War Stories II (56 page)

But the Americans weren't the only ones who had learned lessons at Peleliu. The Japanese didn't bother to return fire on the U.S. battleships and cruisers—they were too far out at sea. Instead, the surprised defenders hunkered down in their holes waiting for softer targets—the landing craft ferrying MacArthur's troops from ship to shore.

Despite a Philippine occupation force that numbered more than 270,000, the Japanese troops ashore, led by General Tomoyuki Yamashita, were woefully unprepared for MacArthur's invasion. On Leyte, the 16,000 men of the Imperial Army's 16th Division were short on supplies, ammunition, and fuel. American carrier aircraft had bombed their air force practically out of existence. And U.S. Navy submarines, operating from bases in New Guinea, New Britain, and the Marianas, were sinking Japanese merchant ships and crude oil carriers faster than they could be replaced.

Early on the morning of 20 October, MacArthur and Kinkaid agreed that the landing beaches had been sufficiently “prepared.” When MacArthur was told that the headquarters of the 16th Division had likely been destroyed, he is said to have remarked, “Good, that's the outfit that did the dirty work on Bataan.” Shortly before dawn on 20 October, Kinkaid gave the order: “Land the landing force.”

The assault, led by the 96th and 24th Infantry Divisions, began after sunrise as the final fires from hundreds of heavy guns swept the beaches and more than 1,000 carrier aircraft crowded the skies. Well before noon, soldiers of the 96th Infantry Division had captured Hill 120, a key D-Day objective. On the other side of the waterfront town of Tanuan, the 24th Infantry Division moved smartly inland. Then, a little after noon, a Navy landing craft motored to within a few feet of the beach. It let down its ramp, and with bullets snapping through the air a few hundred meters away, General Douglas MacArthur strode through the shallow water to the shore. The old general had kept his promise: He had returned.

Once ashore, MacArthur headed to the 24th Infantry Division's command post. From there he broadcast a message to the Filipino people and to
listeners in America: “This is the voice of freedom. People of the Philippines, I have returned.” After informing them that Filipino president Sergio Osmeña, Manuel Quezon's successor, had returned with him, he concluded with “Let no heart be faint.”

One of those who was there for this remarkable moment was twenty-two-year-old First Lieutenant Paul Austin from Ft. Worth, Texas, the commander of F Company, 2nd Battalion, 34th Infantry, 24th Infantry Division.

The Japanese army may not have been prepared for MacArthur's return to the Philippines, but the Imperial Navy was as ready as it could be given the shortages Japan was experiencing from the U.S. Navy's round-the-clock submarine attacks. Word of the Leyte landings was passed quickly and from Tokyo, Admiral Soemu Toyoda quickly put his Sho One plan into effect.
Sho
is the Japanese word for victory, and Toyoda intended to be victorious.

The Imperial Navy's Sho One plan was a last-ditch effort to engage the U.S. Navy in a decisive battle. Within hours of learning about the landings on Leyte, most of the remaining ships in the First Striking Force were under way, steaming toward the Philippines from their base in Brunei, on the island of Borneo. Admiral Soemu Toyoda had a complicated plan—but one
goal: to engage and destroy a U.S. fleet that outnumbered him almost three to one.

Toyoda hoped to lure the American 3rd Fleet away from the invasion beaches and get it into a position where the Japanese could trap it and inflict mortal damage to the ships and men.

Knowing he was outnumbered—particularly in aircraft—Toyoda believed that his more experienced commanders could somehow prevail. His subordinates shared that belief in the Sho One plan, themselves, and their ships.

Admiral Takeo Kurita, aboard the heavy cruiser
Atago
, commanded the Japanese First Attack Force, consisting of five battleships—the
Kongo
,
Haruna
, and the “super battleships”
Nagato
,
Yamato
, and
Musashi
—nine other heavy cruisers, and thirteen destroyers. The three “supers” were the largest battleships ever built and the
Yamato
boasted eighteen-inch guns.

Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, who had been humiliated at the “Great Marianas Turkey Shoot,” led the Northern Force of carriers. Though Ozawa's primary mission was to act as a decoy for Halsey, he was placed in overall tactical command of the operation. A third Japanese naval task force called the Southern Force was split into two separate units, SF-1 and SF-2. Admiral Shoji Nishimura's battleships, cruisers, and destroyers were designated SF-1, and Admiral Kiyohide Shima led a similar surface action force called SF-2. They, along with Kurita's force, intended to enter the Leyte Gulf from opposite sides—Kurita from the north and Nishimura and Shima from the south—in an effort to box in the Americans. Admiral Toyoda calculated that if he could catch the Americans in this “pincer movement” he could trap, destroy, and sink the American ships.

And, like so many other Japanese naval operations, Toyoda's plan relied on deception. He hoped to use Ozawa's task force as a decoy to get Halsey's 3rd Fleet to leave the area around Leyte and go after Ozawa's carriers. Toyoda and Ozawa gambled that, if tempted with nailing four Japanese aircraft carriers, Halsey would leave his station at the east entrance to the San Bernardino Strait and go after the really “big fish.”

If all worked as planned, then Ozawa would engage the 3rd Fleet while the other Japanese task forces moved in and decimated the landing forces and the covering ships of the 7th Fleet. Then, in withdrawal, Kurita's force could come to Ozawa's assistance in a decisive battle to destroy or at least severely cripple the U.S. 3rd Fleet. At least, that was the plan.