What Stalin Knew (47 page)

Bomber and ground-attack aircraft will destroy with powerful blows

the aircraft on enemy aerodromes and will bomb the main con-

centrations of ground forces. Aviation strikes will be mounted to a

218

A SUMMER OF TORTURE

depth of 100–150 kilometers in German territory. Königsberg and

Memel will be bombed. No flights over Finland and Romania are to

take place without special authorization.3

This directive bore the unmistakable imprint of Stalin’s lingering hope

that the attacks were either the work of German generals endeavoring to

force Hitler into a full-scale war with the USSR or Hitler’s way of pressur-

ing him into new concessions. Hence the absence of any language in the

new directive that declares a state of war or calls for full mobilization. And

how to explain the incomprehensible order to ground troops to attack the

invading Germans but not to set foot on enemy soil? The only explanation

for why Timoshenko and Zhukov consented to this strange directive must

have been their fear of Stalin, combined with their nearly total lack of

accurate information on the state of their own forces. Communications

with front-line units, never good to begin with (many units lacked radios)

and already badly damaged by sabotage and air attacks, were being further

degraded by continuing air strikes. That part of the directive instructing

Soviet air units to attack German air fields and troop concentrations was

particularly unrealistic. On the first day of the war, the Soviets lost 1,200

aircraft, a large number of which were never able to take off from their

bases. The raids on Königsberg and Memel were accomplished by long-

range bombers of the First Aviation Corps of the reserve of the high com-

mand operating from bases in the interior but without fighter cover. On

their return flights, the bombers were intercepted by German fighters and

three were shot down.4

Beginning at 7:30 a.m., other members of the Politburo gathered along

with Georgy Dimitrov and Dimitry Z. Manuilksky of the Executive Com-

mittee of the Communist International. All those assembled felt that Stalin

needed to address the people by radio immediately. According to Mikoyan,

who was among those present, ‘‘Stalin refused and said, ‘Let Molotov do it.’

We all opposed this; the people would not understand why, at such a cru-

cial historical moment, they would hear not Stalin, first secretary of the

Central Committee of the party and chairman of the government, but

rather his deputy. It was important to us that an authoritative voice be

heard with a call to the people: ‘All rise up for the defense of the coun-

try.’ Nevertheless, our efforts to persuade him came to nothing. Because

Stalin so obstinately refused, we let Molotov speak, which he did at 12:00

noon.’’ Molotov began his speech by saying he had been directed by Com-

rade Stalin to address the people and ended by asking citizens to ‘‘close

Operation Barbarossa, June ≤≤–September ≥≠, ∞Ω∂∞

Lake

Turku

Vipuri

Helsinki

Ladoga

Stalin line

SWEDEN

Volkhov

Front line June 21

Hanko (USSR)

G U L F O F F I N L A N D

Dec. 3 1941

Leningrad

Front line July 9

evacuated by Russians

Tallinn

Tikhvin

Front line September 1

Narva

Front line September 30

Luga

German advances

Tartu

Novgorod

Trapped Russian pockets

A

L. Iimen

E

S

I C

Northwestern Front

LT

A

(Voroshilov)

Ostrov

B

Riga

Velikiye

Rezekne

Luki

Siauliai

Rzhev

Daugavpils

Idritsa

Memel

Belyy

Moscow

Polotsk

Velizh

Viazma

Kaunas

Yartsevo

Polotsk

Vilnyus

Smolensk

Army Group

Kaluga

Yelna

Orsha

North (Leeb)

Novi Borisov

Roslavl

Western Front

Minsk

Mogilev

(Timoshenko)

Grodno

Novo Bykhov

Bialystock

Gor

Go odisce

ro

Gor disce

odisce

Krichev

Bryansk

Orel

Starodub

Warsaw

Gomel

Pinsk

Brest-Litovsk

Rechitsa

Novgorod Severski

Pripet

Mozyr

Kursk

Army Group

Marshes

Cherniov

Center (Bock)

Kovel

Korosten

Backmach

Konotop
Southwestern Front

P O L A N D

Rovno

(Budenny)

Kiev

Lokhvista

Zhitomir

Kharkow

Lvow

Berdichev

Poltava

Kazatin

Cherkassy

S L OVA K I A

Vinnitsa

Kremenchug

Kamenets-Podolsky Uman

Dnepropetrovsk

Chernovtsy

Pervomaysk

H U N G A RY

Zaporozhe

Army Group

Krivoy Rog

South (Rundstedt)

Kishinev

Nikolayev

SEA OF

Odessa

Perekop

AZOV

RO M A N I A

N

0

100

200 km

Sevastopol

0

50

100

150 mi

B L A C K S E A

The main axes of the German attacks during the summer of 1941

220

A SUMMER OF TORTURE

ranks around our glorious Communist Party, around our great leader

Comrade Stalin.’’5

Even before Molotov spoke, a number of top-secret decrees were is-

sued in the name of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. One declared

martial law in selected union republics and oblasts. A second outlined the

procedures whereby martial law would be imposed by military authori-

ties. Another established military tribunals for hearing cases of violations

of martial law and imposing sentences, to include death by firing squad, on

those found guilty.6

At the front, meanwhile, the situation continued to deteriorate. Despite

rumors that Stalin was incapacitated by the shock of the German invasion,

by 1:00 p.m. on June 22 he began to act as commander in chief, even

though by right that was Timoshenko’s role. Worried that the front com-

manders were not up to their jobs, Stalin sent Zhukov to Kiev as a ‘‘repre-

sentative of the high command’’ in response to a request by Khrushchev,

first secretary of the Ukrainian party. He also sent Marshals Shaposhnikov,

Voroshilov, and Kulik to check on Dimitry Pavlov, commander of the West-

ern Front. Zhukov asked who would be in charge of the general staff while

he was gone; Stalin said, ‘ We’ll get along somehow.’’ After Zhukov had left,

Timoshenko issued another directive, at Stalin’s insistence, that called for

an offensive by all three fronts, action that Stalin thought would drive the

enemy from Soviet territory. This irrational order, reflecting as it did Sta-

lin’s total unawareness of conditions at the front, required Soviet units,

struggling desperately to defend themselves and avoid encirclement, to

prepare for offensive operations. They had no air support, were under

constant German air bombardment, and had serious shortages of fuel and

ammunition. The air attacks had not only destroyed military materiel but

resulted in damage to scarce medical supplies, destruction of dressing

stations, clinics, and hospitals, as well as shortages of qualified medical

personnel to treat the hordes of wounded. Moreover, the loss of experi-

enced commanders at the brigade and division levels as a result of Stalin’s

vicious 1937–38 purges was taking its toll as newly installed but inex-

perienced commanders tried to cope. Because of the failure of the civilian

economy to supply the quotas of trucks, tractors, and horses called for in

mobilization plans, many units suffered critical shortages in transport. It is

no wonder the offensives failed miserably in the Western and North-

western Front areas. Indeed, they actually contributed to the rapid disin-

tegration of these commands. It was only in the Southwestern Front that

an armored counteroffensive was carried out with some success.7

A SUMMER OF TORTURE

221

These early directives mandated by Stalin were half measures taken

too late to affect the outcome of the frontier battles. On June 22, 1941, the

Presidium decreed the mobilization of men subject to military service in a

number of military districts; this action, too, should have been taken much

earlier. By June 25 the Wehrmacht had advanced as much as 150 miles

along the principal axes of advance, and continuing air strikes made mobi-

lization difficult. Because the Luftwaffe continued to destroy warehouses

holding uniforms, individual weapons, and equipment, as well as ammu-

nition dumps, newly mobilized men could not be properly outfitted. Nor

was it easy to move these reinforcements to their new units. The railroads

came under constant air attack. Main and secondary roads were jammed

with civilians from the border areas fleeing blindly east from the combat

zone, often in columns stretching for as far as twenty-five miles. Military

vehicles, artillery, and marching Red Army units trying to reach the fight-

ing were blocked for hours. All these concentrations of humanity were

mercilessly strafed by German aircraft.8

The main German effort was the responsibility of Army Group Center,

under Field Marshal Fedor von Bock. With its fifty divisions and with

panzer (tank) groups on each flank, it was the largest and most powerful of

the three German army groups committed under Barbarossa. Facing it

was the Western Front, commanded by Pavlov, who had served as an ar-

mored force adviser in the Spanish civil war. Although an RU officer who

served with Pavlov in Spain had on record criticized his personal qualities

and questioned his fitness for command, Pavlov had made a good impres-

sion on Stalin when he was appointed commanding general of the Western

Special Military District. Beginning in mid-June, Pavlov had repeatedly

asked for permission to occupy defensive structures in the newly built

fortified areas. But permission had been denied.9

The night before the German assault, Pavlov was in Minsk attending

the theater. He was convinced by the rhetoric from the Kremlin that the

Germans had no intention of starting a war. The attack, therefore, came as

a total surprise to him. Although the border troop detachments on the

frontier offered fierce resistance and the air forces of the front did their

best to contest control, they were overwhelmed by the Luftwaffe. On the

first day, the Western Front lost 738 aircraft, or 40 percent of its entire

force. The Germans were able to outperform Soviet pilots, and their ma-

chines were technically superior.

Shocked by the losses incurred by his units, the commander of the

front’s air forces, Ivan I. Kopets, another Spanish War veteran, committed

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A SUMMER OF TORTURE

suicide. Dimitry A. Lestev, chief of the Propaganda Directorate of the front,

reported ‘‘At 5:00 p.m., June 22, Kopets killed himself in his office. The

suspected cause of this suicide was cowardice and the losses suffered by

aviation. Command of the front air forces has been taken over by Major

General A. I. Taiursky.’’ Ironically, at about 2:00 a.m. on June 22, before

the Germans attacked, Kopets and Taiursky, his deputy, had advised Pav-

lov that the air forces had been brought to complete combat readiness and

had been dispersed to reserve airfields in accordance with Timoshenko’s

orders.10

The air forces’ defeats in the Western Front produced another tragic

incident that reinforced the impression that these forces were simply not

ready to deal with Göring’s Luftwaffe. The commander of the Ninth Mixed

Air Division of the air forces of the Western Front, Sergei A. Chernykh, was

so devastated by the division’s loss of most of its aircraft on the ground that

he fled. He was found later in Bryansk and immediately shot.11 The prob-

lems in the Western Front were indeed catastrophic, yet Moscow had very

little idea of the real situation. Thus, on June 26 Stalin ordered Zhukov to

leave Kiev, go to the Western Front, and try to determine what needed to be

done. After spending three days with front commanders, Zhukov realized

that they had lost control and had little idea of the conditions their troops

were facing. In constant action for the past several days, under continuous

attack by Stukas (German ground-attack aircraft) of the Luftwaffe’s Sec-