Unbound Feet: A Social History of Chinese Women in San Francisco (41 page)

With the tide of the labor movement as it is in the United States today,
Chinese who work in any big scale industry cannot remain aloof from
the trend of unionization.... As the situation stands now, failure on the
part of the Chinese to organize will mean that they will only continue to
work for low wages and long hours. Eventually, as we have already hinted,
it may mean that the American garment workers' unions may take drastic measures to combat the competition of the Chinese in this industry.
In such an event the Chinese, in all probability, will be the losers.'20

Historically, however, Chinese workers had been regarded by white
workers as unfair competition, scapegoated and attacked during hard eco nomic times, relegated to unskilled, low-wage, and dead-end jobs, and
actively excluded from the larger labor movement; it was therefore not
surprising that they resisted the ILGWU's attempts to unionize them.
If Chinatown garment shops were to have any work at all, they had little choice but to bid low on contracts and cut into their workers' wages
to make up the difference. Chinese workers who did not speak English,
had few marketable skills, and faced racial discrimination in the labor market had little choice but to accept the poor working conditions in Chinatown. To compound matters, they were usually also beholden to their
employers, who in most cases were kin.

Chinese workers at the National Dollar Stores factory were aware of
the union's motives. "They wanted to organize us," said Sue Ko Lee,
who became involved in the 193 8 strike. "They tried and tried, but they
couldn't break the barrier. The white shops were already organized and
they were clamoring that the contractors were sending work out to the
Chinese workers, and that was a thorn in their sides. So they had to organize the Chinese. 11121 This was indeed the situation in 1934, when Rose
Pesotta, a committed labor organizer for the ILGWU, blew the whistle
on the deplorable working conditions in the Chinese "subterranean
sweatshops" in an attempt to bring Chinatown into the union's fold.112
NRA code enforcers were called in, and a number of Chinese garment
shops were cited or shut down for code violations. 121 But try as she did,
Pesotta was not successful in unionizing Chinatown shops. She simply
could not convince Chinese employers or employees that the ILGWU
could protect them from racial discrimination in the open market. Nor
could she get other trade unions to support her on the issue.124

Next Ben Fee was hired by ILGWU to organize garment workers in
Chinatown. The son of an American-born Chinese interpreter, he arrived in the United States in 192.2. when he was thirteen years old. He
was one of the first Chinese to be recruited into the U.S. Communist
Party and was active in such leftist organizations as the Chinese Students
Association, the Alaska Cannery Workers Union, and the Chinese Workers Mutual Aid Association. Neither the Chinatown establishment nor
the ILGWU appreciated his radical views. Shortly after his appointment,
he was forced out of the ILGWU because of his Communist background. In 1938, Ben Fee left San Francisco for New York because of
marital problems that had destroyed his credibility in the Chinese com-
munity.'25

Jennie Matyas, who next took on the challenge, had more success. A
dedicated Socialist and union organizer, she was able to gain the trust
of the Chinese workers because of her gender, strong personality, and cultural sensitivity. According to Sue Ko Lee, "She's not Chinese, but
she's a woman. She's dedicated and she's honest. Now you read about
the corruption in the unions. I don't think you could corrupt her. She
really wanted to help us. . . . Everyone trusted her within the group." 126
Jennie Matyas, moreover, arrived on the scene when the legal protections accorded by the Wagner Act were bolstering the greatest organizing
drive in the history of the American labor movement. Whereas in 1933
only 6 percent of American workers were unionized, by 1939 a f=ull 17
percent were; female membership in unions grew from zoo,ooo in 1924
to 8oo,ooo in 193 8. Women strikers were now highly visible in the pecan
fields of Texas, the garment plants of Michigan, and retail stores
throughout Ohio. 117 In 1933 alone, the ILGWU, which had been on
the wane since the 19 zos, increased its nationwide membership 400 percent (from 40,000 to zoo,ooo strong) after mounting a massive organizing drive in sixty cities. Operating on the principle of racial equality,
it welcomed large numbers of black and Mexican American women into
its rank and file.12s But organizing Chinese workers proved more difficult-until frustrated workers at the National Dollar Stores factory decided enough was enough.

With Matyas's assistance, eighty workers at the National Dollar Stores
signed certification cards favoring a union shop, and in November 1937
Local 341 of the Chinese Ladies' Garment Workers' Union (LGWU)
was chartered under the ILGWU. In response, the factory fired four of
the active union members and demoted Willie Go, the chief organizer.
(Later, however, under pressure from the ILGWU, which threatened to
call a strike during the Christmas season with support from the Retail
Department Store Employees' Union, which had jurisdiction over employees at Shoong's retail stores, National Dollar Stores reinstated the
men.)129

National Dollar Stores then insisted that a vote be taken to prove that
the workers wanted the ILGWU as their collective bargaining agent. The
bilingual-ballot election, supervised by the regional National Labor Relations Board on January 24, 193 8, endorsed the ILGWU, and an agreement was reached the next day between factory and union representatives. Wage increases, to be agreed upon at a later date, would be paid
retroactively to January z4, 19 3 8, and the factory would become a closed
shop (all employees had to join the union), with all hiring to be done
through the union. Two weeks later, National Dollar Stores announced
that it had sold the Chinatown factory to Golden Gate Manufacturing,
though it was keeping the retailing sector. The garment workers saw this move as a subterfuge to freeze them out and break up the union. Now
having to negotiate with the new owners, G. N. Wong and Hoo Joe
Sun-the former foreman and manager of the National Dollar Stores,
respectively-the ILGWU demanded that National Dollar Stores buy
all its manufactured goods from Golden Gate and that Golden Gate guarantee work for a minimum of eleven months of the year and ensure this
minimum with a $io,ooo bond. These demands were in addition to
recognition of a union shop and $zo wages for a thirty-five-hour workweek. National Dollar Stores and Golden Gate Company refused to comply with any of these demands, and on February z6, r93 8, at 8 A.M., the
Chinese LGWU officially called a strike and began picketing the factory
and three National Dollar retail stores in San Francisco.130

According to the Chinese LGWU's official releases and flyers directed
at the public, the unscrupulous practices of the National Dollar Stores
were the catalyst that caused io8 workers to go on strike:

We are on strike for increased wages to support our livelihood.... We
have tried repeatedly to negotiate in good faith with our employer, but
he has consistently used the oppressive tactics of the capitalist to delay
us. He forced us to have an election supervised by the National Labor
Relations Board which resulted in recognition of our union. His legal
representatives signed an agreement with ours, but he continued to use
all kinds of unscrupulous tactics to try and break up our collective effort,
even to the point of changing the ownership of the factory. His goal is
to break our ricebowl strategy. We have no choice but to strike for fair
treatment.131

National Dollar Stores, also seeking support from the community, responded that since the factory had been sold, the workers were illegally
picketing the retail stores; the factory had in the past always complied
with the law; and the Chinese community needed to unite in the face of
hard times.132 To this, the Chinese LGWU replied:

If National Dollar Stores is really interested in the national welfare,
they should negotiate with the workers in good faith and allow workers
to make a decent living so that they can afford to buy war bonds to support the war effort in China. How can we survive on $113.3o a week and
still contribute to the war effort? The worker's welfare is the nation's wel-
fare.133

When the Golden Gate Company pointed out that even white factories
did not guarantee work or ensure it with a bond deposit,134 the Chinese
LGWU replied that its demands were not unreasonable. During the ne gotiations with Golden Gate, the local union explained, the employer
had reduced work to one or two days a week, thus applying economic
pressure to control the workers. The union had no choice but to demand steady work for its members. The stipulation of eleven months of
guaranteed work in a year was based on the average amount of work at
National Dollar Stores in its past sixteen-plus years of existence. The
$io,ooo bond request was based on Golden Gate's purchase of the factory from National Dollar Stores on a $5,000 deposit and agreement to
make monthly payments of $5,000. Workers needed the assurance that
the new owners would be able to cover salaries for more than one hundred employees, or $13,000 a month, which is why the bond was set at
$ i o,ooo. Furthermore, the Chinese LGWU said, contrary to a previous
story of the benevolent treatment accorded workers at the National Dollar Stores-that they got an annual bonus at the end of the year as well
as presents of new clothes-such favors were given out only in 193 5 and
1936, and then only to men who had worked at least one full year.
"Women who had worked over ten years did not get a dime or half a
dollar extra, and they make up 8o percent of the workforce in the factory," the union stated.135 The workers, angered by these injustices,
vowed "to fight our fight to the end, and hope to raise the living conditions not only for ourselves but for the other workers in Chinatown
as well." 136

At the time, most of the women workers were foreign-born and spoke
no English. Although they were in the majority at the rank-and-file level,
they elected men to be the key officers to speak on their behalf. Much
the same situation held in the ILGWU and most other unions as well. 117
Sue Ko Lee said that although Chinese women did not usually speak up
at the union meetings, which were conducted in English and Chinese,
they understood the issues. More important, they were quite visible in
the picket lines. The old and the young, the foreign- and the Americanborn, all did their share. "The ones on the picket line were all together,"
Sue emphasized. "We never mentioned anything about why we were doing this. But what is there? Maybe they won't reopen the shop for us.
There was no other recourse. There was nothing else. We were determined to close them down if necessary."138

Jennie Matyas recalled, "This was one strike I had in which I was able
to turn almost everything over to the Chinese members themselves. They
arranged their picketing schedules; they arranged who was to be on what
shift. It was all very democratically done. They took turns, they lived up
to it completely.""' The first shift met at the ILGWU headquarters each morning at six o'clock. After donuts and coffee provided by the union,
workers would be on the picket line by seven. Then at the end of the
day, they would return to the union hall for meetings. During the strike
ILGWU gave each worker $ S a week from its strike find. "That won't
pay your rent," said Sue Ko Lee. "I don't know how we managed on
that, but when you're young, you don't think about those things."14°

Two generations of garment workers joining efforts in the 1938 National
Dollar Stores strike. (Chinese Digest; Judy Yung collection)

Aside from an offer to mediate by the Chinese Six Companies, no
help was forthcoming from any of the established Chinatown organizations, local restaurants, or stores. In fact, stores stopped extending
credit to the strikers. Although sympathetic, the community was hesitant about condemning Joe Shoong, who was not only one of their own but also one of the most generous contributors to community and nationalist causes. Since Chinatown was still under the control of the merchant elite class, it didn't help matters that the strike was openly supported by such leftist organizations as the Ping Sheh (Equality Society)
and Chinese Workers Mutual Aid Association. 141 Leftist influence was
obvious from the political rhetoric of the union literature: the labeling
of Joe Shoong as a "capitalist," the argument that "the worker's welfare is the nation's welfare," and the call for workers to "arise and dare
to struggle for an equal livelihood. 11142 These groups' names often appeared in the campaign literature to win public support for the strike.
Not surprisingly, Sue Ko Lee noted, established Chinatown organizations "didn't do anything [against us], but they didn't show us any support because we were all called troublemakers." Although the strikers
were not avowed Marxists, they were well aware of the class rift. "I remember we were on the picket line and here came Mrs. [Joe] Shoong
and she said, `Ni di sui tong yun!' [These rotten Chinese]. So she's not
Chinese, right?" Sue was indignant even years later. 141