Wellington’s Engineers: Military Engineering on the Peninsular War 1808-1814 (25 page)

Two arches of the formed bridge at Merida have been exploded with gunpowder and I have been desired to make the bridge passable again. The width of the opening is 66 feet 6 inches, fortunately part of the pier still remains 6 or 7 feet above the level of the river, which will assist our operation very much I have desired the Alcalde of the place to collect the necessary timbers; and I should think in a fortnight the passage of the bridge may be restored.
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A month later, Squire was dead, having collapsed and died at Truxillo.

In the north, the French made a reconnaissance in strength towards Almeida, inspecting the repairs and the activity of the garrison. They tried to pass over the Agueda at San Felices but the bridge, which had been previously mined by a Portuguese engineer, was blown. Having determined that there was no opportunity to re-take the fortress, they retired. The repairs at Ciudad Rodrigo were under the charge of the Spanish engineers. Burgoyne noted that Lieutenant William Reid RE who formed a good working relationship with the Spanish General D’España was given charge of part of the repairs and this had allowed greater progress to be made. Whilst these activities carried on in the background, Wellington was looking further east.

Following the successful siege of Badajoz, the army moved north at a relatively slow pace, Burgoyne saying this was to avoid tiring the troops. For the first time in months he was not busy ‘being now unemployed at Headquarters’. He asked John Squire to send him the captured diary of the French siege of Badajoz for him to read during his leisure time.
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The French were watching Wellington’s advance with concern and they started evacuating their sick and stores from Salamanca. Preparations were also underway to defend the city from the advancing Allies. Burgoyne noted on 18 May 1812, a month before they arrived, that ‘they are fortifying some of the convents and have pulled down 300 or 400 houses around them’.
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On the same day, General Hill was carrying out a daring raid on the French crossing-point over the Tagus at Almaraz, the most westerly crossing-point they held. Wellington ordered Hill to carry out the raid on 24 April and to make his preparations in great secrecy. Hill departed from Almendralejo, south of the Guadiana, and advanced to Merida, arriving on 9 May, before the bridge repairs had been completed by Squire and Lieutenant Peter Wright RE. Hill had to wait three days before he could cross the river on the repaired bridge. Hill’s force also had six pontoons with them. John Squire was with Hill when he arrived in Truxillo on 15 May, but he fell ill and died two days later, leaving Lieutenant Wright unexpectedly in the position of senior engineer with Hill’s force. Approaching the pass of Miravete on the 17th, Hill looked without success for a way to get his artillery into the valley of Almaraz. The following morning, Lieutenant Wright was ordered to reconnoitre the forts and the terrain but no route for the artillery could be identified. Hill now decided to attack without his guns and the troops filed through the hills, falling on the French defences at daybreak on 19 May, ejecting the garrisons from the forts and destroying the bridge. Wright was wounded in the attack and it is not clear what role he had in directing the destruction of the forts and the bridges. It is probable than Dickson would have taken charge of this. One of the artillery officers, Lieutenant Thiele from the King’s German Legion artillery, was killed whilst setting off the explosives at Fort Ragusa.

Whilst this operation was under way, Wellington took the opportunity to dispatch Burgoyne to visit the Douro and clarify what appeared to be contradictory reports on its navigability. Burgoyne spent the next three weeks examining the river and making recommendation on improvements, returning just before Wellington moved on Salamanca.

On 2 May, about the same time as authorising Hill’s raid on Almaraz, Wellington ordered Colonel Sturgeon of the Royal Staff Corps to proceed to the damaged bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara and determine if it could be repaired.
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Again, secrecy was essential so that the French could not determine his strategy. Wellington needed the bridge repaired so that he could move the siege guns from Elvas for the attack on Salamanca. As described earlier, the bridge at Alcantara had been broken in May 1809, with one of the arches destroyed. The gap was about 100 feet wide with a drop of over 100 feet and there was no easy way of repairing it. With Captain Alexander Todd RSC, Sturgeon came up with an ingenious solution that was effectively a rope suspension bridge. Using material and some expertise supplied by the Royal Navy, he constructed a rope structure that could be tensioned using capstans and then have a roadway placed across it. It was pre-prepared at Elvas and transported to Alcantara where it was ready for use on 11 June.
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With these two operations, Wellington had significantly altered the strategic situation in central Spain. The loss of Almaraz now meant that the French had to travel further east to cross the Tagus and the repair of Alcantara reduced the distance the Allied had to travel. Wellington could now manoeuvre his forces much quicker than the enemy. Writing to Liverpool, he said:

The bridge over the Tagus at Alcantara, by Leith-Hay
.

The result … been to cut off the shortest and best communication between the army of the south [Soult] and the ‘
Armee de Portugal
’ [Marmont] which under existing circumstances, it will be difficult, if not impossible to re-establish.
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Dickson was ordered to move a brigade of six 24-pounder howitzers to Alcantara, ready to cross the river Tagus. Arriving on 9 June, he had to wait two days until Sturgeon completed the repairs. He then moved on to Salamanca, arriving on the 20th. Four 18-pounder guns were also dispatched from Almeida to make up the artillery for the attacks on the forts at Salamanca. These arrived on 17 June and, as Dickson had not arrived yet, three howitzers were borrowed from a field brigade to start the attacks.

The logistical challenges of moving even such a small siege train need to be described to understand the difficulties that moving stores and equipment caused. To move the four siege guns and a small quantity of shot and spares from Almeida required fifty bullock carts each with two bullocks. Each of the siege guns required twenty bullocks, making a total of 180 animals. To move the six 24-pounder howitzers (which were effectively field pieces) and their shot required 150 bullocks.
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Dickson noted that a further 120 bullocks joined them
en route
. To move these ten small guns needed a total of 450 bullocks! It is also worth saying more about the 24-pounder howitzer. This piece was alternatively known as a 24-pounder carronade or a 5½in howitzer. Most readers on the British army in this period will be familiar with the 5½in howitzer as a low-powered field piece which gave some high-angle capability to field batteries. As a siege piece it was nearly useless, having neither the power nor the accuracy to attack fortresses.

Capture of the Forts at Salamanca

Wellington approached Salamanca on 17 June, with the 6th Division taking the lead in the investment. Burgoyne commanded the attack against the three forts, assisted by Lieutenants Reid and Pitts RE. Jones noted that the forts were ‘found to be more respectable than supposed’,
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suggesting that their strength had been badly underestimated. Work started the same night on the battery to attack the fort of San Vicente but limited progress was made, with Burgoyne complaining about the behaviour of the inexperienced troops: ‘Great difficulty was found in keeping them to work under this fire. The Portuguese in particular, absolutely went on their hands and knees and dragged their baskets along the ground, It was impossible that much work could be done under these circumstances.’
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Whilst the first battery was being completed, an attempt was made to destroy the ditch in front of the convent. Lieutenant Reid and four miners crawled forward to attempt to construct the mine. They gave up after several attempts to approach unseen were thwarted by the presence of a dog with the defenders.

On the night of 18 June, the first battery was completed and the four 18-pounders and three 24-pounder howitzers were installed. Two additional small batteries were constructed for five other small howitzers. The next day the main battery opened and fired with some effect for three hours when it had to stop to conserve the meagre amount of ammunition available. One of the other batteries now opened with two 24-pounder howitzers. Little further damage was caused to San Vicente but the artillerymen firing the guns suffered severe casualties due to the limited protection afforded by the batteries. The stock of ammunition was now so low that an order was sent to Almeida for more.

The firing continued on San Vicente on 20 June but was suspended until more ammunition arrived and also until the intentions of Marshal Marmont, who had arrived in the vicinity, were clear. On the 23rd, the remaining ammunition was fired against the Gayetano fort in the hope that a breach could be made and enable an assault. No breach was made but Wellington ordered an assault to be made that night. Lieutenant Reid led the party forward but there was limited enthusiasm and the attempt failed. When more ammunition arrived on 26 June, the firing on Gayetano commenced, with red-hot shot also being fired against San Vicente. Trenches continued to be dug forward trying to get closer to the forts. Finally, on 27 June, a breach was formed in Gayetano and San Vicente was set on fire, leading to both being taken with little resistance.

It had taken nine days to reduce these three temporary defences. The artillery available was barely capable of breaching them and insufficient shot and shell had been available, leading to delays in taking them. There is no doubt that Wellington knew that the French were fortifying Salamanca. He admitted that he underestimated the strength of the forts, saying ‘I was mistaken in my estimate of the extent of the means which would be necessary to subdue the forts’.
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The three forts were now dismantled and Burgoyne also noted that several days later Wellington asked for further defences to be destroyed and Lieutenant Reid was dispatched for this purpose.
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Reid’s efforts during the siege were recognised in the Divisional Orders: ‘The zeal and conspicuously gallant conduct of Lieutenant Reid of the Royal Engineers has not failed to attract the particular attention of the Major-General [Clinton] and he trusts they will be duly appreciated by the Commander of the Forces.’
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A tense stalemate now developed, with the Allied and French forces manoeuvring in the vicinity of Salamanca, each looking for an opportunity. This came on 22 July, when Marmont over-extended his troops in trying to outflank the Allied army, giving Wellington the opportunity he had been waiting for. He turned his forces on the spread-out French and comprehensively defeated them. Over the coming days the French were pursued north, Wellington entering Valladolid on 30 July. The Allies now turned towards Madrid, arriving there on 12 August. Hearing that French troops were still in the Retiro fort, Wellington sent Burgoyne to demand their surrender. The use of Burgoyne for this task reflects the level of trust in him (or possibly a lack of language skills amongst the gentry on Wellington’s staff). There were several occasions in the coming months when Burgoyne carried out tasks like this for Wellington, even though other members of his staff were available. Although the French refused to surrender at Burgoyne’s request, two days later, realising that resistance was hopeless, they marched out of the fort into captivity. After a couple of weeks of inactivity, Wellington now moved north, his objective being Burgos.

The Siege of Burgos

To take full advantage of his successes in the first half of 1812, Wellington had to hold his forward position, and to do this he needed to take Burgos. The Allies had taken the artillery used at Salamanca with them. These were three 18-pounder guns, one of the original four having been irreparably damaged, and five 24-pounder carronades.
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Having acknowledged that this train was not sufficient for Salamanca, it is difficult to understand why this was all Wellington brought to Burgos. Whilst not a first-rate fortress, was strong enough to resist the attackers’ guns. The defenders also had significantly more ordnance with which to resist the attack. Of even more concern to the Allies was the very limited amount of shot, shell and powder, which meant that the attackers were worried about supply levels before they had fired the first shot.

Wellington took with him four divisions and two independent Portuguese brigades. The more experienced 3rd, 4th and Light Divisions, that had suffered most of the casualties at Ciudad Rodrigo and Badajoz earlier in the year, were not assigned to this siege, as Wellington did not expect serious resistance.

The general plan was to take the hornwork of San Miguel on the first night and establish batteries there. At the same time, trenches would be dug from the suburb of San Pedro to enable a mine to be placed under the outer wall, which would be assaulted when the mine was blown. The two sets of inner defences would then be breached using the batteries. There were only five engineer officers, Lieutenant Colonel Jones, Captain Williams and Lieutenants Pitts and Reid, commanded by John Burgoyne. Fletcher was still at Badajoz finishing its repairs. Additional support came from ten assistant engineers (five of whom had previous experience),
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eighty-one volunteers from the line regiments and eight Royal Military Artificers.

The fortress was invested on 19 September, and the same tactics employed at Ciudad Rodrigo were used, with an immediate assault on the San Miguel hornwork that protected the preferred point of attack. It was taken with heavy casualties of seventy-one killed and 349 wounded. Oman described this as a ‘vast and unnecessary loss of life’.
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Jones privately criticised the orders that were given to support the assault: ‘Luckily the assaulting columns carried the work and success glossed over this most unmilitary and inefficient mode of supporting them.’
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On the morning of the 20th, Burgoyne had a narrow escape when he was hit on the head by a musket ball, He recorded that ‘it was fortunately a distant shot and of not much consequence’.
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Work immediately started on two batteries, the first of which was fitted with two guns and three howitzers on the night of the 22nd/23rd.
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Then Wellington decided to change the plan ‘with a view to abridge the attack and save the troops from unnecessary fatigue’.
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He ordered an assault on the outer line of defences the same night, but the small group of 400 volunteers failed completely, suffering 158 casualties. Lieutenant Reid led the attackers forward. For the second time in three days, Wellington had used his troops as cannon fodder without taking the time to soften the defences. He then reverted back to the original plan to mine the outer wall. The defenders kept up a continual fire of shot and shell on the attackers and the trenches were so close to the walls that the French could roll the shells down the hill into them. Captain Williams was killed on the night of the 23rd/24th whilst working in the trenches. Engineering expertise was now so limited that Lieutenant Pitts, who had broken his arm when thrown from his horse, was forced to resume duty.
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The Allied battery opened for the first time on 25 September. Dickson commented at the end of the first day that ‘it being found from the want of precision in the [24-pounder] howitzers with round shot, a greater expenditure of ammunition would be required … than the limited means … could afford’.
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Ten per cent of the available round shot were used in one day to discover that the guns were highly inaccurate! Dickson recorded that the soldiers were offered a bounty for every roundshot they could recover for re-use and so as not to discourage them, even roundshot of calibres which were of no use were paid for. Wellington wrote to both the Royal Navy and the nearest fortresses for additional supplies. On the same day, a mine was started to run a shaft through to the ditch. On the 29th, the a mine was declared ready and the assault planned for that night. Like the previous attempt, the assault party was small, only 300 men. The mine exploded, but the assault failed due to the forlorn hope losing their way in the dark and missing the breach. There was no engineer officer available to accompany the assault party and this probably was a contributing factor to the soldiers losing their way.
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Jones noted that the effect of 1,000 pounds of powder in the mine did not have the impact he would have expected and this may have been because the mine was placed against old foundations rather than against the current wall.
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Work progressed on a second mine and a new battery close to the wall on the west side of the fortress. The French detected it before the battery had opened fire and they pounded it mercilessly, damaging two of the three guns that Wellington possessed. On the orders of Wellington, the two damaged guns were mounted on temporary carriages and fired with reduced charges (and reduced effect) for the remainder of the siege. The second mine was successfully blown on 4 October, and finally the outer wall was taken by a battalion of the 24th Foot. Casualties during the assault amounted to thirty-seven killed and 213 wounded. Among the wounded was John Jones, reducing the number of engineer officers present to three. His injuries forced him to return home, although this did give him the spare time to publish in 1814 the first edition of his comprehensive work on the British sieges of the Peninsular War. Jones’ autobiography described the circumstances: