Ancient Chinese Warfare (15 page)

Proponents of the pedantically held view that the virtuous, if their “Virtue” is sufficiently perfected, will always prevail over the evil and perverse envision Yü’s symbolic conquest of a Miao chieftain as depicted in the
Shang Shu
as irrefutable proof
.
Despite being a late fabrication, the importance of the section now titled “Great Yü’s Plans” to political and military thought from the Wei-Chin period onward, particularly the reasons cited to justify the “punitive” attack, cannot be overemphasized:
⁹

The idea that cultivating virtue and making a highly visible, righteous display would “magically” affect even a distant Miao chieftain some 2,500
li
away would subsequently be much quoted in imperial court discussions and memorials whenever nonmartial courses of action were advocated. However, traditional commentators offer the interesting observation that Shun, despite being venerated as one of antiquity’s paragons, failed to properly balance the requirements of the civil (
wen
) and martial (
wu
) when he precipitously deputed Yü on this punitive mission against the Miao without first formally announcing their offenses. Since the practice of the civil required adherence to certain idealized forms of behavior and protocols, his premature employment of conspicuous martial power was doomed from the outset.

Yü’s inability to cow the Miao chieftain into submitting prompted Yi Yih’s recommendation that he rededicate himself to perfecting his sincerity, synonymous with initiating diplomatic measures designed to persuade him to acknowledge the constraints of Hsia political domination. The lack of any reference to combat having arisen suggests that Yü’s efforts consisted of a martial display, nothing more. The elaborate dances performed in Shun’s own court, presumably under his direction rather than Yü’s, have accordingly been interpreted as expressing the emperor’s desire to suppress any tendency toward the martial alone, thereby restoring the balance of
wen
or the civil (symbolized by the feathers) and
wu
, here symbolized by a shield rather than an axe, halberd, or bow, the era’s primary weapons. However, irrespective of the validity of these creative interpretations, for historical purposes these passages might simply be seen as a remnant memory, one reflecting the intensity and longevity of the clash between various Miao tribes and the Hsia’s founders.

Mo-tzu, who exploited accounts of these events for his own persuasive purposes, concocted a dramatically enhanced version:

Other writings suggest that Yao not only deputed Yü to smite the San Miao but had earlier personally led a punitive expedition against the rebellious San Miao dwelling among the Southern Man, defeating them in a clash on the banks of the Chou River and compelling them to withdraw and change their customs.
¹³
Similarly, the
Shang Shu
states that Yao “expelled the San Miao out to San-wei,” the latter synonymous with the westernmost point conceivable, one subsequently identified with a location south of the now famous Tunhuang,
¹⁴
and deputed his son Chu to control the region around Chou-shui.
¹⁵

Archaeologists have recently suggested that evidence for these earlier clashes with the San Miao may also be seen in the sudden extinction of the Shih-chia-ho variant known as the Ch’ing-long-ch’üan in the region of Yao’s supposed activity, the Tan-chiang and T’ang-pai-ho river basins.
¹⁶
Throughout its area of distribution in the upper and middle Han River, middle and lower Tan-chiang, the T’ang-pai-ho river basin, and upper Huai River area, this phase—considered the northernmost expression of the Shih-chia-ho—was displaced by localized cultures, presumably as a result of Yao’s conquest and ensuing forced emigration. The radiocarbon-based dates obtained for this displacement fall between 2600 and 2150 BCE, roughly in the centuries ascribed to Yao and Yü, suggesting that although the campaign was attributed to Yao, he merely personifies an evolving cultural conflict. Thereafter, Yü’s activities would necessarily have been directed to the south, to the plains of Hsi-hu, the other regions having already been cleared of a tenacious enemy.

According to accounts that contradict the peaceful transfer of authority from Yü to his son Ch’i, the dynasty’s first significant military conflict was actually a battle over succession. In these versions Ch’i eventually vanquishes Yi, a meritorious official who had become famous for his efforts to reduce the people’s misery during Shun’s reign and been personally designated by Yü to succeed him. Ironically (since he similarly embarked on the path of indulgence shortly after securing the throne), Ch’i’s attack was supposedly justified by Yi’s dissolute and negligent behavior. These events apparently engendered the idea that Yü never designated Ch’i as his successor, but instead forced his son to fight for the throne by somehow predestining the conflict, even though the
Bamboo Annals
note that Yi withdrew to his own state while Ch’i went about convening the lords and was much honored by Ch’i when he finally died in the latter’s sixth year of reign.

Irrespective of its lack of veracity, this account may be understood as symptomatic of unremitting strife within the ruling clan, not to mention among the various extended clans and other tribes or peoples populating the area at the time. Moreover, it apparently presaged centuries of forthcoming strife between the Hsia and eastern powers, since it has been suggested that Duke Yi’s clan originated in the east and was numbered among the Tung Yi.
¹⁷

The Hsia’s next battle quickly arose when Ch’i, presumably in command of core clan forces, confronted the Yu-hu—theoretically members of Shun’s own clan—because they had either rebelled or simply refused to acknowledge his sovereignty. Hsia forces prevailed (at an engagement made famous by the
Shang Shu
chapter “The Oath at Kan”) and the Yu-hu submitted:
¹⁸

The oath falls within the martial tradition of boldly announcing the enemy’s offenses to justify imminent military action, thereby inciting fervor in the troops. However, it is somewhat at variance with comments in the
Ssu-ma Fa
: “The rulers of the Hsia dynasty administered their oaths amidst the army for they wanted the people to first complete their thoughts. They rectified their Virtue, never employed the sharp blades of their weapons, and granted rewards but did not impose punishments.”
²¹

It has long been claimed that Ch’i’s oath proves the existence of chariots manned by a driver, an archer, and a shock-weapons bearer at this battle, confirming implications derived from a listing of the
ch’e cheng
or “chariot commandant” among the Hsia’s officials. Given that Hsi Chung, known to history as Yü’s chariot driver, is credited with inventing the chariot (or at least excelling at constructing chariots), if the oath were at all authentic this would be plausible. However, in the absence of chariot remnants or traces of rotting wood in any excavated late Lungshan, Erh-li-t’ou, or even early Shang site, such claims can only be cast aside as unwarranted.
²²

According to the
Bamboo Annals
, Yü had previously faced dissension within his immediate family, being compelled in his eleventh year to banish his youngest son, Wu Kuan (whose name ironically means “martial observations”), to the Hsi Ho (Western Ho) region, an area west of the Yellow River often noted in later history for its natural strategic advantages. Wu Kuan apparently flourished in this conducive area; he revolted four years later and the king, rather than commanding in person, deputed Duke Shou of Ts’ai to lead the punitive expedition that eventually forced Wu Kuan to submit.
²³

Not unexpectedly, Ch’i’s death precipitated internal chaos. His five sons battled for the throne, and T’ai-k’ang, who eventually succeeded him, apparently followed his dissolute ways. T’ai-k’ang’s excesses in turn provided an opportunity for the Yu-ch’iung of the Eastern Yi, under Hou Yi, to move westward out of the lower Yellow and Huai river valleys, attack the capital, and eventually occupy it. Little is known about the battle, but probably as the result of conflating myth and reality,
tradition identifies Hou Yi as a great archer who followed in the footsteps of his ancestors, chief archery officials under Yao and Shun, or as Duke Yi, just noted for his confrontation with Ch’i, who was also credited with shooting down the nine extra suns incinerating the earth, as well as taming the poisonous animals.

Discounting the mythic aspects, Hou Yi’s pronounced skill in archery probably symbolized the Eastern Yi’s greater dependence on hunting and fishing in contrast to the more agriculturally oriented Hsia. Thus the Yu-ch’iung’s deadly proficiency reputedly forced Shao-k’ang’s son Chu, who eventually completed the lineage’s restoration, to fabricate China’s first body armor so as to survive an onslaught of arrows before engaging in close combat. (He is also credited with inventing the spear, a rather startling and unlikely claim given that spears and javelins are normally among the first weapons developed in any culture, but possibly indicative of Chu being the first warrior to bind a bronze, rather than stone, spearhead to a wooden shaft.)

Remarkably, the victorious Huo Yi is also portrayed as having been quickly seduced by royal pleasures and thus lost his own head when Han Chuo, whom he had foolishly entrusted with the actual administration, gradually developed a power base sufficient to usurp the throne: