Triumph and Tragedy (The Second World War) (122 page)

No one could yet measure the immediate military consequences of the discovery, and no one has yet measured anything else about it.

Next morning a plane arrived with a full description of this tremendous event in the human story. Stimson brought me the report. I tell the tale as I recall it. The bomb, or its equivalent, had been detonated at the top of a pylon 100

feet high. Everyone had been cleared away for ten miles round, and the scientists and their staffs crouched behind massive concrete shields and shelters at about that distance. The blast had been terrific. An enormous column of flame and smoke shot up to the fringe of the atmosphere of our poor earth. Devastation inside a one-mile circle was Triumph and Tragedy

756

absolute. Here then was a speedy end to the Second World War, and perhaps to much else besides.

The President invited me to confer with him forthwith. He had with him General Marshall and Admiral Leahy. Up to this moment we had shaped our ideas towards an assault upon the homeland of Japan by terrific air bombing and by the invasion of very large armies. We had contemplated the desperate resistance of the Japanese fighting to the death with Samurai devotion, not only in pitched battles, but in every cave and dug-out. I had in my mind the spectacle of Okinawa island, where many thousands of Japanese, rather than surrender, had drawn up in line and destroyed themselves by hand-grenades after their leaders had solemnly performed the rite of
hara-kiri.
To quell the Japanese resistance man by man and conquer the country yard by yard might well require the loss of a million American lives and half that number of British — or more if we could get them there: for we were resolved to share the agony. Now all this nightmare picture had vanished. In its place was the vision — fair and bright indeed it seemed —

of the end of the whole war in one or two violent shocks. I thought immediately myself of how the Japanese people, whose courage I had always admired, might find in the apparition of this almost supernatural weapon an excuse which would save their honour and release them from their obligation of being killed to the last fighting man.

Moreover, we should not need the Russians. The end of the Japanese war no longer depended upon the pouring in of their armies for the final and perhaps protracted slaughter. We had no need to ask favours of them. A few days later I minuted to Mr. Eden: “It is quite clear that the United States do not at the present time desire Russian participation in the war against Japan.” The array of European problems could therefore be faced on their merits

Triumph and Tragedy

757

and according to the broad principles of the United Nations.

We seemed suddenly to have become possessed of a merciful abridgment of the slaughter in the East and of a far happier prospect in Europe. I have no doubt that these thoughts were present in the minds of my American friends.

At any rate, there never was a moment’s discussion as to whether the atomic bomb should be used or not. To avert a vast, indefinite butchery, to bring the war to an end, to give peace to the world, to lay healing hands upon its tortured peoples by a manifestation of overwhelming power at the cost of a few explosions, seemed, after all our toils and perils, a miracle of deliverance.

British consent in principle to the use of the weapon had been given on July 4, before the test had taken place. The final decision now lay in the main with President Truman, who had the weapon; but I never doubted what it would be, nor have I ever doubted since that he was right. The historic fact remains, and must be judged in the after-time, that the decision whether or not to use the atomic bomb to compel the surrender of Japan was never even an issue.

There was unanimous, automatic, unquestioned agreement around our table; nor did I ever hear the slightest suggestion that we should do otherwise.

It appeared that the American Air Force had prepared an immense assault by ordinary air-bombing on Japanese cities and harbours. These could certainly have been destroyed in a few weeks or a few months, and no one could say with what very heavy loss of life to the civilian population. But now, by using this new agency, we might not merely destroy cities, but save the lives alike of friend and foe.

Triumph and Tragedy

758

A more intricate question was what to tell Stalin. The President and I no longer felt that we needed his aid to conquer Japan. His word had been given at Teheran and Yalta that Soviet Russia would attack Japan as soon as the German Army was defeated, and in fulfilment of this a continuous movement of Russian troops to the Far East had been in progress over the Siberian Railway since the beginning of May. In our opinion they were not likely to be needed, and Stalin’s bargaining power, which he had used with such effect upon the Americans at Yalta, was therefore gone. Still, he had been a magnificent ally in the war against Hitler, and we both felt that he must be informed of the great New Fact which now dominated the scene, but not of any particulars. How should this news be imparted to him? Should it be in writing or by word of mouth? Should it be at a formal and special meeting, or in the course of our daily conferences, or after one of them? The conclusion which the President came to was the last of these alternatives. “I think,” he said, “I had best just tell him after one of our meetings that we have an entirely novel form of bomb, something quite out of the ordinary, which we think will have decisive effects upon the Japanese will to continue the war.” I agreed to this procedure.

The following is a note which I made for the Cabinet at the time:

PRIME MINISTER’S NOTE FOR THE WAR CABINET

18 July 45

The President showed me telegrams about the
recent experiment, and asked what I thought should be
done about telling the Russians. He seemed determined to do this, but asked about the timing, and said
he thought that the end of the Conference would be
best. I replied that if he were resolved to tell it might

Triumph and Tragedy

759

well be better to hang it on the experiment, which was a
new fact on which he and we had only just had
knowledge. Therefore he would have a good answer to
any question, “Why did you not tell us this before?” He
seemed impressed with this idea, and will consider it.

On behalf of His Majesty’s Government I did not
resist his proposed disclosure of the simple fact that we
have this weapon. He reiterated his resolve at all costs
to refuse to divulge any particulars….

Meanwhile the devastating attack on Japan had continued from the air and the sea. Among the principal targets were the remnants of the Japanese Fleet, now dispersed for shelter in the island sea. One by one the big ships were picked out, and by the end of July the Japanese Navy had virtually ceased to exist.

The homeland was in chaos and on the verge of collapse.

The professional diplomats were convinced that only immediate surrender under the authority of the Emperor could save Japan from complete disintegration, but power still lay almost entirely in the hands of a military clique determined to commit the nation to mass suicide rather than accept defeat. The appalling destruction confronting them made no impression on this fanatical hierarchy, who continued to profess belief in some miracle which would turn the scale in their favour.

In several lengthy talks with the President alone, or with his advisers present, I discussed what to do. Earlier in the week Stalin had told me privately that as his party was leaving Moscow an unaddressed message had been delivered to him through the Japanese Ambassador. It was presumably meant for either himself or President Kalinin or other members of the Soviet Government, and was from the Japanese Emperor. It stated that Japan could not Triumph and Tragedy

760

accept “unconditional surrender,” but might be prepared to compromise on other terms. Stalin had replied that as the message contained no definite proposals the Soviet Government could take no action. I explained to the President that Stalin had not wished to tell him direct lest he might think the Russians were trying to influence him towards peace. In the same way I thought we should abstain from saying anything which would make us seem at all reluctant to go on with the war against Japan for as long as the United States thought fit. However, I dwelt upon the tremendous cost in American and to a smaller extent in British life if we enforced “unconditional surrender” upon the Japanese. It was for him to consider whether this might not be expressed in some other way, so that we got all the essentials for future peace and security and yet left them some show of saving their military honour and some assurance of their national existence, after they had complied with all safeguards necessary for the conqueror.

The President replied bluntly that he did not think the Japanese had any military honour after Pearl Harbour. I contented myself with saying that at any rate they had something for which they were ready to face certain death in very large numbers, and this might not be so important to us as it was to them. He then became quite sympathetic, and spoke, as had Mr. Stimson, of the terrible responsibilities that rested upon him for the unlimited effusion of American blood.

I felt there would be no rigid insistence upon “unconditional surrender,” apart from what was necessary for world peace and future security and for the punishment of a guilty and treacherous deed. Mr. Stimson, General Marshall, and the President were evidently searching their hearts, and we had no need to press them. We knew of course that the Triumph and Tragedy

761

Japanese were ready to give up all conquests made in the war.

Eventually it was decided to send an ultimatum calling for an immediate unconditional surrender of the armed forces of Japan. This document was published on July 26.

ULTIMATUM CALLING FOR IMMEDIATE UNCONDITIONAL

SURRENDER

26 July 45

We, the President of the United States, the
President of the National Government of the Republic
of China, and the Prime Minister of Great Britain,
representing the hundreds of millions of our countrymen, have conferred and agree that Japan shall be
given an opportunity to end the war.

2. The prodigious land, sea, and air forces of the
United States, the British Empire, and China, many
times reinforced by their armies and air fleets from the
West, are poised to strike the final blows upon Japan.

This military power is sustained and inspired by the
determination of all the Allied nations to prosecute the
war against Japan until she ceases to resist.

3. The result of the futile and senseless German
resistance to the might of the aroused free peoples of
the world stands forth in awful clarity as an example to
the people of Japan.

The might that now converges on Japan is
immeasurably greater than that which, when applied to
the resisting Nazis, necessarily laid waste the lands, the
industry, and the method of life of the whole German
people. The full application of our military power,
backed by our resolve, will mean the inevitable and
complete destruction of the Japanese forces, and just
as inevitably the utter devastation of the Japanese
homeland.

4. The time has come for Japan to decide whether
she will continue to be controlled by those self-willed
militaristic advisers, whose unintelligent calculations
have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of
Triumph and Tragedy

762

annihilation, or whether she will follow the path of
reason.

5. The following are our terms. We shall not deviate
from them. There are no alternatives. We shall brook
no delay.