Their Finest Hour (8 page)

9
P.M
. 16th May, 1940

I shall be glad if the Cabinet could meet immediately to consider following. Situation grave in the last degree. Furious German thrust through Sedan finds French armies ill-grouped, many in north, others in Alsace. At least four days required to bring twenty divisions to cover Paris and strike at the flanks of the Bulge, which is now fifty kilometres wide.

Three [German] armoured divisions with two or three infantry divisions have advanced through gap and large masses hurrying forward behind them. Two great dangers therefore threaten. First that B.E.F. will be largely left in the air to make a difficult disengagement and retreat to the old line. Secondly, that the German thrust will wear down the French resistance before it can be fully gathered.

Orders given to defend Paris at all costs, but archives of the Quai d’Orsay already burning in the garden. I consider the next two, three, or four days decisive for Paris and probably for the French Army. Therefore the question we must face is whether we can give further aid in fighters above four squadrons, for which the French are very grateful, and whether a larger part of our long-range heavy bombers should be employed tomorrow and the following nights upon the German masses crossing the Meuse and flowing into the Bulge. Even so results cannot be guaranteed; but the French resistance may be broken up as rapidly as that of Poland unless this battle of the Bulge is won. I personally feel that we should send squadrons of fighters demanded (i.e., six more) tomorrow, and, concentrating all available French and British aviation, dominate the air above the Bulge for the next two or three days, not for any local purpose, but to give the last chance to the French Army to rally its bravery and strength. It would not be good historically if their requests were denied and their ruin resulted. Also night bombardment by a strong force of heavy bombers can no doubt be arranged. It looks as if the enemy was by now fully extended both in the air and tanks. We must not underrate the increasing difficulties of his advance if strongly counter-attacked. I imagine that if all fails here we could still shift what is left of our own air striking force to assist the B.E.F. should it be forced to withdraw. I again emphasise the mortal gravity of the hour, and express my opinion as above. Kindly inform me what you will do. Dill agrees. I must have answer by midnight in order to encourage the French. Telephone to Ismay at Embassy in Hindustani.

The reply came at about 11.30. The Cabinet said “Yes.” I immediately took Ismay off with me in a car to M. Reynaud’s flat. We found it more or less in darkness. After an interval M. Reynaud emerged from his bedroom in his dressing-gown and I told him the favourable news. Ten fighter squadrons! I then persuaded him to send for M. Daladier, who was duly summoned and brought to the flat to hear the decision of the British Cabinet. In this way I hoped to revive the spirits of our French friends, as much as our limited means allowed. Daladier never spoke a word. He rose slowly from his chair and wrung my hand. I got back to the Embassy about 2
A.M
., and slept well, though the cannon fire in petty aeroplane raids made one roll over from time to time. In the morning I flew home, and, in spite of other preoccupations, pressed on with construction of the second level of the new Government.

The Battle Crisis Grows — The Local Defence Volunteers — Reinforcements from the East — My Telegrams to President Roosevelt of May
18
and May
20 —
General Gamelin’s Final Order No.
12,
May
19 —
General Weygand Appointed — French Cabinet Changes — First Orders to the Little Ships, May
20
— “Operation Dynamo”
—
Weygand Tours the Front — Billotte Killed in a Motor Accident — French Failure to Grapple with German Armour — Ironside’s Report, May
21 —
Parliament Votes Extraordinary Powers to the Government — My Second Visit to Paris — Weygand’s Plan — Peril of the Northern Armies — Fighting Round Arras — Correspondence with M. Reynaud — Sir John Dill Chief of the Imperial General Staff.

T
HE
W
AR
C
ABINET
met at 10
A.M
. on the 17th, and I gave them an account of my visit to Paris, and of the situation so far as I could measure it.

I said I had told the French that unless they made a supreme effort we should not be justified in accepting the grave risk to the safety of our country that we were incurring by the despatch of the additional fighter squadrons to France. I felt that the question of air reinforcements was one of the gravest that a British Cabinet had ever had to face. It was claimed that the German air losses had been four or five times our own, but I had been told that the French had only one-quarter of their fighter aircraft left. On this day Gamelin thought the situation “lost,” and is reported to have said: “I will guarantee the safety of Paris only for today, tomorrow [the 18th], and the night following.” In Norway it appeared that Narvik was likely to be captured by us at any moment, but Lord Cork was informed that in the light of the news from France no more reinforcements could be sent to him.

The battle crisis grew hourly in intensity. At the request of General Georges, the British Army prolonged its defensive flank by occupying points on the whole line from Douai to Péronne, thus attempting to cover Arras, which was a road centre vital to any southward retreat. That afternoon the Germans entered Brussels. The next day they reached Cambrai, passed St. Quentin, and brushed our small parties out of Péronne. The French Seventh, the Belgian, the British, and the French First Army all continued their withdrawal to the Scheldt, the British standing along the Dendre for the day, and forming the detachment “Petreforce” (a temporary grouping of various units under Major General Petre) for the defence of Arras.

At midnight (May 18–19) Lord Gort was visited at his headquarters by General Billotte. Neither the personality of this French general nor his proposals, such as they were, inspired confidence in his allies. From this moment the possibility of a withdrawal to the coast began to present itself to the British Commander-in-Chief. In his despatch published in March, 1941, he wrote: “The picture was now [night of the 19th] no longer that of a line bent or temporarily broken, but of a besieged fortress.”

As the result of my visit to Paris and the Cabinet discussions I already found it necessary to pose a general question to my colleagues.

Prime Minister to Lord President.

17.V.40.

I am very much obliged to you for undertaking to examine tonight the consequences of the withdrawal of the French Government from Paris or the fall of that city, as well as the problems which would arise if it were necessary to withdraw the B.E.F. from France, either along its communications or by the Belgian and Channel ports. It is quite understood that in the first instance this report could be no more than an enumeration of the main considerations which arise, and which could thereafter be remitted to the Staffs. I am myself seeing the military authorities at 6.30.

* * * * *

The swift fate of Holland was in all our minds. Mr. Eden had already proposed to the War Cabinet the formation of Local Defence Volunteers, and this plan was energetically pressed. All over the country, in every town and village, bands of determined men came together armed with shotguns, sporting rifles, clubs and spears. From this a vast organisation was soon to spring. But the need of Regulars was also vital.

Prime Minister to General Ismay, for C.O.S.

18.V.40.

I cannot feel that we have enough trustworthy troops in England, in view of the very large numbers that may be landed from air-carriers preceded by parachutists. I do not consider this danger is imminent at the present time, as the great battle in France has yet to be decided.

I wish the following moves to be considered with a view to immediate action:

(1) The transports which brought the Australians to Suez should bring home eight battalions of Regular infantry from Palestine, properly convoyed, even at some risk, by whatever route is thought best. I hope it will be possible to use the Mediterranean.

(2) The Australian fast convoy arrives early in June with 14,000 men.

(3) These ships should be immediately filled with eight battalions of Territorials and sent to India, where they should pick up eight [more] Regular battalions. The speed of this fast convoy should be accelerated.

2. Everything must be done to carry out the recommendations for the control of aliens put forward by the Committee and minuted by me on another paper. Action should also be taken against Communists and Fascists, and very considerable numbers should be put in protective or preventive internment, including the leaders. These measures must, of course, be brought before the Cabinet before action.

3. The Chiefs of Staff must consider whether it would not be well to send only half of the so-called Armoured Division to France. One must always be prepared for the fact that the French may be offered very advantageous terms of peace, and the whole weight be thrown on us.

* * * * *

I also thought it necessary, with the approval of my colleagues, to send the following grave telegrams to President Roosevelt in order to show how seriously the interests of the United States would be affected by the conquest and subjugation not only of France but of Great Britain. The Cabinet pondered over these drafts for a while, but made no amendment.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt .

18.V.40.

I do not need to tell you about the gravity of what has happened. We are determined to persevere to the very end, whatever the result of the great battle raging in France may be. We must expect in any case to be attacked here on the Dutch model before very long, and we hope to give a good account of ourselves. But if American assistance is to play any part it must be available soon.

Former Naval Person to President Roosevelt .

20.V.40.

Lothian has reported his conversation with you. I understand your difficulties, but I am very sorry about the destroyers. If they were here in six weeks they would play an invaluable part. The battle in France is full of danger to both sides. Though we have taken heavy toll of the enemy in the air and are clawing down two or three to one of their planes, they have still a formidable numerical superiority. Our most vital need is, therefore, the delivery at the earliest possible date of the largest possible number of Curtiss P-40 fighters, now in course of delivery to your Army.

With regard to the closing part of your talk with Lothian, our intention is, whatever happens, to fight on to the end in this island, and, provided we can get the help for which we ask, we hope to run them very close in the air battles in view of individual superiority. Members of the present Administration would [be] likely [to] go down during this process should it result adversely, but in no conceivable circumstances will we consent to surrender. If members of the present Administration were finished and others came in to parley amid the ruins, you must not be blind to the fact that the sole remaining bargaining counter with Germany would be the Fleet, and, if this country was left by the United States to its fate, no one would have the right to blame those then responsible if they made the best terms they could for the surviving inhabitants. Excuse me, Mr. President, putting this nightmare bluntly. Evidently I could not answer for my successors, who in utter despair and helplessness might well have to accommodate themselves to the German will. However, there is happily no need at present to dwell upon such ideas. Once more thanking you for your good will …

* * * * *

Far-reaching changes were now made by M. Reynaud in the French Cabinet and High Command. On the 18th Marshal Pétain was appointed Vice-President of the Council. Reynaud himself, transferring Daladier to Foreign Affairs, took over the Ministry of National Defence and War. At 7
P.M.
on the 19th he appointed Weygand, who had just arrived from the Levant, to replace General Gamelin. I had known Weygand when he was the right-hand man of Marshal Foch, and had admired his masterly intervention in the Battle of Warsaw against the Bolshevik invasion of Poland in August, 1920 – an event decisive for Europe at that time. He was now seventy-three, but was reported to be efficient and vigorous in a very high degree. General Gamelin’s final Order (No. 12), dated 9.45
A.M
. on May 19, prescribed that the Northern Armies, instead of letting themselves be encircled, must at all costs force their way southward to the Somme, attacking the Panzer divisions which had cut their communications. At the same time the Second Army and the newly forming Sixth were to attack northward towards Mézières. These decisions were sound. Indeed, an order for the general retreat of the Northern Armies southward was already at least four days overdue. Once the gravity of the breach in the French centre at Sedan was apparent, the only hope for the Northern Armies lay in an immediate march to the Somme. Instead, under General Billotte, they had only made gradual and partial withdrawals to the Scheldt and formed the defensive flank to the right. Even now there might have been time for the southward march.

The confusion of the northern command, the apparent paralysis of the First French Army, and the uncertainty about what was happening had caused the War Cabinet extreme anxiety. All our proceedings were quiet and composed, but we had a united and decided opinion, behind which there was silent passion. On the 19th we were informed (4.30
P.M.
) that Lord Gort was “examining a possible withdrawal towards Dunkirk if that were forced upon him.” The C.I.G.S. (Ironside) could not accept this proposal, as, like most of us, he favoured the southward march. We therefore sent him to Lord Gort with instructions to move the British Army in a southwesterly direction and to force his way through all opposition in order to join up with the French in the south, and that the Belgians should be urged to conform to this movement, or, alternatively, that we would evacuate as many of their troops as possible from the Channel ports. He was to be told that we would ourselves inform the French Government of what had been resolved. At the same Cabinet we sent Dill to General Georges’ Headquarters, with which we had a direct telephone. He was to stay there for four days and tell us all he could find out. Contacts even with Lord Gort were intermittent and difficult, but it was reported that only four days’ supplies and ammunition for one battle were available.

* * * * *

At the morning War Cabinet of May 20, we again discussed the situation of our Army. Even on the assumption of a successful fighting retreat to the Somme, I thought it likely that considerable numbers might be cut off or driven back on the sea. It is recorded in the minutes of the meeting: “The Prime Minister thought that as a precautionary measure the Admiralty should assemble a large number of small vessels in readiness to proceed to ports and inlets on the French coast.” On this the Admiralty acted immediately and with ever-increasing vigour as the days passed and darkened. Operational control had been delegated on the 19th to Admiral Ramsay, commanding at Dover, whose resources at that time comprised thirty-six personnel vessels of various sorts based on Southampton and Dover. On the afternoon of the 20th, in consequence of the orders from London, the first conference of all concerned, including representatives of the Shipping Ministry, was held at Dover to consider
“the emergency evacuation across the Channel of very large forces.”
It was planned if necessary to evacuate from Calais, Boulogne, and Dunkirk, at a rate of ten thousand men from each port every twenty-four hours. Thirty craft of passenger-ferry type, twelve naval drifters, and six small coasters were provided as a first instalment. On May 22 the Admiralty ordered forty Dutch
skoots
which had taken refuge with us to be requisitioned and manned with naval crews. These were commissioned between May 25 and May 27. From Harwich round to Weymouth sea-transport officers were directed to list all suitable ships up to a thousand tons, and a complete survey was made of all shipping in British harbours. These plans for what was called “Operation Dynamo” proved the salvation of the Army ten days later.