Ancient Chinese Warfare (34 page)

Although the early Shang kings probably monopolized power through the usual methods of successful chieftains, by Wu Ting’s era the lines of succession seem to have been reasonably well established and hereditary authority fundamentally institutionalized despite the turbulence marking the middle period. Personal charisma, physical prowess, and martial skills no doubt remained vital to dissuading challengers and thwarting assassination. However, in the interstice between regicide and absolute obedience, major actions probably still required the acquiescence of clan members, as well as the immediate obedience of subjects and subordinates. Shang rulers ensured that these were forthcoming by monopolizing theocratic power and wielding authority over life and death.
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The right to communicate with the ancestors or spirits on high, entities who were believed capable of affecting every aspect of life ranging from personal illness through weather, plague, drought, and military
incursions, was reserved to the king. (A few high-ranking clan members, including Fu Hao, the king’s consort, sometimes also conducted divinatory inquiries, but the privilege was clearly derivative.) Even though divination became more perfunctory in later periods, insofar as the Shang populace acknowledged the preeminence of his transcendent authority, the king was empowered and his actions sanctified, none daring to violate the supreme will of the spirits.

Shang kings arbitrarily decided the fate of individuals and groups, selecting people ranging from relatives to prisoners for sacrifice and ordering punishments that they sometimes directed, including castration and decapitation. They could compel clan members and subordinates to undertake projects such as land reclamation, external missions, and military affairs, and their power even extended to the submissive proto-states. Authority over external areas was maintained through a variety of means, including gifts, acknowledgments, emissaries, reports, inquiries, and military support for the endangered. Every successful activity, particularly military expeditions because they entailed the imposition of command and control measures, reinforced the king’s power.

Insofar as the Shang conquered the Hsia and then claimed dominion over the nearby realm primarily through alliance building and intimidation rather than the dispersion of clan members who established incipient states, unremitting political and military efforts were necessary to preserve and enhance its position. Marriage relations, primarily achieved by the king taking a female member of an important clan as one of his consorts, were among the means systematically employed to strengthen ties with contiguous states. (King Wu Ting was especially prolific in this regard, at least fifty-two of his consorts being known from the oracular inscriptions, whereas only twenty-two can be ascribed to Kings Wu Yi and Wen Wu Ting in the fourth period.)
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In addition to suffering a high degree of psychological intimidation, states were thereby entangled in marriage alliances and expected to furnish troops and logistical support upon demand.

The king undertook numerous peregrinations to assert his power and continuously interact with the disparate entities and peoples within the Shang’s perceived realm. His rambles were undoubtedly multipurpose; armed forces always accompanied him, whether to engage in hunting
or simply to provide protection and companionship. No doubt a primary objective was manifesting the Shang’s “awesomeness,” an objective that was accomplished through military display and the conspicuous show of ritual bronzes and other trappings of prestige, wealth, and power. Through ostentation the susceptible were psychologically subjugated, the hierarchical order consolidated, and the Shang’s destructive potential impressed upon the world.
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In fact, the term “
te fang
” seen in the oracle bones—literally meaning “virtue/quarter”—apparently entails the idea of conducting an imperial procession or tour of inspection intended to put the
fang
(external states) in order.
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Gathering military intelligence and providing an opportunity for the king to assess subordinate states and semi-independent rulers in person were almost certainly collateral objectives.
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As attested by numerous divinations inquiring about the auspiciousness of going forth to hunt in various areas, hunting was certainly a major preoccupation, so common that it was denounced by the Chou when it charged the Shang with perversity.
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More than two hundred place-names can be identified, many mentioned only once, though others recur dozens of times and are also listed as areas for pasturage.
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Conducted on a large scale by the equivalent of a regiment on maneuver over extended periods of up to thirty or forty days, hunting similarly had multiple functions. Personal enjoyment and the training of core military forces were certainly foremost, but secondary objectives probably included evaluating capabilities and performance, especially archery, which was the main form of attack apart from nets and pits;
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imbuing authority and accustoming men to a chain of command; developing coordination and cohesiveness; becoming familiar with the terrain prior to seizing territory;
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and eliminating dangerous animals. The hunt’s essential military nature is perhaps made most evident by instances of the king diverting the limited forces already in the field to attack a foreign proto-state.
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Hunting still constituted a viable method for rapidly acquiring significant amounts of protein because the population density was low and large forested and marshy tracts remained.
¹¹
The large numbers of animals slain and captured furnished an essential part of the requirements for the Shang’s frequent sacrifices and extensive feasting, even
though domesticated herds had been developed. The victims included tigers, some sort of wild ox, at least two species of deer, and wild boar. For example, one report lists 1 tiger, 40 and 159 respectively of two different types of deer, and 164 pigs;
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another 11 wild oxen and 15 boar;
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and a third 6 wild oxen, 16 boar, and 199 deer.
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Based on the numerous inscriptions from Wu Ting’s reign, it appears that rather than observing the sort of seasonal proscriptions described in late Warring States writings, hunting was conducted throughout the year.

The ruling elite confronted both internal and external challenges as the Shang evolved from a chiefdom into a state amid a generally hostile environment. More warriors than administrators, contrary to traditional depictions the Shang well understood the importance of battlefield achievement, valued physical prowess, and enthusiastically embraced military talent. Their strong martial orientation is reflected in elaborately decorated bronze and highly polished jade weapons, stylized metallic human and animal face masks, and other symbols of authority and achievement, including great axes.
¹⁵
The weapons and massive bronze vessels found in Fu Hao’s tomb and those of other important military commanders throughout the Yin-hsü years show that they were not just employed by the living, but also interred with the dead to honor martial prowess and authority, a practice that continued to the end of the dynasty.
¹⁶

The ruling clan also monopolized the acquisition and exploitation of the mineral resources necessary to fabricate metal weapons and the bronze vessels and other valuable objects that were employed to reward the faithful. Massive cauldrons adorned with intricate designs of religious significance, cast in alloys gleaming with a burnished golden color, contributed to an impression of overawing opulence. Weapons, whether of stone or metal, were apparently produced solely in government workshops and even handicrafts remained under central control, ensuring that only the compliant would have access to these products.

The Shang’s ascension was marked by even more extensive and aggressive martial efforts than the Hsia in the area of resource acquisition. The sudden expansion seen at P’an-lung-ch’eng reflects the generally increased output evident at the extensive copper deposits found in this general area, particularly Jiangxi Tuan-ch’ang T’ung-ling-kuang and
Hubei Ta-yeh T’ung-lu-shan-k’uang.
¹⁷
Further evidence of this quest is visible in the numerous small Shang enclaves that appeared near limited but rich deposits of copper and lead in western Henan on the upper reaches of the Luo River. Eighteen Erh-li-kang (Shang) settlements that suddenly replaced three Erh-li-t’ou sites could, although averaging only 40,000 square meters each, easily ship locally smelted metals via the region’s numerous waterways to Yen-shih.
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When Shang power contracted in the west, widespread but highly concentrated ore deposits in the southeast came to replace western sites.

Historians analyzing the Shang generally claim that the rudimentary staff positions then appearing were never differentiated into civil and martial and that all military functions were performed on an ad hoc basis by civil administrators.
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These assertions, written from a perspective prejudiced toward the “enlightened” nature of later ages when the civil reputedly dominated, inherently assume that the first positions to evolve were civil (and therefore more progressive) rather than martial.
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It is then disparagingly concluded that Shang civil officials were compelled to reluctantly accept military burdens. However, not only did specialized military positions clearly exist in the Shang, but it was an era pervaded by concerns with domination and defense, more conducive to a purely military hierarchy than any gestation of civil functionaries.

The Shang was a warrior elite culture that required participants to embrace a vigorous lifestyle and the martial values of a large, evolving, but still clan-based chiefdom. Inscriptions on bronze vessels such as the
Hsiao-ch’en Yü Ts’un
show that the king granted generous rewards, including substantial plots of land, for military merit, and also rescinded “fiefs” for failure.
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Rather than the sort of glittering cultural manifestation subsequently portrayed, it was a brutal, bloodthirsty age of frequent, aggressive warfare in which people were slain, enslaved, and sacrificed without compunction. Furthermore, contrary to later depictions of a purely moral effort marked by an overriding civilian orientation, of virtue and civility having been interrupted by the unruly and baleful face of war, the Shang dynasty was founded through decades
of combat and a brief period of sudden conquest. The Shang didn’t just displace the “one man,” their ostensible target, through a simple punitive attack, but systematically extirpated the Hsia throughout the realm.

Heritage has immense impact in shaping values and determining mindset. Martial spirit, once unleashed, doesn’t necessarily diminish, accounting for the
Ssu-ma Fa’s
emphasis on performing ceremonies designed to reintegrate combat weary soldiers into civilian life.
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The exhilaration of victory and admiration of military prowess clearly pervaded the Shang’s early years, deeply influencing the establishment and monopolization of positions of power. (It should not be forgotten that even the last, reputedly debauched emperor, Hsin, had a reputation for great strength and martial ability.) Survival ranked paramount, and “civil” functions, although necessary to ensure the state’s fiscal and material prosperity, were certainly derivative. Many individuals within this highly charged martial context no doubt deemed administrative tasks a distraction and an annoyance.

The absence of pre-Anyang writings makes it impossible to characterize the exact nature of early Shang rulership, but the dynamics seem to indicate a gradual transition from chieftain to monarch subsequent to the Hsia’s defeat. Despite internal problems and intrigue, Shang rulers acquired the despotic powers already described and served as the final arbiters of military affairs. Anyang oracular inscriptions already show the king performing all the duties generally apportioned between twenty-first-century commanders-in-chief and ministers of defense, as well as frequently serving as battlefield commanders.

Regents from Wu Ting onward decided whether military actions should be undertaken, which enemies should be struck, the campaign’s objectives, the number of men to be levied or deputed, the allies to be summoned, the commanders to be appointed, the manner or tactics of attack, resolution of the conflict, treatment of the vanquished, and the disposition of their land. Allies might also be ordered to undertake offensive or defensive actions alone, in coalition with others, or in conjunction with the Shang itself. Combat appointments were solely at the monarch’s discretion, all field authority being derivative.

With a few exceptions such as Fu Hao, the king initiated divination procedures to inquire about the appropriateness of these military actions and seek the sanction of the ancestors. Whether Shang warriors were
as reluctant as the early Greeks to undertake military action without auspicious indications remains unknown, but in the context of Shang religious and ritual emphasis it seems likely.
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Prognostication being a powerful psychological tool, the king’s queries were probably intended to coerce or persuade others as much as to appeal to the spirits and perhaps reduce the responsibilities of decision making.

Although the king could have always led in person, in about half the recorded conflicts he opted to appoint others to command coalition forces and their segmented contingents. Royal clan members, important members of other esteemed clans,
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and close officials such as the
tuo ch’en
(“chief subordinate”) were often entrusted with this responsibility, with those who proved successful being repeatedly employed. Despite shouldering other responsibilities such as overseeing hunts and directing economic projects such as land reclamation, many evolved into de facto military specialists who could plan, organize, and lead campaigns. Rulers of allied and subservient states were also dispatched on expeditionary missions, normally at the head of their own military forces, with the successful tending to be reappointed if precampaign prognostications boded well.