The United Nations Security Council and War:The Evolution of Thought and Practice since 1945 (59 page)

Soon after its return to New York, UNCIP issued its own three-part resolution reflecting the ‘material change’ in the situation on the ground in J&K. The first part of the UNCIP resolution of 13 August 1948 urged both India and Pakistan ‘separately and simultaneously’ to issue a ceasefire order to apply to all forces under their control and forces in J&K at the earliest possible moment. Military observers were to be appointed to ‘supervise the observance of the ceasefire order’.
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The second part called for a truce, and urged Pakistan to withdraw its troops from J&K as their presence constituted ‘a material change in the situation’. The resolution also called for the withdrawal of tribesmen and Pakistani nationals. Following the Pakistani withdrawal, India was to agree to remove the bulk of its forces from J&K in stages to a minimum level. The third part of the UNCIP resolution affirmed that upon acceptance of the truce agreement, both governments were to agree to enter into consultations for a plebiscite.
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In marked contrast to Security Council Resolution 47, the UNCIP resolution came as a relief to India. It clearly focused on a ceasefire based on the withdrawal of regular Pakistani troops and raiders from J&K, to be followed by the reduction of Indian forces. The plebiscite arrangements were to come after both sides had accepted the truce arrangements. Furthermore, by clearly stating that a minimum number of Indian troops were to remain to maintain law and order, the UNCIP resolution appeared implicitly to recognize J&K’s accession to India. Not surprisingly, after seeking clarifications on a few issues, India accepted this resolution on 25 August 1948. Pakistan, on the other hand, rejected it on the basis that UNCIP ought to have been guided by the provisions of Security Council Resolution 47, and to have dealt with plebiscite arrangements.
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On 5 January 1949, UNCIP published its second resolution. Most importantly, it noted the acceptance of both India and Pakistan of a ‘free and impartial’ plebiscite in J&K to decide its accession to either India or Pakistan. This was to be held when the ceasefire and truce arrangements had been carried out, and arrangements for the plebiscite completed, as outlined in the first UNCIP resolution. It also reaffirmed the UN Secretary General’s nomination of a Plebiscite Administrator.
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In effect, these resolutions resulted in a diplomatic stalemate between India and Pakistan. Meanwhile the fighting in J&K continued for several more months, until 1 January 1949, when each side was exhausted and convinced that it could no longer make significant territorial gains against the other. India took the position that as the UN-mandated withdrawal of Pakistani troops and raiders had not taken place, it would not reduce its own troops in J&K. Consequently, the UN-supervised plebiscite was also not held. Both countries bolstered their case on the other side’s inaction. India made it clear that it would only withdraw and reduce its forces following Pakistan’s withdrawal of forces and raiders from J&K, as requested by the Security Council. Pakistan countered by stating that its obligation on troop withdrawal was not unilateral, but part of a staged withdrawal leading to the demilitarization of J&K. It also stated that the basis of the Kashmir dispute was the ability of the people of J&K to exercise their right to self-determination,
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and that a range of Security Council Resolutions in 1948 and 1949 had called for such a free and impartial UN-supervised plebiscite. Countering this argument, India responded that the conduct of the plebiscite was dependent, in the first instance, upon the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from J&K.

Amidst these diplomatic exchanges in the summer of 1948, the Indian army made further gains by retaking the strategic town of Rajauri in Jammu. This was followed by Pakistani forces launching a thrust towards the Kashmir valley from the mountainous area of Gilgit and Skardu, to be repulsed by Indian forces at the Zojila Pass. In November 1948, Indian forces captured the Ladakh towns of Dras and Kargil. By the end of 1948 the fighting reached an impasse, leaving India controlling the Kashmir valley and parts of Jammu and Ladakh, and Pakistan controlling the remainder of Jammu bordering Pakistani Punjab, the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), and parts of Ladakh (Skardu), and Gilgit and Baltistan (Northern Areas).
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The supplementary plebiscite proposals of UNCIP of 11 and 23 December 1948 readily provided the basis for the India-Pakistan ceasefire, which took effect a minute before midnight on 1 January 1949.

Following the conclusion of the ceasefire, UNCIP invited the military representatives of the Indian and Pakistani governments on 2 July 1949 to a military conference in Karachi, in order to establish the CFL in princely J&K. The resulting agreement ‘between the Military Representatives of India and Pakistan regarding the establishment of a ceasefire line in the State of Jammu & Kashmir’ was signed on 27 July 1949 by Indian Lt. General S.M. Shrinagesh, Major-General J. Cawthorn for the Government of Pakistan, and Hernando Samper and M.Delvoie for UNCIP. The CFL, demarcated in detail on the basis of factual positions on the ground on 27 July, was to be drawn on a one-inch map and verified mutually on the ground by local commanders on each side, with the assistance of UN military observers.
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However, in view of the absence of troops beyond northern grid reference NJ 9842, the CFL Agreement left open to interpretation the phrase that the CFL would run ‘thence north to the glaciers’. This was to lead to the Siachen conflict between the two countries beginning in the early 1980s.

Following the ceasefire agreement between India and Pakistan, subsequent Security Council resolutions focused on the demilitarization of princely J&K as the key step towards a plebiscite, but without success. On 22 December 1949, General A.G.L. McNaughton, the Canadian President of the Security Council, proposed a programme of ‘progressive demilitarization’
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based on the reduction of armed forces on either side of the CFL by withdrawal, disbandment, and disarmament. The aim was to reduce armed personnel in J&K to a minimum compatible with the maintenance of law and order. The programme was to include the withdrawal of those regular forces from both countries not required for purposes of security or law and order; and the disbanding and disarming of local forces on the Indian- and Pakistani-controlled sides of the CFL, including the Pakistan-supported ‘Azad (Free) Kashmir’ forces. Following this demilitarization, the Plebiscite Administrator was to proceed with the conduct of the plebiscite.

Resolution 80 of 14 March 1950 urged the Indian and Pakistani governments to make immediate arrangements to prepare and execute within five months the stage-by-stage demilitarization process on the basis of the McNaughton proposals. It also appointed a UN Representative to supervise the demilitarization and arrange for the assumption of the Plebiscite Administrator. The UN Representative, Sir Owen Dixon, an eminent Australian lawyer, tried to implement this plan and narrow the differences between the two countries over the ‘procedure for and extent of demilitarization’
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but failed. A year later, all the Security Council could do was to recognize the lack of agreement between the two countries and appoint a successor to Owen.
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The new UN Representative, Frank P. Graham, an American, proposed a twelve-point demilitarization plan on 4 September 1952. However, there was disagreement over the specific number of forces to remain on each side of the CFL at the end of the period of demilitarization-between 3,000 and 6,000 on the Pakistani side and 12,000–18,000 on the Indian side.
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The subsequent proposals on demilitarization by Swedish diplomat Gunnar Jarring also came to naught.

At the same time, India began to harden its position on the UN-supervised plebiscite, which it had committed itself to following the withdrawal of Pakistani forces from the Pakistani side of the CFL. With disenchantment at the nature of the UN’s interventions in J&K and concern about Pakistan’s growing military relationship with the West, Nehru began to distance himself from the plebiscite in the early 1950s. This was accentuated by the loss of political support to India from the nationalist Kashmiri leader, Sheikh Abdullah.
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These factors made it difficult for India to be confident of a favourable result in the plebiscite. By late 1954 India had lost all interest in holding a plebiscite in princely J&K.
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Nevertheless, for much of the 1950s the Security Council regularly passed resolutions on the ‘India-Pakistan Question’, calling for demilitarization and the plebiscite in the entire state of J&K. Finally, realizing that neither India nor Pakistan was going to accept these resolutions, and with the possibility of a veto emanating from their new-found allies and supporters – the US in the case of Pakistan and the Soviet Union in the case of India – the Council gave up its attempts to intervene directly in the Kashmir dispute. In 1962, the Soviet Union voted against a draft resolution referring to the plebiscite in J&K for the first time.
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Resolution 126 of 2 December 1957 was, therefore, the last Security Council resolution directly on the Kashmir dispute.

India’s humiliating defeat against China in October-November 1962, combined with Nehru’s death in May 1964, provided Pakistan with an opportunity to instigate a rebellion in Indian-controlled J&K. It was emboldened by the perceived lack of a vigorous Indian response in the skirmishes between the two countries in the disputed western region of the Rann of Kutch in spring 1965, with UK mediation leading India to accept international arbitration on its future status. Pakistan appeared to believe that as with the Rann of Kutch mediation, a mini-war in Kashmir would result in international mediation which would (in view of Pakistan’s belief in the strength of its case) rule in its favour. In early August, in Operation Gilbratar, Pakistan began to infiltrate some 5,000–10,000 armed ‘irregulars’ and army personnel in disguise into Indian-controlled J&K to bring about a mass uprising against Indian rule. In this context, the UN Chief Military Observer, General Nimmo, noted that ‘the series of violations that began on August 5 were to a considerable extent in subsequent days in the form of armed men, generally not in uniform, crossing the CFL from the Pakistan side for the purpose of armed action on the Indian side’.
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The infiltration was followed on 1 September by an attack on Indian territory in the Chhamb area of Jammu. The Indian response largely involved military operations in Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and, from 6 September, escalation to a full-scale Indian offensive towards Lahore. After two weeks of bitter land and air warfare, the Indian and Pakistani armed forces reached a military stalemate.
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Amidst considerable US and UK pressure, including an arms embargo by both on India and Pakistan, both India and Pakistan agreed to abide by the Security Council resolutions calling for a ceasefire.
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The UN-mandated ceasefire that took effect on 23 September 1965 ended the Second Kashmir War.

In view of the fighting taking place across the CFL, UN Secretary-General Thant submitted a report to the Security Council on 3 September 1965. Referring to the ‘recent extensive disregard for the ceasefire agreement and the ceasefire line’, he stated that ‘there can be little doubt that the Kashmir problem has again become acute and is now dangerously serious.’ He also indicated that the Karachi Agreement had collapsed. As a result, Resolution 209, passed the following day, called upon both governments ‘to take forthwith all steps for an immediate ceasefire’.
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It also sought the full cooperation of the two governments with UNMOGIP in its task of ‘supervising the observance of the ceasefire’. Two days later, on 6 September, the Council adopted Resolution 210 calling on both parties ‘to cease hostility in the entire area of conflict immediately’ and ‘promptly withdraw all armed personnel to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965’.
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It also requested the Secretary-General ‘to exert every possible effort to give effect to the present resolution and to resolution 209 (1965), to take all measures possible to strengthen the United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan’.

Following Resolution 210, the Secretary-General visited India and Pakistan and met government leaders in both countries. His report to the Council on 16 September noted that both sides had expressed their desire for a cessation of hostilities, but that each side had posed conditions which made the acceptance of a ceasefire very difficult. Following the escalation of fighting beyond the CFL to the international border, Resolution 211 of 20 September ‘demanded that a ceasefire should take effect on Wednesday 22 September 1965 at 0700 hrs GMT’.
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This resolution also decided to consider ‘what steps could be taken to assist towards a settlement of the political problem underlying the present conflict’. Such a political settlement was to take place as soon as hostilities had ended and all armed personnel withdrawn to the positions held by them before 5 August 1965. This was the first, though indirect, reference to the Kashmir dispute in a Security Council resolution since the end of 1957. However, Resolution 211 contained no reference to earlier resolutions on Kashmir. On 22 September 1965 the Council expressed its satisfaction that the ceasefire demanded by Resolution 211 had been accepted by the two parties; and called upon them to ‘implement their adherence to the ceasefire call as rapidly as possible, and in any case not later than 2200 hrs GMT on 22 September 1965’.