The Wizards of Langley (20 page)

Others, including McCone, were less enthusiastic about the report. The DCI objected that he did not believe that if the PFIAB’s proposals were adopted, either he or the CIA could perform the missions the report “apparently contemplates” for them. He argued that there needed to be a clear recognition of the DCI’s joint responsibility with the Secretary of Defense in developing the reconnaissance program and full participation by the DCI in the development and direction of the program—including decisions concerning the assignment of responsibilities for development of new collection systems and operational activities.
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Two NSC staff members also raised questions about the wisdom of the PFIAB’s conclusions and recommendations. In a memo to Bundy, Spurgeon Keeny, whose background included a seven-year stint (1948–1955) in Air Force intelligence, argued that the recommendations “would place the Air Force within striking distance of achieving complete control of the [National Reconnaissance Program]” and “would tend to eliminate CIA as a creative force in developing our reconnaissance capabilities”—a move that “seems self-defeating since CIA has been responsible for much of the success in this field.” Instead, “there should be formal recognition of the principle that both CIA and DOD should maintain strong,
independent organizations in the recon field.” Peter Jessup, detailed to the NSC from CIA, attributed the PFIAB’s conclusions to a “slick sales job” by “McMillan & Co” combined with a “poor one” by the CIA.
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Bundy, sometime in June or July, directed McNamara and McCone to produce a draft directive, with “a clear delineation of . . . roles and responsibilities,” that would serve as an agreed charter for the NRP. The memo allowed for the possibility that there would be “significant differences” and invited the two officials to offer alternative provisions to the charter reflecting such differences. Bundy requested the work be finished within two weeks.
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It would be far longer than two weeks before the work would be completed. In the meantime, McCone and Wheelon continued having “significant differences” with McMillan and Fubini. In a memorandum concerning an August 1964 meeting of the NRO executive committee, McCone wrote: “I emphasized again and again that there was absolutely no intention of creating in CIA technical assets to conceive, manage, or direct booster operations involved in reconnaissance programs and that the allegations of Dr. Fubini that our purpose was ‘to create another NASA’ were entirely unfounded and I would like him to withdraw them.”
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There was, however, an intention by Wheelon to solidify further the status of a unit he created to handle what he had hoped would be reinvigorated and extensive CIA satellite operations. On September 1, McCone approved Wheelon’s request to assign the Special Projects Staff (SPS), established in fall 1963, formal responsibility for satellite matters that technically belonged to the Office of Special Activities. Jack Ledford had remained as official head of Program B while Jackson D. Maxey served as head of the new staff, which obtained its personnel from the Systems Analysis Staff and OSA. In addition, the technical personnel working on the CORONA program in California, along with four OSA officers, were assigned to SPS.
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In February 1965, Wheelon took another step toward enhancing the CIA’s role in space reconnaissance. A memo from Wheelon to Marshall Carter proposed to transform the “small group of Agency employees,” operating “under the euphemistic title Special Projects Staff ” into the Office of Special Projects. Wheelon noted an earlier reluctance to establish a full-fledged office until the CIA’s role in satellite reconnaissance could be clarified.
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One rationale for establishing a new office was that the limited personnel available were inadequate to cope with the “lively pace” of space re
connaissance activities. There was also the “cumbersome network of satellite activities . . . spread throughout the Directorate.” Included were functions carried out by the SPS but for which OSA and its chief, Jack Ledford, were technically responsible to the NRO. The proposed office would be responsible for the development, operation, and management of the CIA’s satellite activities.
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Wheelon also informed Carter that his staff was preparing a memo for the Deputy DCI’s signature advising McMillan of the transfer of satellite responsibilities within the DS&T, the creation of the new office, the identity of its head, and his designation as “Director, Program E”—which left the aerial reconnaissance functions in Program B, to be managed by OSA.
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But like the NRO agreement, the creation of a new satellite office within the science and technology directorate took far longer than anticipated. Toward the end of 1964, another round of discussions between McNamara and McCone had commenced toward a new agreement that, it was hoped, would clearly specify CIA responsibilities in the reconnaissance area and “put an end to the continual struggle within NRO over lines of authority.”
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But in early 1965, McMillan, at a meeting of the National Reconnaissance Program Executive Committee, demonstrated that he was not a prisoner of his staff—disavowing an agreement concerning CORONA management that had been negotiated by them and the CIA and signed by Marshall Carter. McMillan stated that he had agreed only in principle and subsequently refused to address the question, although he made several additional efforts to transfer the CORONA systems engineering responsibility from Lockheed to Aerospace, attempts that were blocked by Carter. On April 21, McCone gave Wheelon instructions to write into CIA contracts with Lockheed, General Electric, and Itek, language that would clearly establish with the contractors the fact that the CIA had the responsibility and the authority to provide technical direction for the CORONA payload.
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Meanwhile, both the CIA and NRO continued formulating and advocating their different positions concerning the DS&T’s future role in satellite reconnaissance. In an April 2, 1965, presentation to the PFIAB, McMillan made his case for a strengthened NRO—making reference to the continued lack of a clear decision concerning a follow-on to CORONA. His summary of the management status of the NRO began with the remark that “de facto, NRO does not exist.” He also complained that the existence of an executive committee had the effect of elevating
almost all NRO matters to the Vance-McCone level. Since the principals were busy with other matters, meetings were infrequent, and decisions were delayed. McMillan added that “many of the agreements arrived at in the ExCom have not been implemented.”
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McMillan contended that the CIA found direct management by an “outsider”—“in particular by one who in their eyes is colored AF blue”—to be “galling and hard to accept.” The CIA people he had to work with, he said, “have a history of obstructing or defying my control,” which “lends confirmation to charges of bias on my part.” Cited as examples were changes within Program B of which he had never been informed and instructions to Lockheed not to communicate with McMillan.
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In summing up, the NRO chief stated his belief “in a strong NRO” and maintained that neither “the CIA [n]or the military are capable of accepting effectively autonomous responsibility. Both need the discipline of a central problem-oriented management.” He also asserted that “unless the situation that now prevails is changed sharply, the DNRO cannot responsibly spend the taxpayers’ money without firm management controls over the way it is spent.”
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The battle continued throughout April. Possibly in response to McMillan’s presentation, McCone proposed that the Satellite Operations Center be removed from the custody of the NRO and given to the CIA. The proposal resulted in a long and despairing letter from McMillan to Vance, which concluded with the comment that “I am convinced that if [the Satellite Operations Center] is removed from the NRO, the NRO will be destroyed and the DOD will experience interminable difficulties in getting its requirements recognized. I am further convinced that this fundamental fact is well understood by others and that the final irrevocable destruction of the NRO is the primary intent behind the proposal to separate the Op Center.”
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On April 12, McMillan learned that McCone—frustrated by President Johnson’s seeming indifference to intelligence reports, except when annoyed at bad news—would be leaving office shortly. On April 22, McMillan formally presented, and recommended quick adoption of, a directive composed by Fubini for the President’s signature. The directive, as an NRO history put it, “would have resolved all outstanding issues by enforcing the lines of agreement urged by PFIAB in May 1964—the recommendation from which so much had been expected and from which nothing had come.” The proposal would have limited CIA influence to maintenance of a research and development group reporting to the NRO director.
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On April 26, McCone, who would leave in a matter of days, fired back, according to an NRO history, with a formal proposal to dissolve the NRO, with the CIA assuming complete responsibility for “research, preliminary design, system development, engineering, and operational employment” in all programs assigned to it. The NRO Satellite Operations Center would become a CIA facility, and Defense Department agencies would conduct support activities—launching, tracking, and recovery. Instead of a DNRO, there would be a Director of National Reconnaissance (DNR), who would be responsible to an executive committee composed of the DCI and Deputy Secretary of Defense. The DNR would have no management authority for CIA programs but could be delegated authority for Defense Department programs. He would be permitted to review but not modify budgets and would report to the operating head of the CIA in all matters of “policy, coordination, and guidance.” He would have no staff.
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Two days later, McCone departed, taking his deputy out the door with him. At his last staff meeting, he told Wheelon and others, “My only regret is not having done more to straighten out the NRO mess.”
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Mc- Cone’s and Carter’s positions were filled by Vice-Adm. William F. Raborn, who had managed the development of the Polaris missile, and Richard Helms, who had been serving as Deputy Director for Plans since 1962. The departure of McCone and Carter undoubtedly further delayed the conclusion of a new agreement. The main task of negotiating that agreement fell to Raborn, Helms, and longtime agency official John Bross, at the time deputy to the director for National Intelligence Program Evaluation, whose primary function was to coordinate the activities of the intelligence community.
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The CIA’s basic thesis in support of its continued role was the argument by McCone and Wheelon that

In addition, a paper Wheelon prepared in May, “A Summary of the National Reconnaissance Problem,” reviewed various options. He noted that the March 1963 NRO agreement “gave the Air Force virtual control over all CIA programs and established NRO as an operating organization with implied line authority over those elements of CIA involved in reconnaissance.”
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He also observed that an NRO funding agreement signed one month later eliminated direct congressional appropriations to the CIA for its overhead programs “and thereby passed budgetary control of the total effort to DoD.”
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The “present arrangement,” Wheelon wrote, “has been neither a happy nor productive one. External program control has frustrated many CIA activities or forced their development outside the terms of the agreement. Everyone who is aware of the NRO situation is properly concerned about it, and many believe that the present arrangement is basically unworkable.”
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Wheelon then considered several alternatives for managing the national reconnaissance effort. Responsibility could be assigned to a single agency (NASA, the Air Force, the CIA), which would handle all aspects of the effort—from payload design to launch, operations, and recovery. That alternative was not viable, Wheelon argued, because although the CIA should have significant responsibility in regard to the procurement, tasking, and operation of reconnaissance systems, it needed the Air Force to conduct the launch, tracking, and recovery operations.
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Wheelon contended that since launch, tracking, and recovery were clearly DOD functions, and there was agreement at the highest level in DOD that targeting and orbit selection should be handled by the CIA, the only remaining question was who should develop payloads. He noted two alternatives—assigning the CIA the task of developing all payloads, on the grounds that it had to be done secretly and because the design should be responsive to national intelligence needs, or assigning the task to the Air Force. The second alternative was unacceptable because “it would give the Air Force complete control over all satellite reconnaissance,” and “its success would depend on continuing, faithful Air Force responsiveness to truly national intelligence needs.”
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