Ancient Chinese Warfare (36 page)

The intermixture of the
lü
and
hang
, regiments and companies respectively, increased the complexity. Insofar as the clan units seem to have existed as independent units for another half millennium, their commanders—especially those commanding the king’s
tsu
—may have escaped the nominal hierarchy or, relying on their personal charisma and power, simply refused to accede to delegated authority. Although such chaos should not have been tolerated, unless their forces were somehow integrated into the
lü
that were then emerging as an operational contingent, it is likely to have persisted, considerably muddying the overall, somewhat ill-defined authority structure.

Another title known to exist in the Shang was
yin
, as in the famous Yi Yin.
⁴¹
Though generally assumed to be a civil position such as chancellor, minister, or even the world’s first national security advisor, it also appears in conjunction with military contingents, such as
yu tsu yin
or the
yin
for “the clan force on the right”
⁴²
and
tuo shih
(arrow)
yin
.
⁴³
Based on the
Shang Shu
, the various subunits from 100 up through the
hang
and
lü
also had
chang
, leaders or subofficers. In contrast to the Chou, who esteemed the left in government offices and divination, the Shang emphasized the right.
⁴⁴
Thus the famous Yi Yin was reputedly the
yu hsiang
or “minister on the right,” and the three armies were generally enumerated as right, middle, and left.
⁴⁵
However, the king still commanded from the center.

Military units and structural organization slowly but continuously evolved from the inherited, extemporaneous methods that characterized Wu Ting’s early era to more permanent forces and organizations. Nevertheless, as Western military history shows, a certain amount of “organizational fluidity” (more aptly termed chaos) invariably arises during periods of change and retrenchment. Carefully crafted units designed to replace presumably outmoded variants often fail to fully displace the latter or to be tightly integrated into the revised hierarchy,
unexpectedly resulting in the simultaneous existence of vigorous new contingents and antique remnants. Factors other than simple military conservatism can also intervene, including a need to preserve clan-based forces to maintain internal control and manipulate power. Assumptions of structural rigor and homogeneity are therefore often fallacious and counterproductive.

Several new organizational units were created in the late Shang, but they essentially drew upon the same personnel, just differently grouped and segmented. Whether these innovations in affiliation and command resulted in an increasingly formalized hierarchy of company, brigade (or regiment), and army (
hsing
,
lü
, and
shih
), similar in structure to that found in the Spring and Autumn period, remains a much-debated question. Unfortunately, even when supplemented by later textual tradition the evidence that can be derived from the oracular inscriptions remains insufficient to determine unit strength or discern unit composition. Nevertheless, despite the appearance and predominance of the “army” (
shih
) and “brigade” or “regiment” (
lü
) as fundamental operational units, rather than a thorough organizational revolution, an admixture of units evidently persisted.
⁴⁶

Insofar as historians have expended enormous energy in subsuming these presumably distinctive contingents into encompassing schemes, their probable nature merits brief consideration. Preliminary to reviewing the possibilities, it should be noted that a unit’s full complement may not have been mobilized. Because even a few absences would dramatically impact small contingents, serious deficiencies in units such as the 100 archers would have been highly visible and therefore subject to severe accountability. However, the larger units of 1,000 and especially 3,000 might have only achieved the staffing levels of 700 or 800 per thousand often seen in later ages. The accuracy of figures cited for this period therefore depends on how strictly the officials entrusted with responsibility for the levies were held to consistent standards. In contrast, despite a natural inclination to inflate the count and thereby garner greater rewards, reports of the numbers slain and taken captive in actual engagements, being fairly low and highly specific, were probably more accurate.

Based on inscriptions that indicate the existence of three
shih,
the first use of the character
shih
, the traditional term for “army,” has been
attributed to Wu Ting’s era.
⁴⁷
The character has been interpreted as originally depicting an accumulation of men, closely related to a mound or hillock, and derived from the character for town (
yi
). Without doubt, armies in the late Shang were primarily associated with towns and functioned in a protective capacity when not deputed for field duty, including guarding cities at night.
⁴⁸
However, the range of activities they might undertake would have been constrained by the contingent’s composition and size.

On the assumption of institutional continuity, another pronouncement embedded in a prognostication generally ascribed to the consecutive reigns of Wu Yi and Wen Ting, stating that the king “created three armies,” has been interpreted as signifying the addition of three more armies, bringing the total to six, rather than the formalization or reinstitution of a three-army system that had perhaps fallen into disuse in an interim of reduced military activity.
⁴⁹
Primary justification for attributing six operational
shih
to this era is derived from the conspicuous existence of six armies in the early Chou, the latter’s institutions being deemed reflective because traditional literature and relatively early bronze inscriptions indicate that the Chou imitated many Shang organizational practices.

It has also been argued that Wu Yi, the “
wu
” emphasizing military prowess, not only conducted numerous aggressive campaigns against external enemies but also was greatly enamored of martial values and practices, accounting for his apparent addiction to hunting, an activity that reportedly claimed his life. His spirit and commitment would have nurtured a highly charged martial ethos conducive to army building, one that should have persisted even if the actual edict was issued by his successor, Wen Ting (who also merited a posthumous “
wu
” in his designation as Wen Wu Ting), as some analysts claim.
⁵⁰

Whether the army existed before Wu Ting’s ascension, he deliberately created it through a conscious act, or it simply evolved during his reign, the
shih
first becomes visible in inscriptions from his era.
⁵¹
His frequent summoning of men in units of 3,000 from the very beginning of his monarchy suggests that the contingent of 3,000 was already a fairly well-defined, functional unit and a likely candidate for
shih
despite other numbers such as 1,000, 5,000, and 10,000 also having been levied. However,
a certain degree of flexibility probably characterized these extemporaneously constituted field forces, and units of almost any size may have conventionally been designated as
shih
. Perhaps, as suggested, the
shih
originally numbered just a thousand before expanding in accord with the historically attested tendency of units to strengthen over time. This would partially account for the persistence of 1,000-man operational field units.

In addition to multiplying the army’s logistical burdens, Wu Ting’s increasingly lengthy peripheral engagements must have imposed escalating manpower requirements and stimulated military specialization. These voracious needs seem to have compelled a gradual shift from temporary levies to the
shih
’s more consistently organized and stable forces, explaining the disappearance of the term
teng
(“levy”) after his reign. However, though certainly expressive of an intent to reorganize and probably a step toward greatly expanded standing forces, there is no evidence that these armies were permanent or that the designated members were extemporaneously mobilized.

Although no formal pronouncements have been recovered, even in Wu Ting’s era Shang field armies already consisted of a central force bolstered by two flanking commands. Segmentation into left, right, and center characterized not only the army but also the
lü
(regiment), archers, chariots,
hang
(companies), and
tsu
. As early as his famous southern campaign three armies denoted as left, right, and “my” (or the king’s) forces were dispatched, and references to the “army of the left” and “army of the right” are seen throughout his reign, attesting to both the concept and actuality of their existence. However, three armies need not always have been fielded, and any army could be segmented for operational purposes into its constituent components.

Late in Wu Ting’s reign, when an astonishing 23,000 troops may have been summoned in a short period for an expeditionary campaign against the T’u-fang, a basic operational field force of 9,000 comprising three 3,000-man armies would have been both reasonable and readily sustained by expanding Shang economic resources. However, in accord with Shang decade-based practices, it has also been suggested that the
shih
may have numbered as few as 100 men
⁵²
(which seems extremely unlikely) to as many as 10,000 men, though the latter would have required
a massive, highly unlikely increase in manpower and constituted a dramatic shift away from the basic 3,000-man complement.
⁵³

Nevertheless, in the face of eastern challenges and given the martial character of the Shang’s despotic rulers, it would be surprising as well as contrary to the natural tendency of states to constantly augment their military power if the army had remained petrified at 3,000 men. Although the numbers reputedly fielded by the Shang at the Battle of Mu-yeh must be severely discounted because they transcend the realm of possibility, they should still be understood as indicating the presence of a massive force rather than be completely dismissed. Ten-thousand-man armies that were probably unattainable in Wu Ting’s reign may well have been realizable by the dynasty’s ignominious end, when a professional military force that proved capable of sustaining campaigns down into the southeast had clearly evolved.

Near the end of its existence the Shang deployed a number of armies at its secondary capitals. Although force levels of 3,000 men would have been more easily encamped, armies of 10,000 would certainly have cohered with the ruler’s personality. Six such armies would have provided the Shang with a core force of roughly 60,000 at the final clash, to which would be added whatever strength their allies might have provided. Given the urgency of the developments, the latter may not have exceeded 10,000 men, accounting for the 70,000 traditionally (and more realistically) said to have confronted the Chou.

Conversely, being an emerging power, the Chou had to rely on allied contributions to bulk out their own highly motivated forces. At this time their
shih
are more likely to have still numbered a traditional 3,000, or perhaps only 2,500 if based on pyramids of five, as is sometimes claimed.
⁵⁴
Six armies with a nominal strength of 3,000 men augmented by 3,000 elite tiger warriors and the contributions of their allies, presumably at significantly diminished force levels because of their comparatively smaller size, would have resulted in a force somewhat less than half the Shang’s vaunted might.

Next in the hierarchical order stood the
lü
, whose character has traditionally been understood as depicting two men under a pennant (clearly referring to a military unit from inception) and entailing a sense of “multitude.” Discounting the validity of the one inscription that
indicates 10,000 men had been levied, it was a unit whose numbers seem to have varied greatly but probably averaged 500 or 1,000 men.
⁵⁵
In subsequent eras it would be an intermediate organizational unit that would integrate several companies into a
shih
, the latter then being best understood as a regiment within the context of the new term for army,
chün
.
Lü
then, separately and in combination with
chün
, would come to designate the army in general, appearing in such terms as
chen-lü
, “review and order the troops,” a ritual that apparently was already being implemented in the Shang before dispatching the troops on campaign. Although numerous questions remain about its composition and function, in the Shang,
lü
can be envisioned as an independent brigade or regiment that was fielded in conjunction with levied armies, but was not subsumed under the latter’s organizational umbrella.

References to the unit remain sparse, but from the famous (if perhaps dubious) inscription “levy Fu Hao with 3,000 and levy
lü
10,000,” it has also been concluded that the
lü
’s composition somehow differed from that of a normal levy and was still an ad hoc unit in Wu Ting’s era.
⁵⁶
(This ad hoc nature and its early appearance would argue against claims that the
lü
represents a shift toward military formalization and specialization.) Moreover, based on a notation that “the
chung
should be conjoined with the right
lü
,”
⁵⁷
it is evident that their members were distinct. Even though the term had already appeared in King Wu Ting’s era,
lü
’s operational inception seems to date to the reigns of Ping Hsin and K’ang Ting, reflecting a shift toward expanded operations.
⁵⁸
If the king’s
lü
is understood as the “middle” force, inscriptions from Ping Hsin and K’ang Ting’s era suggest that the three standard components of left, middle, and right were all being fielded, though not necessarily simultaneously.
⁵⁹