Art of War (Barnes & Noble Classics Series) (17 page)

and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities.

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided.

 

Another sound piece of military theory. Had the Boers acted upon it in 1899, and refrained from dissipating their strength before Kimberley, Mafeking, or even Ladysmith, it is more than probable that they would have been masters of the situation before the British were ready seriously to oppose them.

Kimberley, Mafeking, and Ladysmith were all important early defeats for the British against the Boer insurgency. The British regulars badly underestimated their colonial foes in what was essentially a war for independence: the South African War. The details of the siege, the battles, and the final British response are worth examining in greater detail both to capture Giles’s full meaning here and also because they read like a petri dish exemplar of Sun Tzu’s admonitions on tactics. Turn to the early writings of Winston Churchill for a pithy examination of the war from the perspective of a participant whose life was deeply affected by it.

The gist of Giles’s comment, however, is that the Boers (Dutch South Africans) initially had the jump on the British. They dissipated their military energies, however, in “small,” brutal engagements, such as the siege at Ladysmith, which they besieged from October 1899 through February 1900, causing the deaths of several thousand citizens. This gave the British time to dispatch formidable regiments from England. Because of its strategic geography, South Africa was important to the British Empire both for its considerable natural resources and also as a protection for their colonial properties, especially India. Ladysmith, for example, is in the Natal region, which had long served as a gateway to the Indian Ocean. DG

The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months;

 

It is not quite clear what mantlets were. Ts’ao Kung simply defines them as “large shields,” but we get a better idea of them from Li Ch’üan, who says they were to protect the heads of those who were assaulting the city walls at close quarters. This seems to suggest a sort of Roman
testudo
, ready made. Tu Mu says they were . . . (wheeled vehicles used in repelling attacks, according to K’ang Hsi). . . . The name is also applied to turrets on city walls.

Of movable shelters, we get a fairly clear description from several commentators. They were wooden missile-proof structures on four wheels, propelled from within, covered over with raw hides, and used in sieges to convey parties of men to and from the walls, for the purpose of filling up the encircling moat with earth. Tu Mu adds that they are now called “wooden donkeys.”

and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more.

 

These were great mounds or ramparts of earth heaped up to the level of the enemy’s walls in order to discover the weak points in the defence, and also to destroy the fortified turrets mentioned in the preceding note.

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants,

 

This vivid simile . . . is taken from the spectacle of an army of ants climbing a wall. The meaning is that the general, losing patience at the long delay, may make a premature attempt to storm the place before his engines of war are ready.

with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege.

6. Therefore the skilful leader subdues the enemy’s troops without any fighting; he captures their cities without laying siege to them; he overthrows their kingdom without lengthy operations in the field.

 

Chia Lin notes that he only overthrows the . . . Government, but does no harm to individuals. The classical instance is Wu Wang, who after having put an end to the Yin dynasty was acclaimed “Father and mother of the people.”

7. With his forces intact he will dispute the mastery of the Empire, and thus, without losing a man, his triumph will be complete.

 

Owing to . . . double meanings . . . , the latter part of the sentence is susceptible of quite a different meaning: “And thus, the weapon, not being blunted by use, its keenness remains perfect.”

This is the method of attacking by stratagem.

8. It is the rule in war, if our forces are ten to the enemy’s one, to surround him; if five to one, to attack him;

 

Straightaway, without waiting for any further advantage.

if twice as numerous, to divide our army into two.

The saying . . . at first sight . . . appears to violate a fundamental principle of war. Ts’ao Kung, however, gives a clue to Sun Tzu’s meaning: “Being two to the enemy’s one, we may use one part of our army in the regular way, and the other for some special diversion.” Chang Yü thus further elucidates the point: “If our force is twice as numerous as that of the enemy, it should be split up into two divisions, one to meet the enemy in front, and one to fall upon his rear; if he replies to the frontal attack, he may be crushed from behind; if to the rearward attack, he may be crushed in front.”