzed.) Steamers that have been disabled by gunfire are not to be sunk until there is not one steamer still moving within sight of the ship concerned.
To conserve ammunition, the heavy flak is to be nose-fuzed and used in the following manner: close within 300-500 meters of the ship, then have the best gunners fire individual shots into the waterline. Fire only when the ship is on the up-roll. Shoot holes in all of the steamer’s compartments (the largest room is the engine room). With 3.7-centimeter ammunition, shoot holes in the upper part of the steamer, so that during the flooding of the rooms, air can escape upwards.

Prinz Eugen
will also use her torpedoes in an
attack on a convoy.
Against a
strongly defended
convoy, there will be only a short time, if any, available for the cruiser’s attack. This must be exploited as fully as possible. In
this case
especially, everything will depend on speedy action. The steamers are therefore to be sunk
primarily with torpedoes.

The work of destruction may not be delayed by rescue operations.

The rescue of survivors, especially those from a convoy that has been attacked, can expose our own ships to serious danger from enemy submarines and surface forces. In such cases, concern for our ships must take precedence over the rescue of survivors. If necessary, a small steamer is to be spared for the purpose of rescuing survivors.

4.
Ships Steaming Independently

In the absence of orders to the contrary, all lone steamers encountered will be captured or destroyed. When weather conditions permit boats to be lowered, the steamers will be searched and, if they themselves are valuable or have valuable cargoes and they can get under way,
brought home
(examine fuel supply, provisions, etc.). In principle, tankers that can make more than 10 knots, refrigerator ships and fast motor ships, if they can get under way—whether they are laden or not—are to be captured and brought by a prize crew over the designated course into the mouth of the Gironde.

Experience has shown that it is best not to bring prizes immediately into the Bay of Biscay, especially those that have transmitted radio signals, but to wait a few weeks in a remote ocean area, then to set out for the Gironde at intervals so as to prevent the enemy from capturing them as they enter the Bay of Biscay. For this, in some circumstances it will be necessary to equip the prizes with extra provisions and send them to an escort tanker so that they can replenish. The start of the prizes’ return voyage is to be reported by short signal.

Prizes must not fall into enemy hands under any circumstances. In every case, therefore, as soon as it boards, the prize crew must make preparations for scuttling at short notice.

For searching steamers, a boarding party is to be organized. Each ship has three prize crews and must organize two others from its company. Equipment is to be stored within easy reach. Prize crews
must be instructed on the mission they are to discharge on board the steamers. All books, code instruments, tables, and notes found on the bridge, in the charthouse, in the radio room, in the captain’s pockets, and elsewhere are to be seized and examined on board the ship by officers qualified in the language.

On approaching a ship sailing independently, fly the British ensign and keep the turrets at zero degrees to avoid arousing suspicion. Signal her to stop and forbid her to use her radio. The transmission or completion of a radio warning signal must be prevented if possible. For this, the following measures are to be taken: