Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) (38 page)

36. Too frequent rewards signify that the enemy is at the end of his resources;

 

Because, when an army is hard pressed, as Tu Mu says, there is always a fear of mutiny, and lavish rewards are given to keep the men in good temper.

too many punishments betray a condition of dire distress.

 

Because in such case discipline becomes relaxed, and unwonted severity is necessary to keep the men to their duty.

37. To begin by bluster, but afterwards to take fright at the enemy’s numbers, shows a supreme lack of intelligence.

 

Another possible meaning, set forth by Tu Yu, Chia Lin, Mei Yao-ch’ên and Wang Hsi, is: “The general who is first tyrannical towards his men, and then in terror lest they should mutiny, etc.” This would connect the sentence with what went before about rewards and punishments.

38. When envoys are sent with compliments in their mouths, it is a sign that the enemy wishes for a truce.

 

Tu Mu says: “If the enemy opens friendly relations by sending hostages, it is a sign that they are anxious for an armistice, either because their strength is exhausted or for some other reason.”

39. If the enemy’s troops march up angrily and remain facing ours for a long time without either joining battle or taking themselves off again, the situation is one that demands great vigilance and circumspection.

 

As Ts’ao Kung points out, a manœuvre of this sort may be only a
ruse
to gain time for an unexpected flank attack or the laying of an ambush.

40. If our troops are no more in number than the enemy, that is amply sufficient; it only means that no direct attack can be made.

 

Literally [with reference to the latter phrase], “no martial advance.” That is to say,
chéng
tactics and frontal attacks must be eschewed, and stratagem resorted to instead.

What we can do is simply to concentrate all our available strength, keep a close watch on the enemy, and obtain reinforcements.

 

This is an obscure sentence, and none of the commentators succeed in squeezing very good sense out of it. . . . I follow Li Ch’üan, who appears to offer the simplest explanation: “Only the side that gets more men will win.” . . . Chang Yü [expounds the] meaning to us in language which is lucidity itself: “When the numbers are even, and no favourable opening presents itself, although we may not be strong enough to deliver a sustained attack, we can find additional recruits amongst our sutlers and camp-followers, and then, concentrating our forces and keeping a close watch on the enemy, contrive to snatch the victory. But we must avoid borrowing foreign soldiers to help us.”

He then quotes from Wei Liao Tzu . . . : “The nominal strength of mercenary troops may be 100,000, but their real value will be not more than half that figure.” [Chang Yü’s] interpretation means “to get recruits,” not from the outside, but from the tag-rag and bobtail which follows in the wake of a large army. This does not sound a very soldierly suggestion, and I feel convinced that it is not what Sun Tzu meant.

41. He who exercises no forethought but makes light of his opponents is sure to be captured by them.

 

Ch’ên Hao [says, quoting from the
Tso Chuan
]: “If bees and scorpions carry poison, how much more will a hostile state! Even a puny opponent, then, should not be treated with contempt.”

42. If soldiers are punished before they have grown attached to you, they will not prove submissive; and, unless submissive, they will be practically useless. If, when the soldiers have become attached to you, punishments are not enforced, they will still be useless.

43. Therefore soldiers must be treated in the first instance with humanity, but kept under control by means of iron discipline.

 

Yen Tzu (B.C. 493) said of Ssu-ma Jang-chü “His civil virtues endeared him to the people; his martial prowess kept his enemies in awe.” [Wu Tzu says]: “The ideal commander unites culture with a warlike temper; the profession of arms requires a combination of hardness and tenderness.”