There is No Alternative (42 page)

Perhaps Gorbachev was moved. Or perhaps he rolled his eyes—
how just like a woman to be offended because we didn't hand-write the letter.

Thatcher, recalled Zamyatin, “had a definite womanish feeling towards Gorbachev.”

“I found myself liking him,” recalled Thatcher.

Obviously, I cannot say exactly what transpired at that meeting. But this much we know for sure: Thatcher emerged from that meeting and declared, “I like Mr. Gorbachev. We can do business with him.”

This was one of the great turning points in the Cold War. Margaret Thatcher had met a communist she didn't hate.

Later that month, Thatcher visited Reagan at Camp David. She told Reagan that Gorbachev was “an unusual Russian.” He was
“much less constrained, more charming, open to discussion and debate.” He did not “cry or complain” when she criticized the Soviet record on human rights.
²¹⁶

Gorbachev, she told Reagan, had asked her to give him a message : “Tell your friend President Reagan not to go ahead with space weapons.” She reported this to Reagan and told him that she had, in turn, told Gorbachev that Britain supported Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) research. A White House scribe took detailed notes of this meeting:

Reagan responded with great pleasure. He was “simply amazed” by the parallels in their thought; it was wonderful that she had told Gorbachev exactly what
he
would have said. How gratified he was, he added, that Thatcher supported his much-misunderstood SDI program.

Yes, yes, Thatcher assured him. “The wretched press has tried to make out that we have major differences. This is simply not true.” Then, very gently, she added that while
of course
her solidarity went without saying, she did have some . . .
concerns.
Nothing serious, mind you. It was just that Mutual Assured Destruction was a doctrine with a proven record. There had thus far been no nuclear war between the superpowers. Was Reagan entirely sure it was wise to tamper with this formula?

From a woman not generally known for her tact, this is an impressively circumspect way of putting it. “Some” claim SDI would encourage the Soviets to launch a first strike
. Yes, yes, of course I support you, Mr. President, we are absolutely as one, SDI is a marvelous idea, simply marvelous, but have you perhaps thought about the 60 million people who would die even if this harebrained fantasy of yours works, which it won't?

In her memoirs, Thatcher engages in some rather striking revisionism about SDI. “I had no doubt,” she writes, “about the rightness of his commitment to press ahead with the program. Looking back, it is now clear to me that Ronald Reagan's original decision on SDI was the single most important of his presidency.”
²¹⁹
It is true that she supported Reagan and defended SDI against its critics both in Britain and America. It is obviously not true that she had no doubts.

Following this meeting, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger sent Thatcher a brief note. “Dear Mrs. Thatcher,” he wrote. “I wanted to especially thank you for the opposition [
sic
] to present the technical side of the President's Strategic Defense Initiative. We feel that very substantial progress is being made, although there is a long way to go.”
²²⁰
Perhaps the substitution of the word “opposition” for “opportunity” was just a typo; perhaps it was a classic Freudian slip.

Although Thatcher did not persuade Reagan to abandon SDI—indeed, he managed at this meeting to persuade
her
that there might be some merit to the idea—she did convey to him a message that proved enormously important when Reagan subsequently met Gorbachev. There was, she pointed out, a certain logic
to the Soviet Union's suspicions about this program. If Reagan was to insist upon it, he must succeed in convincing Gorbachev that he was a man of peace.

Chernenko expired in 1985. Gorbachev became the new general secretary of the Communist Party. Some historians believe that Gorbachev's election was a direct response to the Reagan-era arms buildup; it was this, they argue, that convinced the Soviets they must embrace radical economic reform so better to compete with the West. I do not know whether this is true. It is certainly true that by this time, anxiety within the Kremlin about the state of the Soviet economy was acute. It cannot have helped that both Britain and the United States appeared to be reversing the dire economic trends of the 1970s, which had been hopefully interpreted in the Kremlin (and in much of the West) as capitalism's death rattle. Capitalism now seemed to be up and about and crankily demanding its boiled egg, even as the Soviet Union was frantically creating commissions to solve the problem of women's pantyhose.

In 1985, impressed by Thatcher's favorable evaluation of the new Soviet premier, Reagan invited Gorbachev to Geneva. “Reagan and Gorbachev each spoke in direct and positive terms,” recalls Secretary of State George Shultz. “The personal chemistry was apparent.”

Expectations matter: If a trusted friend assures you that you'll find a man likeable, you will be more apt to find the likeability in the man. “As we shook hands for the first time,” Reagan recalled, “I had to admit—as Margaret Thatcher and Prime Minister Brian Mulroney of Canada predicted I would—that there was something likable about Gorbachev.”
²²¹

Compare the tone of Reagan's speech following the downing of KAL 007 to the letter he sent to Gorbachev immediately after the summit:

When Reagan returned from Geneva, he convened the National Security Council. The head of the American arms negotiation delegation, Max Kampelman, recalls the scene: “Sitting in the situation room, the president began by saying: ‘Maggie was right. We can do business with this man.' His reference to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher prompted nods of assent. Then, in a remarkably matter-of-fact tone, he reported that he had suggested to Mr. Gorbachev that their negotiations could possibly lead to the United States and the Soviet Union eliminating all their nuclear weapons.”
²²³

I am not saying that Reagan would not have liked Gorbachev if Thatcher had not told him he ought to, nor am I saying that he would not have taken Gorbachev's concerns seriously if Thatcher
had not taken pains to explain them to him, but—well, yes, maybe I am saying just that. That
is
the kind of influence she had on him.

Thatcher's friendship with Reagan has been widely described, so I will add only a few more details to the portrait. I was surprised to hear from so many people that she envied Reagan. “More than anyone else,” stresses Charles Powell. “She thought he had this incredible ability to get over a very tough message in very gentle language and tones. It was quite true, if you listen to him speak, I mean, the content and the tone were completely at odds with each other. This gentle, avuncular tone about condemning communism to fire and brimstone was remarkable, and she knew she couldn't do that.”