What Stalin Knew (50 page)

Hoth, stood poised to resume the offensive. Their goal was Moscow, now

only a few hundred kilometers away. Then, on August 21, Hitler issued this

order: ‘‘The most important objective to be achieved before the onset of

winter is not the capture of Moscow but the seizure of the Crimea and of

the industrial and coal-mining regions on the Donets [in the Ukraine].’’

Army Group Center officers were aghast. They knew that if their armored

forces were diverted to the south, there would be no hope of resuming the

Moscow offensive before weather conditions worsened. They chose Gu-

derian to try to change Hitler’s mind by explaining that ‘‘Moscow was

the heart of the Soviet political system, a major industrial complex, its

communications center, and above all, the hub of the entire railroad sys-

tem. The fall of Moscow would decide the war.’’ The response to his plea

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233

was vintage Hitler. His generals ‘‘understood nothing of wartime econom-

ics. . . . We need the grain of the Ukraine. The industrial area of the Donets

must work for us instead of for Stalin.’’1 Of course, Hitler’s vision of mil-

lions of docile Ukrainians working for Greater Germany in the farms and

factories of their country was delusional. To a great extent it was rendered

so by Stalin’s ‘‘scorched earth’’ policy and the massive relocation of indus-

trial facilities, equipment, and workers eastward. Most important, how-

ever, was the adverse reaction of the population to the atrocities com-

mitted by the German occupiers, turning potential allies into enemies.

Could not Hitler understand that these atrocities were animated by his

racist attitudes toward all Slavs, who were ‘‘a mass of born slaves who feel

the need of a master?’’2

Despite his misgivings at Hitler’s insistence on abandoning the offen-

sive against Moscow, Field Marshal von Bock, the commander of Army

Group Center, had no alternative but to comply. His panzer units were

committed to the drive against Kiev, capital of the Ukraine. Kiev fell on

September 19. On September 26 the battle ended with the destruction of

five Soviet armies and the capture of 665,000 Soviet prisoners. Contribut-

ing to this tremendous loss of men and equipment was Stalin’s stubborn

refusal to allow the Southwestern Front to withdraw until it was too late.

The man who ‘‘knew’’ Hitler would not invade was still rejecting advice

from the military professionals, who in turn were afraid to cross him.3

Suddenly, as though intoxicated by the enormity of the victory in the

Ukraine, Hitler ordered a resumption of the offensive against Moscow

with the code word designation Typhoon. It began on October 2, well over

a month later than planned by Army Group Center. For von Bock and his

generals it was a huge gamble forced on them by Hitler. Their armored and

motorized vehicles, already weakened by the battles for Smolensk, had

deteriorated further in the long marches and battles of the Kiev encircle-

ment. Supply lines were stretched thin, and shortages worsened. Further-

more, while the weather was fine the first week of October, no one knew

how long it would take for autumn rains and winter cold to begin. Nev-

ertheless, by October 14 German panzers had succeeded in capturing two

heavily defended key cities, Vyazma and Bryansk. In so doing they en-

circled and took 663,000 more prisoners and much equipment. But their

luck with the weather ran out and they found themselves bogged down in

mud. Still, they struggled on and by October 19 had taken Borodino, the

historic Napoleonic battlefield. They had also captured Mozhaisk, a hun-

dred kilometers from Moscow.

Operation Typhoon

Vyshniy

Volochek

Yaroslavl

N

Kalinin

Klin

Dmitrev

Velikie Luki

Azhev

Volokolamsk

Moscow

Gzhatsk

Mozhaisk

Kolomna

Viazma

Smolensk

Kashira

Yelnia

Orsha

Kaluga

Roslavl

Briansk

Orel

Yelets

German

Penetration 1941

1st stage

Sept. 30

Oct. 10

Voronezh

Oct. 30

2nd Stage

Kursk

Nov. 15

0

50

100 km

to Dec. 5

0

25

50

75 mi

The German assault on Moscow as it developed in October–December

1941

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235

On October 12, two days after Zhukov had replaced Ivan S. Konev as

commander of the Western Front, the Stavka had watched nervously as

the fresh Siberian Thirty-second Rifle Division was chewed to pieces by

the Germans at Borodino. That day the Convoy Service of the Chief Direc-

torate for Internal Troops, USSR NKVD, received a telegram directing the

removal of thirty-nine ‘‘especially dangerous state prisoners’’ from the

NKVD internal prison. One of them was I. I. Proskurov.4 It seemed that no

one wanted to risk having such criminals fall into German hands, so they

were being moved.

Fear that Moscow’s defenses might not hold was everywhere. That

same day, October 12, Operation Typhoon was closing in on Kalinin, a city

just north of Moscow on the suburban railroad and a key sector in the

Moscow defense system. The unhindered German advance was made pos-

sible by the failure of Kalinin’s authorities to organize its defense. The ex-

tensive defensive works constructed during the summer of 1941 by thou-

sands of volunteers were left unoccupied. Four home guard units had been

created, but they had not been trained and would melt away at the first

shots. When the Thirtieth Army established its command post in Kalinin

on the morning of October 13, its arrival seemed to be a signal for the

civilian population as well as party members, the NKVD, the police force

(militia), and the fire brigades to flee in panic toward Moscow. Although by

plan only family members were to be evacuated, nearly everyone left, from

workers to directors of enterprises, taking with them the motor transport

that should have been given to the military. About two-thirds of the resi-

dents of Kalinin left town.5

By the evening of October 13, the Germans occupied the western out-

skirts of Kalinin. Fires started by German air raids and by saboteurs were

allowed to burn unchecked. In the absence of the militia, looting of food

stores and warehouses began in earnest. When the military commander

demanded that the chief of the Kalinin Oblast NKVD order his subor-

dinates to return to the city, he threw up his hands and said there was

nothing he could do. Finally, checkpoints were organized south of the city

by the military. Among those stopped from continuing on to Moscow were

1,500 Red Army junior officers and soldiers. Nevertheless, many, both ci-

vilians and military people, got through, and their stories of the German

advance and the chaos in Kalinin must have contributed to the sense of

panic that began to grip Moscow. NKGB awareness of the Kalinin situa-

tion was probably also behind the decision to move Proskurov and other

prisoners out of Moscow.6

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THE FINAL RECKONING

As the Germans drew nearer to Mozhaisk on October 15, the Politburo

sat in continuous session, receiving reports on conditions in Moscow and

at the front lines. By late afternoon it had decided to defend the city but to

evacuate the government, the diplomatic corps, and other key institutions

to Kuibyshev (now Samara). Late that evening Molotov notified members

of the diplomatic corps of the plans for evacuation. The news spread

quickly and by the next day public order and party discipline began to fray.

Crowds waited impatiently at railroad stations for trains that never came.

Some officials used their official cars and headed east. Looting occurred at

bakeries and food stores. Some offices and factories were unable to func-

tion as their workers were absent, tending to their own affairs.

On the evening of October 16 the central offices of the NKVD were

evacuated to Kuibyshev. As of October 17, it was confirmed that a number

of ‘‘especially dangerous state criminals were being convoyed from the

NKVD internal prison in Moscow to the internal prison of the NKVD in-

Kuibyshev.’’7 There could now be no doubt that their relocation was related

to the chaotic situation in Moscow and at the front. That day Moscow

Party First Secretary A. S. Shcherbakov told Moscow citizens in a radio

broadcast that the city would be defended ‘‘to the last drop of blood.’’

Nevertheless, by October 19 Mozhaisk and Maloyaroslavets had fallen,

increasing Muscovites’ terror. Most were familiar with these cities and the

many beautiful towns and villages in the region, where some had their

country dachas. That evening the State Defense Committee (GKO) met to

review the situation, deciding that NKVD General Pavel A. Artemev would

be responsible for ‘‘the approaches to the city and for the city itself.’’ His

report on conditions in Moscow shocked the members of the GKO, and

they agreed to his recommendation that martial law be established.8 Amid

this feverish activity, Beria found time to send a trusted courier, Demian

Semenikhin, to Kuibyshev with Order No. 2756B listing various prisoners

and instructing those in authority: ‘‘Discontinue investigation, do not send

to trial, shoot immediately.’’9

At his trial in 1955, L. F. Bashtakov, the senior officer in charge of this

group of special prisoners, insisted that before Beria’s order was received

in Kuibyshev, ‘‘Shvartsman had orders to finish the interrogations, prepare

the dossiers, and send the indictments to Moscow.’’ The order to proceed

with the executions was unexpected, clearly reflecting the chaos in the

capital. It has been said that Beria acted on his own, but it seems highly

unlikely that he would have taken this step without touching base with

Stalin. Back on September 6 he had asked Stalin to sign an order for the

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237

execution of 170 dangerous prisoners being held in the Orel NKVD inter-

nal prison. (Orel was in the path of the impending offensive against Mos-

cow and was captured by the Germans on October 3.) As for the specially

dangerous group in Kuibyshev, its senior officers were well known to Sta-

lin personally. He knew he could take no chances of their escaping in the

confusion that would ensue even as far away as Kuibyshev were the Ger-

mans to take Moscow.10

It took some time to locate the prisoners on his list. According to

journalist Arkady Vaksberg, lower-ranking interrogators had not been in-

formed of the Beria order and were continuing their work. Prisoner Arzhe-

nukhin was still being interrogated on October 27, and Maria Nesterenko’s

interrogation by Ya. M. Raitses was under way on the morning of Octo-

ber 28 when Senior Major Rodos broke in, shouting: ‘‘Let’s go!’’ Shortly

thereafter five trucks left the prison.11 The release of these prisoners to the

custody of a member of an NKVD USSR special group was provided for in

Order No. 7/2–5017 from the chief of the First Special Department of the

NKVD USSR to the chief of the NKVD internal prison in Kuibyshev.12 It

would appear that Bashtakov was that person. The ‘‘October massacre’’

would soon begin.

October 28 also saw the Germans take Volokolamsk, a Sunday’s outing

away from central Moscow. There was still no assurance that Moscow

could be held. If it fell, forcing an ignominious departure by Stalin and his

cronies, his position would be threatened. No chances were to be taken,

and the secrecy of the prisoners’ removal was total.

After leaving the prison, the trucks proceeded to a settlement then

called Barysh, on the outskirts of Kuibyshev, where a walled compound

contained dachas used by the Kuibyshev Oblast NKVD directorate during

the summer months. According to Vaksberg, the prisoners were executed

and their bodies buried there. Afterward, a list of those executed was

drawn up (see appendix 3). An act dated October 28, 1941, and signed by

Bashtakov, Rodos, and Semenikhin stated that those listed had been ex-

ecuted in accordance with Order No. 2756 B from Beria.

The list is bizarre (see appendix 3). Fourteen of those named were air

force or air defense senior officers or individuals connected with weapons

development. Others were completely unrelated. For example, David A.

Rozov was the deputy people’s commissar for trade and the former head of

AMTORG, the trading company in New York well known as a cover for

Soviet intelligence officers. Dmitry A. Bulatov was secretary of the Omsk

Oblast Party Committee. The most puzzling name on the list was that of

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