Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (29 page)

There were a number of criticisms around the assault on the morning of the 25th itself. The plan required daylight so that artillery support could be given to the assault. Dickson had told Graham that the artillery would be able to suppress the defenders’ fire during the assault. Graham’s official report stated that the attack took place ‘soon after daylight’, and Fletcher stated that the assault was given at daylight … the mine having been previously sprung’.
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However, the artillery officers recorded that the assault had failed before there was sufficient light for them to determine what was happening. Dickson stated ‘the column of attack certainly moved forward too early, either from a mistake … or from over anxiety on the part of the directors’.
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Frazer was more forthright, writing ‘The assault was … made … stupidly an hour before, instead of after daybreak’.
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It is almost certain that the mine was blown before 5 a.m. as Graham’s letter to Wellington informing him of the failure of the assault was written at 5:30 a.m.
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In his biography of Sir Thomas Graham, Aspinal-Oglander strongly refutes the claim that the attack commenced before daylight, but seems to base his argument on the fact that Graham’s dispatch reported it was in daylight.
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While no account clearly stated who gave the order to start the assault, it is likely that Graham did. Even if he did not, he must, as commanding officer, still take responsibility for the failure.

General Oswald, the commander of the 5th Division, did not plan the actual attack well. Campbell of the 9th Foot was of the opinion that the troops were too extended during the assault and thought that if a compact mass had arrived at the breach they ‘would have bodily forced through all opposition’.
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He may have had a point about the organisation of the troops, but his approach would not have worked against the twenty-foot drop that the attackers were faced with in the main breach. Oswald’s plan, bearing in mind the concerns about the narrow area in which the assault had to take place, organised his troops so that those heading for the nearest breach went first followed by those who needed to pass the first breach to go to the second breach. With the failure of the assault on the first breach, the troops destined for the second breach could not get past the retiring troops and were swept back into the trenches with them.

A more contentious issue is the view expressed at the time that the 5th Division had not tried very hard. Oman called this a ‘monstrous injustice’ writing ‘everything that mismanagement could accomplish had been done to discourage them’.
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He quoted statements from Frazer and Larpent (Judge Advocate General and part of Wellington’s headquarters) who are generally respected commentators, but pointed out that neither was present at the assault. Burgoyne, recognised by Oman as one of the authorities on the siege, also recorded that the officers ‘could not get the men to follow them’.
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Jones wrote that the attack was not pressed energetically, but finished cryptically by noting although many officers thought so, it could not be true as the ‘highest authority’, Graham, had stated in his dispatch that the troops had done their best.
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One authority not used by Oman was Lieutenant Harry Jones RE, who led the column to the main breach and was captured there after being wounded. He commented:

Finding the descent [from the breach into the town] too great on the inside, I returned for the ladders … but upon reaching the foot of the breach everybody was running back with their heads between their legs as hard as they could. At the foot I waited, expecting them to rally and come on immediately, which not being the case, the enemy’s Grenadiers jumped into the breach sword in hand and made prisoners all who were able to crawl.
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Oman’s comment about the mismanagement has some validity, but this, sadly, was true of every other siege and the troops usually did their best despite the mismanagement of their superiors. Whether the criticism of the 5th Division was fair or not, this was a view held at the time and Wellington was clearly concerned enough to ask for volunteers from the other divisions, which the 5th Division took as a clear insult.

A figure that appears to have generated much of the criticism of the engineers was Lieutenant-Colonel William Gomm, who was with the Quarter Master-General’s department attached to the 5th Division and also an officer of the 9th Foot, one of the regiments involved in the failed assault. Gomm’s criticisms are extensively used by Oman, Fortescue and Myatt with variants of:

The successes [at Ciudad Rodrigo and the third siege of Badajoz were] … owing to the almost miraculous efforts of our troops has checked the progress of science among our engineers … the artillery have become as summary in their proceedings as our engineers … providing they can make a hole in the wall … they care not about destroying its defences.
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Of the above writers, only Fortescue uses the portion of Gomm’s letter that reads: ‘had we … attended to the niceties of the art in the attack of Ciudad Rodrigo or of [the third siege of] Badajoz it is possible we should have taken neither’. Gomm appeared to recognise that the sieges were being undertaken using methods that were not typical, and commented in the same letter that in his opinion there were sufficient resources to attack according to the normal rules of siege warfare. This was clearly not a view shared by Wellington, the artillery officers or the engineers. Gomm’s scathing comments continue in his subsequent letters with phrases such as: ‘escaping from the hands of those Philistines, the engineers’ and ‘when we commence [the siege] again, I dare say we shall do it a little less
en charlatan
and more
en regle
’.
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In this same letter he also notes that ‘the enemy made a sortie this morning upon our lines, and, as we did not expect them, gave us more trouble than was necessary’. Perhaps the army officers should have been paying more attention to their own duties before criticising other branches of the military. Gomm was not untypical of the ambitious, confident officer who had a view on everything, which sometimes did not match the views of their superiors or the actual circumstances. A number of the engineer officers would also fall into this category from their private letters.
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They may be entertaining to read but that does not make them accurate. It is a little more surprising that Gomm is so outspoken about scientific soldiers, because he was one of them, having attended the Royal Military College in 1805. It is possible that there was an element of professional jealousy in his opinions.

One final puzzling fact from the first siege of San Sebastian is the complete lack of comment on the presence of a large body of the Royal Sappers and Miners for the first time. Connolly’s history of the corps details their efforts in the siege and the assault,
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but there is no mention of them by either engineer or army officers

Roncesvalles and Sorauren

Soult was determined to try and relieve the invested French fortresses. On 25 July, the same day as the first assault on San Sebastian, he launched two attacks on the Allied positions at Maya and Roncesvalles. Although the 3rd and 4th Divisions were initially surprised and pushed back, the Allies regrouped and then held their ground over the next few days until Soult realised that his attack had failed. He had got within a few miles of Pamplona but could not break through. Lieutenant Wright RE, who was with the Allied troops, reported trying to warn General Byng, brigade commander in the 2nd Division, of the danger to his left flank ‘but in vain; I had not an opportunity of doing so to General Hill until the day it happened. General Hill then became very anxious about that point, but before any order could be sent the attack took place’. Wright remained with Hill until 28 July, working on repairing roads in the area and then asked for permission to return to San Sebastian. Hill ordered Wright to stay and later he was ordered to fortify the ground around Roncesvalles. He remarked ‘I have never had so much work in my life.’
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Wellington realised that Soult’s attack had nearly succeeded and, writing to Fletcher, said: ‘A great deal can be done to strengthen the positions on the right; but engineer officers and intrenching [
sic
] tools will be required. I beg to know where the field equipments [
sic
] of intrenching tools are, and what officers can be sent on this service, without loss of time.’
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In the period between the two sieges, whilst the Allies waited for new supplies of ammunition to arrive, Wellington made use of the pause by ordering an engineer officer to the port of Guetaria, as he wanted to provide the maximum number of safe anchorages for Allied shipping, particularly as winter was approaching. He asked for an investigation into ‘the time and expense would be required to construct wells’ as well as an estimate of the size of the garrison required. If wells could not be dug, then water would need to be supplied in casks. Captain Stanway was given this task and Graham reported back to Wellington on 14 August that Stanway thought ‘the making of the wells would be tedious’.
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The following day, after receiving an update from Beresford, Wellington gave up on the idea and ordered the engineers to destroy the place.

The Second Siege of San Sebastian

Whilst Wellington was busy repelling Soult’s attacks at the end of July, Graham remained at San Sebastian with sufficient troops to maintain the blockade and keep the French from recovering any of the ground that had been taken. It was not possible to stop them making repairs in the town but there was only a limited amount that they could achieve.

Following Wellington’s orders, the siege guns were returned to the transports until it was judged safe to land them again. Everything was on hold, waiting for the additional guns and ammunition from England. Four transports arrived on 19 August containing two full siege trains and a further full siege train arrived on the 21st. There was now sufficient roundshot to consider restarting the siege. For the first time in the Peninsular War, the Allied army had more heavy guns than it could use.

All the guns were back in place and fifty-seven guns opened fire on the morning of 26 August. The plan, as mentioned above, was similar to that used in the first siege. The larger number of guns on the eastern attack would attempt to destroy the whole south-eastern corner of the fortress. There were fewer guns used on the attack on the left (isthmus) and they made poor progress due to the distance from the walls. Graham complained about this on the 26th and 28th,
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and Wellington ordered a new battery to be constructed. Frazer noted that ‘Wellington wisely ordered another and more advanced battery’.
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This battery had an immediate impact on the wall of the fortress when it opened fire.

A false attack was made on the night of the 29th, to try to get the French to blow any mines they had placed in the defences of the town, but they were not taken in. By the next day, the damage caused by the batteries formed one continuous breach in the walls, and many of the guns were turned to attacking any remaining defensive armament, the intention being to assault the town the following morning at low tide.

The assault was scheduled for 11 a.m. on 30 August. The situation with regard to the perceived lack of effort from the 5th Division in the first assault was resolved to no-one’s satisfaction. General Leith, who had returned as commander of the 5th Division on the 27th, refused to have the volunteers lead the assault and they were to be held in reserve, with the 5th Division making the attack. The attack started on time and once again the troops could not get through the breaches due to the fire and defences of the French. The volunteer reserves were also thrown in without effect. An attack was also made across the estuary by the Portuguese but they did not make any better progress. After about an hour, Graham gave the risky order for the siege guns to open fire and sweep the walls and defences of the town over the heads of the attacking troops. Twenty minutes later, when the guns ceased firing, the assault had finally made some progress with the French retreating into the castle. By 2 p.m., the town was in Allied hands, but it was also in ruins and large parts of it were on fire due to the shelling. Following what was now becoming the norm, many of the troops dispersed in an orgy of looting and destruction that took two full days to settle down. During this period, Graham and Wellington were genuinely concerned that if the French made a sortie from the castle, the Allies would be hard-pressed to hold the town. Fortunately, the French were in no fit state to do so.

The Allied guns were now turned on the castle. Beginning on 1 September, they bombarded it for the next six days during which time fires continued to rage through the town. The French governor, Rey, refused another summons on the 3rd, and new batteries were prepared to attack the castle. At 10 a.m. on 8 September, fifty-six guns opened on the castle, which had no shelters for the French or their prisoners. Rey finally accepted the inevitable and raised the white flag around noon.