The Watergate Scandal in United States History (6 page)

Newly appointed Special Prosecutor Archibald Cox wanted to postpone the hearings. If guilty parties testified in the Watergate hearings, it might be more difficult to convict them in court. Ervin replied that it was:

more important for the committee to inform Congress and the American people what high officials entrusted by the President with enormous governmental and political power had done than it was for the courts to send a few people to jail.
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Nixon tried to use the power of executive privilege to limit the committee’s findings. The president was the head of the nation’s executive branch, and the executive branch was equal to Congress, the legislative branch. Under executive privilege, Nixon claimed Congress could not make demands of the president or his staff. The president did not have to answer a congressional summons.

He offered a compromise. Staff members would testify, but not under oath or in person. Ervin snapped, “That is not executive privilege. That is executive poppycock.”
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Nixon finally permitted his staff to testify, although he refused to do so himself.

At first television networks rotated their coverage of the hearings. That way soap opera fans would not miss their favorite shows. Soon Americans forgot other programs. This real-life political soap opera was the most popular show of all.

Reporters and television cameras did not change the solemn mood of the hearings. Ervin set the tone in his opening statement. If the charges against the Watergate burglars were true, Ervin said, then the burglars were trying to steal “not the jewels, money, or other property of American citizens, but something more valuable—their most precious heritage, the right to vote in a free election.”
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Early Witnesses

More than three hundred spectators, including Daniel Ellsberg, crowded into the Senate caucus room on May 17, 1973. They heard leadoff witness Robert Odle say that he showed G. Gordon Liddy how to operate a shredding machine on the afternoon following the break-in.

The next day James McCord testified. Judge Sirica had told him that the length of his jail sentence would depend on how well he cooperated with the Watergate Committee. McCord more than happily talked. He claimed that John Mitchell, John Dean, and Jeb Magruder all approved the Watergate break-in early in 1972. He told how Jack Caulfield contacted him in January, offering clemency if McCord pleaded guilty and did not cooperate with prosecutors. He also said Caulfield had added that if McCord refused to plead guilty, the administration would “have to take steps to defend itself.”
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Former CRP Treasurer Hugh Sloan also testified. He told of massive quantities of money that passed from the CRP to unknown destinations. He said he had resigned from the CRP rather than lie in court about the amount of money being handled. An admiring Ervin said of Sloan, “an honest man is the noblest work of God.”
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Jeb Magruder had not always been an honest man. He admitted to the Senate Committee that he had committed perjury at the Watergate trial. He also told many other things. Magruder said the Watergate break-in was only one of many White House wrongdoings. He described the activities of Haldeman, Ehrlichman, Dean, Mitchell, Colson, and several others. However, he stopped short of implicating President Richard M. Nixon. John W. Dean would handle that task.

Enemies

Ordinarily, summit conferences push all other news to the side. Journalists and the public wait anxiously for the results of talks between leaders of the most powerful nations. These decisions, after all, could affect the entire world.

Leonid Brezhnev, premier of the Soviet Union, visited the United States in 1973. The conference delayed the Watergate hearings for a week. Many Americans objected. To them, the words of a world leader were less interesting than those of a former White House lawyer.

John Dean’s lawyers had bargained with the Watergate Committee for weeks. He received limited immunity. Dean testified for a week. His opening statement alone was 245 pages long.

Dean focused on four conversations he had with Nixon. He told the senators how Nixon congratulated him last September 15 for stopping the investigation. He mentioned a March 13 conversation regarding hush money for the burglars. He talked about the “cancer on the presidency” conversation with Nixon on March 21. Dean also described the April 15 discussion. That was the day Nixon appeared to ask leading questions, then whispered something from the corner of the room.

Dean also revealed a shocking secret. The White House had kept a list of people and organizations considered hostile to Nixon’s administration. More than two hundred names appeared on this “enemies list.”

It covered business executives, labor leaders, most major Democrats, newspaper publishers and columnists, and even entertainers. Liberal Senator Edward Kennedy landed on the list. So did conservative former Alabama Governor George Wallace. Paul Newman, an actor who usually supported Democrats, made the enemies list. So did Joe Namath, a football player of no known political convictions. The “enemies” had nothing in common except that for some reason they displeased Richard Nixon. Dean said the White House never followed through on plans to take action against them.

Dean’s charges, if true, could lead to impeachment. Richard Nixon could be forced from office. Yet there was no proof. Dean seemed to possess an amazing memory. He was calm and composed. Still, it was only the word of an unhappy former employee against the president of the United States. Many, if not most, Americans needed more proof than that.

Tales of the Tapes

Those who wanted confirmation of Dean’s testimony would not get it from former Campaign Director John Mitchell. Time and time again he denied approving the Gemstone plan that included the break-in. He said that when he heard of the break-in, he did not tell Nixon. At that time, to Mitchell, Nixon’s re-election was more important than anything else. He did not want to disturb his friend and boss with bad news before the election.

Former Haldeman aide Alexander Butterfield testified on July 16. His testimony would be, perhaps, the most important in the hearings. Butterfield told the senators that Nixon’s White House conversations had been tape recorded since 1971.

Stunned silence greeted Butterfield’s testimony. Then someone simply said, “Wow!”
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Now there was a way to determine the truth. The tapes could show that Richard Nixon was telling the truth and John Dean was lying. Of course, they could also tell a completely different story.

It was a story Richard Nixon apparently did not want told. He refused to hand over the tapes after the Senate Committee subpoenaed them. Nixon’s new chief of staff, Alexander Haig, immediately shut down the taping system. He and other advisors debated whether to destroy the tapes.

Nixon decided to keep them. After all, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson had recorded others’ conversations without their knowledge. Nixon considered the tapes his private property. No one could force him to yield them.

“What a Liar!”

After Butterfield, Nixon’s two former top advisors spoke. John Ehrlichman snarled at the questioning senators. He said Dean had lied about Ehrlichman telling him to “deep six” the documents. He never promised Colson that executive clemency would be offered to E. Howard Hunt. By the time he had finished, Ehrlichman had contradicted the testimony of eighteen previous witnesses. Senator Daniel Inouye could take no more. He leaned back in his chair and muttered, “What a liar!”
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His microphone was on, and viewers all over the country heard his opinion.

The often-surly Haldeman spoke in the opposite tone. The one-time tiger of Nixon’s staff turned into a pussycat. He quietly, meekly, and politely evaded the senators’ questions. He could not recall when he first heard about Watergate. He could not remember aide Gordon Strachan’s warning of a Liddy bugging scheme. He had no idea how three hundred thousand dollars could have been removed from a cash fund he controlled.

He did remember Nixon’s tapes. In fact, he said that the tapes proved his former boss innocent. How did he know? He had borrowed two key tapes and listened to them at home.

Ervin erupted when he heard this statement. “The United States Senate can’t hear these tapes and you, a private citizen, can?” he asked.
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Haldeman’s statement only steeled the senators’ determination to hear what evidence the tapes could give.

The Watergate Committee was adjourned from early August until late September. By that time, public interest in the committee testimony had waned.

August 1973 was not a dead time, however. A new, entirely different scandal was on the horizon.

Chapter 6

“I WILL NOT RESIGN IF INDICTED!”

Richard M. Nixon’s popularity had skidded throughout the Senate Watergate hearings. Even so, few Americans wanted to see him removed from office. Some did not believe there was enough evidence to remove him. Others felt the Watergate investigation was an attack by bitter Democrats upset at having lost the last election. Others feared the vice president. If Nixon were gone, Spiro T. Agnew would become president.

Spiro Who?

Spiro Agnew’s rise in politics was not swift; it was meteoric. In 1962 the forty-four-year-old Agnew was executive of Maryland’s Baltimore County. Four years later he became the state’s governor. In 1968, Richard Nixon chose him as vice-presidential running mate. From political unknown less than seven years earlier, Agnew could become the second-highest ranking official in the United States.

Republicans and Democrats alike were surprised about this unfamiliar candidate. “Spiro who?” many people asked.
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Why did Nixon choose Agnew, when many other, better-known Republicans were available?

Nixon had his reasons. Agnew came from Maryland, a state the Republicans had a chance of winning. He had a reputation as a moderate or liberal governor, in contrast to the conservative Nixon image. Perhaps most important, Nixon sought a little-known running mate who would not distract attention from himself.

From the beginning, Agnew appeared to be a disaster. His thoughtless comments upset many ethnic groups. In one speech he said, “If you’ve seen one slum, you’ve seen them all.”
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To some, that remark showed he did not care about poor people. At one rally, a heckler raised a banner that read, “Apologize now, Spiro, it will save time later.”
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When Nixon became president, Agnew went on the attack. He criticized antiwar demonstrators, intellectuals, and anyone else who opposed the Nixon administration. These attacks made him a favorite target of Nixon enemies. At the same time, the attacks gained him support among middle-aged, middle-class Americans who Nixon called the “silent majority.”

Few Nixon administration officials avoided involvement in the Watergate scandals. Agnew was one and Henry Kissinger was another. Nixon consulted with foreign affairs advisor Kissinger almost daily about China, the Soviet Union, and the Middle East. He all but ignored his vice president. “The Nixon-Agnew relationship was virtually nonexistent,” noted conservative commentator Howard Phillips.
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Agnew stayed free of the Watergate intrigue. As it turned out, he had a scandal of his own.

Nolo Contendere

Stories began circulating in the summer of 1973 that Agnew had been accepting bribes for years. Workers under him had been forced to kick back, or give him, part of their salaries when he served in Maryland. Justice Department officials told Nixon of the Agnew crimes in June. Attorney General Elliot Richardson said he had never seen a stronger case against anyone. Agnew could be indicted on forty or more counts, or specific charges.

The
Wall Street Journal
ran the story on August 7. It claimed Agnew was guilty of extortion, bribery, and tax evasion. He had been taking bribes even while serving as vice president. Agnew went to Nixon for help. Nixon, however, had his own problems. He was not about to help a dead duck vice president.

By mid-September, Agnew appeared doomed. He wanted another meeting with President Nixon. Chief of Staff Alexander Haig told him that if he were indicted, Nixon would call for his resignation.

Agnew decided to try and cut a deal. He would plead guilty to a single tax evasion charge, but no felony charges. The Justice Department was ready to proceed with the case. Prosecutors had a certain victory. “We’ve got the evidence. We’ve got it cold,” Assistant Attorney General Henry Petersen claimed.
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These remarks infuriated the vice president. He then tried to take his case to the public. He proclaimed his innocence before the National Federation of Republican Women. “I will not resign if indicted!” he shouted. “I will not resign if indicted!”
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Before long, though, reality set in. He was obviously guilty. If he went to trial, he could face prison time. If found guilty, he would lose the hefty vice- presidential pension he had earned.