Read The Watergate Scandal in United States History Online
Authors: David K. Fremon
On October 10 Agnew gave in. He pleaded
nolo contendere
in a Baltimore court. The plea meant he would not contest the court’s decision. Agnew was fined $10,000 and placed on probation for one to three years. As part of the agreement, he resigned as vice president.
It was a humiliating experience for Spiro Agnew. In court, he was forced to listen as the Justice Department read seventy pages of charges against him. When Judge Matthew Hoffman asked Agnew if, by his plea, he admitted that the Justice Department “is possessed of sufficient evidence to prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt,” Agnew responded, “I do.”
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The day before Agnew’s resignation, Nixon wished his running mate the best of luck. They never spoke again.
“Can You See Gerald Ford . . . ?”
The Agnew resignation meant a possible crisis. Carl Albert, speaker of the House of Representatives, was next in line to become president. Albert did not want the job. Even his fellow Democrats did not want him to assume the presidency. Republicans, after all, had won the 1972 election. If Richard Nixon were removed from office, his successor should also be a Republican.
After John F. Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, the United States had been without a vice president. Soon afterward, the Twenty-fifth Amendment was added to the Constitution. The president would nominate a vice president, and this choice would be confirmed by a majority of both houses of Congress.
John Connally was Nixon’s first choice for vice president. The former Texas governor had once been Nixon’s secretary of the treasury. He remained an informal advisor. Still, Democrats had majorities in both the Senate and House of Representatives. They were not about to approve Democrat-turned-Republican Connally.
Nixon needed someone who could be confirmed. That someone turned out to be Gerald Ford, minority leader of the House of Representatives. Members of both parties liked the genial Ford, but few talked of his intellectual abilities. Nixon once scornfully commented to New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller, “Can you see Gerald Ford sitting in this [Oval Office presidential] chair?”
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Richard Nixon might have thought that Gerald Ford was impeachment insurance. He hoped Congress members, knowing Ford’s limitations, would be too afraid of the possibility of Ford becoming president to remove Nixon from office.
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Congress, however, confirmed Ford. If something happened to Nixon, Gerald Ford would become president.
Richard Nixon wasted little time mourning Agnew’s fall. He had other business on his mind. “Now that we have disposed of [the Agnew] matter,” he told Attorney General Elliot Richardson, “we can get rid of Cox.”
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Nixon referred to Archibald Cox, special prosecutor for Watergate and related crimes. The president would soon remove this unwanted investigator, but it would come at a terrible cost.
Special Prosecutor
Richard Nixon had no real need to dismiss Attorney General Richard Kleindienst when H. R. Haldeman, John Ehrlichman, and John Dean resigned at the end of April 1973. In fact, it was a disastrous move. Nixon wished to name Defense Secretary Elliot Richardson as the new attorney general. Richardson’s appointment had to be approved by the Democrat-controlled Senate. They put a condition on the approval. Richardson must appoint an independent special prosecutor. This officer’s sole job would be to prosecute Watergate-related crimes. When Richardson agreed, the Senate confirmed him.
Richardson found such an officer. Archibald Cox was not someone Nixon would have chosen. Cox had served in the Justice Department under Presidents Kennedy and Johnson. Henry Kissinger commented that Cox had been “frantically anti-Nixon all the time I’d known him.”
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Even Cox was surprised by the appointment. He questioned Richardson how he got Nixon to agree to the appointment. “I never asked him,” Richardson responded.
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Cox started his job assured of several powers. He could investigate other election-related frauds as well as the Watergate break-in. He could speak publicly whenever he wished and did not have to report to the attorney general. He had the power to grant immunity to witnesses. Only the attorney general could fire him and only for “extraordinary improprieties.”
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The special prosecutor did not take long to show his independence. When the White House taping system became known in July, Cox immediately requested several tapes. Nixon cited executive privilege and refused to hand them over. Cox went to Judge John Sirica for a subpoena to receive the tapes. Nixon again refused to obey the subpoena. Cox even called out the twenty-three-member grand jury that looked into Watergate crimes. Every grand juror requested the tapes. Nixon would not budge.
Tapes Delay
Spring and summer of 1973 were not kind to Richard Nixon. In May, Judge Matthew Byrne threw out the case against Daniel Ellsberg. He pointed to the break-in of Dr. Fielding’s office. He also revealed that Ehrlichman had approached him during the trial with an offer to become FBI director. Byrne cited these moves as examples of government interference in the case. A grand jury indicted Ehrlichman, Young, and others for the Fielding break-in.
There were other mounting problems. Several large corporations admitted to making illegal contributions to the Committee to Re-Elect the President. Owners claimed the White House pressured them to make the contributions. The General Services Administration (GSA) told that $17 million in government money had gone to refurbish private Nixon homes in San Clemente, California, and Key Biscayne, Florida. A memo addressed to the Senate Watergate Committee disclosed that a company called International Telephone and Telegraph (ITT) had made payments to the Republican Committee. In return for the money, the Justice Department offered to drop a lawsuit against the giant communications company.
The tapes remained Nixon’s most important problem. At first he claimed he needed to protect the confidentiality of his conversations. Then he claimed the nation’s security was at stake. Later he said the tapes would prove him innocent of any wrongdoing.
Critics did not believe these explanations. The need to uncover criminal activity was more important than a right to a private conversation. Nixon gave no proof of a threat to national security.
“There must be real dirt on the tapes. Otherwise he wouldn’t be fighting so hard,” Kissinger commented. Someone asked him if Nixon might be worried about preserving the powers of the presidency. “He cares about the office,” Kissinger said, “but he cares about Richard Nixon more.”
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Judge Sirica did not accept Nixon’s argument that the tapes proved his innocence. “If Nixon himself were not involved, why would he stand on such an abstract principle as executive privilege when by voluntarily turning over the tapes he could prove himself innocent?” he commented later.
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On August 29, Sirica ordered Nixon to turn over the tapes for Sirica’s private inspection. Nixon immediately appealed the judge’s decision. The United States Court of Appeals upheld Sirica.
Nixon would have to turn over something. He hoped it would not be the tapes themselves, which could be used as evidence in court. They could prove his guilt and that of his staff members. Instead, he sought a compromise. He would turn over written transcripts of the requested tapes. A neutral third party could listen to the tapes and verify them against the manuscripts.
Mississippi Senator John Stennis was Nixon’s choice to be that third party. Other senators acknowledged Stennis’s honesty. Still, Stennis was a Nixon ally who could be persuaded that the Watergate operation might be justified under national security. He also had poor hearing. Most important, a transcript verified by him could not be admitted as evidence. “[Nixon’s] proposal was absolutely unacceptable to me,” Cox said.
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Nixon aide Alexander Haig told Cox that the Stennis proposal was Nixon’s final offer. Furthermore, the president would turn over no new materials to the grand jury, and Cox could not subpoena any new materials.
Triumph and Disaster
The religious holiday of Yom Kippur should have been a day of quiet reflection for Israel’s Jews. Instead, October 6, 1973, was a day of war. Egyptians from the southwest and Syrians from the north invaded Israeli territory. Some people feared that hostile Arab neighbors would overrun Israel. Others worried that this conflict might lead to a world war between the United States and the Soviet Union.
Nixon and Kissinger helped control the crisis. The United States airlifted supplies to Israel. Those goods helped Israel’s army drive the Arab states back to the previous borders in a matter of days. Meanwhile, Kissinger flew to Moscow and convinced the Soviets to stay out of the battle. It was the Nixon administration’s finest hour.
Considerably worse hours were passing at home, however. By mid-October, Richard Nixon was determined that Archibald Cox must go. Dismissing him was Elliot Richardson’s job.
Haig called Richardson and told him that the president wanted Cox fired. Richardson refused such an order from anyone except Nixon himself. He told Haig that Cox had done nothing improper. He resigned rather than fire Cox.
Next, Haig tried William Ruckelshaus. The deputy attorney general would not fire the special prosecutor either. Nixon fired Ruckelshaus before he could submit a resignation. The third person in line, Solicitor General Robert Bork, finally agreed to discharge Cox.
These dismissals took place on Saturday, October 20. That night Press Secretary Ron Ziegler announced the Richardson resignation and the firings. He added that the president had abolished the office of special prosecutor. Meanwhile, Haig ordered the FBI to seal off the offices of Cox, Richardson, and Ruckelshaus.
The action stunned the nation. It became known as the “Saturday Night Massacre.” Some feared for the safety of the government. If the president took such actions to stop an investigation against him, what would prevent him from attacking the Congress and courts? “A government of laws may be on the verge of becoming the government of one man,” Richardson commented.
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Illinois Republican Congressman John Anderson had a more accurate prediction. He said, “Impeachment resolutions are going to be raining down like hailstones.”
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According to the U.S. Constitution, even the president can be removed from office. Article II, Section 4 says the president “shall be removed from office on impeachment for, and conviction of, treason, bribery, or other high crimes and misdemeanors.”
The House of Representatives is able to impeach a president. This means the representatives believe there is enough evidence to remove him. If a majority of representatives vote against him, the president is impeached. Then the case goes to the Senate. A special committee presents evidence against the president. If two thirds of the senators vote for conviction, the president is out of office.
Some Congresspersons cringed at the word
impeachment
. They knew about the case of Andrew Johnson, a Democrat who became president after the Civil War. Johnson took over when Republican Abraham Lincoln was assassinated. The House impeached Johnson. He escaped Senate removal by one vote. Historians generally believe Johnson was tried unfairly. Republicans wanted to oust him for purely political reasons. Congress members might have been willing to impeach Richard Nixon. Yet they would demand proof of his misdeeds.
Congress met the Tuesday following the Saturday Night Massacre. Immediately, twenty-one representatives offered resolutions of impeachment. Debate went on for forty-five minutes before anyone spoke in Nixon’s favor. Republicans were sending Nixon a message. If he did not turn over the tapes, they would desert him.
Missing Tapes and Gaps
Nixon miscalculated when he ordered Cox fired. He did not realize public reaction against him would be so fierce. In 1972
Time
named Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger “Men of the Year.” In late 1973 the news magazine printed the first editorial in its fifty years, calling for Nixon’s resignation. “Richard Nixon and the nation have passed a tragic point of no return,”
Time
commented. “The nightmare certainly must be ended.”
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Richard Nixon had no intention of resigning. However, he knew he had to make some compromises to keep his office. Nixon had hoped to abolish the special prosecutor and put the attorney general in charge of Watergate prosecution. That way, he could have more control over the investigation. He could prevent investigators from seeking his tapes.
Now, however, it was clear that like it or not, he would have to appoint another special prosecutor. Leon Jaworski, a highly respected Texas attorney, was his choice. This time, however, neither Nixon nor the attorney general could remove the special prosecutor. Removal required the agreement of Republican and Democratic leaders of the Senate and House, plus the leaders of the Senate and House judiciary committees.