Wandering Greeks (29 page)

The Phoenicians, as we have just seen, had a reputation for raiding, but they certainly did not monopolize the profession. In fact they may well have been unfairly singled out as perpetrators. The “son of Castor,” one of the Cretan personae adopted by Odysseus when he returns
incognito to Ithaca, boldly asserts that “much wealth came my way” from being a raider. He further states that he “went among the people of Crete as one who was feared and respected,” a claim that tells us much about the morally ambivalent value system that prevailed in Homeric Greece (
Od
. 14.234). Brigands and pirates operated more or less at will in the archaic and classical periods. Though pirates were kept in check in the fifth century, when Athenian naval power was at its height, they seem to have been particularly prevalent in the fourth century and proved largely immune to Alexander the Great's efforts to control them (Str.
Geog
. 5.3.5 C232; McKechnie 1989, 122–26).

Much about the lifestyle of such individuals is shrouded in mystery. We do not know what circumstances might have induced a man to choose such a career path. In some cases the career no doubt ran in the family; in others it was the result of exigency. Many able-bodied refugees must have turned their hand to raiding, whether on land or on the high seas. We tend to think of raiders as living wholly outside the law, but what constituted legality was not the same in antiquity as it is today. We should not rule out the possibility that they were able to retire in comfort and style, as “the son of Castor” claims to have done, particularly if they had enriched their local communities. If this is the case, they must have retained ties with their homeland. Indeed some at least may have led lives of partial domesticity.

Mercenaries

Mercenaries, known variously as
misthophoroi
(pay-earners),
xenoi
(foreigners), or
stratiôtai
(soldiers), comprised by far the largest number of itinerants. They are attested from the second half of the seventh century onward, though they almost certainly existed earlier. One such is Antimenidas, the brother of the lyric poet Alcaeus of Mytilene, who fought in the Babylonian army, possibly under Nebuchadnezzar when he campaigned in modern-day Israel and destroyed Ascalon in 604 (fr. 350 Campbell). From the seventh to the fifth centuries, however, the
demand for mercenaries in the Greek world declined and was largely confined to tyrants such as Pisistratus of Athens, whose authority depended on private armies. However, those who practiced a specialized discipline, notably Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers, continued to be in demand. We also know that the Athenians employed mercenary rowers in their fleet, both in the fifth and fourth centuries (Thuc. 1.121.3; Dem. 50.14–18).

Mercenaries, as we have seen, were numerous in Sicily, partly because the
poleis
did not have sufficient manpower to perform all their military duties, largely because of the threat from the Carthaginians from the beginning of the fifth century onward. It was the worsening economic conditions at the end of the Peloponnesian War and, later, in the fourth century that generated the rise of mercenaries on an unprecedented scale. This was aggravated by the frequency of
stasis
consequent upon the unstable conditions that resulted from the weakened condition of Athens and Sparta, since this drove large numbers of able-bodied men into exile. Yet another reason for the rise of mercenaries was the increased dependency upon light-armed troops known as “peltasts.” (Their name derived from the
pelta
, a crescent-shaped shield made of wicker.) Unlike the hoplite, whose equipment represented a substantial financial investment, a peltast could be armed with little financial outlay.

Though the extent to which individual city-states used mercenaries varied considerably, only the most backward and isolated parts of the Greek world were spared what many commentators, Isocrates most vociferously, saw as a menace to civilized society. From his privileged perspective and that of others like him, mercenaries were the dregs of society and they deserved nothing but contempt. In his
Address to Philip
(dated 346) he wrote (5.120–21):

If we do not put a stop to those who wander about without the means to support themselves and who assault all those whom they encounter by providing them with an adequate livelihood, they are in danger of becoming so numerous without our realizing it that they will become as formidable as the barbarians.

Although Isocrates was no doubt exaggerating, he obviously expected his scaremongering to work, which indicates that there was a genuine alarm at the prospect of a breakdown in the political and social order provoked by vagrants armed to the teeth and capable—in the hysterical hype of Athens's equivalent of a tabloid journalist—of dealing the deathblow to civilization. There is, of course, at least a kernel of truth to what he says in that unemployed mercenaries—an unidentifiable percentage of their total—would have had little option but to turn their hands to extortion and intimidation. Mercenaries also contributed to political instability, notably in Syracuse, where 20 out of 27 outbreaks of
stasis
saw their involvement (Berger 1992, 90).

It has been estimated that between 399 and 375 BCE, “there were never fewer than 25,000 mercenaries in service, and often more” (Davies 1993, 199). Faced with a severe demographic shortfall, even Sparta with its proud tradition of militarism came to rely on their services (Xen.
Hell
. 4.4.14). Aeneas Tacticus, who was writing in the middle of the fourth century, assumed that mercenaries would be in the employ of every Greek state (10.7, 12.2–5). His recommendation that they should never be more numerous than those who serve in the citizen militia is a clear indication of how much their services were in demand.

Greek mercenaries served abroad as well as in their homeland, and it was in fact the hiring of the Ten Thousand—or to be more precise, the hiring of 10,400 hoplites and 2,500 peltasts—by the Persian prince Cyrus the Younger in 401 that thrust them into the limelight and demonstrated their unrivaled excellence as fighters. The band did not come exclusively from the most underdeveloped and impoverished parts of the Greek world, as had generally been the case up to now. This may have been in part due to the Peloponnesian War, which had thrown many parts of Greece into economic turmoil. Indeed many of those who signed up for service under Cyrus had probably fought in that war. Owing to its duration, they might in some cases have been ill-suited to any other career. They included Athenians, Boeotians, and Spartans, as well as Achaeans, Arcadians, and Thessalians. The peltasts comprised Cretan archers and Rhodian slingers. Few of the Ten Thousand came
from East Greece. Their leadership was primarily in the hands of Athenians and Spartans.

Cyrus's objective was to seize the throne from his brother King Artaxerxes II, though he seems to have kept that fact secret as long as he could, so as not to discourage recruits from enlisting (Marinovic 1988, 27). His bid failed due to his death in battle, but this in no way tarnished the image of the Greek mercenary. Quite the contrary in fact, since the Ten Thousand—or more accurately about half that number—succeeded, despite hunger, exhaustion, and frostbite, in making their way through hostile territory to the port city of Trapezus on the shores of the Black Sea, while being buffeted by the snows of central Anatolia—a journey of some 1,900 miles—in effect “a
polis
on the move,” as they have been aptly described (Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1977, 380).

This event, which was immortalized in Xenophon's
Anabasis
or
March Up-Country
, marks the beginning of an era in which the mercenary became central not only to Greek warfare but also to the political and social life of the city-state. Henceforth a floating population numbering in the tens of thousands was perpetually available for hire. Consequently, there were probably more Greeks in the fourth century on the move looking for employment, or, failing that, scouring the landscape for the means of survival, than there had been at any time previously.

Some seventy years after Cyrus's campaign, Greek mercenaries served in the army of Darius III, when he was defending his empire against Alexander the Great. Though Alexander vilified them as traitors, they saw themselves as patriots defending Greek freedom against Macedonian oppression. They had a point. When Darius was defeated, some of them were conveyed to the equivalent of labor camps in Macedon, others fled, and a number of them fought to the last. Still others switched their allegiance and enlisted in Alexander's army.

Though primarily attracted by the prospect of adventure and plunder, mercenaries sought to acquire some degree of social respectability as soldiers of fortune. After all, even a man of means could take pride in the fact that he had served with a distinguished mercenary general. The defendant in a speech by the Athenian metic Isaeus (2.6), who fought
in Thrace under Iphicrates, saw fit to boast of this fact before an Athenian jury. Likewise Lycomedes of Mantinea took pride in the fact that no mercenaries were more sought after than the Arcadians, amongst whom he himself numbered (Xen.
Hell
. 7.1.23).

Though mercenary generals amassed fortunes, this was hardly true of those who served in the ranks. Most signed up because they could not find better employment. Cyrus was unusual in having a reputation for being generous. The truth is that much about a mercenary's job was lousy. The pay was often irregular, the conditions of service harsh in the extreme, and one's paymaster a law unto himself. We know nothing about the fate of career mercenaries who sustained a serious, perhaps crippling injury. Was any provision made for them? Aeneas Tacticus, who was probably an Arcadian, recommended that before a campaign got under way the terms of their contract should be proclaimed, and if any mercenary found them unacceptable, he should be free to withdraw, whereas if he attempted to do so afterward he should be sold into slavery (10.18–19). We do not know whether this practice was ever adopted, though some basic contractual agreement advertising the rate of pay and outlining the campaign's objective would surely have been essential.

Some mercenaries, like modern professionals, had families awaiting them back home. This included many of the Ten Thousand, who, as Xenophon informs us, “longed to return safely to Greece” (
Anab
. 6.4.8), rather than establish a settlement on the southern shore of the Black Sea, as he had hoped. We can only speculate as to what might have been the domestic circumstances of those who chose not to return to Greece. Marriage to a local woman was obviously the best option, but we have no way of knowing how long a career mercenary might have remained in one place. It is a fair assumption that many of them would have served for a strictly limited period of time before being hired by a different employer and dispatched to another region—a situation hardly conducive to domesticity.

Mercenary settlements were sometimes established in foreign territory, either to provide a base for support, to serve as a garrison, or to reward mercenaries who had reached the end of their careers. The first
two factors were certainly to the fore when Dionysius I of Syracuse established his mercenary settlements at the beginning of the fourth century (see earlier,
chapter 4
). Alexander the Great, too, had similar objectives when he settled his mercenaries in the East. When a rumor broke out that he had died, 3,000 of them abandoned settlements in Bactria and Sogdiana and headed back to Greece, whether to be massacred by the Macedonians (D.S. 17.99.6) or to make good their escape (Curtius 9.7.11). Sometimes, however, mercenaries chose to settle abroad, like those of the Ten Thousand who were eager to establish a foundation at Calpe Harbor, midway between Heraclea Pontica and Byzantium (Xen.
Anab
. 6.4.1–7).

Being temperamentally unfit for civic responsibility and inclined by training to impose their will by force, mercenaries posed a serious threat to settled urban life. Diodorus Siculus reports a particularly egregious example of bad behavior on the part of Dionysius I's Campanian mercenaries that occurred at the end of his war against Carthage in 404. The mercenaries in question journeyed to Entella, where they “induced” the citizen body (“bullied” might be a better word) to admit them as
sunoikoi
(fellow citizens). Once inside, they “fell upon all the men of military age by night, married”—presumably by raping—“the wives of the men with whom they had broken faith, and took possession of the city” (14.9.8–9). This, however, is an extreme case, and though it remains questionable how effectively settlements occupied by mercenaries functioned overall, the desire for land and citizenship at the end of one's working life was logical and understandable. Since, moreover, many thousands of them were non-Greek, their incorporation in the life of the
polis
contributed significantly to the hellenization of Sicily (Berger 1992, 91–92).

Persons of No Fixed Abode

Itinerants include those whose livelihood depends on begging and casual employment. Since, moreover, borders were highly porous, there must have been a large number of people who were in effect stateless.
Both Hesiod (
Op
. 299–302, 395–400, 498–99) and Tyrtaeus (10
IEG
) suggest that the prospect of becoming homeless in the archaic world was an ever-present reality, though what percentage of the population sunk to this level is impossible to determine. It is not improbable that the number increased dramatically in the fourth century, as a result of the political upheavals and economic problems that we discussed a moment ago. Vagrants not only faced hardship but also opprobrium. Plato, like many educated and wealthy Greeks, believed that beggary was the consequence of idleness, and he refused to admit such people into his ideal state on the grounds that “they make their livelihood by endless entreaties” (Pl.
Rep
. 552a–e). Significantly,
ptôchos
(beggar), derives from
ptoôssô
(shrink from, skulk, cringe). In other words, the very attitude and appearance of the beggar, quite apart from his or her circumstances, aroused both loathing and fear.